An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour: Logistics and the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front 1914-1918

[Gunga Din]

Has anyone reviewed this book?

 

An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour: Logistics and the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front 1914-1918

 

 

It looks like a very welcome addition to an under researched area of the War.I just bought it and have yet to read it but would be interested in other people's thoughts.The few reviews on Amazon seem very positive. It covers the BEF and the IEF-A which I have a particular interest in so I am looking forward to it. I have also often wondered about the huge logistic challenges of the Railway Transportation system. The 1914 Star medal rolls reveal very significant numbers of Officers dedicated to as RTOs to this mammoth task and it promises to be a fascinating insight.....The inadequacies of the BEF's General Staff are often criticised and this volume seems to redress some of those criticisms. We shall see.

 

I have pasted the publisher's summary below. Sadly no Kindle edition yet.

 

GD

 

"An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour is not a comprehensive examination of British Expeditionary Force (BEF) logistics on the Western Front, nor indeed a short history. To achieve the former would involve several volumes and the latter would omit much fascinating detail. It does however bring a new and fresh perspective by analysing, in a series of engaging essays, the critical contribution of particular components of military and commercial logistics to the preparations and operations of the British and Empire Armies in the pre-war period and during the Great War on the Western Front, through the lens of specific elements and themes, each of which, cast penetrating light into dark corners of an important, yet mainly forgotten story.

 

An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour explains how pre-war strategic, economic, political and defence dynamics constrained military logistic resilience but influenced the plans to rely upon commercial assets to support military and naval operations, before examining the role of the commercial railways and mercantile marine in the planning, preparation and execution of Defence mobilization and movement in the United Kingdom during Transition To War in 1914. The role of British railways in playing a defining part in a critical moment of European history is explored in depth as are the technical processes and managerial interfaces that enabled them. The contribution of British commercial and business leaders and managers to enhancing the combat capability of the BEF is examined through the lens of the increasing industrialization of logistic support to operations. In particular, the influence of commercial practice in improving military logistic efficiency and effectiveness, whilst also subtly changing military culture is matched to the dynamics and frictions of employing commercial logistic advisers in the operational environment of the Western Front. Whilst, the exploits of the combat elements of the BEF in 1914 have been analysed in depth, the contribution of the logisticians who kept the BEF in the fight has effectively marched into the mists of time. An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour explores the success of the BEF’s Quartermaster-General, Wully Robertson, in utilizing the skill of his logistic planners and soldiers to deliver the agile operational logistic capability that was the salvation of the BEF in 1914.

 

Also examined, is the long forgotten but extraordinary logistic feat of deploying Indian Expeditionary Force A to France, through the mobilization and transportation of its soldiers across deserts and oceans before its complex logistic integration to the BEF in France.

 

The solutions to the challenges in executing these operations by military and civilian logisticians from Britain, France and India, offer unusual insight into Coalition co-operation from three culturally diverse countries. Rarely studied, logistic planning, resources and execution played a crucial role in the preparations for the Battle of the Somme. These important aspects are analysed to highlight a developing capability, the military 'learning curve' of which, is of at least equal significance to those in the operational and tactical environments. The influence of the BEF’s Wheeled Motor Transport (WMT) component upon the operational art on the Western Front is reviewed, including its impact upon the deployment and employment of armour, infantry, artillery and aviation. These were all affected by the expanding use of WMT, creating a requirement to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Logistics were fundamental to the use of tanks in the Great War, an aspect comprehensively examined, to assess how transportation in particular, constrained the development of operational deployments.

 

An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour also analyses how, in 1918, the BEF’s logisticians were able to generate the capability to sustain All-Arms mobile three dimensional combat operations in a chemical warfare environment, whilst maintaining the momentum of the advance, having focused mainly upon supporting siege warfare for the previous four years. The corporate memory of the commercial aspect is even more faded than the military one but it was an essential component of the British and Empire endeavours on the Western Front and is lucidly exposed. The combined military and commercial story has many facets: innovative people, constant training, emerging technology, developing doctrine, fresh ideas, new equipment, maturing experience, complex planning, increasing mechanization and relentless industry.

