German flame thrower attacks

[Terry_Reeves]

Mike 

 

Thanks, no worries.  It is interesting though as the Special Brigade had a number of FW teams formed for 1 July 1917, but were not used. For your information the officer concerned was Lt William Astley. Pre-war he was a railway engineer and had gained a BA in Engineering at Cambridge University. Prior to being transferred to the RE, He had  served in the ranks the Royal Naval Division and was commissioned into the RE on 10.5.1916.  He was wounded on 28.10.16 and returned to his unit on 21.11.16.  On  31.12.16 he was appointed as a Deputy Assistant Director Light Railways.

 

TR

 

Edited 22 March , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[bob lembke]

53 minutes ago, Skipman said:

This is from the 96th Infantry Brigade war diary 1/7/1916. Not exactly what you are after but may be of interest.

 

Mike

 

Tantalizing. I hoped that more was in the file, but I copied this to another space and the cropping is still there. 

I can talk about the British FGW effort and their use at 7/1/16 but I don't think that I know about this, as I think

you are saying that this is an attack that didn't happen. The British heavy FW weighed about 4000 lbs and

required 300 man carries to bring it forward, and one shell might lose a part or two and the monster could

not be used. Was this the light unit or the heavy one?

.

I don't think that Terry wants me pontificating about British FW

[bob lembke]

I have top burrow into my records, but I think that there was one or two British FW attempts at the opening day at the Somme,

one or two devices did work, I think one or two didn't.  The 4000 lb device was assembled underground, and I think a periscope type

nozzle emerged and a powerful stream of something I don't know what) emerged, perhaps causing casualties, but the defenders

could just move out of range, and continue the defense. At 4000 lbs and buried underground it would take days and weeks to move

the device forward. All of this is from memory  of ten years ago. But this is interesting to me, at least. Could we see the entire entry?

 

Thanks a lot.

[Terry_Reeves]

Is it too much to ask for contributors to stick to the original request? Please, do try your hardest.

 

TR

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited 22 March , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[bob lembke]

Terry -  Looked in my material, and came across a lot of help you gave me on British FW and Z Company Special Brigade almost exactly 11 years ago. But you are right, we have dragged the discussion down another rabbit hole. I will attempt to only respond when someone drags up a British War Diary mentioning a German FW attack.

 

Mike -  Thanks for the full report; looks like the FW detachment was present but didn't actually do anything. I do have information on a couple of places

where the British attempted FW attacks at the Somme, on the 1st, the 3rd, the 7th, etc., but this is not the place to discuss them. Again, Terry wrote

11 years ago that the British probably did not try a FW attack after January 1917.  I do understand that Foulkes kept a 4000 lb monster operational at his base to impress visiting celebrities, such as Royals, but did not attempt to use them again in combat. If we want to look at any of this lets communicate off this thread.

 

Are you guys using 1/7/16 to indicate July 1, 1916? I am familiar with the use of 1. 7. 16. for July 1st, but with 1/7/16 for January seventh.

 

"The English and the Americans -  two peoples separated by a common language.".

[bob lembke]

Terry;

 

Just read, in a different corner of the Forum, of a great project where a Pal who  has digitized the war diaries of four battalions 

of the Grenadier Guards, some 2-3000 pages of material, which can be word searched. To further your project, you might consider doing a

word search on "Flammenwerfer", "flame thrower", "liquid fire", etc.That should lead you to some good examples. The diaries supposedly

are very good. Given a location and date, I can tell you what in in my 597 page FW timeline that covers most if not all German Great War 

flame attacks. With the exception of Hooge, we really have not struck "pay dirt". I have not put much time into Hooge lately (I have pressing

tax matters, our Federal taxes are due April 15th), and a long-term tenant of mine has died and I am unable to find her family. Sounds crazy

but a big problem.)  There seems to be a small up-front cost to using these diaries, perhaps someone working with these diaries could do such

a search for you. This gentleman seemingly is going ahead and digitizing more war diaries. This might be a really good and efficient way to

further your project. 

