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Remembered Today:

Hackney Gurkhas


Gareth Davies

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3 minutes ago, Bartimeus said:

That reminds me I had seen this - officers of 1/10th Londons shortly before they embarked for Gallipoli:

 

 

10th Londons officers Tatler 29-9-1915.jpg

 

Newspaper Image © The British Library Board. All rights reserved. With thanks to The British Newspaper Archive (www.BritishNewspaperArchive.co.uk).

 

Thank you.  I know Martin posted some of the names back in the mists of time but this is of interest.  Might any of these officers have had any connections with the Indian Army and/or Nepal?  

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My understanding is that the 3rd Bn was formed in 1915 and never deployed out of the UK.

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34 minutes ago, Gareth Davies said:

Might any of these officers have had any connections with the Indian Army and/or Nepal?  

 

I know that the QM, Captain Bass, had been a Regular soldier in the RA, and first saw service in the Afghan War (1878-80), followed by a string of other campaigns. So he at least had set foot in India.

 

Not India or Nepal, but another officer whose name is familiar is Captain W.P.M. Russell. He was a student interpreter at the British Legation in Peking when it was besieged during the Boxer Rebellion, 1900, and had the rare 'Defence of Legations' clasp to his campaign medal. He transferred to the Gordons later in the Great War and had an MC.

 

I wouldn't be surprised if one or two of the younger officers transferred to the Indian Army during the war. That doesn't seem to have been uncommon in TF units serving in the Middle East.

 

Bart

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Thank you Bart.  

 

Did the QM go to Gallipoli with the Bn?  

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Just now, Gareth Davies said:

Did the QM go to Gallipoli with the Bn?

 

Yes, he did.

 

I have the impression old QMs such as he were a godsend to relatively young and untried units.

 

Bart

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The Army Lists in mid 1915 show around 90 named officers serving with 10th Londons, of whom only 6 show any prior active service (crossed swords). Of these only Prittie and Bass in the 1/10th Londons at Battalion level.... the others with 2nd and 3rd lines. 

 

Interestingly Bass's entry in the 1914-15 Star medal roll shows (1) under Theatre, meaning France. Given the date 30th July 1915 is coincidental with most other Officers disembarking in the Dardanelles (code 2B), it would seem this is likely to be an error on the original. Interestingly his MIC shows 6th Aug 1915 suggesting an advance party (34 ORs ditto) ahead of the main body who overwhelmingly show 10th Aug 1915. A good illustration of how different sets of records can differ wildly. 

 

The 10th London's Officers 1914-15 Star medal roll is not a great work of record keeping. Less than 20 Officers show dates coincidental with being in the first cohort; suggesting either some Officers records are missing or the disembarkation dates are a mess. I suspect the latter.

 

Martin.

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45 minutes ago, QGE said:

Less than 20 Officers show dates coincidental with being in the first cohort; suggesting either some Officers records are missing or the disembarkation dates are a mess.

 

As officers had to put in a claim for their medals, it may also indicate that some did not trouble to do so. If they didn't claim, they will not appear on the rolls.

 

Establishment would have been 29 officers (including the Adjutant, in pre-war days an attached Regular), plus a Medical Officer.

 

I believe the units of 54 Division were told to leave their transport sections behind, in which case the RTO probably stayed too.

 

Bart

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13 hours ago, Bartimeus said:

 

As officers had to put in a claim for their medals, it may also indicate that some did not trouble to do so. If they didn't claim, they will not appear on the rolls.

 

Establishment would have been 28 officers, plus a Medical Officer.

 

I believe the units of 54 Division were told to leave their transport sections behind, in which case the RTO probably stayed too.

 

Bart

 

Medal Rolls. I think it extremely unlikely so many failed to apply or their Next of Kin failed to apply. It would make the Hackney Gurkhas a massive out-lier when compared to the other 220 Battalions at Gallipoli. Some rolls confuse embarkation with disembarkation and some confuse landing on the Peninsula with landing on Mudros. There are a host of reasons why the dates are potentially unreliable, particularly when we have a reasonably detailed Brigade diary as a cross-reference.

 

In my experience the rolls are riddled with small errors that only come to light when compared to other primary source material. In addition the TF record keeping was simply appalling when compared to the regulars - mainly because the Regular Adjutants were actually running the battalions (see below) and had little time for the diaries.  The 10th Londons war diary for example is one of the least intact diaries I have ever seen, so it is no surprise to see their medal roll in a similar mess. This is why tracking the 10th London's in order to solve the Hackney Gurkha mystery is so difficult- the paper trail of primary material is very thin, even by the low standards of the TF at Gallipoli. Some regiments had appalling record keeping and there are a few examples where the same dates for disembarking are simply applied to everyone regardless of when the actually disembarked. Lazy clerks. I don't doubt that Bass went to Gallipoli but the rolls are not as reliable as we might think and cross referencing is useful. 

