Futile Exercise? The British Army's Preparations for War 1902-1914

[Crunchy]

Simon Batten.  Futile Exercise?  The British Army's Preparations for War 1902-1914. Helion, Warwick, 2018, 235pp.

 

The subject of the British Army's reform and preparations for war prior to the Great War have received little serious study, and much of what has been written in general histories has been simplistic and derogatory based on shallow research, ill-founded assumptions or deliberate misinformation. Two excellent studies of doctrinal reforms, especially after the South African War, that have challenged these views are Stephen Badsey's Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918 (2008), and Spencer Jones's From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902 -1914 (2012).  They are now joined by another fine work in Simon Batten's Futile Exercise? The British Army's Preparations for War 1902-1914, which, rather than considering doctrine, largely surveys the practical exercises and manoeuvres conducted between 1904 and 1914.  It offers a firm rebuttal to those who have criticised the British Army's preparation for the Great War. As Spencer Jones says it 'offers the first serious study of how the British Army trained for large scale operations.'

 

Based on wide ranging research of primary and secondary sources Batten presents a convincing case of how the Army's higher commanders took a serious and close interest in the development, preparation, and training of the Army for what was expected to be the future nature of war. In doing so, in some areas he shows they were ahead of the Germans and French in their approach and tactics. Above all, Batten demonstrates that the Army's higher command were not the 'donkeys' so readily ascribed to them, rather they  were dedicated and intelligent men, who, despite some flaws, had a sound grasp of their profession, were intent on preparing the Army for modern warfare, and readily tested and adopted fledgling technology.  In several areas their comments and views were prescient.

 

Commencing with an overview of the conduct of manoeuvres and the issues and difficulties involved in undertaking them, Batten then devotes four chapters to those undertaken in the decade prior to the outbreak of war.  Three, the 1904 amphibious landings on the Essex coast around Clacton-on-Sea, the 1912 two sided operation between Haig and Grierson in East Anglia, and the 1913 exercise in Buckinghamshire and south Nottinghamshire are covered in detail. These three chapters detail the objectives, planning, conduct, and lessons derived from each activity, while an intervening chapter discusses those undertaken between 1904 and 1912.  Rounding out the book are two chapters on the attendance at foreign army manoeuvres and wars, and the BEF at war in the latter half of 1914 against the backdrop of the experience gained from peacetime manoeuvres and exercise, all pulled together with a sound conclusion of the key issues.

 

Batten writes in an easily read style that hums along, keeping the reader's interest. Demonstrating the breadth and depth of his research, he makes observations that are fair and balanced, taking issue with some historians, such as Allan Mallison and especially the Canadian Tim Travers, shredding the fallacy of some of their pronouncements with sound argument and solid evidence. Central to the discussion are the key commanders, most of whom would play a part in the coming war, addressing their views, relationships, and contributions to the development and preparation of the army for the war they knew was coming. We have been accustomed to the view that the British undertook a learning process during the Great War; this book reveals the learning process commenced after The South African War and it transformed the Army. In refuting those who criticise it for being ill-prepared for the war that stagnated on the Western Front, Batten reminds us that all of the armies that mobilised in 1914 had trained and prepared for mobile operations involving manoeuvre, and that the experience of the wars of the previous decade reflected this approach. In fact they trained for the very war that took place between August and November 1914, when on the Western Front they ran out of space to manoeuvre. In undertaking this mobile phase of the war, the pre-war manoeuvres, despite their limitations, served the British Army well.

 

While Batten identifies several shortcomings of the manoeuvres themselves, of the technologies employed, and the commanders who participated, he sensibly discusses them in the context of the difficulties and constraints faced, and the information available at the time. For example, several historians simply suggest Haig failed at the 1912 manoeuvres, but Batten takes a more positive view, derived from a detailed study of how the action evolved, demonstrating that a commander can only work on the intelligence available to him and is reliant on the actions of his subordinates. If anything Haig relied too much of the information provided by aerial reconnaissance which at times was faulty, and he was not well served by Allenby's cavalry division. Moreover, the idea that these officers were resistant to new technologies is amply refuted by the evidence Batten produces.

 

In reading this book, this reviewer is reminded of Sir Michael Howard's sage advice: if one wants to gain an understanding of what actually occurred then one should read widely, in depth and in context. Simon Batten has done just that. Futile Exercise? The British Army's Preparations for War 1902-1914 offers readers a perspective that has rarely been investigated in such depth, and throws fresh light on the Edwardian Army, especially its higher commanders. It is a thoughtful, deeply researched, balanced, and well presented piece of work which shows that those who still persist in 'the Donkeys' school of thought are on very shallow ground indeed. Highly recommended.