 

My background, leading to my attempt to quantify the impact of the FW on the war, is that I am a mathematical economist and an engineer, 

and have worked with computers for 56 years. Admittedly I am not doing a lot in these fields now, but that is my background, and helped form

my approach to these matters. I also was privately tutored by my intellectual mentor, a well-trained historian, in the methods of historical

research, first working on the Mexican War (1845-48) for several years at the "Public Library" in New York City, a private library (naturally) that is 

one of the best research libraries in the US.

 

This admirable project is probably where a lot of military historical research is headed.

[phil andrade]

A WFA bulletin reached me this week, and within is an article by Jack Sheldon depicting the fighting for the Butte de Warlencourt in the autumn of 1916 from the German point of view.

 

There is a significant allusion to the use of flamethrowers.

 

Anxious not to replicate what might have already been written on this long thread ; should anyone require further citation or quotes, happy to oblige.

 

Phil

[Terry_Reeves]

Phil

 

 I have the Bulletin, but thanks anyway. There seems to be a pattern building showing that these attacks were fairly quickly nullified by bringing down concentrated rifle and machine gun fire, however I think there is someway to go yet before any firm conclusions can be reached.

 

TR

[phil andrade]

Stories about the use of flamethrowers by the Germans in the Great War seem to be becoming entrenched - excuse pun ! - in Great War folklore.

 

Yesterday I saw a film - The Lost City of Z - about  Colonel Percy Fawcett, and there were a few vignetttes about his frontline service on the Somme in 1916.

 

The action depicted was on 26 September 1916. As the Tommies advanced in huge masses yelling loudly ( another irritating feature of these films ), flamethrowers operated by Germans wearing the obligatory spiked helmets incinerated one or two British soldiers.

 

I cite this not to divert the thread, but to draw attention to the development of lurid mythology , in which the flamethrowers are - it seems - becoming prominent .

 

Phil

Edited 29 March , 2017 by phil andrade

[MBrockway]

On 15/03/2017 at 23:19, bob lembke said:

On the day of attack, often one or two FW would open up, Allied artillery would be trained on that site, and once they opened up the real FW attack happened perhaps 600 meters down the line, and the FW teams at the point of the demonstration were in a dugout. By the time the artillery could re-aim, the defenders at the point of attack had run away, and the FW troops were in the first and perhaps the second line. My father told me that the French usually ran off; I don't think that he ever fought the British, except at Gallipoli.

 

46 minutes ago, Terry_Reeves said:

There seems to be a pattern building showing that these attacks were fairly quickly nullified by bringing down concentrated rifle and machine gun fire, however I think there is someway to go yet before any firm conclusions can be reached.

 

There's some evidence from British sources to confirm Bob's statement that the German Flammenwerfer troops were used to seeing their enemy run away from advancing Flammenwerfer.

 

See this section from the 10/DLI's Report on the 22-24 Aug 1917 actions at Inverness Copse describing the dawn counter-attack by (apparently) 4th Sturm Battalion on 24 Aug 1917 ...

 

Unfortunately they seem to have been tactically badly non-plussed when the British responded by holding ground and giving suppressing fire!

 

The German stormtrooper tactics were clearly effective when they worked well - as in the dawn mists of 21 Mar 1918, for example - but this report shows that was not always the case.

 

These 14th (Light) Division Inverness Copse action battle reports are extensive, yet references to Flammenwerfer are very few.  If battalion and brigade commanders did not think it necessary to mention them in particular, that suggests to me they saw Flammenwerfer as "business as usual" and were confident they had appropriate tactical responses available to deal with them.  One does not get the impression they were seen as a tremendous threat and certainly not a battlefield game changer.

 

Mark

 

[Terry_Reeves]

Mark

 

Thanks for your information. I don't doubt that British troops get out of the way quite quickly on occasions. It is interesting that the bombers who formed part of the FW team were quite effective and sometimes bombing battles ensued.  

