First use of predicted artillery fire

[Crunchy]

I am seeking information on the first use of predicted artillery fire on the Western Front.  I have read that the first battle in which the complete fire plan used predicted fire was Cambrai in November 1917.  It seems the technique was developed prior to that, and I suspect there were cases of predicted fire for counter battery missions prior to Cambrai. Does anyone have any information as to when it was first used, together with the source for the information?

 

Chris

[Howard]

Beg, borrow or even buy a copy of Artillery's Astrologers by Peter Chasseaud.
ISBN 10: 0951208020 ISBN 13: 9780951208021

 

It covers the topic quite well along with the link to the need for accuate maps.

 

Howard

 

[Crunchy]

Thank you Howard. I greatly appreciate your help.

 

Regards

Chris

[DarrellDuthie]

I'm pretty sure the use of these techniques on a large scale was well before November 17. At Vimy Ridge in April 1917, for example, in addition to counter-battery operations making use of predictive techniques, the entire creeping barrage was a well-publicised example of firing by the map. I can't find a source for it offhand, but I had the idea that many techniques were being experimented with already in late 1916, and perhaps earlier (e.g. creeping barrage at the Somme). You might take a look at Andrew McNaughton, an artillery officer who was renown for making use of, and in some cases of inventing these predictive techniques for use in CBOs - see for instance:  https://www.jstor.org/stable/3009938?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

 

If you were interested I can PM you two smallish papers on McNaughton that might be helpful.

 

Best of luck,

Darrell

[ghch1555]

Hi Chris,

 

Whilst I cannot assit with an answer to your question, I note you are from Australia. You therefore may also be interested in another book titled  "Do Unto Others - Counter Bombardment in Australia's Military Campaigns" by Alan H Smith (Big Sky Publishing ISBN9780987057440).  Chapter 1 covers survey mapping and it technical development on the Western Front 1915-18 - the author references Peter Chasseaud's work (as referenced by Howard above on this thread).  Predicted fire is covered in that chapter.

 

I bought this book when I discovered my grandfather had transferred from AIF infantry to AIF Artillery following his time at Gallipoli - it was an essential reference thereafter as I continued to research his service in the AIF artillery through 1916 to 1918.

 

Regards

 

Stephen

[Crunchy]

Darrell and Stephen, 

 

Many thanks for your comments. They are greatly appreciated.

 

Darrell, I will PM you re the papers - it is very kind of you to offer to send them.

 

Regards

Chris

[Howard]

In his book, Chasseaud points out that the method of predicted fire (shooting of the map) was understood and practiced before 1914. What stopped its effective use in 1914-1915 was the poor quality of the maps, many were re-drawn from the truly awful French 1:80,000 series and it was not until the resurvey of part of the front just in time for Loos in September 1915 that things improved. Even early in the war, Battery Commanders were ordered to plot key positions and possible targets, they could do that before the guns arrived. Then only the “error of the moment” had to be added on the day of a shoot to allow for the “Meteo”, the weather.

 

Howard

[Gunga Din]

VII Corps attack on Gommecourt might fit the bill. Here is the fireplan:

There are pages of details target descriptions. The HAGs were centralised for counter-battery work. I don't have knowledge of the battle but the fireplan always struck me as incredibly detailed. Dozens of pages.  

 

Edit. Farndale covers VII Corps and Gommecourt on page 147. "The Counter-battery guns were pre-registered by aircraft with great accuracy and their task was destruction not neutralisation. Results were excellent"

 

You may also want to look at Brig Gen E W Alexander CRA 15th Div at Loos who allegedly pioneered the creeping barrage according to Farndale. It might provide some leads. 

 

Edit. Farndale is worth reading just for the Annexes on Sound Ranging in France 1914-918 and  the Development of Meteor in France 1914-1918 both of which outline some of the early technical factors making predictive fire extremely difficult for example wind speed and direction was not circulated on a daily basis until 12th April 1916...

 

GD

 

Edited 13 September , 2018 by Gunga Din

[Crunchy]

GD, 

 

Many thanks for this information.  It is very much appreciated. The maps are excellent indeed, and I will chase up the other references.

 

I think pre-registering with aircraft at Gommecourt would indicate this was a registration, ie observing the fall of shot and correcting it onto the target,  rather than predicted fire. 

 

Regards

Chris

[WiseMonkey]

On 13/09/2018 at 20:16, ghch1555 said:

 

 

I bought this book when I discovered my grandfather had transferred from AIF infantry to AIF Artillery following his time at Gallipoli - it was an essential reference thereafter as I continued to research his service in the AIF artillery through 1916 to 1918.

