Somme 1916: Success and Failure on the First Day of the Battle of the Somme.

[Crunchy]

Paul Kendall Somme 1916: Success and Failure on the First Day of the Battle of the Somme. Frontline Books, Barnsley, 2015. 442pp

 

Much has been written about the 1916 Battle of the Somme, and forty seven years ago Martin Middlebrook first devoted a volume to the horrendous 1 July 1916 with his classic The First Day on the Somme.  We now have another book devoted specifically to that day in Paul Kendall's Somme 1916: Success and Failure on the First Day of the Battle of the Somme. The advertising content on the inside of the dust cover claims 'the author sets out to highlight the failures and successes on that day, and evaluate those factors that caused some divisions to succeed in capturing their objectives whilst others failed. He also investigates the many myths and misconceptions surrounding the battle that have been propagated for the last 100 years.'  Unfortunately he is not entirely successful.

 

He succeeds in achieving the first aim, but falls short with the others. In reality this is a narrative of the attacks made all along the British line that day, rather than the analytical study it claims to be.  Commencing with six short chapters providing a brief background on the British Army and the planning and preparations for the battle, the bulk of the book is divided into six parts covering each Corps that attacked, commencing with the diversion at Gommecourt in the north, and then following the assaults south to XIII Corps on the right flank. Within each Corps we trace the divisions south, with a chapter devoted to each and broken down further into the brigade attacks. The final part considers the aftermath and an assessment of success and failure.

 

Admirably researched, this is a detailed but disjointed account of each brigade attack, and it suffers from repetition of both words and information that makes, at times, for an unsatisfactory read; it lacks the finesse of a more polished writer. Nor do the maps, facsimiles of each of the Corps sectors from the Official History, add much in following each battalion's fate, which is where the focus of much of the book lies. Moreover, in delving down to the platoon and individual level, laced with personal accounts, at times one loses the thread of each event. Some will relish this detail and the atmosphere Kendall vividly brings to the story by including so many personal reminiscences, but in this reviewer's opinion they are overdone, and distract from what the book purports to achieve.

 

Where Somme 1916: Success and Failure on the First Day of the Battle of the Somme really falls down is in the consideration of the planning and preparations for the battle, and in the assessments of the reasons for success and failure. They are cursory and shallow, and those with a good knowledge of the first day of the Somme will find nothing new here. Nor does he really address the myths he seeks to dispel. Kendall is fair in his comments, and probably too fair. He highlights the difficulties and problems associated with preparing for and mounting the attack, and eschews the shallow criticism and damnation of the generals one often sees in the more popular histories, and for this he is to be commended

 

In essence this is very much a detailed narrative aimed at the popular market. Consequently, we still await a good analytical study of why so much went wrong on this terrible day for the British Army, and the underlying factors that contributed to the few successes that were achieved.

[josquin]

As always, a sophisticated, perceptive and highly informative review of a book addressing a subject of the greatest moment.

As you state quite well, Middlebrook is a commanding act to follow when assessing narratives, and the definitive analyses

and assessments remain to be written.

Best regards,

Josquin

 

[Captain RHW]

The question I have seen few investigate is not what the British got wrong, but what the Germans got right. How via their listening system, their interrogation of prisoners and other intel they knew the details of the planned attack, how their defensive structures enabled them to survive the bombardment, and how their tactics and displacement etc enabled them to cut down the British so efficiently. 

 

Also, to what extent did the Germans at the time or since claim that the first day was one of their great victories? Did they realise at the time how much damage they’d inflicted? 

[Crunchy]

All good points Captain RHW.  A sound analytical study would cover both sides to assess the successes and failures.

 

 

[Captain RHW]

Cheers Crunchy.  In terms of 'popular history', I suspect spending any time on the German successes rather than British failures doesn't fit with the 'Lions and Donkeys' thesis that still knocks around.  The other points to consider include: 

 

- The Germans had a hardened field army by that stage, whereas many of the attacking British were still green;

- The German general staff were used to division - corps scale actions, whereas the British staff office had spent its life on brigade/regimental level exercises and was still feeling its way

- The ground that was more suitable for attacking was also more suitable for defending.  The chalk seam in Northern France was dug out by the Romans in the C4 and their mines still stand today (eg those below Pommery/Tattinger champagne houses that include scores of kilometers of perfectly preserved tunnels, even though the Romans were only intending to use them temporarily.)  Hence the Germans could dig artillery-proof shelters. 

[Crunchy]

I agree all those points would be addressed in any sound analysis Captain RHW. The reasons for failure and success are complex, and consideration of both sides of the wire are essential to come to a considered view. It is not simply the generals were Donkeys, and of course we have the considerable of advantage of hindsight and information not readily available to the BEF commanders at the time.

 

Regards

Chris

[Bernard_Lewis]

Well done, Crunchy! Excellent reviewing...

 

Bernard

[Crunchy]

Thank you for your kind words Josquin and Bernard. As always hope they are useful.

 

Warm regards

Chris

[David Filsell]

Can we add to the list that a lack of truly trained and experienced staff officers in the BEF unready for such a major action?

[Captain RHW]

16 hours ago, David Filsell said:

Can we add to the list that a lack of truly trained and experienced staff officers in the BEF unready for such a major action?

I certainly agree David and that forms part of the wider point I made above about the German Army being much more experienced in divisional / corps level operations than the hastily formed new British Army. 

 

I have seen conflicting opinions over the years about how much Verdun demanded the attack and whether it would have fallen (opening a gate to Paris) absent the Somme, or am I setting too many hares running by raising those qu’s? 

 

James 

[David Filsell]

Captain RHW

The time lines are interesting. Initial planning for the Somme certainly seems to be based on 'relief 'of Verdun. Haig had to rein in the French requirements for the level of  British involvement and then bring them in. Bill Philpot's book is good on this.

But the serious fighting at Verdun had just about ended by July 16. The German goose was overcooked.

However, I become more and more convinced that it was British artillery's lack of adequate guns - and perhaps expertise -   there was little moving artillery fire - what 'dun it in' .

The British failure to subdue/destroy the German front line positiions was as much a reason for the  day's failure as anything if not THE reason.  Not least of course British infantry doctrine certainly not prevent more adventurous infantry tactiics than line following line - which were employed in places. Equally British command and control was under-developed for so huge a battle. Bevertheless it will remain a long discussed topic (and anyway my real expertise is in 1st Ypres!!!) So what di I know.

As an interesting thought - had we broken through we would have almost certainly have lacked the logistical wherewithal to press on to Berlin. This is rarely if ever discussed but seen by some to be absolutely right. Food for thought anyway.

Best regards

David 

[Hyacinth1326]

I have always regarded Tim Travers' 'Killing Ground' as a good analysis of the Somme battles

[DigNap15]

Like many of us, I am always fascinated and depressed with the 1st day of the Somme.

What always amazes me is the reaction or lack of reaction by the British commanders to the huge losses.