'Tank Men' a B.B.C documentary

[Guest]

1 minute ago, squirrel said:

I'll give that a miss then!

 

The D Day programme was pretty good. Lots of Bovington input too on DD tanks and 'funnies' . 

[paulgranger]

20 hours ago, johntanner said:

The programme included a (post-war, I think) quote from the OC, but there did not appear to be any suggestion that he had witnessed the alleged event.

Christy Campbell in 'Band of Brigands' refers to an unnamed infantry officer in reply to the Official Historian, telling him that MacPherson committed suicide, but he does not appear to have witnessed it himself.

[phil andrade]

10 hours ago, QGE said:

 

Here's a novel idea: Why doesn't the BBC just use the correct number. 

 

No wonder the BBC lost Bake Off !

 

Phil

[PRC]

And no mention of the friendly fire incident involving the 9th Norfolks which would have added some real drama and poignancy. The first tanks crews website has:-

 

Henriques recce the route and ground before leaving the RV at 4.00 am. Tank reached a point 500m behind the front line by 5.00 am and then stopped. By 5.45 am tank was up to the British trenches but then reversed 20m to avoiding the infantry in the area being hit by German artillery fire aimed at the tank. As tank moved up to the start point, the tank crew fired on 9th Norfolks (believing they were enemy) and created several casualties. Tank Comdr was directed on his route by a Coy Comd of 9th Norfolks and arrived on the objective at zero hrs, 500m forward of the British lines. There tank enfiladed the German objective, with machine gun fire, whilst the infantry advanced. Tank then moved north; whilst so doing, it was badly damaged by German armour piercing bullets, the crew were injured and Henriques and his driver were partially blinded. The tank withdrew once the Infantry arrived on the location, to avoid the tank being captured; however the tank was hit by German artillery fire

http://www.firsttankcrews.com/tankcrewsc19c24.htm

 

By coincidence I was going to start a thread in commemoration of the 9th Battalion men who lost their lives  that day and use it as an opportunity to ask a few questions but as this thread has gathered together some subject matter experts can I take the opportunity to post some of those questions \ observations here.

 

Its often stated that the first tankmen were trapped in a noisy compartment and unable to hear themselves talk. The programme mentioned that Henriques crew didn't actually close down the hatches until they entered combat but even if we assume that means after they came under fire then it would still have been difficult for that unknown Norfolk Company Commander to attract the crews attention. The tanks machine guns were firing, adding to the din as well as the danger. Any ideas as to how he did it.

 

Many sources, including the programme, refer to the Germans having armour-piercing bullets when they faced the tanks for the first time. Which to my mind begs the question - what were they used for prior to the 15th September 1916. Strikes me as one of those weapons in search of a reason to exist, especially to be so freely available that it counted as standard munitions. I assume these were delivered by machine guns rather than standard issue rifles - I've never seen any reference to some early equivalent of the anti-tank rifle that would become standard issue in many of the worlds major armies in the 1930's (but then I haven't been looking!).

 

And finally, one last thought on the effectiveness of the weapons. Henriques and his crew come across a trench packed with troops and begins to machine gun them. Casualties are stated to have been caused - you'd expect quite heavy ones. These were soldiers who weren't shooting back or trying to evade from the outset - the proverbial fish in a barrel. This was in a front line trench that remained in possession of the allies after the attack. So you'd expect quite a few burials of the fallen and died of wounds over the next few days. However the few burials are of men recovered from the battlefield after the war and died of wounds are minimal. The casualty rate of the Norfolks (431 O.R's, 4 Officers plus 1 missing) is comparable to the other unit from the Brigade that attacked, the 1st Leicesters, (14 Officers, 410 other ranks killed, wounded or missing). Both units were held up by uncut wire that the tanks did not help with. The casualty rates could certainly be co-incidental, but as the Leicesters didn't have a (tank) friendly fire incident, as far as I'm aware, then does throw up a question about how effective the Mk1 tank was.