 

I quite agree that British troops and their commanders appear generally  to have taken the weapon in their stride, as I have have said previously there seems to be no evidence of any real alarm. There is still someway to go yet though.

 

TR

[AOK4]

Hello,

 

According to the casualty list of the Garde-Reserve-Pionier-Regiment, they had fatalities near Thiepval on 26 September, on the Somme on 21 and 22 October and 11 November, near Combles 25 September, near Mouquet Farm 28 August, near Longueval 18 July, near Martinpuich 29 July, near Bouchavesnes 20 September, near Sailly on 17 and 22 October.

 

This is just from a quick look at the list for the British sector on the Somme 1916.

 

Jan

[Terry_Reeves]

Jan

 

Thanks, I will investigate further.

 

TR

[bob lembke]

A few comments.

 

Although my father seemingly only fought the French with the FW, he did tell me a few stories about his unit's involvement

against British troops. His assessment was that the French had more elan for the attack, but were less steady; the British

were steadier when attacked, but had less stomach for the attack. That may have been fair or accurate, or not, but he had 

a lot of experience and contact with other veterans, he fought from Gallipoli till mid-1919, and was active in a veteran's

association until the mid-1930's.

 

I have not done a statistical study, but the Germans seemed to use the FW more against the French (of course the French

held more of the front), and some of the really large attacks were against the Russians, who were really prone to attack.

 

I have not studied the limited employment of the FW by other formations, from early 1915 to sometime in 1918 Reddemann 

and his unit had a FORMAL MONOPOLY on the use of the FW, aside from a limited number of storm units that each had a

small FW detachment. The only one I know was Sturm=Bataillon No. 5 Rohr. Reddemann tended not to mention those, and the

historian of S=B Rohr rarely mentioned FW, even when I know that they took an important role in an attack. I want to clearly

state that the GRPR did not attack by simply come across the battlefield with infantry in the same old "blow the whistle, charge

thru the wire" fashion that caused so many 

casualties. They had a variety of tactics and tricks to get on top of the trench and sentries or at least into FW range before any

serious fire was laid on them. That is one reason they wanted to attack only with their own men, as others did not understand or

train in these tactics. The idea that you just got a bit of rifle fire out there and the attack fizzled is generally not what happened.

 

I looked at the time frame that Mike reported, and the only GRPR action that I can find was at Epinoy, where the 6th Company

attacked and lost a NCO. Is that the attack in question? I am hampered as I rarely know the British units attacked and the two sides 

usually used different place names, either different names or described actions by different features.

 

In that time frame there was a serious action that included FW at Castle Park Herenthage in Flanders, where the 12th FW Company

lost 11 men, but seemingly accomplished a good deal, including knocking out a tank. I don't think that the described action was that.

The mention of Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 4 suggests that they might have been the FW troops involved.

 

The FW attacks sometimes involved a Trupp of ten men and two FW, sometimes a Zug with perhaps 8 FW, or sometimes one, two,

or more companies with 64, 101, or 154 FW. All attacks were planned, with the exception of some desperate defensive actions at the

Somme, and as I said the local FW commander, even if he was a senior NCO, could decline an attack, even if ordered by a lt.-general

While trying to find the 8/24/17 attack, I .came across a quote by Guy Chapman. "Number 2 Company, which had borne the brunt of the

FW attack, was reduced to 17." When I read his book, I must have known his battalion, I don't have it at the tip of my tongue now. This was

from an attack in the August/September time frame. Any one have that engagement at hand? I don't have good references for the UK

actions and troops; when I read that material my wife the librarian delivers a book and I read it. Most of my study of UK material was

ten years ago. 