 

 

Separately; 

 

Memories. Prittie - whose memoirs have been used as a strong point of reference in this interesting debate starts his correspondence with Aspinal Oglander thus:

 

"All my papers, maps etc have been destroyed when we were burnt out of here. I am afraid I cant help much but will do my best"

 

My emphasis. This I believe refers to him being burned out of his home; Kilboy House, Nenagh, Co Tipperary by the IRA on 22nd August 1922, which suggests he had to rely on his memory when writing to Oglander in 1931, recounting events some 16 years in the past. Prittie continues:

 

"..The three regular Adjutants, Crosbie, Younghusband and self, ran the Brigade. Of course Terrier COs were not taken seriously.  Unofficially I held Brunker's hand having got his confidence on board ship. However he only lasted about 24 hours before going gugga (sic)..."

 

He signs off:

 

"I hope these rambling reminiscences may be of some use. If I had a map and my diary I might have done better."

 

Brunker was GOC 163rd Inf Bde at Gallipoli. Prittie and the Hackney Gurkhas were in a different Brigade. It is difficult to see how Prittie was holding the hand of a Brigadier in a different Brigade, particularly as Prittie claims to have effectively been running the Battalion. This sounds like Prittie trying to inflate his importance at Gallipoli and is worth trying to corroborate. It is worth noting that Prittie goes to great lengths explaining the incompetence at Gallipoli to Aspinal Oglander and again put himself as the saviour highlighting his more sensible plans which of course were ignored. Incidentally Brunker lasted for a bit longer than 24 hours, so Prittie's memory is failing him. Faint alarm bells should be ringing at this stage. 

 

Dunally's (aka Prittie) autobiography "Khaki and Rifle Green" was published in 1940, a quarter of a century after Gallipoli and as we have seen, by his own admission his papers had been destroyed. 25 year-old memories can be fragile and it might be worth cross-referencing Dunalley's comments. For example Dunalley seems to have forgotten that Brigades in 1915 had four, not three Battalions.  "Crosbie" was Capt J P G Crosbie, Rifle Brigade, Adjutant of the 11th London Regt (Finsbury Rifles) and "Younghusband" was Capt H Younghusband, Adjutant of the 1/5th Bedfordshire Regt. The Adjutant of the 1/4th Northants appears to have been lost to Prittie's memory - he was Capt J Brown (a regular and veteran of South Africa). Prittie was 'knocked out' in the action at Kidney Hill barely a week after landing, so his Gallipoli experience was limited to just a few days. It might explain why he forgot about 25% of the force in the same Brigade. Very little of what Prittie wrote managed to find its way into the Official History Gallipoli. For good reason. 

 

At risk of stating the obvious, we need to tread carefully when relying on single witnesses Given the available paper trail is exceptionally thin, it seems the memories of one individual might be all that is available. 

 

Martin

 

 

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2 hours ago, QGE said:

 

Brunker was GOC 163rd Inf Bde at Gallipoli. Prittie and the Hackney Gurkhas were in a different Brigade. It is difficult to see how Prittie was holding the hand of a Brigadier in a different Brigade, particularly as Prittie claims to have effectively been running the Battalion. This sounds like Prittie trying to inflate his importance at Gallipoli and is worth trying to corroborate. It is worth noting that Prittie goes to great lengths explaining the incompetence at Gallipoli to Aspinal Oglander and again put himself as the saviour highlighting his more sensible plans which of course were ignored. Incidentally Brunker lasted for a bit longer than 24 hours, so Pritties memory is failing him. Faint alarm bells should be ringing at this stage. 

 

Dunally's (aka Prittie) autobiography "Khaki and Rifle Green" was published in 1940, a quarter of a century after Gallipoli and as we have seen, by his own admission his papers had been destroyed. 25 year-old memories can be fragile and it might be worth cross-referencing Dunalley's comments. For example Dunalley seems to have forgotten that Brigades in 1915 had four, not three Battalions.  "Crosbie" was Capt J P G Crosbie, Rifle Brigade, Adjutant of the 11th London Regt (Finsbury Rifles) and "Younghusband" was Capt H Younghusband, Adjutant of the 1/5th Bedfordshire Regt. The Adjutant of the 1/4th Northants appears to have been lost to Prittie's memory - he was Capt J Brown (a regular and veteran of South Africa). Prittie was 'knocked out' in the action at Kidney Hill barely a week after landing, so his Gallipoli experience was limited to just a few days. It might explain why he forgot about 25% of the force in the same Brigade. Very little of what Prittie wrote managed to find its way into the Official History Gallipoli. For good reason. 

 

At risk of stating the obvious, we need to tread carefully when relying on single witnesses Given the available paper trail is exceptionally thin, it seems the memories of one individual might be all that is available.

 

Martin

 

 

 

Martin, 

Prittie  was known as a very competent officer during his time with the 4th Rifle Brigade. Maybe a look at page 191 might explain his involvement with other troops

 

"About 9.30pm a messenger from the worthy Brunker found me and conducted me to where this unfortunate had parked himself. I then heard all about it. It seemed that the whole Divisional staff had remained behind at Imbros and that poor Brunker had been put in command of the division, or rather of the six battalions that had landed, with no staff of any kind to help him. The 163rd Brigade, it is true, had their staff but Brunker couldn't stand the sight of them. So he informally appointed me as G.S.O., acting and handed me an order he had just received from Corps. Hold the line from the right of the 10th Division to the shore of the Salt Lake. The bearer will guide you."

