ss002d6252 Posted 8 September , 2016 Share Posted 8 September , 2016 An article in the Daily Mail about the first tank attack failing due to 'rebellious irish pow's'. Is there any substance in the story?http://dailym.ai/2c9j6yN Craig Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Gareth Davies Posted 8 September , 2016 Share Posted 8 September , 2016 If @johntaylor is saying it is true, I am going to believe him (rather than the hyperbolic version in the Daily Fail). Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ss002d6252 Posted 8 September , 2016 Author Share Posted 8 September , 2016 (edited) 7 minutes ago, Gareth Davies said: If @johntaylor is saying it is true, I am going to believe him (rather than the hyperbolic version in the Daily Fail). Thanks Gareth - I tend to take the DM stories with a pinch of salt unless I know the background is relatively solid (and even then their own take on the matter may sometimes be questionable.) Craig Edited 8 September , 2016 by ss002d6252 Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Moonraker Posted 8 September , 2016 Share Posted 8 September , 2016 Seems plausible. Pity the Daily Mail article doesn't indicate where Josh Taylor got the information from - German war records presumably. Perhaps the BBC History Magazine is more forthcoming? As always, it's the comments appended to the article that depress. Moonraker Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Sidearm Posted 14 September , 2016 Share Posted 14 September , 2016 Refer to John Taylor's book "Deborah and the war of the tanks 1917" to be published by Pen and Sword at the end of this month, I believe (though it's already in the Tank Museum bookshop and I have a copy - thanks John!). The information comes from German archives and the book is fully referenced. So, buy the book (and don't buy the Daily Mail...). Gwyn Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
SiegeGunner Posted 15 September , 2016 Share Posted 15 September , 2016 I have spent a large proportion of my working time over the last few years translating German reports on interrogations/conversations with prisoners in 1916-17 and I would be very interested to see the original German documents in this case. Many of these intelligence reports combine information obtained from numbers of prisoners from several different units and it is not always possible to tell who said what. A couple of weeks ago, for example, I translated a report that said it was based on examinations of 1 officer and 40+ men of one unit, a sergeant and 20+ men of another unit, and 8 men from another unit. Apart from a couple of items that were clearly attributed to the officer, and one that probably came from the sergeant, the rest of the information in the report was unattributed and could have come from anyone. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
BFBSM Posted 15 September , 2016 Share Posted 15 September , 2016 I am currently reading Guderian's Achtung-Panzer, in which he writes: Quote As late as 16 November 1917 the commanders of Second Army had the impression that no major attacks were to be anticipated in the immediate future. Reconnaissance patrols on 18 November confirmed that the British 36th Division was holding the front at Trescault, as before. The prisoners taken on this occasion said that the division was due to be relieved by 51st Division, and that they had caught sight of tanks in Bois d'Havrincourt; they added that an artillery preparation of several hours would precede an attack that was planned for 20 November. On the 19th a prisoner confirmed that the British 20th Division was still present. Enemy air activity and ground traffic were livelier than usual, and a number of new batteries we're spied in the Bois d'Havrincourt. Otherwise 19 November passed peacefully, and there was no notable increase of registration fire on the part of the British batteries. [page 79, Cassell, 1992] Mark Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
johntaylor Posted 15 September , 2016 Share Posted 15 September , 2016 (edited) Hi, sorry I seem to have come rather late to this discussion, but Gareth and Gwyn have explained the background accurately. The full details and references are given in Deborah and the War of the Tanks, but to summarise: SiegeGunner is correct - the interrogation report is an aggregate of interviews with six members of 1st Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers, captured in a raid on November 18, 1917. This is indeed the raid mentioned by Guderian, and in other accounts of the battle. The interrogation report doesn't specify exactly who said what, other than some comments from the sergeant in charge which are specifically attributed to him. The report makes it clear that the prisoners were unhappy because they had been left behind to man a sap in no man's land while the rest of the battalion was withdrawn. They felt they were being sacrificed to disguise the fact that fresh troops from 51st Highland Division were secretly moving into position ready for the attack. In fact there was some justification for this, because a screen of troops from 36th Ulster Division was deliberately left in place in case the Germans mounted a raid. However, the report also says that "the Irishmen among the prisoners are thoroughly war-weary and speak badly of the English. They say if an uprising takes place in Ireland, they would take up arms against England without more ado." There are other comments