 

An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour draws these threads from the bobbins to weave a colourful pattern of achievement, whilst illustrating how logistics evolved to overcome complex challenges and in doing so, transformed operations, creating a Great War legacy that links to defence logistics in the 21st Century, particularly in the expanding arena of contractor support to operations. Logistics however, do not swim alone in the military pond. At the operational level, the role of logistics is to develop, sustain and regenerate combat power to ensure that the tempo and effectiveness of the operations maintain momentum. Equally, logistics places constraints on strategy and tactics. On the Western Front, the BEF’s enormous logistic capability was not an end in itself but a vital means to achieve the military aim, an observation as valid today as it was in 1918.

 

Great War military logistics, not generally perceived to be racy, has, for far too long, held its light behind a bushel, its practitioners, from General to Private, long gone and the experiences they had and lessons they learnt, lying in dusty volumes in archives and libraries. An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour brings their important work to life, whilst assessing the significant aspects and identifying relevant lessons for military logistics in the 21st Century."

Edited 4 November , 2018 by Gunga Din

[Neil Mackenzie]

To me the sheer effort and planning required to move just one Battalion of men, it's horses, wagons, equipment and supplies from A to B (whether by road or rail) has always seemed immense. It is something that is taken for granted - usually barely a a line in a War Diary and skimmed over by historians - so will be looking out for this.

 

 

[Gareth Davies]

I met Clem at the weekend and had a good chat with him.  He has spent a great deal of time and effort researching and writing and I think it is very fair to say that he is an expert in his field.  I am only a couple of chapters in but I am learning something from every single page I read.  Some non-military readers may not like the comparisons to modern logistic systems and terms but the depth and quantity of information should more than make up for that.

[Marilyne]

Being Log myself and considering the problems we have to face nowadays to get even a fraction of a fraction of all that on the road, reading about the logistics in the war always will amaze me. I've read Ian Malcolm Brown's book on British logistics on the Western Front and have Martin van Creveld's "Supplying War" on my desk at the office ... we are SO far off!!! 

 

Just to give an example: during my deployment, parcels from my sister from Belgium, over the Belgian military post took 6 to 8 WEEKS to reach me... because personal parcels are so not interesting and when a guy at one end of the supply chain decided to fall ill or just to forget your parcel in a corner, it'll just stay there (so long live the German feldpost ... but that's not the issue) ... and then compare that to the postal services deplyed during the Great War, where parcels and letters took a few days to reach the trenches and the guys read the newspapers of the day before... So I will certainly read this book too!!! 

 

Thanks for the tip!! 

M.

[Gunga Din]

Book arrived yesterday... first impressions are that this is a absolutely wonderful piece of research. Lots...and I mean lots of footnotes (always preferable to end notes). The footnotes are so copious that the frequently cover more of the page than the main text. 

 

Initial impressions are that this is one of the books of the year..... 

 

Helion again. High quality paper, Well bound hardback. Bibliography runs to 28 pages. 

 

GD

[Waggoner]

This sounds very interesting! There was a global funnel that channelled goods from New Zealand, South America, North America, etc. through to the soldier in the trenches. It would be nice to see a book that can knit all of this together. I will see if I can find a copy.

 

All the best,

 

Gary

[Captain RHW]

Looks really good, and raises the question of how the British managed such an efficient system. Were there cultural factors involved, in that Victorian men of duty were good at organising the Empire, and all those involved in the chain from the postman to the director quietly and diligently did their jobs? 

 

 

[healdav]

35 minutes ago, Captain RHW said:

Looks really good, and raises the question of how the British managed such an efficient system. Were there cultural factors involved, in that Victorian men of duty were good at organising the Empire, and all those involved in the chain from the postman to the director quietly and diligently did their jobs? 

 

 

I'm waiting for my copy to arrive, but one of the factors in the excellent logistics system was the effect of the Duke of Wellington, believe it or not.

H seems to have been one of the first to realise that a good and well organised system was a primary factor in his winning the Peninsular War and being able to advance through France as quickly as he did.

For example, the French simply stole what they wanted indiscriminately in Spain and France, but Wellington paid, and the penalty for men who pillaged was death (as show in the film Waterloo). So, the French peasants, despite exhortations, saw absolutely no reason to refuse good money from 'invaders' when their 'protectors' had simply stolen everything.