 

He was more than aware of the battalions in his brigade and makes several references to them during the build up to embarkation, yes he is very derisory of the Gallipoli affair and is not the only officer to do so. A Division's staff at Imbros while that Division had landed. if that in itself IS true then it would not bode well for the whole campaign and shows some of the incompetency. He comments on only 6 battalions having landed from the Division??? maybe that might account for some of the discrepancies??

 

Andy

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6 hours ago, QGE said:

The 10th London's Officers 1914-15 Star medal roll is not a great work of record keeping. Less than 20 Officers show dates coincidental with being in the first cohort; suggesting either some Officers records are missing or the disembarkation dates are a mess. I suspect the latter.

 

3 hours ago, QGE said:

Medal Rolls. I think it extremely unlikely so many failed to apply or their Next of Kin failed to apply. It would make the Hackney Gurkhas a massive out-lier when compared to the other 220 Battalions at Gallipoli.

 

There are undoubtedly fairly frequent inconsistencies in the medal rolls, both for officers and other ranks, but more so when it comes to officers. I think this may be explained by the necessity for officers to apply for their medals, the issue rolls not being compiled in advance. One often sees an annotation referring to EF9 in connection with applications noted on officer MICs; this I think was a form which they had to fill out with the detail of their service. It would not be surprising if individuals could not remember, or misremembered, the exact date of their entering into a theatre of war four or more years earlier; even less surprising if the next-of-kin of deceased officers didn't have such detail to hand. Given that each entry on the officer rolls is the result of information supplied by an individual, rather than applied to a block of men by an administering authority, the lack of consistency is inevitable.

 

That we perhaps see less inconsistency on the other ranks version of the 1914-15 Star rolls I think is down to the way they were compiled. I believe they were put together by the responsible records office for the unit in question, and divided into three parts:

 

Part A records those men who qualified with a particular unit and were still 'active' on its books at the time of compilation some years later.

Part B records those men who qualified with the same unit, but who were now non-effective on account of death while serving with that unit, or discharge directly from that unit.

Part C records those men who are serving with the unit in question at the time the rolls were compiled, but had qualified for their Star while serving with an entirely different unit.

 

Part C I think is where there is the greatest risk of inconsistency. The regimental records office would probably have reasonable knowledge of embarkation / disembarkation / qualification dates for its 'own' battalions, but much less so for the whole rest of the Army, of all regiments and arms. In these circumstances they may well have replied more on the soldier's own statement of his service, or interpretation of his records.

 

I have a feeling that the other ranks roll you have compiled for 10th Londons may only take into account the document compiled by the records office, because to compile a true roll of all 1/10th 'first landers' you would have had to additionally check the 'C Roll' for every volume of the 1914-15 Star roll, and that is a very big job !

 

Looking at the officers roll, I don't think it is quite as bad as you say, and I come up with the following names who I would be comfortable as placing in the original contingent of 1/10th who embarked on the Aquitania at the end of July 1915:

 

1           Lt. Col.           M.F.M.S.       KITTOE            04/08/1915               2B           

2           Major             A.P.              FORD-MOORE 30/07/1915               2B           

3           Major             T.B.D.           MANN              07/1915                   2B           

4           Capt.              W.P.M.          RUSSELL         30/07/1915               2B           

5           Capt.              F.A.S.           CLARKE           30/07/1915               2B           

6           Capt.              S.                 TURNER           08/1915                                  

7           Capt.              A.W.             SCRIVENER     30/07/1915               2B           

8           Capt.              G.E.C.           COWLEY          30/07/1915               2B           

9           Capt.              C.J.R.           HURRELL         Prior 15/08/1915       3             

10         Capt.              C.B.              ISARD              30/07/1915               2B           

11         Capt.              A.G.              EDMONDS       30/07/1915               2B           

12         Lieut.              H.H.C.           PRESTIGE       30/07/1915               2B           

13         Lieut.              W.                 SMITH              30/07/1915               1             

14         Lieut.              C.H.B.           FARMAR          Prior to 13/08/1915   2B           

15         Lieut.              W.E.             HERTSLET       30/07/1915               1             

16         2 Lieut.           H.J.               HOARE            08/1915                   2B            K in A 15/08/1915

17         2 Lieut.           A.P.              FIELD              30/07/1915               2B           

18         2 Lieut.           G.B.              STRAHAN        [Not stated]             2B            K in A 16/08/1915

19         2 Lieut.           W.C.             BARHAM          30/07/1915               2B           

20         2 Lieut.           H.W.             HIND                10/08/1915               2B           

21         2 Lieut.           L.P.               PRIOR              Prior to 13/08/1915   2B           

22         2 Lieut.           R.W.             WILLIAMS        [Not stated]             3              D of W 16/08/1915

23         QM & Capt.    W.                 BASS               30/07/1915               1             

 

To these you can certainly add Captain Prittie, who appears on the roll of his parent regiment, the Rifle Brigade:

 Capt. Hon. H.C.O.  PRITTIE            30/07/1915     2B

 

And possibly an officer who appears in the Tatler picture, but was also employed wuth the RFC and appears on their roll:

Capt.  A.A. WALSER                          06/1915    2B

He later rose to high rank in the RAF - more on him here:

http://www.rafweb.org/Biographies/Walser.htm

 

There's one other that may bear closer examination too: Lieut. G.A.D. DOUGLAS (prior to 27/09/1915 2B, D of W 30-11-1915). CWGC shows him as Captain George Archibald Percy Douglas, attached as Adjutant to 6th Essex . He appears in the Tatler picture, which is not itself conclusive, but does show he must have been with 1/10th at some point before they went to Gallipoli, rather than being a later replacement from the second line unit.