 

I think it was Chapman that said over the course of the war his battalion moved 33,000 men thru it. The GRPR was a regiment of about

4 battalions, about 17 companies, and in almost four years of fighting and 657 attacks lost about 800 men. You may not accept that the

capture of about 59,000 men was entirely due to the action of this unit, at a cost of 121 men, in 50 odd engagements (I don't) , but this was

a very cost-effective unit and weapon. The fact that, in most attacks, which might include two FW, or 154 FW, this unit and weapon did not

lose a single man. Reddemann had to report every engagement, even one with two FW, to the High Command. He rated every attack as

"successful" or "not successful". for time periods and fronts, the engagements rated "successful" 60-93% of the time, usually at the upper

range of that range. 

 

I think we are all "cherry-picking". I of course include the Verdun attack where the FW troops captured an entire French brigade and the 

three intact HQs in about 15 minutes at a cost of two FW troopers. Others mention an attack with no results, which I cannot usually even

find any mention of. (The FW were sometimes used as a diversion, sometimes to get the defenders to shift their artillery to a certain point

on the line; then a second real attack, FW or not, struck 600 meters down the line, the attacking troops getting into the front line before the

artillery could be shifted back.

 

[Guest]

Hi Terry. Not sure if you've tried the Imperial War Museum audio collection. A search for "liquid fire" shows a number of results that might be worth following up Click. Including an interview with Donald Murray of the 8th KOYLI " memory of German use of liquid fire and effects on men " Click

 

Mike

[Terry_Reeves]

Bob and Mike

 

Thanks for your contributions, I will check them out.

 

TR

[bob lembke]

Terry, in post 101, didn't you mean 7/1/16? Or 1/7/16? July 1, 1916.

 

The UK did make a few FW attacks in the first day on the Somme, and then (US system) on 7/3/16 and 7/7/16, I think. 

 

It would seem, if you don't think it thru too much, or you don't have too much experience to base your thought on, 

that putting gas and flame attacks under the same command. After all, wrenches, pressure, hoses, etc.

 

But in fact there are good reasons to keep the two efforts in different compartments, and certainly to use different troops. 

[bob lembke]

Three or four British FW attacks at the Somme.

 

On July 1, 1916,

18th Division front, between Kasino Point and Carnoy, large (very large!) FW built into saps 7, 10, and 13. The large FW in sap 13 was wrecked 

by German shell-fire. At 0715 the two others fired.  (Also, in October 1917, two FW (Seemingly large) were also fired at Dixmude. This was

unsuccessful. But I had thought that the UK dropped the FW idea before that.) The above information was from Terry Reeves perhaps 10 years ago.

 

Also, 7/3/16, the 18th Division attacked the 7th Company, Bavarian Infantry Regiment (List), or Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 16 (One of

these was Hitler's regiment), but the attack was not successful, although the Bavarian company was totally out of contact with any other German

unit and was attempting to withdraw.

 

On 7/14/16, the 9th Scottish Division was attacking towards Longueval, supposedly led by FW.

 

Also on that date, 9th Brigade, 3rd Division, was attacking with FW, supposedly 1 km. south of Gross=Bazentin.

 

I also have a separate section on British FW efforts (the above is in my German FW timeline), and I think that it has other British FW efforts;

one might be on the Somme on 7/7/16, if memory serves. 

Edited 29 March , 2017 by bob lembke
Added a missing date

[Terry_Reeves]

Bob

 

I was referring to portable FW teams, 16 were deployed but not used. Two Liven's gallery projectors were fired but  made little difference to the operation and quite frankly were ill-concieved. Heavy, cumbersome, time-consuming to install and recharge they were  in a fixed position with a limited azimuth and  were, quite frankly, a waste of time.  

 

I would obliged if you would stick to the original question.

 

Thank you

 

TR

Edited 29 March , 2017 by Terry_Reeves

[MBrockway]

In my day job, I run projects, which frequently involve multiple teams spread around the world.  To avoid chaos from confusing date formats, I always enforce that ALL dates be expressed in dd mmm [yy]yy format - i.e. 01 Jul 1916. Anyone caught using dd/mm/yy or mm/dd/yy is forced to stand a round of drinks!