 

Stephen my great grand father was transfered from the Light Horse to Arty at the time of the AIF doubling size after Gallipoli. I'll have to track that book down. I vaguely remember seeing it at the AWM.

[Gunga Din]

On 9/14/2018 at 12:30 AM, Crunchy said:

GD, 

I think pre-registering with aircraft at Gommecourt would indicate this was a registration, ie observing the fall of shot and correcting it onto the target,  rather than predicted fire. 

Regards

Chris

 

I am sure you are right. I read this as using aircraft to pinpoint German batteries (on a map) that were not visible to the British on the ground. Farndale makes the point that the Germans position was on a reverse slope (and presumably invisible to FOOs on the ground). 

 

One wonders if guns could register on fixed points (not necessarily 'targets') and have these corrected/adjusted by observation from the air. Once these points were registered, would it then be possible to pinpoint intermediate targets through interpolation.  In simple terms if a target was equi-distant between point A and Point B, if these points were registered, simple maths might be able to hit the intended target without actually registering the target itself. Whatever the approach, the Germans record that the counter-battery fire was devastating. If the positions had been pre-registered would the Germans have not developed alternative positions?

 

The appendices in Farndale's book in the RA indicate that the necessary technology for predicted fire had not been fully developed by 1st July 1916 but he implies less technologically sophisticated methods were attempted prior to Cambrai 1917. Given GHQ's insistence that CRAs develop a counter-battery plan prior to the 1st July 1916 and gave CRAs a free rein on how to do this, the scale of operations and the likely variations in approach to this task might suggest it would be a happy hunting ground for some novel approaches; VII Corps and Gommecourt receives more attention from Farndale than mots other Corps in this sense..... Achieving 'surprise' after  5 days of relentless artillery barrages would be difficult and one might reasonably assume that the German artillery operated from a number of pre-prepared alternative positions. 

 

I would be surprised if there was nothing in the RA Institution on this subject. 

 

Maps and Artillery Boards was not published by the War Office until Dec 1916 according to the US Army Reprint, which might provide a useful 'not before' date. According to the text, "Notes on Contours' was in the process of production at the time, again suggesting the necessary knowhow was still in development in late 1916/early 1917. It is an interesting read and might provide the necessary technical context. 

[Gunga Din]

The Monstrous Anger of the Guns: The Development of British Artillery Tactics 1914-1918 page 111 onward is worth reading. Page 224 gets to the crux of the issue. 

 

pdfresizer.com-pdf-resize.pdf

 

 

 

[Howard]

9 minutes ago, Gunga Din said:

The Monstrous Anger of the Guns: The Development of British Artillery Tactics 1914-1918 page 111 onward is worth reading. Page 224 gets to the crux of the issue. 

 

 

British Artillery Tactics 1914-1918.pdf

Indeed, credit is given to the surveyors.

 

There are two aspects of this. First is the ability to hit point B whilst knowing the battery is at point A. To achieve that “off the map” assumes the surveying of both points is accurate, not forgetting that what is in the gunsight is not the target but some arbitrary aiming point whose position is determined by the Battery Commander (BC) using survey techniques. Second is finding the accurate positons of targets, this is where sound ranging, flash spotting, aerial spotting etc. was important. A good predicted shoot required both. The first was well understood in 1914 and regularly practiced, the determination of target positions and then plotting on accurate maps came a lot later. Sound ranging and flash spotting developed rapidly as did aerial spotting** and the re-survey of the front. Spotting a German battery was all well and good but if the determined position was on an old map and that map ref. passed to the BC who was also using an old map, accuracy will drop at least initially until fall of shot can be reported back. An artillery board with a crap map is good to put your tea on but not much use otherwise even if the BC knew how to use one.

 

The maps used by the British were the metre based Belgian sheet numbers that were extended across France then overprinted with a yard based grid that did not fit. They used yards because “someone” believed the artillery could not use metre based tables. It would have been simple to create metre based artillery tables but the myth persisted. The artillery knew all along how to shoot off known ranges and bearings, few thought to ask them before the maps were made. It was only in late 1917 that the decision was made to go over to the French Lambert projection and grid, a system far better than the Bonne projection shoe-horned into a yard based grid. The Bonne projection does not even preserve angles so for longer range shoots it is a poor choice of map. The war ended before the British had lambert maps but a few were produced.

 

One cannot separate the stunning achievement of the surveyors from the other aspects of better and better artillery accuracy.

 

Howard

 

**1914 was only 11 years after the Wright brothers!

[Gunga Din]

Relevant file is WO 95/1746 - CRA 9th Div. It probvides the detailed fireplan. No mention of predicted fire however if "The Monstrous Anger of the Guns" is correct, this is the first battle where it was tried by the British.