 

Thoughts?

 

Peter

Edited 13 September , 2016 by PRC
Corrected Leicester Unit

[Gareth Davies]

 

1 hour ago, PRC said:

 

Its often stated that the first tankmen were trapped in a noisy compartment and unable to hear themselves talk. The programme mentioned that Henriques crew didn't actually close down the hatches until they entered combat but even if we assume that means after they came under fire then it would still have been difficult for that unknown Norfolk Company Commander to attract the crews attention. The tanks machine guns were firing, adding to the din as well as the danger. Any ideas as to how he did it.

 

By waving his arms, by standing in front of the tank (or in line with any of the vision slits), by banging on the side with his stick/a rifle?

 

1 hour ago, PRC said:

 

And finally, one last thought on the effectiveness of the weapons. Henriques and his crew come across a trench packed with troops and begins to machine gun them. Casualties are stated to have been caused - you'd expect quite heavy ones. These were soldiers who weren't shooting back or trying to evade from the outset - the proverbial fish in a barrel. This was in a front line trench that remained in possession of the allies after the attack. So you'd expect quite a few burials of the fallen and died of wounds over the next few days. However the few burials are of men recovered from the battlefield after the war and died of wounds are minimal. The casualty rate of the Norfolks (431 O.R's, 4 Officers plus 1 missing) is comparable to the other unit from the Brigade that attacked, the 9th Leicesters, (14 Officers, 410 other ranks killed, wounded or missing). Both units were held up by uncut wire that the tanks did not help with. The casualty rates could certainly be co-incidental, but as the Leicesters didn't have a (tank) friendly fire incident, as far as I'm aware, then does throw up a question about how effective the Mk1 tank was. 

 

Not very effective in terms of facilitating the desired breakthrough is the honest answer.  But when you consider that the first prototype Mk 1 tank, Mother/Big Willie/HMLS Centipede was only produced in late Nov 15 and that training for the crews didn't start in earnest until spring 1916, I think they did pretty well.  

 

[PRC]

Understood - this was the crews first experience of battle and for the gunners this was the first time they'd fired their guns in anger. Extrapolating the effectiveness of a weapon based on one crews performance was always going to be a bit dodgy. I was just wondering if there was any facility with the Mk1 for the outside world to communicate with the occupants rather than having to perform some Indiana Jones like stunt to get their attention :-)

 

In my haste to post I forgot to add one last query. How did the tanks cross the British Front Line \ Return to the Rally Point on that first day? Were there temporary bridges, (which would make the FFI even less understandable) or did they crash across the trenches and it was up to the PBI to get out of the way. The program glossed over that.

 

BTW - one of the Gunners, Reginald Fisher, was also from Norfolk. He would survive the War and would return to live in the county.

Edited 13 September , 2016 by PRC

[Gareth Davies]

The Mk V had a door in the rear that crews often left open in order to see what the following infantry were up but other than attracting the attention of a Mk I crew by visual means or knocking on the sides, there was no other method for the outside world (which included tank section, tank company, and tank battalion commanders) to communicate with the tank. 

 

 

[Guest]

The 71st Infantry Brigade War Diary is rather detailed and mentions the tanks having 'either gone back or were out of action'. The diary includes an 'Airman's Map' which plots the exact location of the tanks on 15th Sep 1916. There are six maps and all cover Combles, Quadrilateral, Morval, Lesboeufs  up to Gueudecourt. The diary narrative describes one tank stuck on the railway line (plotted) and another (also plotted) is shown near the Quadrilateral- presumably Henriques' Tank. It is interesting to see an exact plot from the air. 

 

No mention in the Brigade diary or battalion diary of the 9th Norfolks coming under fire from one of their own tanks. The battalion was left with just three Officers after the battle and less than a month later was to lose a further 10 Officers and 231 ORs...effectively destroying the best part of a battalion in just over a month. The History of the Norfolk Regt notes that only one of the original 9th Bn Officers came out of the war unscathed. 