 

Just a suggestion.

[bob lembke]

On 3/29/2017 at 18:10, MBrockway said:

In my day job, I run projects, which frequently involve multiple teams spread around the world.  To avoid chaos from confusing date formats, I always enforce that ALL dates be expressed in dd mmm [yy]yy format - i.e. 01 Jul 1916. Anyone caught using dd/mm/yy or mm/dd/yy is forced to stand a round of drinks!

 

Just a suggestion.

 

A good suggestion. As I am a (Hunnish) Yank, I will not use the mm/dd/yy system, but will also not use the dd/mm/yy system, as some 

people might assume that I am using a Yankish system, being from this side of The Pond..

 

In my "Successes Spreadsheet" most of the engagements are against the French, and some against the Russians and Italians. I will try to

dig out more attacks against UK troops; the nationality of the troops attacked is not one of my columns of data characterizing the attack; at

the time of compiling the data it was obvious, less so now. Some of the columns put in are the number of FW used and numbers of POWs,

cannon, MGs, and mortars taken; FW treoopers lost, if any, etc.  I will try to dig out a few obviously successful attacks; in one one British

general was captured, and from scanty notes a second may have died of wounds the next day. One or two generals taken or killed sounds

like a successful attack. A second had several thousand POWs taken, and many FW used in the attack, that also was a successful attack,

but what part of the success was due to the use of FW in the attack? In the attack at Verdun in which two companies of FW inhaled a French

brigade, with the loss of two FW troopers, with the brigade HQ only managing to get out a one sentence call out before being taken into custody,

the whole attack only taking minutes, the success of the FW weapon is obvious (In the German usage, the FW teams lead from the front, No

infantry proceeded them, unless wearing asbestos underwear. If the front being attacked suddenly collapsed, with little defense or actual fighting,

the FW probably initiated a general collapse. My father's company went to participate in the last Battle of Caparetto, in Italy (he was in hospital

again with a badly infected arm wound from Verdun, and missed it, but told me some reports from his comrades) there were a good number of

FW there, but the initial attack created such a general collapse that it was not necessary or even possible to set up FW attacks, and they should

get no credit for the stunning success.

 

I took a quick look (and listen) to the IWM material that Mike posted above, and when I have some time I want to go over it more. It mentioned

the conditions of use for the photos. (Photos of WW I FW are rare and usually extremely expensive.), what is allowed "non-commercial use"? 

Selling cornflakes certainly would not be non-commercial use. Use in a book, with the proper identification of the source, a typically non-profit

activity? My question is OT and probably should be pursued elsewhere, and probably has been already.

 

 

[bob lembke]

Trying to hew as closely as possible to Terry's formulation. Going back to my work 12 years ago, when he helped me a good deal.

The below is from memory and several spreadsheets, some of which I had even forgotten.

 

I am going to refer to an action involving the Canadians in June 1916, where I studied the various Allied war diaries in great detail.

I would think that the Canadian forces in 1916 were closely allied and modeled after the British Army, similar procedures, record

keeping, largely same culture and ethnic stock. I have picked this, again, because of my study of I think all of the relevant war diaries.

 

On June 2, 1916, the Germans attacked the Canadian 8th Brigade at Zillebeke, in Flanders. The Brigade had the 1st and 4th

Canadian Mounted Rifles in line, with the 2nd and 5th Mounted Rifles in reserve. The attackers included 20 Klief (old style light

FW, a model I think from 1912) from the 9. Komp., G=R=P=R. I think that other men of the 9th Komp. attacked elsewhere not

far away on that day, 20 light FW might be handled by two platoons in a pinch. One battalion and then the other battalion of

defenders were quickly pierced.

  

Losses:  Major General Malcolm Mercer, CO of the Canadian 3rd Division, was wounded three times and died the next day.