to this effect, and this was clearly a factor in what occurred. In the end it was possible to identify the prisoners using ICRC records. Two were English NCOs (including the sergeant, whose service record has survived), two were Ulster Protestants, and two were Catholics - one from Northern and one from Southern Ireland. However, I have stressed in the book that we don't know exactly who said what, and no-one should point the finger of blame at any individual. While it's generally known that the prisoners gave away some information, the interrogation report reveals for the first time exactly what was said, and more importantly why it was said - one reason being bitterness over British actions in Ireland. In addition, Deborah and the War of the Tanks goes on to show how the Germans reacted by moving substantial infantry and artillery reinforcements into and towards Flesquieres and Havrincourt, just in case the claims turned out to be true. This was despite widespread scepticism, especially among the front-line troops who had seen no sign of preparations, and knew the British couldn't attack without a long artillery bombardment to break through the barbed wire. When the attack did take place, using tanks instead of artillery to crush the wire, the Germans managed to hold Flesquieres by the narrowest of margins, thus preventing the British from taking the vital Bourlon Ridge on the first day. In the book I argue that the reinforcements who were sent forward in response to the prisoners' information were crucial in tipping the balance in the Germans' favour. However I don't want to give away too much! I hope you enjoy the book, and look forward to further discussions. All the best, John Edited 15 September , 2016 by johntaylor Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Posted 15 September , 2016 Share Posted 15 September , 2016 (edited) Given the fact that Ireland did not have conscription it would be interesting to establish why such an anti-British soldier joined in the first place and why the 1st Bn R Irish Fusiliers rather than a Southern Irish Battalion. By definition he had to be a volunteer if, as indicated, he came from Ireland. We know these men existed but seem to be very small in number if Roger Casment's failed attempt to recruit them in Limburg POW camp is any indication; 56 in total out of 2,500 or roughly 2%. Do we know when these individuals were recruited? and who they were? Is there a remote possibility that terrified POWs snatched in a raid and lucky to be alive might have just been telling their captors what they thought they wanted to hear? How can we differentiate between a genuinely anti-British soldier from Ireland and one who is simply trying to save his own skin? I can't imagine that the intelligence gathered by the Germans from Prisoners snatched in trench raids was much different from the British experience. In the British archives there are probably many hundreds of accounts of Prisoners providing masses of information, some of which was conflicting and some of which turned out to be false. If a formation captures enough prisoners, some of their terrified testimony on timings might simply be 'correct' by chance. Similarly, terrified prisoner might choose to appear to be anti-British by way of currying favour with his captors and hopefully increasing his chances of survival. I slightly struggle with the idea that a private soldier knew days in advance of the precise date of a major attack. Most of the (British) Operation Orders at Div, Brigade and Battalion level omit the date of attack for security reasons and the fact that other factors such as weather could delay the exact date (release of gas, assembly of troops, ability to observe from the air etc). The general protocol was to release confirmation of the date with other minor changes to the original Op Orders very close to the actual day, often just the day before. Even then the dissemination of information down to Pte T Atkins was controlled. The 1st Bn War Diary records leaving 11 ORs in saps on 17th Nov 1917 when the remainder of the Battalion withdrew at 10:30 pm. If these soldiers knew of the attack they would have known by this time. The trenches were taken over by the 2/7th West Yorks 185th Inf Bde, 62nd Div. All preliminary orders only mention Z Day rather than a specific date Curious to understand this better. MG Edited 19 September , 2016 by Guest Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
johntaylor Posted 15 September , 2016 Share Posted 15 September , 2016 Hi, like you I was fascinated by this story and wanted to explore it further. Wearing my author's hat I would have to say that many of these questions are covered in the book (available from all good booksellers). However I realise that's not terribly helpful here. Re the points you raise, we know that one of the Irish Catholic soldiers joined up in October 1914 and had been in France since August 1915. As you know, there was intense debate early in the war about how the Nationalist community should respond to the war, and it's entirely possible that he became disillusioned later on - particularly after the Easter Rising, which is mentioned in the interrogation report. But I would stress we don't know, and this is pure speculation. After the war he joined the RAF but was dismissed (for violence against a superior) and then joined the Irish Army, but seems to have died of natural causes in 1924. Not surprisingly, his British medals were returned