 

There are some reasonably interesting accounts in the history of the Suffolk Regt (9th Bn), Norfolk Regt (9th Bn), Leicestershire Regt (1st Bn)and Sherwood Foresters (2nd Bn) of this battle. The Leicesters lost 14 Officers and 410 ORs, representing slightly over 60% of the numbers they started with on 15th. The  Sherwood Foresters's history:

 

"So as far as the 6th Division was concerned the tanks were a failure for of the three allotted, two broke down before starting while the third, moving off in accordance with orders, long before the infantry had its periscope shot off, its peep-holes blinded, was riddled by armoured-piercing bullets and had come back without having achieved anything." [Written by Col H C Wylly CB]

 

The 2nd Bn Sherwood Foresters diary makes no comment on the tanks, so the opinions expressed by the historian might well have been formed in subsequent years. The Battalion went into action on 12th with 681 All Ranks, of whom 17 Officers and 421 ORs became casualties by the 16th (64%). It is interesting that all four battalions lost very similar numbers during the battle at roughly 60%

 

Despite the arrival of new technology in the form of the Tanks, casualties remained high in the set piece attacks. 

 

MG

Edited 13 September , 2016 by Guest

[Perth Digger]

The officer who remembered a tank officer committing suicide on 15 Sept 1916 was named Wardle, who was at 6th Div HQ that day. His letter was to Sir James Edmonds and is in CAB 45.

 

I began writing an article of Macpherson last year but stopped once I heard that he was to be the centrepiece of Bovington's commemoration of the tank crews. I was also aware that there were still living descendants of Macpherson. 

 

There was a Winchester connection, but it was between Macpherson and his distant cousin Geoffrey Wyatt. They were best friends at school (and at prep school). Both received commissions into the Buffs at the same time. I think that Macpherson's state of mind on 15 September was greatly affected by hearing that Wyatt had been killed that very day, with the East Kents of 6th Division. On the second part of his journey up to the line he passed within a few hundred yards of the Buffs and I'm pretty sure (I can't prove it, of course) that he stopped to ask former colleagues how Wyatt was. I think the news shattered him.

 

Mike

Edited 13 September , 2016 by M.Durey
Grammar

[horrocks]

I have found the quote that I mentioned above. It is in Peter Hart's 'The Somme', and is from Brigadier Osborne, OC 16th Brigade;

 

"It may interest you to know the history of the three tanks with 16th Infantry Brigade on 15th September. One went north of the Quadrilateral and wasn't much use to me. Then the tank which reported a broken tail went back, and while the subaltern in charge was waiting for a minute while I heard another officer's report, he shot himself and left a paper in which he wrote 'My God, I have been a coward'. I concealed the manner of his death to save his parents unnecessary grief. The third tank was absent, lost its way."

 

Hart goes on to write;

 

'George MacPeherson did not die instantly, but was taken back to a CCS where he succembed to his injuries.'

 

Basil Henriques is subsequently quoted as saying;

 

"The nervous strain in this first battle of the tanks for officers and crew alike was ghastly. Of my company, one officer went mad and shot his engine to make it go faster, another shot himself because he thought he had failed to do as well as he should, two others including myself had what I suppose can be called a nrevous breakdown."

Edited 14 September , 2016 by horrocks

[Staffsyeoman]

The programme had the feel of being made on the cheap by one of the regions for "local interest" which explains several key failings in the reconstruction parts. 

My only comment "Costume by Dressing Up Box".

[Guest]

3 hours ago, horrocks said:

I have found the quote that I mentioned above. It is in Peter Hart's 'The Somme', and is from Brigadier Osborne, OC 16th Brigade;

 

"It may interest you to know the history of the three tanks with 16th Infantry Brigade on 15th September. One went north of the Quadrilateral and wasn't much use to me. Then the tank which reported a broken tail went back, and while the subaltern in charge was waiting for a minute while I heard another officer's report, he shot himself and left a paper in which he wrote 'My God, I have been a coward'. I concealed the manner of his death to save his parents unnecessary grief. The third tank was absent, lost its way."