Edited 21 August , 2018 by Crunchy

[Steven Broomfield]

Thanks for that: I was pondering whether to buy this. Now I know I have to.

[josquin]

An admirable review in every respect--knowledgeable, balanced, and most informative.  Clearly an essential work

for all with an interest in the British Army in the Great War and during the preceding decade. Batten's emphasis

on practice rather than doctrine is a welcome development in recent Great War historiography.

Josquin

[Crunchy]

Steven,

Hope you enjoy it as much as I did. Greetings to Mrs B whom we remember fondly from our dinner in Salisbury in 2008. Well we remember you fondly too, but as for the better half!!

 

Josquin,

Thank you for your kind words.

 

Regards

Chris

[Steven Broomfield]

Cheers, Chris. It was a very pleasant evening indeed, though sadly the restaurant is now a rather trendy wine bar.

[David Filsell]

Mr C is dead right in his terrific review. This a superb piece of work

Edited 26 August , 2018 by David Filsell

[Steven Broomfield]

My copy has arrived, thanks to Amazon Prime, and I must say that as a result of a quick scan through, it looks superb. The illustrations alone are excellent.

 

And how sad to wonder about the four officers of the 1st Cameron Highlanders, photographed leaning against a hedge in a village in East Anglia during the 1912 Manoeuvres in September of that year. How many of the four even made it through to September 1914?

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Chris. 

 

A very balanced review and I endorse your recommendation, FWIIW. Batten's style made the book easy to read, as you say. It was very interesting to read about the evolution of the annual manoeuvres. The analysis of the 1912 manoeuvre was very good. It illustrated how lessons could be learned, for example around the potential for misleading information from aerial reconnaissance. When in France, the BEF was well served by General MacDonogh, who required multiple sources of evidence from an Intelligence perspective before he would provide firm recommendations. Not so with some of his colleagues outside GSO1...

 

A couple of caveats about the book. Batten rightly compares the British manoeuvres with those of the major Continental powers. We need to be cautious about the interpretations though. Batten points to the problems imposed by Kaiser Wilhelm for example. The massed cavalry charges, one of which (the winning charge) was led by the Kaiser, illustrated how politics could distort military needs. Von Moltke definitely made significant improvements in this regard. It should be remembered, however, that the British manoeuvres were really only at the same level as the German corps manoeuvres that were very different from the Kaiser's manoeuvres. Each German corps had a sizeable tract of land in which to refine the tactical and operational efficiencies that would serve them well during the opening weeks of the war. These manoeuvres were conducted well away from the routine gaze and influence of the Kaiser.

 

The second minor issue relates to the wider discussion about the impact of the British manoeuvres on the performance of the BEF and various generals within the war. These conclusions are of interest but are, of necessity, less robust IMHO. Batten has drawn on work by Travers for example, which needs to be treated with more caution. This aspect of the book does not detract from the overall significant contribution that Batten has provided.

 

Robert

[Crunchy]

I agree with all your points Robert. However, in writing the review I was conscious of a reasonable word limit, and indeed I tend to write more than most journals accept. I could have written a lot more about the issues he covers, but then the aim of the review was not to tell the whole story but hit the key points - good and bad in some reviews. IMO, as you have said, Batten makes a great contribution to our understanding of the pre-war manoeuvres, and that was the intent of the review.

 

In regard to the German manoeuvres Batten is primarily concerned with the Army manoeuvres at which British, and other foreign officers, attended and their views on what they thought of them. Also he does consider other countries manoeuvres at the same level. To be fair to him, Batten is concerned about what the British drew from viewing them

 

Cheers

Chris

Edited 29 August , 2018 by Crunchy

[Robert Dunlop]

Chris, I agree with your points about the intent behind Batten's review of the Continental army manoeuvres (multiple countries). The British perspectives on these (as well as the converse views of the British manoeuvres) are important, especially the general point about reinforcing pre-existing national stereotypes. 

 

Robert

[Bernard_Lewis]

Cracking and comprehensive review! Thank you.

 

Bernard

[Steven Broomfield]

I am about two-thirds of the way through this book and I have to echo everything the OP said: it really is excellent. Informed, informing, readable (the author wears his research lightly) and endlessly bringing up snippets of information about the men who led the army to war in 1914.

 

One aspect I particularly like is the positioning of references notes at the foot of each page - far better than at the end of the book or even at the end of the chapter.