unclaimed. The other Irish Catholic soldier is harder to trace with certainty, but it appears his cousin died of wounds in Gallipoli in 1915, which may have been a factor. As to why they were in 36th Ulster Division - their battalion, 1st RIF, only joined in August 1917, and the German report makes the point that the character of the division had changed and it now included men from all over England and Ireland. Re the point about telling the Germans what they wanted to hear - that was probably the case, but at least some of the prisoners certainly told what they knew, and some also said they were disillusioned with Britain because of its treatment of Ireland. Whatever the reasons, they certainly passed on details of troop movements they'd witnessed (including the presence of the elite 51st Division, which rang alarm bells in itself), as well as the presence of tanks, and the expected date and time of the attack - all of which are in the interrogation report dated November 19, so they must have known about them in advance. One can only conclude that people knew more than they should have done, and more than one might assume from the official records. At the same time, the prisoners only knew what they'd seen and had no idea of the true scale of the attack. They said they'd seen three tanks, whereas in fact there were more like 400 along the entire six-mile front. On the basis of this the Germans assumed a large-scale raid was being planned to capture Havrincourt, and immediately set about reinforcing this place and the Flesquieres ridge behind. That's why I find it significant that this was the only area where the attack was repelled (other than on the right, where the British failed to take the canal crossings for well documented reasons). The full scale of the offensive only became apparent to the Germans once it was under way, and by then it was too late. Regarding the British obtaining information from German prisoners - this is undoubtedly true, and there are many well documented cases in the same attack. But this case is particularly interesting because of the light it sheds on the impact of events in Ireland, and because it had such potentially far-reaching consequences. It's also worth mentioning that in the course of my research, I found a photograph showing four of the prisoners with their captors, one of whom has his hand on a prisoner's shoulder. It's now appeared in a number of newspapers so you should be able to Google it. Hope this helps to clarify the situation. John Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
SiegeGunner Posted 15 September , 2016 Share Posted 15 September , 2016 Photographs of prisoners with their captors, and in particular officer prisoners with the German intelligence officer who interviewed them, are not uncommon. As for prisoners who expressed animosity towards the British, the highest ranking whose examination report I have translated was a Brigadier General. The Germans were well aware that ORs were given very little information and readily believed prisoners who said that they knew next to nothing. Even those were useful when they recounted where they had come from and what they had seen on the way. Their ideal prisoner was a regular sergeant, as they tended to know as much or more than their officers, but very few of them proved cooperative. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
johntaylor Posted 15 September , 2016 Share Posted 15 September , 2016 This all sounds very interesting. Are your translations available, or are you planning to publish them? John Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
The Scorer Posted 16 September , 2016 Share Posted 16 September , 2016 "I slightly struggle with the idea that a private soldier knew days in advance of the precise date of a major attack. " I mostly agree with what you say, but Frank Richards in "Old Soldiers Never Die" relates several occurrences in which he says that Signallers always knew in advance what was going to happen as a result of their job. If one of the captured men was a Signaller (and I don't know if he was), could this have been how the information was known? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Posted 16 September , 2016 Share Posted 16 September , 2016 (edited) 32 minutes ago, The Scorer said: "I slightly struggle with the idea that a private soldier knew days in advance of the precise date of a major attack. " I mostly agree with what you say, but Frank Richards in "Old Soldiers Never Die" relates several occurrences in which he says that Signallers always knew in advance what was going to happen as a result of their job. If one of the captured men was a Signaller (and I don't know if he was), could this have been how the information was known? I don't doubt that signallers (in the vicinity of Bn HQ) would be better informed. I do doubt that they would know Z day 48 hours in advance simply because Z day often relied on factors beyond the powers of the commanders (weather for example, or patrol reports confirming success (or otherwise) in wire cutting.). Any soldier would be aware of imminent operations simply due to the build up in stores and particularly ammunition and the large fatigue parties involved. Ditto gas. etc. I would still contend that it would be highly unusual for a soldier to know the exact date of Z day and the exact hour of the attack two days before the event. Put another way I would be interested in seeing the evidence as all the