 

As for the officers noted with a '1' for France rather than '2B' or '3', one of them is Lieut. Hertslet, who was killed at Gallipoli, so I don't feel uncomfortable about putting them down as a minor error. It might be worth noting that two other officers on the 10th London roll with a 1 did in fact go to France at the times specified, through attachment to the RFC (Lieuts. LINTHUNE and METHVEN).

 

Besides not applying, another reason why an officer might not appear on the regimental roll is that they had already qualified for the 1914 Star, or even the 1914-15 Star for one of the early colonial campaigns. I haven't looked for examples in 10th Londons, but I can think of at least one example in 1/11th Londons (a man called Akerman, who went to France in 1914 with 28th Londons), and two in 1/8th Hants.

 

Anyway, we're now at 24 or 26 officers, out of 28 or 29 establishment (depending on what the RTO did), which is a definite improvement on 20 or less. To offer comparison with my usual other battalion in 54 Division, 1/8th Hants, they landed with 28 officers and the MO (RTO stayed in the UK), and 26 of these 29 claimed medals, so the 10th London officers roll is looking a bit more convincing perhaps.

 

On your other points regarding Prittie's account, I can remember reading that there was considerable confusion amongst the Brigades' staffs. Brig-Gen. De Winton of 162 Brigade got separated from his command on the way out and took a few days to catch up. Brunker's move up from 163 Brigade left it nominally in the hands of Lt. Col. Proctor-Beauchamp of 1/5th Norfolks, with disastrous results on August 12th. The lack of mention of 1/4th Northants, or its Adjutant, I also think was down to the fact that they landed later than the other battalions in 162 Brigade.

 

Bart

 

Edit: this obit from the Chelmsford Chronicle (10 December 1915) seems to confirm Lieut. Douglas as one of the original contingent:

 

 

 

 

Douglas Chelmsford Chronicle.JPG

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12 hours ago, stiletto_33853 said:

 

Martin, 

Prittie  was known as a very competent officer during his time with the 4th Rifle Brigade. Maybe a look at page 191 might explain his involvement with other troops

 

He comments on only 6 battalions having landed from the Division??? maybe that might account for some of the discrepancies??

 

Andy

 

Andy, I don't doubt that he was competent. I am simply pointing out the fact that his memoirs were written a quarter of a century after events and that in some detail they are at odds with diary records made at the time. He was also on the ground for a very short period (a week) before becoming a casualty.

 

Brunker lasted significantly more than 24 hours for example.The first elements of 54th Div disembarked late on 9th August and Brunker was still on the ground at 8 pm on 16th August according to the Div HQ diary. By this reckoning at least 6-7 days. By this time Prittie had become a casualty so probably didn't witness the final demise of Brunker......Anyone attempting to untie this Gordian knot of a story should be aware of Prittie's occasional inability to recall events accurately - presumably because he is relying on his memory rather than his papers which we know were destroyed.; This was not unusual if the correspondence files that Aspinall-Oglander assembled; in the chaotic conditions it was difficult for any one person to have an accurate idea of the units on the ground and Aspinall-Oglander made strenuous efforts to unravel the truth.

 

It is important to remember that the terrain at Gallipoli made communication extremely difficult. Often we read accounts of a very 'myopic' nature - individuals only aware of what was immediate within sight and not aware of events just out of sight. The chaos was legendary and units often became separated from their Commanders. The number of Battalions is incorrectly recorded by Prittie. By midnight on the following dates according to the Battalion and Brigade diaries of the 54th Div:

 

9th Aug - 4 Battalions landed

10th Aug - 3 Battalions landed...total 7 Battalions

11th Aug - 3 Battalions landed...total 10 Battalions - Incidentally the 54th Div A&QMG diary concurs.

12th Aug - 1 Battalion landed...total 11 Battalions

15th Aug - 1 Battalion landed..total 12 Battalion

 

By way of confirmation OH Gallipoli Vol II page 313: "The 54th Division (Mjor General F S Inglefield) began to reach Suvla on the afternoon of the 10th and seven of its Battalions had landed before nightfall"  Interestingly the Div HQ diary claims eight Battalions had landed on 10th Aug. It also claims Div HQ landed on 11th which would imply that Brunker's command of the Division 'without any Staff' was very short lived. The probable source of the confusion was that six Battalions were used to fill a gap in the line between the 10th (Irish) Div and the 53rd (Welsh) Div on the evening of the 10th which was consolidated on the 11th with more Battalions[Source: 54th Div Report on Operations  10th -18th Aug 1915 WO 95/4324]

 

On the day of the attack on Kindney Hill (15th Aug) the GOC 54th Div had 11 Battalions at his disposal and the 12th was held in Reserve having landed later that day; Three Battalions were sent to operate in coordination with 10th Div; 1/10th Londons, 1/11th Londons and 1/5th Bedfordshires took part in the Operations and the lately arrived 1/4th Northants were under the direct control of GOC 54th Div held as Divisional Reserve. On this day we know Prittie was with his battalion and therefore presumably not with Brunker who was in fact with 1/4th Essex watching events from their OP on Norfolk Hill some distance away. Presumably Prittie wasn't acting as a GSO for Brunker at this stage as he was leading men into action on Kidney Hill.