 

Hart goes on to write;

 

'George MacPeherson did not die instantly, but was taken back to a CCS where he succembed to his injuries.'

 

Basil Henriques is subsequently quoted as saying;

 

"The nervous strain in this first battle of the tanks for officers and crew alike was ghastly. Of my company, one officer went mad and shot his engine to make it go faster, another shot himself because he thought he had failed to do as well as he should, two others including myself had what I suppose can be called a nrevous breakdown."

 

Thank you for digging up the chain of evidence. It seems quite unequivocal.

 

Here is the HQ 16th Inf Bde (6th Div) war diary account. Note the comments in the first and last paragraphs relating to the tanks.

 

" Sept 15th CHALK DUGOUTS. The attack started at 6:20 a.m. The 8th Bedfords crossed the parapet and attacked across the open with a bombing party, attacking up our [?] trench from the SE. They reached the top of the ridge when the German machine guns caught them and the enemy's wire fencing stopping them, they could make no more headway. They attacked most gallantly against a very strong position. The Tanks were supposed to have gone for the QUADRILATERAL before the infantry started; two of them however broke down, one never getting further than Brigade HQ and the other never crossing our front line. the third got forward but got blinded by the periscope being shot away and all the peep holes also. This tank returned with the driver wounded and the Officer also.

 

The 1st Buffs supported the 8th Bedfords with the finest courage but could not stand against the very heavy machine gun fire opposite [?] to them. This regiment suffered most casualties during the day. A great number found cover in the shell holes and managed to get back into the trench running SE from the QUADRILATERAL held by the 8th Bedfords. The 2nd York and Lancaster Regt followed the Buffs but got cover before they came under the very heavy fore that the others had been subjected to and did not suffer too much.

 

The 1st KSLI (less two platoons attached to 1st London Field Coy RE and two platoons held back for carrying parties at Bde HQ) were stopped in the assembly trenches of the 1st Buffs. All carrying parties of these regiments deserve the highest praise and carried out their duties with the greatest courage. The troops in the front line although very crowded and a great percentage of wounded lacked nothing throughout the day by way of bombs, SAA etc thanks to their carrying parties.The attack was resumed in the evening by the 18th Infantry Bde with the 11th Essex attacking from the SE and the 14th DLI from the NW. the 18th Infantry Bde attack was to be supported by a bombing attack of the 2nd York and Lancaster Regt, 16th Infantry Bde. This attack started at 7:30 pm and failed. The 11th Essex lost their direction in the attack.

 

The main cause of the morning's failure was that the artillery barrage was made to suit the TANKS. The TANKS failed and our men had to advance across the open with no help from the BARRAGE. Also the QUADRILATERAL had not bee [illegible] out by heavy guns beforehand..."

 

Capitals in the original. 

 

Edit. Cross-referencing this with the OH 1916 Vol II, the attack on the Quadrilateral on 14th-15th Sep 1916 is barely mentioned, and there is no mention of the Tanks. 

Edited 14 September , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

HQ 6th Div has some nice detail Included as an Appendix to the Op Orders was a document "Instructions for Employment of Tanks" which seems to be the earliest indication to the formations of the use of Tanks. 

 

MG

 

[Guest]

..

[Gardenerbill]

Was the tank used in the program the working replica created for the film Warhorse?

[Guest]

Slightly related, I see that Helion are about to republish Tanks at Fleurs by Treveor Pidgeon click

 

One only sees good reviews of this book. Long out of print. MG

[Andrew Upton]

10 minutes ago, Gardenerbill said:

Was the tank used in the program the working replica created for the film Warhorse?

