Moritz Dancing: Surveillance and counter-surveillance

[Guest]

Inspired by a recent documentary on the Somme, I am interested in the development of battlefield surveillance and counter-surveillance, particularly of signals, telephony, and wireless. 

 

Background. Part of the failures of the first day of the Somme have been attributed to the German's listening-in to the British field telephone network. It is widely accepted that a Staff Officer in 34th Div sent the final orders in clear across the telephone network at 02:45 on 1st July 1916 which was partly picked up by the German's using technology code-named 'Moritz'. The British telephone systems were poorly insulated and earthed  close to the source. The faint signals could be picked up, particularly in certain soil types and in the right climatic conditions through the ground. This is quite different from 'tapping' wires. it relies on the electromagnetic signal permeating the ground. The Germans, French and British all developed technologies for listening-in (Or 'overhearing' as the Official History describes it). Similarly they all developed counter-surveillance measures. Closely related to this is encryption, encoding and voice-discipline. 

 

I am trying to establish a number of things:

 

1. When did the British first become aware that the German's were capable of listening-in to their telephone systems?

2. When did the French first become aware that the German's were capable of listening-in to their telephone systems?

3. When did the Germans first become aware that the Allies were capable of listening-in to their telephone systems?

 

From some rudimentary research there are claims that the British first discussed the possibility that the Germans were listening-in to field telephones as early as Jan -Feb 1916. These concerns were allegedly confirmed in April 1916 from prisoner interrogations. A number of publications, including the British Official History 1916 Vol 1 (pub 1933) mention the Moritz system. The implications are that the British were aware of Moritz well before the First Day of the Somme (I am looking for further corroboration). While the British were allegedly aware, their immediate counter-surveillance options were limited to strict discipline in the use of telephones, forbidding critical information to be passed across the lines. Clearly this failed and it is this failure in discipline that arguably had greater consequences (another area of exploration)

 

I am interested in establishing the earliest publications that mention the Moritz system.

 

Separately I am also interested in establishing the amount of information that was sourced this way. Various books claim that Charteris (Head of Intelligence) was astounded by the sheer level of information that the Germans had gather via this means when the Moritz station at La Boiselle on the Somme front was captured in early July 1916. While he allegedly knew of the Moritz before the offensive, he was shocked by the implicit indiscipline of the British when using the phones. This led to two immediate developments: a tightening of disciple (I am interested in what specific measures) and a deliberate attempt to create telephonic traffic with misinformation, particularly in advance of the night operations of 14th July 1916. (I am looking for detail on this).

 

If anyone can provide any material (and references) that will expand on this, I would be very grateful. I will add what I have found so far with a few additional posts. Thank you. 

 

Martin G

 

PS I use 'allegedly' a lot as there are claims that the British had no idea of the Moritz ahead of the Somme battles. There is a risk that post war the British Intelligence claimed that they were aware when they were not. This is why trying to trace key documents prior to 1st July 1916 is key to this thread. 

 

 

Edited 3 September , 2016 by Guest

[WhiteStarLine]

Hi Martin, have you read "The Signal Service in the European War of 1914-1918 (France)" 
R. E. PRIESTLEY, M.C, B.A. (Late Major, R.E.). 

 

It covers espionage and also the incident you cite, in quite some detail, including the absolute horror of the Brigade Major when ordered to read the operation order in clear.  See page 106 onwards.

 

It is highly readable and I have certainly gone through it a few times.  It's a pity that Centurion is no longer active, as he loved this topic ...

 

[MaureenE]

The book above is available online.

The Signal Service in the European War of 1914-1918 (France) by R E Priestley (Late Major, R E) 1921 Archive.org.

 

Cheers

Maureen

[MikeMeech]

23 minutes ago, WhiteStarLine said:

Hi Martin, have you read "The Signal Service in the European War of 1914-1918 (France)" 
R. E. PRIESTLEY, M.C, B.A. (Late Major, R.E.). 

 

It covers espionage and also the incident you cite, in quite some detail, including the absolute horror of the Brigade Major when ordered to read the operation order in clear.  See page 106 onwards.

 

It is highly readable and I have certainly gone through it a few times.  It's a pity that Centurion is no longer active, as he loved this topic ...

 

Hi

Bringing the information that I posted on the other thread today, reference this book.  This covers the discovery of German listening in to the phone system in Chapter VI.  The leakage had been noted and there was a bit of a 'spy mania', but information from the French and experiments by British signallers of what information could be gained and found that:

 

"Here was the explanation sufficient to account for the knowledge the enemy had obtained in the past; equally staggering was it to contemplate what he was overhearing every moment in the present, and what he might overhear in the future unless precautions were promptly taken."