[Howard]

I am no artillery man, I can only go by what I read. I just found this section in Chasseaud's book. He uses the term map-shooting and predicted fire as the same. This mentions the French plan directeur, these were 1:20,000 maps of Lambert Projection and made to a high accuracy. He also points out the fact that the French did not see fit to tell the British of the existence of these maps until a long way into the war.

 

Howard

 

British Artillery and Survey on the Aisne.

At Mons, most of the artillery was in close support of the infantry. Indirect fire and map-shooting were first used by the British on a large scale at Le Cateau during the retreat, when II Corps stood to fight and administered a bloody nose to the German pursuit; many batteries, however, were still pushed forward. On 5th September and the days following, during the Battle of the Marne, the French generals de Langle de Cary, Foch and Sarrail made heavy use of indirect fire and map-shooting, sweeping and searching in depth. A German account of this period noted the French artillery superiority in the Nancy area, stressing the advantage to the French gunners of the well-surveyed pre-war artillery ranges of the Nancy garrison over which much of the fighting took place; assisted by an accurate, large scale plan directeur, from which they could measure range, bearing and angle of sight, the French gunners shot 'with a dismal precision.' The accurately fixed heavy guns of Nancy's outer ring of forts added their fire to that of the mobile batteries. By the end of the following year, survey had increased the accuracy of the map of the Western Front area to the extent that these firing conditions were extended to all parts of the front. Soon all points on the ground would be 'on the grid.' On 8th September, during the Battle of the Marne, the British 60-pdr. guns of 108th Heavy Battery (5th Division) came into action at Doue, due east of Paris and south of the Marne and Petit Morin, and fired by the 1:80,000 map to great effect, engaging and silencing a German battery near Jouarre and another to the east. On the same day, the artillery of the French VI Corps was directed from the air against the centre of Crown Prince Wilhelm's Fifth Army.

[petwes]

Mr Din mentions individual gun calibration which I believe was greatly assisted later in the war by the use of sound ranging techniques (by the British).  Another factor that has an influence on the accuracy of fire is the projectile and propellant.  The wide variability in the quality of shell particularly in 1916 must have created errors due to their erratic weight and dimension.  Likewise propellant; charges were frequently sorted by manufacturing lot to ensure consistency.  I note that charge temperature is often recorded in diaries along with the meteo, so this must also have been factored in to the daily corrections.

Peter

 

[Gunga Din]

2 hours ago, petwes said:

Mr Din mentions individual gun calibration which I believe was greatly assisted later in the war by the use of sound ranging techniques (by the British).  Another factor that has an influence on the accuracy of fire is the projectile and propellant.  The wide variability in the quality of shell particularly in 1916 must have created errors due to their erratic weight and dimension.  Likewise propellant; charges were frequently sorted by manufacturing lot to ensure consistency.  I note that charge temperature is often recorded in diaries along with the meteo, so this must also have been factored in to the daily corrections.

Peter

 

 

Barrel wear was the largest factor. In a Battery of, say, six guns, if one gun was off the production line (having replaced a gun that had mechanically failed), its ballistic qualities would be different from the guns that had been in the battery for (for example) 2 years. If, (for example) another gun had its barrel replaced six months previously, another would have different technical characteristics. This single factor alone would generate margins of error that were very large (and not tactically achieving the aim : missing the target) and not properly understood in Aug 1914. When compounded with variations in other factors such as ammunition propellant, human error (accuracy in gun-laying, calculations (reading a compass bearing), accuracy of compasses etc) the errors increase exponentially as the distance to target increases. Almost by definition, long range counter-battery fire (largely the catalysts for developing predicted fire) was the most susceptible to margins of error....Add to this the creeping understanding of other meteo factors it becomes a very complex multi-factored model. 

Edited 16 September , 2018 by Gunga Din

[WhiteStarLine]

Hi Chris,

The Report on Survey on Western Front [Part II Artillery Survey page 86] appears to support Cambrai with specific evidence of how it was done and a preamble of how it had evolved from 1915:  "The Battle of Cambrai (20th November, 1917) began a new era ... A complete surprise means, however, map shooting and no previous registration.  This in turn implies the most careful preparation for line and to a slightly less extent for position.  The survey preparations for this battle were, therefore, most thorough and included the insertion of a bearing picket sufficiently close to each battery to allow of easy reference.  Every battery, heavy or siege, which took part was visited by an officer of the Field Survey Battalion".

 

So if the surveyors think this was the first occurrence, as you say, other claims would need rigorous citation.

[Crunchy]

Many thanks to all for your contributions.

 

GD I very much appreciate the link to the thesis on British artillery tactics.