Op Orders I have seen from this period have the date and times omitted as a standard operating procedure. This event was after all in Nov 1917. In the example cited, there are lots of assumptions. Do we know that the German's moved in reinforcements based on this single testimony? Or were there a myriad of other German intelligence gathering snippets that might have influenced their decision? It seems so unlikely that a single soldiers' testimony under interrogation would trigger such a large scale move, so the hard evidence would be interesting to see. MG Edited 16 September , 2016 by Guest Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Black Maria Posted 16 September , 2016 Share Posted 16 September , 2016 On 08/09/2016 at 15:20, Moonraker said: As always, it's the comments appended to the article that depress. Moonraker I always find them quite amusing , when the WW1 articles appear I sometimes go straight to the comments first and occasionally I even find that one or two of them actually know something about the subject. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
The Scorer Posted 16 September , 2016 Share Posted 16 September , 2016 29 minutes ago, QGE said: I don't doubt that signallers (in the vicinity of Bn HQ) would be better informed. I do doubt that they would know Z day 48 hours in advance simply because Z day often relied on factors beyond the powers of the commanders (weather for example, or patrol reports confirming success (or otherwise) in wire cutting.). Any soldier would be aware of imminent operations simply due to the build up in stores and particularly ammunition and the large fatigue parties involved. Ditto gas. etc. I would still contend that it would be highly unusual for a soldier to know the exact date of Z day and the exact hour of the attack two days before the event. Put another way I would be interested in seeing the evidence as all the Op Orders I have seen from this period have the date and times omitted as a standard operating procedure. This event was after all in Nov 1917. In the example cited, there are lots of assumptions. Do we know that the German's moved in reinforcements based on this single testimony? Or were there a myriad of other German intelligence gathering snippets that might have influenced their decision? It seems so unlikely that a single soldiers' testimony under interrogation would trigger such a large scale move, so the hard evidence would be interesting to see. MG Ah, okay, points taken - thanks. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
johntaylor Posted 16 September , 2016 Share Posted 16 September , 2016 (edited) Hi, I'm interested to hear your views, and would of course be interested to hear what you make of the evidence presented in the book. Actually I'm not sure many assumptions have been made, as the case is based on British and German records which are fully referenced, so it's possible to assess them for yourself. Where information is uncertain then I have tried to spell this out. Regarding how the prisoners knew so much - in most cases there's no mystery there, as they were describing things they'd seen in terms of preparations for the attack. As an example, they say (this is my translation): "In the past week a number of officers have been seen in the lines from different arms of the service, including artillery and engineer officers, who inspected the trenches and the ground in front." There are more similar details, some quite specific relating to units, tanks, etc. In most cases the report states what they saw, where and when, the only exception being the expected date and time which came from "one of the prisoners". He isn't identified, nor is his source. It's worth stressing that he gave the correct date, but the timing was quite general - the prisoner said the attack was fixed for "early on the 20th. Artillery fire will start at 2 a.m. and the infantry attack will take place at dawn." He was completely wrong about the bombardment, but right about the infantry attack which started at 6.20am. Regarding whether the Germans were likely to have responded in this way to the testimony of a small group of prisoners (not a single prisoner) - again I would refer you to the German unit histories which are referenced (and in some cases quoted) in the book. These make it clear there were was intense uncertainty among the Germans about whether the information could be genuine, bearing in mind there were no other signs of preparation. There were one or two other snippets of intelligence, but the interrogation report was the only substantive evidence that anything was afoot. As I mentioned above, many in the front-line believed it was another fire-drill but still went through the motions. It's also clear there was debate about this afterwards in Germany, running into the 1930s, with mutual recriminations about who did what and who should have done more. Setting all this aside, if you look at troop movements just before the attack then it's clear the Germans did respond by moving units of 84 Infanterie-Regiment, 27 Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment, and 213 Feld-Artillerie-Regiment into Flesquieres on the day before the attack, or towards it so they could be sent forward quickly if required. The original records of these units have been destroyed, but all three left comprehensive regimental histories plus other accounts which make it clear that this was done in response to the prisoners' allegations. Of