Likewise, he organised a proper distribution and transport system and treated those involved in it as being as important as the men fighting. The maxims he laid down were still being taught to me when I started in RN logistics in 1965!

By contrast, the Austrian army never moved more than 10 miles per day because if they went further the logistics couldn't be trusted not to get in a tangle, and no real officer and gentleman would dirty his hands organising the system. It was down to people who were not good enough to be real soldiers. Guess who lost big time.

[Ron Clifton]

Not just Wellington, but the Duke of Marlborough a century earlier had understood the value of good logistics. Paying the local inhabitants a fair price, and in gold, was one aspect: he also provided a fresh pair of shoes for all his troops as they reached Heidelberg on their march towards Blenheim.

 

I rarely buy new military books these days (I have run out of storage space) but I will certainly look out for this one.

 

Ron

[David Filsell]

The greatly missed Richard Holmes always considered that while military historians study battles,  good, really good, military historians study logistics.

[Captain RHW]

A few years ago I read the book The Prize, a history of oil. It went too far at times, but the central thesis of how crucial oil was to C20 warfare (and geopolitics full stop) was pretty sound. One wonders what the Germans might have achieved if they had put all their resources into capturing and securing the Caucus oil fields in 1941 (and used the resources wasted on their surface fleet on u boats, planes and tanks); the effect of losing Atlantic Conveyer in 1982; operation Michael running out of steam etc. And on the other hand the incredible resource of the red ball express from Normandy - Berlin

[RobertBr]

Ron beat me to mentioning the Duke of Marlborough. I was at Blenheim Palace last week and revisited the tapestry of the "Marlborough Wagon". A simple two wheeled cart pulled by two horses in line ahead, it was a masterpiece of design which allowed the allied armies to move there supplies. The Palaces' audio tour stated that its design was used well into the 19th Century.

 

The book is going on my reading list.

 

Bob

[Gunga Din]

The proportion of the British Army devoted to logistical functions (ASC, AOC and from 1917 the Labour Corps) grew from 3% in 1914 to 20% in 1918*. While this might not surprise most authors, the fact that one in five men were in the logistic tail is lost in most histories.  The 'Unappreciated' part of the book's title seems quite apposite. 

 

One thing I think is a big mistake in the book is the extremely heavy use of military abbreviations and mnemonics. They might have been better relegated to footnotes which would make the book more accessible to the layperson. Some terms are repeated in full and with the abbreviation viz "Order of Battle (ORBAT)" again and again....and again. Some are repeated within a few lines (see page 230). Most readers will get it first time. The proof reading is not particularly good in this aspect.

 

GD

Edited 5 November , 2018 by Gunga Din

[Steven Broomfield]

9 hours ago, Gunga Din said:

The proof reading is not particularly good in this aspect.

 

GD

 

If I were critical of helion, I'd say proof-reading is one of their shortcomings. The other is the Index: often these are rather poor in Helion publications.

[Captain RHW]

Sadly proof reading and indexing are two things many (not all) publishers have cut back on as it involves cost. Same with national newspapers, who have been slashing subeditors for years. Hence the Guardian being renamed the Grauniad ...

[healdav]

22 hours ago, Ron Clifton said:

Not just Wellington, but the Duke of Marlborough a century earlier had understood the value of good logistics. Paying the local inhabitants a fair price, and in gold, was one aspect: he also provided a fresh pair of shoes for all his troops as they reached Heidelberg on their march towards Blenheim.

 

I rarely buy new military books these days (I have run out of storage space) but I will certainly look out for this one.

 

Ron

You are correct, but Malborough wasn't quoted to us in the 1960s!

 

[healdav]

On 30/10/2018 at 10:12, Marilyne said:

 

 

Just to give an example: during my deployment, parcels from my sister from Belgium, over the Belgian military post took 6 to 8 WEEKS to reach me... because personal parcels are so not interesting and when a guy at one end of the supply chain decided to fall ill or just to forget your parcel in a corner, it'll just stay there (so long live the German feldpost ... but that's not the issue) ... and then compare that to the postal services deplyed during the Great War, where parcels and letters took a few days to reach the trenches and the guys read the newspapers of the day before... So I will certainly read this book too!!! 