 

Separately Brunker was not on his own. He was simply out of his depth. Evans of the Div HQ Staff was at Suvla on 11th Aug according to Brig de Winton's personal diary. The Div HQ diary records them landing on 11th. Inglefield was certainly on the ground on and spoke with de Winton, whose diary is detailed and particularly useful in this context. Here is his account which perhaps sheds some light on the Hackney Gurkhas and their Commanding Officer:

 

Brig Gen de Winton. Personal Diary. 15th Aug 1915. Suvla.

"This is horrible and most unsatisfactory warfare and the Turk must be laughing at us. The BEDFORDS had a few casualties today from shrapnel including CHANDLER. A forward dressing station was deliberately shelled this afternoon and almost the whole personnel was killed or wounded. The ships are now firing heavy shell, but do not seem to be able to find the enemy guns and have no aeroplanes to assist them. The dust, heat and flies are very bad.

 

The usual fusillade during the night and early morning but nothing serious had happened. A hot, close morning, but a breeze sprang up about 08:00. At that hour I got hold of BRIGHTEN and we walked up to DIV HQ to get some news. On arriving at INGLEFIELD’s dug out he came out and said “There is a job for your Bde today. You are to be lent to the 10th DIV for a special operation”. I proceeded at once to the 10th DIV HQ and found SIR BRYAN MAHON and his staff, and received verbal orders (written ones arrived at 16:30). MAHON was in a very bad temper and received me most rudely. Gave me little or no information, spoke disparagingly of the artillery support, said the “sausage” balloon was “no damned use” and seemed generally fed up with the whole thing. His Staff were more helpful, and I came away with a pretty clear idea as to what was wanted of me. 

 

The 10th DIV (except the right Bn) was to make a frontal attack on what I named KIDNEY HILL (on account of its appearance on the map), and my Bde was to advance at the same time through the R.I. FUS to protect the right flank of the attack and if necessary to assault KIDNEY HILL from that flank if the 10th DIV could not take it. My secondary job was to fill up any gaps in the line on my right. I returned to my HQ at about 10:00. At noon I assembled the Bn CO’s (3 Bns only as the NORTHAMPTONS had not then landed), explained the operations and gave orders. The BEDFORDS were to lead, the 10th LONDONS to follow in echelon on the right, and the 11th LONDONS in Res. The attack was to commence at 13:00 and at that hour the leading Coy of the BEDFORDS went over the parapet. My first HQ was established at the point marked in a trench occupied by a Coy of the ROYAL IRISH FUS and at that point I was interviewed by Capt BERNARD (RIFLE BDE) a SO of the 10th DIV. We were under fire the whole time and the air was humming with bullets. I was in telephone communication with the 10th DIV and received constant messages from them. 

 

The Bns of that DIV seemed to have been checked in their advance pretty soon. The BEDFORDS were advancing somewhat slowly and I urged more push and HAY (my Bde Maj) went forward to one Coy Commander to say I wanted greater rapidity. At about 15:00 I received a message from the 10th DIV that their attack was held up and needed our assistance. I ordered the 10th LONDON to move forward, but owing to the configuration of the ground they were not visible to me. At 16:00 I moved my HQ to a point marked R on my map, leaving HAY to bring on the 11th LONDONS. I and my party were sniped at the whole way, and one of my signallers was hit. To my annoyance I found several groups of BEDFORDS sheltering behind rocks, bushes etc. and personally kicked some of them up. Unquestionably at this time there was, in the area under my observation, a certain amount of reluctance to come to grips with the enemy.

 

From R I went forward to make a personal reconnaissance, but could see very little owing to an intervening ridge with a nullah in between. I could just see the top of KIDNEY HILL. I returned to my HQ and ordered a Coy of the 11th LONDON, which had now come up, to go forward in support and to mop up all the skulkers they came across. This was about 17:15. At about 17:30 I received a message from the 10th DIV to the effect that my people were not pressing to attack, that they could be seen lying down doing nothing and that it would be a bad business for me if they failed to get home. I turned to HAY and said “Well, there is nothing for it but to throw in our last Reserves and go with it ourselves”. Giving orders to the rest of the 11th LONDONS to move forward (less one Coy to hold a ridge as a rallying point), we went forward. As we topped the ridge a heavy shrapnel fire was opened on us, and about 18:00 I was hit in the chest by a shrapnel bullet. The shrapnel fire continued and presently a number of men came running back, whom we tried to rally but failed.

