At All Costs:The British Army on the Western Front 1916 Spencer Jones (Ed)

[Crunchy]

At All Costs:The British Army on the Western Front 1916, (Editor) Spencer Jones, Helion, Warwick, 2018, 517pp.

 

Following on from two splendid studies of the BEF in 1914 and 1915, Spencer Jones brings us another excellent volume of essays, this time concerning the British Army on the Western Front in 1916.  In it we have 20 first class contributions from mainly academic historians.  Given the Battle of the Somme was the only major operation conducted by the BEF in 1916, it is understandable that the bulk of the chapters are devoted to the planning, preparations for, and conduct of it. In the popular memory the Somme is largely defined by the enormous casualties and the perceived incompetence of the generals. This book takes a broader view to provide a more nuanced and balanced study that not only considers the failures, but also the successes, and the complexity of preparing for and conducting such a massive battle.

 

Throwing the net wide, Jones and his authors address a wide range of subjects from strategy, through command, intelligence, transportation, artillery, operations, doctrine, and officer training to post war remembrance. Most are concerned with the BEF save for Tim Gale's analysis of the French XX Corps attack on 1 July, Tony Cowan's  study of the effects of the battle on the German Army by the end of 1916, and two concluding chapters concerned with memorials, post war memoirs and memory. While Gale's and Cowan's chapters have some relevance, noting this volume is ostensibly about the British Army on the Western Front, the last two, dealing with the post war years, seem out of place in a book dealing with 1916, and one wonders why they have been included.

 

Stephen Badsey's overview of British war plans for 1916, complements John Spencer's essay on Sir William Robertson's contribution as CIGS to Britain's strategic focus, while Andrew Wiest presents an equitable evaluation of Sir Douglas Haig's command performance on the Somme. Discerning the enemy's intentions is often a difficult task, and Jim Beach highlights this with the intelligence available to the British and the extent to which the German Offensive at Verdun influenced their decision to fight on the Somme, coming down on the side of the late Elizabeth Greenhalgh. The importance of supply is not overlooked, and Christopher Phillips admirably addresses the transportation difficulties in supplying the enormous appetite of the formations at the front, the reasons for them, and the resulting changes wrought by Sir Eric Geddes in the aftermath of the battle. Two very good studies of trench raiding round out the period before 1 July.

 

Bill MacCormick charges that in employing their artillery at the Somme, the British failed to learn from their experience during 1915, providing detailed and ample evidence of the differences in approach taken between them and the French. While employing the rule of thumb of guns per yards of front and weight of shell to argue his case, which is a compelling one, it stands in stark contrast to Simon-Innes-Robbins's excellent command study of Sir Henry Horne (XV Corps) and Spencer Jones's equally fine chapter on XIII Corps's attack at Montauban. Both demonstrate not only the contribution of excellent planning and training to the success of these two Corps on 1 July, but also the successful employment of artillery and the considerable contribution it made in supporting the infantry, especially within XV Corps's sector.  They highlight that a great many factors contribute to success or failure, and with artillery it is not simply a matter of weight of shell and guns per yard, but also how it is used and the artillery tactics employed.

 

  In considering failure on the 1 July Stuart Mitchell's study of the 32nd Division's "Learning from Defeat" delivers more than the title suggests. Rather he undertakes a detailed consideration of pre-war command doctrine  and the way it shaped planning prior to the battle and decision making during the attacks, before looking at the extent to which the division analysed its failure. In examining the Australian and Canadian participation, Meleah Hampton, an up and coming young Australian historian, and Kenneth Radley eschew the nationalistic hyperbole normally associated with their countries' contribution to the war. Hampton's incisive chapter is a damning indictment of the planning and application of firepower by I ANZAC Corps during the push along Pozieres Ridge after the successful capture of the village by the 1st Australian Division. Similarly, Radley examines the disastrous Canadian attack on Regina Trench, the three investigations into the failure, and the lessons derived from them. Both reveal these Dominion forces had some way to go before achieving the status accorded to them later in the war.

 

Three fine chapters round out the British discussions on the battle: Philip Ventham's narrative on the development of early tank doctrine and training prior to their initial employment on 15 September; Timothy Halstead's study of the contribution of OTC's on the recruitment of junior officers, and Peter Hodgkinson's detailed analysis on the performance and rates of retention of British battalion commanders during the battle.

 

All are well written, quality essays, detailed in their research of primary sources, incisive in their analysis, and balanced in their judgements. Here we see well reasoned criticism beside positive evaluations of performance; of commanders not up to the demands of trench warfare alongside those who demonstrated sound ability and leadership; of the uncertainties, competing priorities, and differing opinions in planning operations; and of a new British Army flush with inexperienced commanders and troops that was adapting to the complexities and difficulties of overcoming a well armed, highly trained and strongly entrenched enemy. The Battle of the Somme unquestionably was a turning point in the development of the British Army, and these articles bear this out.

 

Rather than the shallow analysis, unrestrained criticism and demonisation of the generals through the distorted lenses crafted by the likes Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, Alan Clark, John Laffin, Leon Wolff et al, which present a deliberately misleading polemic, At All Costs: The British Army on the Western Front 1916 provides another deeply researched and well reasoned corrective. It treats the reader with respect, presenting cases from which they can draw their own conclusions about the Somme, and in particular the British Army that fought there.  It is hoped Dr Jones has a similar volume in the pipeline dealing with the BEF in 1917. Highly recommended.