Untrained soldiers sent to die - misconception?

[Moonraker]

A recent Daily Mail article about the excavation of practice trenches near Stonehenge said: "It is a misconception that troops from Britain and her Empire were simply handed a uniform and a rifle, shipped across the Channel and sent to die in the mud. It’s the old ‘lions led by donkeys’ narrative, perpetuated by lazy history teachers and Blackadder."

 

Was there really such a misconception? Even at the start of the war, most recruits received a few months of training, albeit  some of it outdated for a modern war. The First Canadian Contingent was hastily mustered and given some training at Valcartiers before travelling to Salisbury Plain for three month's further training before joining the Front Line. (Two or three units did leave earlier for France.) Likewise ANZAC troops received training at home and more when they arrived in Britain.)

 

Exceptions to this have been noted on previous threads, but I wonder if the Mail's  description of a misconception is simplistic - not to say journalistic?

 

Moonraker

 

[depaor01]

I'm having trouble with the phrase "Daily Mail" and "misconception " in the same sentence. 

Edited 10 June , 2017 by depaor01

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

16 minutes ago, Moonraker said:

"It is a misconception that troops from Britain and her Empire were simply handed a uniform and a rifle,

That's making a statement about current day beliefs.

 

18 minutes ago, Moonraker said:

Was there really such a misconception?

You're asking about whether there were such misconceptions in the past.

[Guest]

In 1914 there were not that many spare uniforms and rifles to hand out. Kitchener recruits from K1 and K2 typically received at least 9 months training before the first units went overseas. The statutory training was at least 6 months according to the AOs. The first to see action en masse were the K1 Divs at Gallipoli exactly a year and one day after the war started.

 

The only men I can think of who were accelerated through training were in two categories: re-enlisted men who were accelerated through re-training in 1914 and were in the combatants units as early as Sep 1914 and in growing numbers thereafter - over 100,000 re-enlisted in 1914-15 although many were not fit enough to survive the rigours of trench warfare and some were sent back.. Mixed in with these are a few men who had no prior experience who were sent out by early Nov. I have two examples of men who definitely had no prior service and were in the line on the Western front in early Nov 1914. One was a trouble-maker with a charge sheet as long as your arm and was eventually executed for desertion. These are exceptions. The overall numbers pushed through with hardly any training are likely to be extremely small. By Jan 1915 post declaration recruits were coming through in drafts in large numbers; the evidence is in the 1914-15 Star medal rolls cross referenced against surviving service records. in 1Q 1915 most of the drafts consisted of trained recruits. for the simple reason that the regulars and reserves were almost run dry. Some regiments actually ran out o fully trained and effective men in March-April 1915, so trained recruits were the only option. These were distinctly group from the K1 and K2 battalions. 

 

Lastly, there were the TF units sent out very early such as the 1/14th (County of London) Bn London regt (London Scottish) and the 1/1st Queen's Own Oxfordshire Hussars. The vast majority had prior training although I suspect that the QOOH (which was undermanned in Aug 1914) had to scrape together old-timers and possibly some raw recruits to make up the numbers.

 

I don't believe there were perceptions of being sent to the front with no training during the War. Most of the 'noise' relates to Kitchener recruits worrying that they would never get to see action as the training was taking so long.... MG

Edited 10 June , 2017 by Guest

[Mike Cross]

Indeed there were quite a few men who joined the QOOH on the eve of their departure for the Western Front in September 1914 straight from the farm, without either military training or a uniform.  There are many references to this happening - they did of course have experience of both shooting and horsemanship which clearly made them effective additions to the ranks.

 

MC

[David Filsell]

I certainly found a stated case of an individual joining a bn of 7th Infantry Division when it formed up at Lyndhurst prior to embarkation for Belgium. 