 

Finding that no further advance could be made, I returned to my HQ and talked things over with HAY. Arranged for the holding of a rallying point the supply of ammunition and got into touch with the CO of the 11th LONDONS (BRYNE), who went off to rally his men. KITTOE of the 10th came up a good deal upset at what he thought was the failure of his Battalion, but I said “Never mind, you’ve done your best, we shall win through all right” (I afterwards learnt that he went off his head that night from shell shock). Soon after this my wound became very painful, and I was incapacitated and had to find my way to the dressing station, leaving BRYNE in command with HAY. The last named, I afterwards heard, pulled things together and under cover of darkness continued to advance capturing a portion of the position, and taking some Turkish prisoners, but was driven out of it in the morning by a counter-attack. The Bde was officially considered “to have done well under difficult circumstances”.

 

 

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Out of interest, I assume The Hon H C O Prittie must have been related (father?) to The Hon T C F Prittie, also (I think) Rifle Brigade, captured at Calais and author of, amongst others, Cricket North and South.

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14 hours ago, Bartimeus said:

 

There are undoubtedly fairly frequent inconsistencies in the medal rolls, both for officers and other ranks, but more so when it comes to officers.

 

Looking at the officers roll, I don't think it is quite as bad as you say, and I come up with the following names who I would be comfortable as placing in the original contingent of 1/10th who embarked on the Aquitania at the end of July 1915:

 

1           Lt. Col.           M.F.M.S.       KITTOE            04/08/1915               2B           

2           Major             A.P.              FORD-MOORE 30/07/1915               2B           

3           Major             T.B.D.           MANN              07/1915                   2B           

4           Capt.              W.P.M.          RUSSELL         30/07/1915               2B           

5           Capt.              F.A.S.           CLARKE           30/07/1915               2B           

6           Capt.              S.                 TURNER           08/1915                                  

7           Capt.              A.W.             SCRIVENER     30/07/1915               2B           

8           Capt.              G.E.C.           COWLEY          30/07/1915               2B           

9           Capt.              C.J.R.           HURRELL         Prior 15/08/1915       3             

10         Capt.              C.B.              ISARD              30/07/1915               2B           

11         Capt.              A.G.              EDMONDS       30/07/1915               2B           

12         Lieut.              H.H.C.           PRESTIGE       30/07/1915               2B           

13         Lieut.              W.                 SMITH              30/07/1915               1             

14         Lieut.              C.H.B.           FARMAR          Prior to 13/08/1915   2B           

15         Lieut.              W.E.             HERTSLET       30/07/1915               1             

16         2 Lieut.           H.J.               HOARE            08/1915                   2B            K in A 15/08/1915

17         2 Lieut.           A.P.              FIELD              30/07/1915               2B           

18         2 Lieut.           G.B.              STRAHAN        [Not stated]             2B            K in A 16/08/1915

19         2 Lieut.           W.C.             BARHAM          30/07/1915               2B           

20         2 Lieut.           H.W.             HIND                10/08/1915               2B           

21         2 Lieut.           L.P.               PRIOR              Prior to 13/08/1915   2B           

22         2 Lieut.           R.W.             WILLIAMS        [Not stated]             3              D of W 16/08/1915

23         QM & Capt.    W.                 BASS               30/07/1915               1             

 

To these you can certainly add Captain Prittie, who appears on the roll of his parent regiment, the Rifle Brigade:

 Capt. Hon. H.C.O.  PRITTIE            30/07/1915     2B

 

 

Bart - the roll above illustrates the inaccuracies well. I think Hind's is the only accurate record in the list above giving the exact date and even then it might be a day out if the Brigade diary is accurate..... Under 'Disembarkation' thirteen on this list are recorded as disembarking in the Dardanelles on 30th July 1915. This was in fact the embarkation date from Devonport, over a thousand miles away.. Between embarkation and landing on Gallipoli (2B) a host of leakages could happen. Five are recorded as killed (Herslet, Hoare, Isard, Williams and Strahan) and only three are mentioned in various diaries (Kittoe, Cowley, Prittie  - none incidentally in the small remnants of the 10th Bn diary for Gallipoli)... which means we only know for certainty that eight of those mentioned above landed at Gallipoli and were involved in the operations of the 15th. This is important if we are sourcing these individuals for personal accounts.  While I would agree that the list above is likely to be the nominal roll we don't know for sure. 

 

As an aside I don't agree that the rolls were just records of those Officers who applied - for a multitude of reasons - or that the individuals provided the information in their applications. They simply applied and their applications checked against rolls - particularly embarkation rolls and disembarkation rolls. It is not difficult to find MICs with annotations of the source roll for the qualification date - often these rolls are provided by the Battalions or regiments to the records office. When these sources are found to be missing, clerks sometimes became imaginative.  As one simple example above, it would imply 13 officers not only got their disembarkation dates wrong in their applications, they coincidentally chose the wrong date, all conflating the embarkation date with disembarkation date. There are Officer medal rolls where 54 Officers are listed as disembarking on the same date for the same battalion. Not only factually incorrect but statistically so unlikely that all got the date wrong and all chose the same (incorrect) date, including the families of the deceased. A lazy clerk is clearly filling in the dates and incidentally not all the stars were 'issued' on that particular list - at least three were scrapped. The root problem was that Officer movements (postings) were extremely fluid and tracing their records was significantly more difficult. Most infantry battalions turned over three to four times War Establishment in Officers (some even more) and reassembling the original lists years after the events was often difficult. The other arguments are too long winded to clutter this thread (I have transcribed the 1914 Star  and 1914-15 Star rolls for well over 300 battalions) but I will start another thread on Officer Rolls as the subject interest me greatly. It is important in the context of this thread; establishing who was where and when if any are to be used as sources for unravelling this mystery.