Brigadier General Arthur Williams, CO of the 8th Brigade, was captured by the attackers. (I think that suggests a piercing of the

front and a rapid advance.)   The 1st Mounted Rifles had a strength of 21 officers and 671 ORs; their casualties, from the Canadian

records, was 19 officers and 506 ORs. The 4th Mounted Rifles fared even worse, of a strength of 22 officers and 680 men, the

battalion had casualties of 21 officers and 657 ORs; 95% of their officers and 97% of their ORs.

 

The 9. Komp., GRPR lost two Flamm=Pioniere, and a third the next day. (This was frequent, after a major loss of position and/or men, 

the enemy (either side) often heavily shelled the captured position, a significant portion of the lasses of the GRPR was the next day, I

include this in my casualty statistics, so the actual losses in the fighting, the actual losses in the assault is often lower that the figures

I cite.

 

What did the war diaries say about this fighting? The diary of the 4th Mounted Rifles, which lost over 95% of its officers and lost 97%

of its men, offers little information. In fact, it did not even mention the fighting. Does not mention fighting, for a day in which it was almost

utterly destroyed? 

 

I have seen this repeatedly. I have studied a US/German engagement in and about Fismette carefully (for years I thought that my father

was in this fighting, in fact he was fighting some miles to the east, getting wounded twice). An American (very large) regiment crossed

a river into a position in the line,  after two days it pulled out, and the regimental war diary wrote about two sentences about the orderly

lines of tents set up in the reserve position to house the men. Not mentioned were fighting or losses; in fact the regiment of about 4000

men lost half its strength in two days. (This was fighting in which German FW had a big role, once or twice allowing the capture of

hundreds of Yanks.) Not mentioning fighting? 

 

I have looked at a bunch of British war diaries, for engagements where I knew there was a major FW factor, and I have seen the same 

phenomenon; the worse the fighting often the less mention of serious combat, or the employment of FW. One factor was the loss of officers.

In the case of the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles, which officer was spared being killed, wounded, or captured? Was he there? Maybe he was 

having a tooth pulled. The battalion only had 23 ORs left.  Who wrote the war diary entry for the day?

 

I have another engagement, a German attack at Kemmelberg, also in Flanders. The defenders were mostly French, but I know that at least

some UK troops were there. Elite Bavarian mountain troops attacked uphill, with four companies of FW (for once I don't have a number, but

it could have been 132 light FW). The battle lasted from 6 AM to 7:10 AM, and 8200 POWs were taken, 233 MGs and 53 cannon were taken,

and the best observation point in Flanders was captured. Clearly, substantial forces of other arms were employed, but approximately 132 FW,

and the loss of 15 FW Pioniere, indicate a large FW role in the fighting. Substantial territory and prisoners taken in a literal uphill battle very 

quickly is characteristic of a large FW role, the shock of a large FW presence not only stuns the defenders, but is a great morale support for

the attacking troops. (This is a major factor in the value of FW leading an attack, which I have not even mentioned, but could probably write

50 pages on from memory.) I can mention major examples of this effect.

[MBrockway]

5 hours ago, bob lembke said:

I am going to refer to an action involving the Canadians in June 1916, where I studied the various Allied war diaries in great detail.

I would think that the Canadian forces in 1916 were closely allied and modeled after the British Army, similar procedures, record

keeping, largely same culture and ethnic stock. I have picked this, again, because of my study of I think all of the relevant war diaries.

 

On June 2, 1916, the Germans attacked the Canadian 8th Brigade at Zillebeke, in Flanders. The Brigade had the 1st and 4th

Canadian Mounted Rifles in line, with the 2nd and 5th Mounted Rifles in reserve.

 

<snip>

 

What did the war diaries say about this fighting? The diary of the 4th Mounted Rifles, which lost over 95% of its officers and lost 97%

of its men, offers little information. In fact, it did not even mention the fighting. Does not mention fighting, for a day in which it was almost

utterly destroyed? 