 

The exterior moving shots were. There was clearly a lot of stuff done in and around the Bovington Tank Museum (using their recreated inside trenches, dug-out, recruiting office and the War Horse tank for the shots of a tank moving around fields, etc, as well as the interviews with David Willey). Not sure where they did some of the interiors and close-up exterior tank work, but the War Horse tank isn't authentic inside, and as already noted whenever they went to a close-up of the viewing hatches with the actors inside the Lewis gun that should have been visible mysteriously disappeared. Possibly done using one of the other, original, WW1 tanks instead.

 

All the kit worn by the actors in the stuff filmed at Bovington was very poor, the sort of things available on the cheap from Ebay and presumably supplied by the production crew or a very poor costume hire company. This was in direct contrast to the outside trench scenes (I thought filmed at Whittington Barracks, but not sure) but done with proper reenactors (I recognized a few faces and names in the end credits), where kit looked infinitely better.

[Gardenerbill]

Thanks Andrew,

I must admit I was baffled by the uniforms, I hope the explanation was budget constraints, rather than indifference.

[PRC]

On ‎13‎/‎09‎/‎2016 at 11:20, Gareth Davies said:

 

 

By waving his arms, by standing in front of the tank (or in line with any of the vision slits), by banging on the side with his stick/a rifle?

 

 

 

I've been working my way through both the known dead and also trying to establish a rudimentary roll call of the survivors of the 9th Norfolks in this action. One of the Officers who died was a 2nd Lieutenant Bashforth and an internet trawl brought me to a piece on his life and circumstances of his death.

 

"The attack was to be made by the 9th Norfolk Regiment, to the right of the 1st Leicester Regiment, each with a front of about 250 yards. They lined up in a sunken road behind the main trenches, which were manned by battalions of the Suffolk Regiment and the Sherwood Foresters. As they waited to attack at 5.50 am, the tanks moved forward. There were three supporting the 6th Division, of which two broke down, while the third tank (in front of the Norfolks) was badly shot up by German machine gun fire and lost its bearings. Accounts vary as to what exactly then happened. One version states that the unsighted tank began firing into a trench packed with the waiting Norfolks until Lieutenant Crosse leapt out to wave the tank away."

http://www.hiddenlives.org.uk/blog/2016/06/2nd-lieutenant-jfc-bashforth/#_bookmark0

 

The source for the version involving Lieutenant Crosse is given as Lyn Macdonald: Somme (London, 1983) page 276. As one of the officers listed as wounded on that day was a Lieutenant E C Crosse (Edward Castellain "Ned" Crosse), the immediate presumption was that it must be him. Edward was Mentioned in Despatches for an action on the Somme and given the significant number of lives he potentially saved probably deserved something better. However in the same unit was his brother Arthur John Green Crosse, also a Lieutenant. He had a Military Cross Gazetted in February 1917 but so far I've not been able to track down a citation. So either could have been the quick thinking officer who sorted the issue.

 

One of the other names on the list of the dead was a Private Albert Caston. While looking for more on him I came across a thread here on the forum which actually quotes the relevant page from Lynn Macdonalds book.

 

"Lynn MacDonald (in her great book "Somme") says of the tank: They had planned to send three tanks into subdue the Quadrilateral 20 minutes before the troops went over at zero hour. One tank broke its tail on the way up. Another developed engine trouble. The third appeared but, unlike the solitary tank which so dramatically subdued the Germans resistance at Delville Wood, it made a tragic error. Lurching along beside what its crew took to be a Germans’ frontline trench they sprayed it with machine gun fire. The trench was packed with soldiers. The kill was enormous. But it was a British assembly trench and the soldiers were men of the 9^th Norfolk’s waiting to go over the top. It was Captain Crosse who put a stop to that. He leapt out of the trench and rushed up to the tank whose guns were still blazing. It was difficult to make himself heard above it pandemonium, but furious gesticulation was enough. The tank swung away and was last seen tuning to the north, moving parallel to Straight Trench. Straight Trench was the German front line running between the triangle and the Quadrilateral."