 

Like the OP, I can't recommend this book too highly. Good also to see our own Mr Raker ( @moonraker) quoted so extensively from his excellent books on Salisbury Plain.

 

I really do wholeheartedly suggest anyone interested in the development of the BEF reads this book.

[Guest]

Thank you for the kind words in this thread - more than the book deserves, I'm sure. I have appreciated the constructive criticism, too.

[Moonraker]

On 26/09/2018 at 09:19, Steven Broomfield said:

...Like the OP, I can't recommend this book too highly. Good also to see our own Mr Raker ( @moonraker) quoted so extensively from his excellent books on Salisbury Plain...

 

 

15 hours ago, Simon Batten said:

Thank you for the kind words in this thread - more than the book deserves, I'm sure. I have appreciated the constructive criticism, too.

Following Simon's expression of gratitude, what else can I do but thank Steven?

 

Seriously, back in the 1990s I used to enjoy wading through old copies of The Times for news coverage of manoeuvres, and not just in Wiltshire. It did mean spending hours peering at microfilm in my local library and relying on the printed quarterly indices for appropriate articles, usually listed under "Naval & Military Matters" (IIRC), though sometimes there would appear to have been a change of indexer and I had to look for other entries.

 

Nowadays, of course, it's all so simple, with the ability to access the newspaper's archive from one's home. When I do search it, I still allow myself to be distracted by coverage of other military topics outside Wiltshire.

 

One feature of the reporting was the naming of locations (such as copses and farms) that would only have meant anything to those with a very intimate knowledge of the terrain.

 

The 1910 manoeuvres were of particular interest, with the unofficial participation of certainly two, possibly three, aircraft and varying reports about their activities. I spent quite a bit of time trying to rationalise these , my efforts being truly eclipsed by Timothy C Brown in Flying with the Larks.

 

May I add my congratulations to those already paid to Simon, which have prompted me to get his book.

 

Moonraker

[Guest]

Terry, I am glad to have the chance to thank you for your excellent work on Wiltshire, which I drew on heavily as you will see when you get the book. I now find myself wishing I had spent a bit longer on the 1910 manoeuvres as they are certainly of interest for all sorts of reasons. I hope you enjoy 'Futile Exercise'.

Simon

[Moonraker]

I agree with all the positive comments made above.

 

Views differ about the British Army's preparation and preparedness for the Great War. The Official Historian, James Edmonds, judged  it "the best trained, best organized, and best equipped British Army which ever went forth to war". Others wonder how much the Army had learnt from its experiences in the Boer War, its lack of preparation for trench warfare and the usefulness of exercises and manoeuvres. (Incidentally, Simon several times questions some of Edmonds' statements and anecdotes.)

 

It did not take long for it to be realised that the openness of Salisbury Plain did not aid realism, and this was not helped by restrictions on disturbing game and crops and entering woodland, this last often providing the only cover. This led to the manoeuvres sometimes being held elsewhere - but with an increased attendance by civilians whose cars sometimes impeded troop movements. Billeting was only occasionally practised and umpires' decisions sometimes questionable.

 

Simon Batten makes comparisons with Continental manoeuvres and mentions the Kaiser's involvement - always on the winning side and occasionally leading heroic charges. At least George V limited himself to a few comments and congratulations.

 

I note that one D Filsell is mentioned in the Bibliography - perhaps our illustrious member of that name?

 

On a subjective note, I would have liked to have seen a few lines devoted to life in the overnight camps, including the catering arrangements, and also to the problems with civilian contractors engaged to supply the troops. (I mention this in the tradition of nit-picking reviewers who know something that they think that the author doesn't.)

 

Even more subjectively, I checked my postcard collection and realised there were very few cards that manifestly related to the manoeuvres on Salisbury Plain. There are lots showing "the 2nd Blankshire" arriving at a railway station or in camp but hardly any showing soldiers on exercises on the relative remoteness of Salisbury Plain. In contrast I have half-a-dozen of the 1909 manoeuvres in the Highworth-Shrivenham area, and Simon has reproduced photographs of activity in towns and villages away from Wiltshire.

 

Moonraker

 

 

 

 

[David Filsell]

Mr M

'Twas I - information about the employment of Infantry - particularly 7th Infantry Division at Ypres. But 'illustrious" is certainly a bridge too far.