 

I have seen this repeatedly. <snip>

 

<snip>

 

I have looked at a bunch of British war diaries, for engagements where I knew there was a major FW factor, and I have seen the same 

phenomenon; the worse the fighting often the less mention of serious combat, or the employment of FW. One factor was the loss of officers.

In the case of the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles, which officer was spared being killed, wounded, or captured? Was he there? Maybe he was 

having a tooth pulled. The battalion only had 23 ORs left.  Who wrote the war diary entry for the day?

 

 

As this assertion about losses being routinely left out of British and Commonwealth war diaries is so completely contrary to my own experiences reading those same war diaries, I thought it worthwhile checking the war diary of 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles for 02 Jun 1916.

 

 

Judge for yourselves, but it seems to me that in contrast to Bob's assertion, there seems to be a great deal of information about both the fighting and the heavy losses sustained by the battalion.

 

The only claim that seems to be accurate is that Flammenwerfer are not mentioned.

 

Bob - are these the sources on which you have built your thesis about the Allied war diaries?

 

Mark

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[MBrockway]

Likewise the relevant Brigade war diary - that of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade - is very open about the heavy losses, containing this Communication from the divisional commander (OC 3rd Canadian Infantry Division)  ...

 

For the whole division that's total casualties of 2,573, of which an estimated ~600 were POWs (wounded & unwounded) leaving ~2,000 killed, wounded and missing.

 

For 4/CMR, this Divisional CO's communication in the 8th brigade war diary is completely open about the fact that there were only 23 OR's and 1 officer untouched after the 02 Jun 1916 action.

 

Again, this does not seem to support Bob's assertion that the Allied war diaries were inaccurate.

 

 

Edited 2 April , 2017 by MBrockway

[MBrockway]

7 hours ago, bob lembke said:

I am going to refer to an action involving the Canadians in June 1916, where I studied the various Allied war diaries in great detail.

I would think that the Canadian forces in 1916 were closely allied and modeled after the British Army, similar procedures, record

keeping, largely same culture and ethnic stock. I have picked this, again, because of my study of I think all of the relevant war diaries.

 

On June 2, 1916, the Germans attacked the Canadian 8th Brigade at Zillebeke, in Flanders. The Brigade had the 1st and 4th

Canadian Mounted Rifles in line, with the 2nd and 5th Mounted Rifles in reserve.

 

<snip>

 

What did the war diaries say about this fighting? The diary of the 4th Mounted Rifles, which lost over 95% of its officers and lost 97%

of its men, offers little information. In fact, it did not even mention the fighting. Does not mention fighting, for a day in which it was almost

utterly destroyed? 

 

I have seen this repeatedly. <snip>

 

<snip>

 

I have looked at a bunch of British war diaries, for engagements where I knew there was a major FW factor, and I have seen the same 

phenomenon; the worse the fighting often the less mention of serious combat, or the employment of FW. One factor was the loss of officers.

In the case of the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles, which officer was spared being killed, wounded, or captured? Was he there? Maybe he was 

having a tooth pulled. The battalion only had 23 ORs left.  Who wrote the war diary entry for the day?

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Bob,

From the pages above, I think you'll concede what you said about the 4/CMR war diary is clearly inaccurate.

 

Perhaps your impression of the sparseness of negative information in the 02 Jun 1916 Canadian war diaries is based on the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade war diary pages ...

 

 

However did you not notice the References to Appendices A, B and C and Map 1 in the right margin?

 

Appendix A is a detailed report on the Operations 02-03 Jun 1916 from 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade [6 pages]

Appendix B is a detailed report on the Operations 01-04 Jun 1916 from 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade [6 pages] - I'll post this in the next post

Appendix C is a report on Brigade/Divisional Inter-communications 31 May to 04 Jun 1916 by the 8th Brigade Signals Officer [3 pages]

Map 1 is a detailed annotated trench map of the Zillebeke sector

 

That's 15 pages of detailed operational reports and a detailed trench map covering this 02 Jun German attack in great detail.

 

 

Edited 2 April , 2017 by MBrockway