 

 

Forum member Pat Atkins who wrote that recommended checking the original book as they'd got that extract from another source. On my way through Norwich today I did just that, checking out the current published version in a chain booksellers. It was on page 287 in the paperback version but the extract above, (apart from the last seen "tuning" to the north) ties up with the books contents. However I didn't have time to check what was Lynns' original source but I now have the actions attributed to a Captain Crosse!

 

And a statement that the kill was enormous!

 

Ned and his brother Arthur, both sons of the then vicar of Hickling, moved to Malaya after the war and worked on the rubber plantations. Serving as Officers in one of the Malay State volunteer units they were captured by the Japanese. Ned would die in a prison camp in December 1942.

Edited 14 September , 2016 by PRC

[Guest]

Today is the 100th anniversary of this historic event.

 

Remembering the crews.

[David Filsell]

"One only sees good reviews of this book. Long out of print. MG"

And that's exactly what Trevor's ground breaking book deserved. In view of Steven Pope's ne w book  (The First Tank Crews;  The lives of the Tankmen who fought at the Battle of Flers Courcelette 15 September 1916. Helion, 400 pp. Ills throughout ISBN 979-1-910777-77-1). This may be of interest.

 

In 1995 Trevor Pigeon self published his seminal work The Tanks at Flers. His decision was dictated by the fact that no publisher was prepared to contemplate publishing his two oversize the volumes in the form the author wished.  

Trevor was simply unprepared to edit the work into the smaller book the publishers considered saleable. He would not countenance small scale reproductions of the 12 large scale maps for volume two or any reduction in the number of colour and monochrome pictures for the work.  Since his death the book has been out of print and copies coveted rarities for those who consider the first tanks to be the big boys’ toys of choice in the Great War.

Whilst Stephen Pope, author of The First Tank Crews, clearly owes much to Pigeon’s work - which he fully acknowledges - his book embarks on a far less technical view of the first tanks at war. It is therefore important, before purchasing, to realise that this  work is not about the technology or the precisely detailed minutia of combat at Flers and, if you are not a tank completist, or if armoured combat and technology drives your reading, this at may not be a book for you.

Instead Steven Pope’s detailed approach valuably concentrates on those who crewed the vehicles at Flers.  It is the story of the officers and men who operated them, died in them or were wounded in them - the young men who joined the Motor Machine Gun Corps and took unreliable, untried weapons into action and suffered both the immediate and long term consequences of their war.

Like Trevor Pigeon, Steven Pope is an undaunted researcher and a writer who presents his, often surprising, conclusions with skill .The First Tank Crews is no simplistic review of battles fought, lost and won, it is above all a highly detailed work of memorial to the tank pioneers who crewed and directed the tanks in their first battle, their lives, deaths and, for the more fortunate, their return to civilian life.

Together,  Pigeon and Pope’s book offer an fascinating view of Flers and the ‘tankies’ who fought it. That Simon People’s publisher is Helion is in itself a guarantee of textual, illustrative and publication quality as well as good proof reading and sensible pricing. That the publisher is also republishing The Tanks at Flers after 21 years is a bonus for anyone who shares a fascination with the tank at war and the men who operated them.    

 

Edited 15 September , 2016 by David Filsell

[Mark Hone]

I am pleased to say that I had the foresight to buy Trevor Pigeon's superb book when it came out. I think I ordered it via an advert in ' Stand To!' It's a fabulous piece of exhaustive research, reminiscent of the books published by ' After the Battle'. I'm rereading it for the anniversary. 

[Chris_Baker]

I have one, too, signed by Trevor when he handed it to me. It remains one of the best researched and produced books I have ever seen. It's good to see that it is to be republished.