 

I would simply argue that because of the appalling record keeping, the task is twice as difficult. 

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2 hours ago, Steven Broomfield said:

Out of interest, I assume The Hon H C O Prittie must have been related (father?) to The Hon T C F Prittie, also (I think) Rifle Brigade, captured at Calais and author of, amongst others, Cricket North and South.

 

Steven,

Yes he was Terence's father. He had two sons both of whom served in the Regiment during WW2 (Desmond & Terence), his brother was killed 19/12/14 serving with the 1st battalion. His father also served in the Regiment in the Ashanti 1873/4 becoming Lord Lieutenant of Co. Tipperary in 1905.

 

Martin,

Agreed re. the 25 years gap, however he was more than aware of the battalions in his Brigade. As stated previously he makes several references to them. Crosbie has a thread on the forum due to a members sword collection.

 

Andy

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Thanks Andy - seemed a little too much of a coincidence.

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   An article in "The Bookman", 1934 on rhyming slang confirms the use of the term "Hackney Gurkhas"- the author thanks a former soldier of the 10th Londons for the help given on rhyming slang-but says nothing of it's provenance. Seems to confirm that it originated within the regiment and with men from the East End/East London.

   It was a supposition of mine that it was,perhaps, rhyming slang (what the article was about,after all)- Gurkhas=workers. However, no evidence to support it. Nor traced in any listing of rhyming slang (which is notorious for invented rhyming slang,rather than proven examples actually used)

     I have also zapped some other newspapers and periodicals- FT,Times, Daily Mail, Observer,Guardian. No usage- Thus, suspect finding a wartime reference is going to be hard work  to see if it is in any soldier accounts that are contemporary.

    Regret I can see no mileage in any theories it might be because of regimental officers with Gurkha connections- a little too far fetched.

 

 

2)   The oral history collections at IWM may assist- the recollections of Edward Bowyer-Green, recorded in 1986. Served with 1/10th Londons in 1915-ish. The item listing for Reel 1 (30 minutes worth) is:   

 

REEL 1 Background in Battersea, London, GB, 1896-1916: family; education including scholarship to City of London School, 1907-1913; reason for not joining Officers' Training Corps; employment as accountant and clerk in City of London court, 1914-1916; reaction to outbreak of war, 4/8/1914; memory of Boer War; question of reserved occupation status; effect of war on court work; story of enlisting under Derby Scheme prior to conscription, 1/1916; reason for joining 25th (Cyclist) Bn London Regt in Fulham, 1/1916. Aspects of training in GB, 1-11/1916: description of training at Feltham and Salisbury Plain; reaction to conversion of 25th Bn to infantry Bn and amalgamation with 10th Bn London Regt; reputation of 10th Bn as 'Hackney Gurkhas'; opinion of training; drafted to Harfleur Base Camp, France, and question of embarkation leave, 11/1916; posted to A Coy, 15th Bn Royal Irish Rifles at Neuve Eglise, Ypres area, Belgium, 11/1916; question of reinforcements for Irish battalions; story of execution of Irish soldiers and problem of recruitment in Ulster; attitude of Irish troops to British reinforcements

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    There is an interesting piece of newsreel from British Pathe on You Tube- the 10th Londons at camp,somewhere in the country- and marching down Mare Street, Hackney. The physique and bearing of the men should put an end to this nonsense about them being under-height. A look at their uniforms and kit should similarly dispose of any notions that they carried extra edged weapons. A normal, fit, London battalion of the Great War

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   At last, a contemporary wartime reference  to the term "Hackney Gurkhas".  It is contained in  "The Londoner", the regimental magazine of 1/25th London Regiment for the issue of 1st January 1917.  The article reports the doings of the "third line" units- viz the 3/25 Londons -Cyclists- which has been amalgamated with 3/10th Londons.

    The article refers to a publication of this amalgamated regiment (at home) as publishing a little magazine called "The Kukhri" (not to be confused with anything more famous), of which Vol.I,Issue 1 is October 1916.  It is described as "the official organ of the Hackney "Gurkhas" and Topical Journal of the Putney Sikh". Printed with the permission of the CO, Lt.-Col.H.A.Steening, TD and described as "a light-hearted and cheery journal with amusing line drawings"

   Whether "Gurkha" has any antecedent in rhyming slang still appears nebulous-but it shows the term was used to describe 3/10 Londons by at least c.September 1916-and at home. I suspect that the 3/25th London came from the Putney area and the combined journal name is  barrack-room boredom and badinage-and nothing more.