course we can't say what would have happened if they hadn't been there, but it's difficult to see the Germans could have held onto the village without these reinforcements, bearing in mind that the two battalions of 84 Infanterie-Regiment holding the front-line had been overwhelmed after a fierce fight, and the positions on either side were held by Landwehr reservists who pretty much surrendered en masse. As is well known, the gunners of 108 Feld-Artillerie-Regiment were dug in behind the ridge and certainly would have destroyed a number of tanks, but the toll was undoubtedly higher because they had been reinforced the night before by 213 FAR. But in my view it was the infantry reinforcements who really tipped the balance. Looking forward to further debate on this once you've had a chance to examine the evidence. All the best, John Edited 16 September , 2016 by johntaylor Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Posted 16 September , 2016 Share Posted 16 September , 2016 (edited) John Thank you for the detail. Given he didn't know when the artillery barrage was being launched is it a reasonable chance that he made this part up? There are no Op Orders that suggest this time for the barrage that were subsequently changed. By extension would that increase the probability that he also guessed the date and time? I note he said 'dawn' rather than a specific time which given British tactics at the time would not be a difficult guess. I have never seen a Op Order with 'dawn' as the start time. If, as suggested he was in the 'know', he would presumably 'know' the exact time. There is a more than a slight possibility that he was simply guessing. MG Edited 16 September , 2016 by Guest Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
johntaylor Posted 16 September , 2016 Share Posted 16 September , 2016 Hi, I think it's clear these men didn't have access to any special inside knowledge - the fact they talked about a barrage starting at 2am shows they knew nothing about the unique character of this operation, which involved a surprise attack spearheaded by tanks with an almost simultaneous barrage. As you say, dawn might have been a stab in the dark (as it were). However the fact that one of them mentioned the 20th shows he had heard something, perhaps just a rumour, but if so an accurate one, or else a guess, but if so an inspired one. The interesting thing is that this shows how much ordinary soldiers knew about what was going on, however much they shouldn't or 'couldn't' have done so. In fact Sir Douglas Haig heard of the raid and was worried the prisoners might have given something away, but was reassured by General Byng that they wouldn't have known anything. He was almost right about that - but they had seen stockpiles of ammunition and supplies, and newly arrived guns and fresh gun-pits, and officers from different arms doing recces of the sector, and soldiers from 51st and 62nd Division in the area, and a few tanks. They had heard "general talk of a forthcoming attack", and one had heard a time and date. It wasn't much, but it was enough for the Germans. John Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Gareth Davies Posted 18 September , 2016 Share Posted 18 September , 2016 I bought the book on Monday and had a good read of the Cambrai chapters on Friday, and then I went to Flesquieres yesterday. I haven't a clue about the German's ability to interrogate prisoners but I do know that they had a well thought out plan for the defence of Flesquieres, and they did things that could well have been influenced by a little bit of new intelligence. On 15 September 2016 at 14:29, johntaylor said: In addition, Deborah and the War of the Tanks goes on to show how the Germans reacted by moving substantial infantry and artillery reinforcements into and towards Flesquieres and Havrincourt, just in case the claims turned out to be true. This was despite widespread scepticism, especially among the front-line troops who had seen no sign of preparations, and knew the British couldn't attack without a long artillery bombardment to break through the barbed wire. When the attack did take place, using tanks instead of artillery to crush the wire, the Germans managed to hold Flesquieres by the narrowest of margins, thus preventing the British from taking the vital Bourlon Ridge on the first day. In the book I argue that the reinforcements who were sent forward in response to the prisoners' information were crucial in tipping the balance in the Germans' favour. As the tanks of D & E Bns moved out at 0620hrs, the British HE barrage started to pound the German front line trenches for 24 minutes. The barrage then lifted and moved north in 6 waves until it targeted Flesquieres at 0915. But there was also a smokescreen on the village from 0620 - 0745 in the west and 0620 - 0835 in the east. Despite the first line of trenches being under heavy bombardment in the period 0620 - 0800 and despite the smokescreen obscuring the view from the village down the hill to the south, the Germans knew what was going on and brought up some guns. But they didn't push the guns onto the ridge line and fire down the hill to the advancing tanks (which were not that visible because of the smokescreen), they stopped to the rear (north) of the slope and waited for the tanks to crest the ridge. Clever defensive plan just in case or plan influenced by recent intelligence? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Posted 18 September , 2016 Share Posted 18 September , 2016 (edited) On 9/16/2016 at 18:40, johntaylor said: They had heard "general talk of a forthcoming attack", and one had heard a time and date. It wasn't much, but it was enough for the Germans. John If I understand this correctly, it is suggested that one of the prisoners 'knew' the exact time and date of the attack? And this person was a Private? And the possibility that he was guessing has been discounted? Furthermore, the implications are that this lowly Private deliberately gave the game away? If none of the Op Orders up to that date included the date or time of the attack. They are blank. It was only confirmed afterwards. So how could anyone outside a few people in GHQ 'know'? How does a lowly Pte in the trenches overhear something that had not yet been disseminated from GHQ miles to the rear? Separately, RA and RE in the front line was a daily occurrence and nothing unusual. Ditto stockpiling stores, ammunition etc. Tanks on the front line had been used for over a year. Etc. I suspect the Germans were worried about being attacked all the time which is why they conducted trench raids all the time. We don't know for sure if he was repeating something he heard. That is an assumption not a fact. If he was repeating something he had heard, then that person was also clearly guessing given the inaccuracy of the bombardment details. Given the total inaccuracy of the bombardment part, it seems far more likely he was guessing (or repeating someone else's guess) and telling his captors what he thought they wanted to hear. If if you interrogate enough prisoners and they talk, some are going to guess correctly. It does not necessarily mean that they knew. Unless he had a set of written orders on him there is no way we can be sure he knew the exact time and date. By extension one might consider the real possibility that it was a guess. I would be be curious to know if the whole of the German Front line had received orders that they should expect an attack with tanks on 20th on the back of this intelligence. One might expect them already to be standing to at dawn on every day. Just my view. MG Edit: Some reference material. Incidentally the 1st Bn R Irish Fusiliers trenches were taken over by the 2/7th Bn West Yorks (TF) part of 62nd Div (TF) in 17th Nov 1917.... i.e not the 51st Highland Div (TF) which was to the right of 62nd Div. The Op Orders for the 62nd Div all have Z Day rather than a date right up to and including the 19th Nov 1917. Ditto Op Orders for 51st Div. Working backwards, the 51st Highland DIv did not move forward until 18th according to the HQ 51st Div diary, so it is difficult to understand how these men, being left in their forward Sap on 17th could be aware of the 51st Highland Div which were nowhere near their position. The 185th Inf Bde diary (WO 95/3080) records the 2/7th taking over the trenches of the 1st Bn R Irish Fus on 17th Nov and mentions that the outpost line was not relieved. It records that at 05:30 on 18th Nov that E Sap was raided and 5 prisoners of the 1st Bn R Irish Fus were captured. This is also recorded in the 2/7th Bn West Yorks war diary (WO 95/3082) which also has an Op Order No.34 time-stamped 11:00 am on the 19th Nov which still refers to Z day. This is 30 hours after the Royal Irish Fusiliers were captured. Timings all remain referenced to zero hour. The HQ 36th Div diary also mentions the trench raid in slightly better detail. There seems to be little evidence of the date and time in the available paper trail. If the date and time were not yet established on 17th when the unfortunate men were left in E Sap, I cant see how any of them 'knew' these critical details. On this evidence I would assume they were probably guessing. MG Edited 19 September , 2016 by Guest Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
johntaylor Posted 19 September , 2016 Share Posted 19 September , 2016 (edited) I agree there are excellent grounds for supposing that these men should not, and could not, have known anything about the plans for the attack. However, I think at some point it will be necessary to adjust this view to take account of the fact that they clearly did! To me this is part of the fascination of historical investigation, that new evidence can sometimes show things are not as tidy as they may seem. In this case, at least some of the prisoners revealed there was "general talk" of a forthcoming attack (in other words a rumour), and described the preparations they had seen with their own eyes, including the presence of tanks and the fact that they had seen troops from 51st Highland Division before they went into the line on November 13. In addition, one of the prisoners said the attack was fixed for dawn on the 20th. We can speculate endlessly, and interestingly, about whether this was supposition, or inside knowledge, or just a lucky guess. The fact is, it was passed on to the Germans and is described in their interrogation report dated November 19. In fact, the evidence is pretty clear on these points. The really interesting question, about which I'm sure there will be much debate, is whether the information really did tip the balance for the Germans in enabling them to hold Flesquieres. In my view there is strong evidence to support this, but of course we will never definitely know the answer one way or the other. Gareth, I'm glad you were able to read the relevant chapters before your visit to Flesquieres and I hope this