 

This is on page 101 and relates to experiments undertaken in June/July 1915.

I have attached  page 102 below which covers some of the measures to reduce the leakage of information and the problem the signallers and GHQ had in getting officers to obey the instructions.

 

Mike

[Guest]

Gents. Many thanks for the tip -  Book ordered. 

 

Mike - does Chapter IV provide any key dates of when key events happened, such as first discovery etc? Some of the books I have trawled are good on the general narrative but frustratingly omit dates, providing just a general idea of the timeline....Book is unlikely to arrive until Monday. 

 

Edit

 

A useful link to an original publication of 1917 from the British which includes a summary of the Moritz. click

 

MG

Edited 3 September , 2016 by Guest

[MikeMeech]

Hi

A useful book on this subject is 'The British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First World War', edited by John Ferris, Army Records Society, 1992.  This has copies of various documents with a bit of editorial comment.  The first chapter is 'Field Telephones and Telegraphs:  Intelligence and Security'.  The first document is a First Army memorandum, dated 27 October 1916 on 'Indiscreet use of Telephones near the Front'.  It starts with a brief 'history', stating:

"Listening sets have been in use by the French and Germans for nearly a year; by the British for 8-9 months, although no definite organization was established until April.  Many experiments were tried by all 3 Armies before satisfactory results were obtained. "

The document lists  examples of information that had been given away due to misuse of the telephone system, this includes:

"It has been ascertained from captured German maps that, on 5th March 1916, out of 24 identifications on that portion of the British front, 12, i.e. 50%, had been established by the listening apparatus.

   It has been ascertained, both on the SOMME and on the French front, that the Germans have obtained much valuable  information reference raids, reliefs, bombardments, attacks, etc., from their interception of our indiscreet telephone conversations."

Despite stating: "...the Germans take the strictest precautions, and it is extremely difficult to intercept their conversation at most places, whilst information of military value is rarely given."

 

However, obviously not all the time as the document also list some successes against the Germans, including:

 

"The Germans believed we were going to make a raid, alarmed the Battalion, evacuated the front line, and called up their reserves.  Our guns were able to make good use of this information."

 

It should be mentioned though that security will never be 100 % as information/orders have to get to the front line by one method or another and if the security makes the command system to complicated or delays it too much then it is not a success.

 

Mike 

[MikeMeech]

34 minutes ago, QGE said:

Gents. Many thanks for the tip -  Book ordered. 

 

Mike - does Chapter IV provide any key dates of when key events happened, such as first discovery etc? Some of the books I have trawled are good on the general narrative but frustratingly omit dates, providing just a general idea of the timeline....Book is unlikely to arrive until Monday. 

 

Edit

 

A useful link to an original publication of 1917 from the British which includes a summary of the Moritz.

 

MG

Hi

 

It does not have an 'exact' date but from the text between early and mid 1915.  It mentions the earliest authenticated positive information coming from a British civilian interned in Ruhleben Camp (no date) on page 105, one can only assume knowledge of this listening method was rather widely known?!  Also that as "the months went on, prisoners, captured from the German Signal Service admitted under examination that results of tremendous importance were still being obtained in this way."  Obviously the German soldier could be as talkative as the British when captured.

 

On page 105-106  it mentions the British Corps Operational order that had been obtained by this method and the German document being captured by the British in the Autumn of 1916 at Ovillers-la-Boisselle.

 

Mike

[brummell]

On ‎03‎/‎09‎/‎2016 at 16:14, MikeMeech said:

It should be mentioned though that security will never be 100 % as information/orders have to get to the front line by one method or another and if the security makes the command system to complicated or delays it too much then it is not a success.

 

The first part of this is true, but I think there is room for discussion around the second part.  The proliferation of telephony throughout the army, itself only made possible by the static nature of the fighting, led to a corresponding increase in communication.  Those who would ordinarily be out of touch with each other, or forced to rely on runners, etc., were now capable of instant and easy communication. People therefore become rather garrulous.

 

Whilst this enabled rapid passage of information up the chain, which is almost entirely virtuous, I would argue that it also played into the hands of the centralisers, micro-managers and technocrats in the chain of command.  The ability to pull on the 15 mile-long strings of a khaki-clad puppet in the front line, regardless of the conditions there prevailing, arguably enabled the chateau-based leadership of some of our general officers and the kind of command style discussed elsewhere on the forum a few weeks back.  A similar process occurred in the Navy during Victoria's reign when advances in signalling enabled a theretofore unprecedented level of control to be exercise over a fleet.