 

Regads

Chris 

[ianjonesncl]

On ‎16‎/‎09‎/‎2018 at 14:31, Howard said:

 

On ‎16‎/‎09‎/‎2018 at 13:41, Gunga Din said:

One wonders if guns could register on fixed points (not necessarily 'targets') and have these corrected/adjusted by observation from the air. Once these points were registered, would it then be possible to pinpoint intermediate targets through interpolation.  In simple terms if a target was equi-distant between point A and Point B, if these points were registered, simple maths might be able to hit the intended target without actually registering the target itself.

 

 

Short answer - Yes. In more modern times, though still manual calculations, a target was recorded thereby providing a known point. Other targets firing data could be determined by giving a correction from this point. The accuracy obviously depends upon the accuracy of the correction. Fired may a mission using the technique.

[MikeMeech]

On ‎16‎/‎09‎/‎2018 at 14:16, Gunga Din said:

The Monstrous Anger of the Guns: The Development of British Artillery Tactics 1914-1918 page 111 onward is worth reading. Page 224 gets to the crux of the issue. 

 

 

British Artillery Tactics 1914-1918.pdf

Hi

 

Thanks for this link, however, I was having a quick look at it and noticed this on page 11:

 

"To assist the ground observers the Germans produced a technique that caught the British entirely off guard, the use of spotters in the air for long-range guns.  German artillerymen were flown over the battlefield of Le Cateau and, after observing a few shots, flew over their batteries dropping messages in bags, or signalling via semaphore to the batteries below.  The British did not realise for some time what these German planes, slowly traversing the battlefield, were doing..."

 

This appears to indicate that the British had no idea of this technique, which is a bit strange as the 1912 Central Flying School syllabus included 'Observation of Artillery Fire'.  Also the British had tried ranging artillery using spherical balloons for observation during the Boer War.  Much experimentation and trials had been undertaken in the years before the war over places like Larkhill, using different methods of communication including, aeroplane manoeuvres, smoke balls, Very lights, flags, wireless etc. from aeroplanes and Kites.  The RA was even allocated extra ammunition, if required, for these trials.  No. 3 Squadron was the RFC unit most involved in these, but quite a few artillery batteries would have been involved at various times.  Higher authority were also involved as a letter from the Directorate of Military Training to the Commander in Chief of Southern Command indicates:

 

"I am directed to inform you that it has been decided that the experiments carried out last year with aeroplanes in the location of concealed targets and observation of artillery fire are to be continued in 1913."

 

There are short reports in magazines, such as 'Flight' and 'The Aeroplane' before the war, that mention the RFC being involved in Artillery Observation activities up to the outbreak of war (also reports on German, French and other nations as well at times, although much 'classified' detail is missing of course).  So I doubt the Germans using similar methods would have taken any RFC pilots or many artillery officers by surprise.  However, I do suspect the Germans had rather more long-range guns than the British at the time.

I hope that is of interest.

 

Mike

Edited 20 September , 2018 by MikeMeech

[Robert Dunlop]

On 16/09/2018 at 23:03, WhiteStarLine said:

A complete surprise means, however, map shooting and no previous registration.

 

It also meant that the guns had to undergo a pre-registration analysis. Test firings were carried out on each gun at a specially set up range before it was transported to and put into position on the Cambrai battlefront. This enabled the behaviour of each gun to be calibrated, which facilitated the process of laying each gun on target/s. The process marks out Cambrai as different - I don't know of any previous battle where it was applied systematically.

 

Robert

[ianjonesncl]

From Artillery's Astrologers by Peter Chasseaud Page 35.

 

On 15th October [1914] 48th Heavy Battery, with one section near Les Lobes Farm opposite Neuve Chapelle and one at Rue Delavoy, recorded it had adopted the French Method of Map Shooting.:

Supporting French cavalry. No view owing to fog, but directed fire by the map on LE DRUMEZ & LAVENTE to aid French cavalry advance''..."Feu systematique a la carte". When observation is impossible, compass bearing is taken off the map by protractor, also range and ground searched. When obs. is possible, the compass bearing is often found very accurate.

 

Chasseaud records on page 12 - As with Field Artillery Training , 1914 no mention was made in Garrison Artillery Training of map shooting ! Map shooting was such an obvious practice that it was often taken for granted when writing official manuals !

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

This type of fire was in use on the Somme before 1 July 1916. The German batteries used all available information from the weather to the wear on the gun tubes to establish fixed target coordinates. The individual guns would fire at the fixed target and if the shell burst directly above the target it was considered a success. In this manner the British targets could be bombarded with great accuracy on the first shots.

 

Ralph