added to your interest and understanding, though you obviously know the area well. I think it's hard to visit the Stollenweg, on the way down from Trescault, without a frisson when you know about the desperate last stand of Hauptmann Soltau and his men there, as the tanks and Highlanders rolled over their positions. Very much looking forward to catching up with you next month. John Edited 19 September , 2016 by johntaylor Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Posted 19 September , 2016 Share Posted 19 September , 2016 (edited) 2 hours ago, johntaylor said: In this case, at least some of the prisoners revealed there was "general talk" of a forthcoming attack (in other words a rumour), and described the preparations they had seen with their own eyes, including the presence of tanks and the fact that they had seen troops from 51st Highland Division before they went into the line on November 13. John My underlining. Is the 'November 13' a typo? or is this referring to the R Irish Rifles? The 51st Highland Division TF were between 30 and 40 km away training with Tanks prior to the 13th Nov 1917. The 1st Bn R Irish Fusiliers must have had excellent eyesight to see these troops. They were not within 10km until the day after the men were captured. Between the 7th and 13th Nov the 1st Bn R Irish Rifles were in billets in Metz en Couture (7 km SSW of Flesquieres), then went into the trenches. During this period the 51st Div were many miles away. 152nd Bde for example was in Walrus some 32 Km NW of Flesquieres until the 16th when it moved to Corcelles le Comte, still some 25 Km from Flesquieres. Location of 51st Div in the preceding days (all distances as the crow files. For distances to Metz reduce by approx 1-2 Km) 2nd - 16th Nov: Centred on Hermaville. 152 Bde in Walrus and Dainville, .........................................................32 km NW of Flesquieres 153 Bde in Wailly training with D Battalion Tanks..................................31 km WNW of Flesquieres 154 Bde in Iel les Hameau.....................................................................42 km NW of Flesquieres 16th Nov 152 Bde moves to Courcelles le Comte.................................................25 Km W of Flesquieres 153 Bde moves to Courcelles le Comte.................................................25 Km W of Flesquieres 154 Bde remained at Iel les Hameau.....................................................42 Km NW of Flesquieres 17th Nov: Brigades move by train as follows: Div HQ moves from Hermaville to Ytres................................................ 11 km SW of Flesquieres 152nd Bde moves from Walrus to Rocquingny .....................................15 km SW of Flequieres 153rd Bde moves from Hauteville to Beaulencourt ................................17 km SW of Flesquieres 154th Bde moves from Iel les Hameau to Bapaume ...............................18 km SW of Flesquieres 18th Nov : Div HQ remains at Ytres........................................................................11 km SW of Flesuieres 152nd Bde moves from Rocquingny to Metz en Couture........................7 km SW of Flesquieres 153rd Bde moves from Beaulencourt to Metz..........................................7 km SW of Flesquieres 154th Bde moves from Bapaume to Metz, Rocquigny and Havrincourt.....7 km, 15km and 6 m SW of Flesquieres respectively Which raises question of how these soldiers saw the 51st Div before the 17th when they were many miles away on trains heading towards their concentration points, the nearest of which was 11 km away. 154th Inf Bde (51st Highland Div TF) Op Order No 148 dated 19th Nov 1917 showing date and time "to be notified later". also added (2nd image) Edited 19 September , 2016 by Guest Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
sjustice Posted 19 September , 2016 Share Posted 19 September , 2016 1 hour ago, johntaylor said: <snip> To me this is part of the fascination of historical investigation, that new evidence can sometimes show things are not as tidy as they may seem. <snip> John I absolutely agree. Further, I have now come to the view that when I find 'tidy' I dig a lot harder. Cheers, SMJ Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
johntaylor Posted 19 September , 2016 Share Posted 19 September , 2016 Many thanks for your continuing interest in this topic, and we have presumably shaken off most other members of the forum by now. The records of troop movements are indeed comprehensive, though I think you should check your spelling of Walrus, which is normally to be found in colder climes than those on the Western Front (I suggest Warlus, as shown in the document attached). On a more serious point, November 13 is certainly not a typo. The interrogation report says "Before the 1st RIF went into the line on 13 November, the prisoners saw pioneers from 51st Division (8th Royal Scots) in Metz-en-Couture, as well as various men from other battalions of 51st Division (Gordon Highlanders, Seaforth Highlanders and Royal Highlanders)..." I almost feel the need to apologise for the fact that this happened, even if it was theoretically impossible. I think we are caught on the horns of what philosophers call the "is-ought" problem, which according to the helpful guide on Wikipedia, "renders 'ought' statements of dubious validity." That should have shaken off any remaining forum members! John Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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