     I cannot locate a copy of the London Regiment jorunal called "The Kukhri" but hope that there is a copy out there somewhere. None on COPAC

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One can add the DLI to the growing number of units claiming the Gurkha nickname. Allegedly the 9th Bn DLI was known as the Gateshead Gurkhas

 

I have not read the book but it might be interesting (and relevant) to discover how these other units adopted the Gurkha nickname.

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I thought how sad none appear to be alliterative. One yearned for a 'Greenock Gurkhas', 'Gretna Gurkhas' or 'Gosport Gurkhas', and then along come the 'Gateshead Gurkhas'. Well done, Tyneside.

 

 

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Broadening the theme - Cheshire Constabulary officers were known as Gurkhas to the surrounding city Police forces. It wasn't a term of endearment rather a sarcastic comment about their perceived greater interest in enforcing minor traffic offences rather than arresting offenders for criminal offences.

 

I understand that the pre 1974 West Riding of Yorkshire officers were known as Donkey Wallopers to their nearby city based colleagues but the history of that nickname is perhaps beyond the remit of this topic......

 

Steve Y

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1 hour ago, tullybrone said:

Broadening the theme - Cheshire Constabulary officers were known as Gurkhas to the surrounding city Police forces. It wasn't a term of endearment rather a sarcastic comment about their perceived greater interest in enforcing minor traffic offences rather than arresting offenders for criminal offences.

 

I understand that the pre 1974 West Riding of Yorkshire officers were known as Donkey Wallopers to their nearby city based colleagues but the history of that nickname is perhaps beyond the remit of this topic......

 

Steve Y

 

The term "Gurkha Policing" is still used today. It's context is that on a Friday and Saturday night, and officer numbers are low, then patrols are to conduct "Gurkha Policing", i.e. no prisoners! That way, anybody dealt with on the street, stays on the street and officers aren't taken off the street to deal in custody.

 

Trev

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    One aspect of this thread is  the British image of the Gurkha in 1914.  Not the image that comes from the war itself- loyal, ferocious, quite violent, aggressive, etc.- but what the image was of the Gurkha BEFORE the war- Perhaps more particularly in wider British society (where the recruits who used the term "Gurkha"  for several battalions, it seems, came from) rather than in the higher military circles or the metropolitan press.

    The  pre-war years were years where there were royal tournaments, Earl's Court and the like. Whether there were Gurkhas at these affairs, I do not know- I have not yet tumbled over any reference of their being brought over to the UK as a particular crowd-puller. but if it's there, then shout out.(Found the New South Wales Lancers coming over-which should cheer a Mr. SB of Hampshire) but I cannot see the Gurkhas featuring at all, thus far.

   It looks likely (to me at least) that Gurkha "virtues" (in a military sense) may have influenced nicknames for various units. Could this fit in with the post-1857 promotion of the "martial races" as part of the military strength (and raison d'etre) of the Raj?.  Or is the current view of the Gurkhas- formed and promoted, I suspect, largely as an "End of Empire" exercise?

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Certainly the affiliation between the KRRC and the Sirmoor Rifles (2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles) dates back to fighting shoulder to shoulder at Hindu Rao's House at the Siege of Delhi in 1857.  The 60th received six VC's for this and a further 2 VC's for the subsequent relief of Delhi.

 

Both units were mentioned in the despatch of 17 Jul 1857 by Maj.-Genl. Reed, the retiring Provincial C-in-C, published in the London Gazette of 24 Nov 1857.

59abf70482772_SiegeofDelhiLG.jpg.734b48cdf7615dcdd4771dce41ce9fb7.jpg

 

"the post" referred to is Hindu Rao's house.  Later despatches in the same LG issue give a lot more detail of the various actions at Hindu Rao's House and its related outposts.

 

The coverage of the Indian Mutiny in The Times also contains a sketch of Maj.-Genl. Nicholas Penny, former CO of the Nusseree Battalion (later the 1st Gurkha Rifles) and by 1857 the CO of the Meerut Division (which included 1/KRRC and the 6th Dragoon Guards), which references back to the 1846 Battle of Aliwal in the First Anglo-Sikh War.  The despatch of Maj.-Genl. Sir Harry Smith in LG 27 Mar 1846 detailing the victory contains this little snippet on the Nusseree and Sirmoor gurkha battalions ...

59ac02af55031_BattleofAliwal1846.jpg.736f02ff5befac1550d5b1349d10ce43.jpg

["N.I." = Native Infantry]

 

These snippets are from the London Gazette versions, but the same material was also used in The Times (and no doubt the other dailies) - not posted here due to our copyright guidelines - so would certainly have been read by the Victorian middle classes.  If you can access the Newspaper Archive, it could be interesting to look for similar Gurkha material in the mass-market papers.

 

I completely agree with you that much of the Gurkha reputation is layered with the 'Martial Races' post-Mutiny agenda and the move away from Bengali troops, but the 1846 despatch does suggest these layers are applied onto a Gurkha martial reputation dating back at least a decade earlier.

 

Note also the reference to stature!

 

Mark

 

 

 

 

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