[Martin Brown]

That quote may have come from me. I do generally think that the public, as opposed to us enthusiasts, have no idea that there was lots of training. They have seen a few pictures of men doing Swedish drill and a bit of marching. They have seen Oh What a Lovely War and possibly heard of Sassoon's comment about the dugout officer telling them to prod the Germans to death. Worst, they may have read the last paragraph of Denis Winter's Death's Men that the British Army of 1918 was no better trained than that of Wellington; it's all cobblers. Anyway, in my experience, the public at large haven't thought about training, or if they have, they thought it was pretty poor. The evidence from the ground contradicts it and that's the point I was making - the journalists will always distill whatever one says. The same is true of my "quote" about comical zeppelin attacks from Sunday's Observer, which wasn't exactly what i said!

[Perth Digger]

David

I know of another--I can't recall who now--who came from overseas, enlisted and was in France within a week. He was about 6 feet 4 inches, though.

 

I'd be careful about assuming that length of training equated with good and relevant training. The 11th RWK took its first volunteers in mid-May 1915 and went to France on 3/4th May 1916. For the first six months it trained in Lewisham, living at home or in digs, not getting up to strength until November 1915 (in reality, not even then). They were probably fit and had the rudiments of some skills, but in reality their effective training didn't start until January, when it went to Aldershot. So many, for various reasons, were transferred that its numbers were made up by many who had only the briefest training. Agreed, this is one of the last battalions raised (for 41st Division). Nevertheless, it was fortunate that the policy of placing new battalions in quiet sectors was in place. 

 

Mike

[Ron Clifton]

My grandfather was in France within six weeks of being conscripted but his was rather a special case - he was put into a labour battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment, then joined the Labour Corps, and later was transferred to the Royal Engineers Waterways and Railways Section. He was a railwayman in civilian life, laying track, and seems to have ended up doing a similar job in 319 Road Construction Company.

 

Ron

[Terry_Reeves]

There are others - the first four companies of the Special Companies were untrained along with the two land drainage companies and the men of the carrier pigeon service.  I think also some of the early tunneling companies were also in this position as well.

 

TR

[Guest]

    I can add two examples of lack of training from my local area- 2LT  Maurice Arthur Pritchard Shawyer, Middlesex Regiment, kia 14th October 1914-  he had just finished a degree at East London College and had stayed on to act as Cadet Sergeant_He had both his A and B certs. as a cadet. He applied for a commission on 4th August 1914-the head of East London College signed off his character reference that day. As The Die Hards had undertaken to put 4 battalions into France pronto, he was given an immediate commission in the Middlesex  Regiment to help bring the officer cadre up to strength. He lasted 10 weeks from application  to be an officer to KIA. 

 ii)   Just how much training if supposed to be enough???  Another casualty, GTD Davis, killed on the Somme 7th August 1916, with 10 RF was part of a rush draft cobbled together after 1st July to put this battalion back in the line- even the war diary comments on the lack of training and military experience of the large draft-men of "only" 3 or 4 months service (that is, from enlistment)

[Wexflyer]

I don't think this is a misconception. I did most of my Great War reading 30-45 years ago, but I clearly remember first hand survivor accounts (well, you only get to read survivor accounts) stating that 1914 and early 1915 drafts contained militia (i.e. SR) men who were unfamiliar with the operation of their rifles. 

Edited 9 August , 2017 by Wexflyer

[Guest]

The War Diaries of late 1914 (post Ypres) contain plenty of references to the poor quality and poor training of later reinforcement drafts. By the end of 1914 the supply of fully trained and effective men (regulars) was beginning to dry up, ditto reservists. The later reinforcement drafts were the residual reserves made up of recovered sick and wounded regulars, Special Reservists, re-enlisted men and new recruits. Their training and experience varied considerably. An important aspect is the appropriate training. One could easily argue that no prior training in 1914 could prepare the men for trench warfare. Many of the re-enlisted men would not necessarily be familiar with the more modern equipment and the necessary training may well have been inadequate.

 

the TF and the Indian Army arriving in France in1914 were re-equipped with a new mark of rifle and new ammunition. Sometimes this happend on the day before disembarking and for some Indian troops they were re-equipped on arrival in France. Some had very limited opportunities to test fire on ranges before being launched into the fray. Their machine guns were taken away and modified. Most had the old Maxim which we gradually replaced with new Vickers (a significantly lighter design). None had hand grenades until later and 'bombs' were improvised as were trench mortars. So there was considerable training on the spot. In addition there was a raft of other new equipment that required training. 

