July/August 1914 & Cuban Missile Crisis 1962

[RodB]

I've been thinking out the uncanny similarities in the 2 abovementioned situations :-

Both involved a great power (Russia / USSR) determined to stand by a small "client" state (Serbia in 1914, Cuba in 1962) for reasons of prestige and political leverage.

Russia's full mobilization on Germany's border in 1914 was an equivalent of the USSR placing nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962.

In both cases the great power threatening the client state (Austria in 1914, USA in 1962) would like to destroy the client state but did not desire a war withs its "protector".

In both cases the great power threatening the minor power had made aggressive moves earlier (Austria annexed Bosnia in 1908, USA staged Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961). Hence Serbia & Cuba's "protectors" felt they had been provoked and had a moral right to their "defensive" actions and felt "this far but no further".

In both cases there was an ultimatum - Germany to Russia to cancel mobilization, USA to the USSR to cease delivering missiles to Cuba & remove those already there.

In both cases, the great power which had made an ultimatum had only a "total war & annihilation" plan for conflict with its opponent great power (Germany's Schlieffen Plan in 1914, the USA's total nuclear response plan in 1962). I.e. they lacked "graduated response" plans.

In both cases the great power which made the ultimatum put out "peace feelers" - The Kaiser put forward a "stop in Belgrade" plan, to assure Russia that Serbia would not be destroyed. USA put proposals to the USSR that they would not invade Cuba if the missiles were removed, and that the missiles in Turkey targetting the USSR would , nudge-nudge wink, wink, be removed.

The difference is that in 1914, Russia refused to cancel mobilization.

In 1962, Kruschev turned back the Russian freighters from Cuba and agreed to remove the nuclear missiles. Cuba was never militarily threatened by the USA again and the (obsolete) missiles were removed from Turkey.

I wonder whether the "think tanks" on both sides in 1962 thought of the mistakes of 1914 on their way to their decisions ?

[AndyHollinger]

Not to put too much cold water on the idea ... but I doubt people in either Washington or Moscow considered 1914 much if at all in their reactions. There's just too much different about both situations and the ramifications of each.

My thoughts here are the German reactions of 1914 had more to do with the German High Command convincing the Kaiser that this was the time for the dreamed of war rather than any real consideration of crisis at hand. Khruschev wisely decided that the US was serious and in no mood to end life as we know it over Cuba ... the Turkey missles were a sap added to keep Khruschev some face ...

[DirtyDick]

WW1 left a legacy of politicians - at least in democracies - being fearful of war; so much so that this acute trepidation led to WW2. Post-1918 it was no longer seen by mainstream political society as an easy way out of a political logjam or a quick and decisive way of achieving retribution. (Note, this does not refer to small-scale foreign adventures against backward foes, but future war between the then Great Powers.)

The economic and social misery of WW2 (for most participants) and the added component of nuclear weapons, leading to swift and certain annihilation for both sides, or MAD, compounded this fear of major conflict.

Obviously national concerns and matters of 'honour' were still important to the political psyche, but both sides would better know when to back down rather than face war over a point of honour or principle (e.g. Franco-Prussian War: although fear of a united Germany dominating France was a significant factor, the catalyst was a supposed snub to Napoleon III).

Richard