 

Thanks for the tip!! 

M.

There is a German film about the Battle of the Bulge, and Pieper.

At one point some high ranking officer turns up to find out why he hasn't arrived at the Meuse seeing that the Americans were in complete disarray, and with no supplies.

Piper invites him to take coffee and cakes as they discuss the problem. Then Pieper points to the cake and say,s, "That is the reason why we are losing". Of course, the senior officer gapes. "That is a birthday cake that we captured with a truck load of post. It is fresh. If the Americans can fly birthday cakes across the Atlantic so that it gets fresh to the man, when they are in disarray, what do you think they can do when they are perfectly organised?"

[Marilyne]

3 hours ago, healdav said:

There is a German film about the Battle of the Bulge, and Pieper.

At one point some high ranking officer turns up to find out why he hasn't arrived at the Meuse seeing that the Americans were in complete disarray, and with no supplies.

Piper invites him to take coffee and cakes as they discuss the problem. Then Pieper points to the cake and say,s, "That is the reason why we are losing". Of course, the senior officer gapes. "That is a birthday cake that we captured with a truck load of post. It is fresh. If the Americans can fly birthday cakes across the Atlantic so that it gets fresh to the man, when they are in disarray, what do you think they can do when they are perfectly organised?"

 

interesting... and so true !

We Belgians are, in our operations, famous for our "débrouillardise"..; we repair a C-130 with a roll of tape and make things work SOMEHOW, sometimes without even knowing what we're doing... imagine if all of what some of our guys in ops do was actually part of an existing process...

 

And still I think we could learn a lot from the logistic processes of the two world wars.

other example: Overlord. The base at Arromanches... analyse ... look at the idea and the working... and then imagine having to do the same today... we'd be lost!

 

This being said... the book is on my Xmas wish list...

 

M.

[healdav]

20 hours ago, Marilyne said:

 

interesting... and so true !

We Belgians are, in our operations, famous for our "débrouillardise"..; we repair a C-130 with a roll of tape and make things work SOMEHOW, sometimes without even knowing what we're doing... imagine if all of what some of our guys in ops do was actually part of an existing process...

 

And still I think we could learn a lot from the logistic processes of the two world wars.

other example: Overlord. The base at Arromanches... analyse ... look at the idea and the working... and then imagine having to do the same today... we'd be lost!

 

This being said... the book is on my Xmas wish list...

 

M.

I would love to see a book on D-Day, and on, logistics. Maybe someone will take on what would be a mammoth task.

[Waggoner]

My copy finally arrived in the mail from the UK, despite Canada Post’s rotating strikes. Only a few chapters into it but first impressions - there is a lot of repetition and the use of modern British terminology is distracting. For some reason, the author has chosen to not use the term “Distribution Point (DP)”. Hopefully, things will improve!

 

All the best,

 

Gary

[Ron Clifton]

On 06/11/2018 at 07:16, Captain RHW said:

Sadly proof reading and indexing are two things many (not all) publishers have cut back on as it involves cost. Same with national newspapers, who have been slashing subeditors for years. Hence the Guardian being renamed the Grauniad ...

It's been known as the Grauniad for at least fifty years: it was current in my undergraduate days.

 

My copy of Clem Maginniss' book arrived yesterday and I look forward to wading through it in due course. My initial reactions were that nearly half of every page seems to be devoted to footnotes, which make it rather heavy going; A&Q doesn't stand for "Administration and Quartermaster"; and the French port used for many purposes isn't "le Harve". I also find that abbreviations, especially TLAs, are used in a fashion which is less accessible to the non-military reader.

 

All that said, I am fairly sure that careful reading will add greatly to my understanding of military logistics. Well done Mr (Colonel?) Maginniss.

 

Ron

[Waggoner]

I, too, am reading slowly through this book. Very interesting but heavy going! He is Lt. Col. by the way.

 

All the best,

 

Gary

[Gareth Davies]

Lt Col is the one rank that he doesn't hold (any more). In the ACF he is (but is in the process of giving up) a Colonel, in the Army Reserve he is a Major.

[Waggoner]

Interesting...the address in his email to me this week said Lt. Col.

 

All the best,

 

Gary

[Gareth Davies]

Oh.