 

In broad terms much of the British Army was poorly trained and equipped simply because the challenges of modern trench warfare had not yet been fully absorbed into their military doctrine. They were fighting a War they hadn't really anticipated or trained for. Lastly the learning process was slow simply because the attrition was so incredibly high (again significantly higher than anything expected in current doctrine). This meant that the ability to pass on the lessons was severely limited as there were so few of the original BEF left; 90% casualties makes it difficult to pass on lessons/training. The consequences were that in 1915 the BEF simply repeated many of the mistakes made in 1914, but on a larger scale. Many Kitchener battalions of K1 and K2 were annihilated in a matter of weeks at Gallipoli in Aug 1915 and Loos in Sep 1915. It is difficult to find anything in their diaries or related literature that alludes to being trained and learning from the mistakes made by the BEF in 1914.

 

MG

Edited 10 August , 2017 by Guest

[squirrel]

Excellent summary MG.

[Guest]

Further to the equipment issue, as related to London. Locally to me, 7th Essex, based on Walthamstow were hampered in 1914 by the inadequacies of the stocks of rifles used-In part it was the background to the suicide in December 1914 of the Hon. Major and Quartermaster of the unit, Major John Burleigh Oldfield - an old AOC Hon Captain bought in after the battalion had administrative problems when it's recruiting area was changed and the western part-Hackney-re-assigned to the Royal Fusiliers. As he and the Adjutant were the only officers with any war experience in 1914, the strains on him must have been enormous.  Another man  =Civil Service Rifles, transferred to London Scottish - attended a "Japanese Rifle Course" in February 1915-to use the rifles of the stock purchased from the Japanese Government to help overcome the rifle shortage. The rifles proved too awkward to be of general use, other than for Home training.

  Guest has referred en passant to another major problem which my reading for the London regiments throws up no answers-  Just how many men in the early months of the war refused the Imperial Service Obligation??  Is there a listing of numbers that I have missed?  Perhaps by unit?  Should be lurking somewhere at Kew, as numbers of men available to serve in France must have been a critical consideration both as to which units went-and to the creation of  the "2/" units where the non-signers who be put to some good use. Burrows, the official historian of the Essex Regiment (but he ran a printing business in Stratford-so he is informed yet discreet on early  London-centered problems) mentions the problems-both ways-that the early volunteers created. 7th Essex went from under-strength to chaotically over-strength in a matter of weeks. Actually administering the ISO was not an automatic part of the enlistment process in 1914-as Burrows says,a War Office oversight. Thus, sorting out who was willing to serve and who was not  retrospectively caused chaos. I suspect, given the large pool of recruits for London, that this chaos must have coloured i) The creation of the 2/ battalions-and also  (ii)  hindered the reinforcement of the Regular battalions. Burrows comments that sorting out the ISO post-enlistment meant that a home battalion  was over-strength (with the wrong rifles) while Regular battalions in the line overseas remained short of trained reinforcements to their cost in the fighting of 1915. Burrows hints that drafts from 7th Essex to the Regulars at Gallipoli were hindered by these  problems, with,as he says, tragic consequences.

  (I have included 7th Essex here as it was a London-based unit-  Also, HAC stuff may come up-although HAC was not by name a "London Regiment" . it was originally assigned  London Regiment numbering but refused it and campaigned to keep it's more independent status.

[Loader]

I read an account of a US soldier who was reched under fire by a messenger. The man told him the message & I don't recall all the details but it came out that the runner had only been in the army for 6 wks  &didn't know how to fire his rifle.I recall the story was clear the the man had been only 6 wks in the army included his travel time to France. I'm sure there is more truth to such things than is generally known. 

[Chris_B]

Just to emphasise Terry Reeves point about Tunnellers and Chemical Corporals.  Have a look at miner Robert Ashby from Ibstock:

 

Just four days from signing papers before joining 178th Coy in France. 

 

Chemical Corporal John William Hyde Harrison, 12 days from volunteering to going to France, see: https://goo.gl/yWjcUz

Edited 12 August , 2017 by Chris_B