[Guest]

15 hours ago, PRC said:

Forum member Pat Atkins who wrote that recommended checking the original book as they'd got that extract from another source. On my way through Norwich today I did just that, checking out the current published version in a chain booksellers. It was on page 287 in the paperback version but the extract above, (apart from the last seen "tuning" to the north) ties up with the books contents. However I didn't have time to check what was Lynns' original source but I now have the actions attributed to a Captain Crosse!

 

And a statement that the kill was enormous!

 

 

Lynn MacDonald's book "Somme" provides no foot note or end note reference for the anecdote. In the long list of personal memoirs there is no mention of any diary from Crosse, 

 

It is a small mystery. I have little doubt that MacDonald is quoting a source, however it seems strange that the Battalion and Brigade diaries don't mention it if it was such a large scale error that resulted in large numbers of casualties. MG

[PRC]

1 hour ago, QGE said:

 

 however it seems strange that the Battalion and Brigade diaries don't mention it if it was such a large scale error that resulted in large numbers of casualties. MG

 

Depends on whether you subscribe to the cock-up & cover-up theory of organisations. This was little to be gained by flagging up the incident - it might have made other troops wary of working with the new weapon, could have been disastrous for the morale of the tankies and wasn't what the high-ups would have wanted to hear. By the time the diaries were being written up it was old news and most of the voices who might have spoken up about it were dead or well in the rear at hospitals. Plus looks like group think was to blame the tanks for not letting the artillery do their jobs when the reality is that if the no-fire zone was 100 yards wide and the Norfolks and Leicesters attacked on a combined front of 500 yards, then 80% of the target area was still fair game - both units were held up on uncut wire.

 

Interestingly I did come across an extract from the diary of a Private Soldier, Dennis Douglas,  who was wounded in the attack. He makes no reference to being fired on by the tank.

 

September 1916:

We were moved up in stages and by the 10th of the month, had dug in, at the appropriately named “sand pits”. The shelling, which had increased with everyday, now was like steam trains thundering over our heads. Sleep was something to dream about.

 

On the 14th we moved up to a once wooded area. It was a shell pocked landscape of half buried tree stumps. We had little or no cover and set about digging in. Major Turner and Captain Robinson were organising the effort to construct some kind of shelters, when a shell scored a direct hit on their, so called, command post. I noticed George had become seriously withdrawn and ghost like. This was the first action of any consequence he had been in. We had little time to collect our thoughts or dead and injured. At 10pm we were ordered to move up to our start line for the morning attack.

 

September 15th 1916, 1am:

Eventually we made it to the line of trenches held by the Suffolks. The chaos was total and it took our senior officers an age to get some sort of order. At 5.50am a strange mechanical thing ground its way through our line. Like some mobile pill box. Later I was told this new metal war machine was called a Tank. Sometime later we were ordered to form up and prepare to advance; I kept a watchful eye on George. When the time came Lientenant Garnham blew his whistle and we climbed over the top.

 

My heart was pounding fit to burst, and I was feeling light headed. I lost sight of George and just kept heading forward in a low, stumbling stoop. All around me was the whizzing of bullets and the crash of shell fire. The churned up earth felt more like a porridge mixture. At last I caught sight of George in a group of men being led by Major Bradshaw. As I tried to reach them I felt a sting in my right leg and was spun round and fell to the ground. For a moment I looked up into the sky and wondered if this was my lot. I must have passed out, as the next thing I remember, two privates from the Suffolks were dragging me towards their trench.

 

22nd September 1916 continued:

Still today I do not know what has happened to George. Some of the lads who survived with me, believe he was lost with Major Bradshaw in front of the strong-point called “Quadrilateral”. Before leaving France I heard the battalion had been stopped by uncut wire and over half had lost their lives. So many friends and George were unaccounted for.

 

(The George referred to is Private 40010 George Dennis Douglas who also came from Cawston).

http://www.cawstonparish.info/ww1diarydd.htm

 

As you say it is a small mystery.