 However, the comment about the BEF being the best trained, best equipped, best organised, best  trained British Army to go forth to war was probably true overall  in comparison with earlier wars. Equally, not least infantry tactics - fire and movement, the SMLE - were all noted by the Germans. Artillery, the lack of howitzers in particular was another question but above all it was a very small Army and one operating fighting well above it weight. Both 7th and 8th Divisions were both pretty scratch units and after Ypres you reach a point where everything from the lack of trained staff officers to the industrial capacity to equip/re- equip the army, or replace losses in officers or men was acute. My view was that it was an army well fit for purpose - but in the event the purpose was far to large.

 

Edited 29 October , 2018 by David Filsell

[squirrel]

3 hours ago, David Filsell said:

 

 However, the comment about the BEF being the best trained, best equipped, best organised, best  trained British Army to go forth to war was probably true overall  in comparison with earlier wars. Equally, not least infantry tactics - fire and movement, the SMLE - were all noted by the Germans. Artillery, the lack of howitzers in particular was another question but above all it was a very small Army and one operating fighting well above it weight. Both 7th and 8th Divisions were both pretty scratch units and after Ypres you reach a point where everything from the lack of trained staff officers to the industrial capacity to equip/re- equip the army, or replace losses in officers or men was acute. My view was that it was an army well fit for purpose - but in the event the purpose was far to large.

 

Thoroughly agree.

Edited 29 October , 2018 by squirrel

[Crunchy]

On 29/10/2018 at 23:16, David Filsell said:

My view was that it was an army well fit for purpose - but in the event the purpose was far to large.

 

 Agree David, a small well trained force thrown into a war of mass armies. Additionally, by November 1914 the purpose changed - from a war of manoeuvre for which it trained and was fit for, into one of entrenched warfare for which it, and none of the other armies were not trained or fit for - and so the so called learning process.

 

Regards

Chris 

[nigelcave]

I must admit to (1) having got the book - along with tens of others that have come out over the last four years or so but (2) not having read it yet. Thus a caveat on my comments below.

 

Having at long last come to the end of writing a trilogy of Battleground books on Ypres 1914 with Jack Sheldon (second caveat - no academic apparatus with them) I/we have to say that I/we was/were forcibly struck by three things in particular - bearing in mind that this applies specifically to First Ypres:

 

1. The very effective performance of the Allied armies. They coordinated well and worked well together. I wonder if a long term impact of this might have been the relatively good relationship between Haig and Foch.

 

2. The flexibility of the BEF during the battle from all arms and from all ranks. The ability to take on higher responsibilities at short notice (just look at the list of senior commanders who had to be replaced immediately as a result of casualties), from battalion commanders upwards; and, indeed, at command levels within battalions. The shifting around of units (and often breaking them up), the ad hoc creation of 'groups', the construction of strong points, so valuable, for example, on 11 November, even the creation of 'corduory roads' during the battle .. and still retaining a coherent command system.

 

3. The increasing desperation of the actions of the German army; and the monumental error of launching their last great push on subsequent days (the 10th and 11th November) instead of on the same day, as originally planned.

 

The relevance of all of this is that it shows a depth of professional capability in the BEF of 1914, which extended to the Reserve and even the TF units available. Worth bearing in mind that K of K warned French in the middle of the battle that he had only 7,500 men available in the UK that he could send to the Front.

[Steven Broomfield]

One sidelight which I found of particular interest was the interactions between commanders - the likes and dislikes and relationships between the chaps at the top of the future BEF. Very interesting and informative.

[David Filsell]

Nigel,

For what it's worth I think you offer a perfect overview - one with which my own lengthy research into 1st Ypres, particularly 7th Infantry Division fully supports. As an example it's worth looking closely at Haig's actions in deploying Bulfin's ad hoc force to plug the gap in the at Zadvoorde at the end of October 1914. 

Equally, Mr Bloomfield's view is interesting. Has there ever been an army in which relationships between commanders were always in perfect union? I suspect those in the BEF in 1914 were little better or worse than those of any of the combatants command and control systems. Soldiers are by definition competitive.

[Steven Broomfield]

Currently reading the recent biography of Bulfin (also following Chris's review), and I can recommend that. So far, very good.

[Moonraker]

I've just acquired an album of 34 photographs of the 1910 army manoeuvres. The subjects include Lemonade Supplies arrive in Camp,The Camp Butcher, The Camp Farrier, The Camp Kitchen en Route, Looking for Enemy (officers in flash cars), Earl Roberts on the Plain, the Boxkite of  Captain Dixon (sic - actually Dickson ) and the President of Brazil!

[EastSurrey]

Simon's book is excellent! I only wish it was longer! I'm interested in the 1909 Manoeuvres, in particular. There is a detailed report on these in WO279/31 at TNA.

Michael