 

Bringing this back towards the topic, the obvious solution to security concerns was to stop using telephony until a technological solution could be found, or to allow only certain lines to be used (such as from infantry to artillery or observers to batteries).  Slapping a half-hearted ban on operationally-sensitive information being passed by telephone was a rather Canute-like measure, doomed to be broken by tired men under pressure who are in any case inherently lazy and prone to think 'it'll never happen to me'.  This being the case, how much is the leak of sensitive information due to the man who picks up the phone instead of typing yet another copy of the operation order?

 

None of which helps MG pin down the dates on this, but it's interesting.  I think!

 

 

- brummell

 

[charlesmessenger]

Martin

 

John Ferris ed The British Army and Signals Intelligence during the First World War (Alan Sutton for the Army Records Society 1992) will give you a good feel for the subject.

 

Charles M

[Guest]

On 3 September 2016 at 14:12, Maureene said:

The book above is available online.

The Signal Service in the European War of 1914-1918 (France) by R E Priestley (Late Major, R E) 1921 Archive.org.

 

Cheers

Maureen

Maureen. Many thanks. Apologies for not responding earlier. I have only just seen this and my "thanks gents" must have appeared odd. 

 

A useful link. Thank you. MG

[MikeMeech]

13 hours ago, brummell said:

 

The first part of this is true, but I think there is room for discussion around the second part.  The proliferation of telephony throughout the army, itself only made possible by the static nature of the fighting, led to a corresponding increase in communication.  Those who would ordinarily be out of touch with each other, or forced to rely on runners, etc., were now capable of instant and easy communication. People therefore become rather garrulous.

 

Whilst this enabled rapid passage of information up the chain, which is almost entirely virtuous, I would argue that it also played into the hands of the centralisers, micro-managers and technocrats in the chain of command.  The ability to pull on the 15 mile-long strings of a khaki-clad puppet in the front line, regardless of the conditions there prevailing, arguably enabled the chateau-based leadership of some of our general officers and the kind of command style discussed elsewhere on the forum a few weeks back.  A similar process occurred in the Navy during Victoria's reign when advances in signalling enabled a theretofore unprecedented level of control to be exercise over a fleet.

 

Bringing this back towards the topic, the obvious solution to security concerns was to stop using telephony until a technological solution could be found, or to allow only certain lines to be used (such as from infantry to artillery or observers to batteries).  Slapping a half-hearted ban on operationally-sensitive information being passed by telephone was a rather Canute-like measure, doomed to be broken by tired men under pressure who are in any case inherently lazy and prone to think 'it'll never happen to me'.  This being the case, how much is the leak of sensitive information due to the man who picks up the phone instead of typing yet another copy of the operation order?

 

None of which helps MG pin down the dates on this, but it's interesting.  I think!

 

 

- brummell

 

Hi

All communication systems had problems, the solution or rather solutions to the telephone leakage was not just about 'operationally sensitive information' but also making some changes to the technology.  At what level of command should the 'strings of khaki-clad puppet' not been pulled, Army, Corps, Division, Brigade or Battalion?  Most battles required an awful lot of co-ordination but with detail planning allocated to the various levels of command written orders were sent down to the level required, indeed judging from the types of documents captured in attacks and raids we find documents marked 'Not to be taken into the front-line' in the front line, not only the British were guilty but judging what is in the UKNA the Germans were quite careless as well.

Wireless security was even a bigger problem than telephone, again for all sides, the Russians at Tannenburg is generally used as an example, however Ferris, page 5, mentions:

 

"Yet in France the German Army did precisely the same, with identical results.  During September-November 1914 French and British forces intercepted at least some 50 radio messages in plain language from German divisions, corps, armies and army groups.  These provided otherwise unavailable insights into the collapse of enemy command and the yawning gap in its line during mid September 1914.  Victory on the Marne was no miracle.  Over the next two months similar en clair transmissions (combined with solutions of encoded German traffic) warned the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the precise time, location and strength of six full scale attacks on its front, each involving four or more German corps.  Without this material, the BEF might well have lost the race to the sea, or even have been destroyed.  At no time in this century has signals intelligence affected campaigns more significantly than at the very hour of its birth, in 1914."

 

You may or may not agree with the author, but with the stabilisation of the front and trenches being dug, the telephone systems were seen as a 'solution' for communicating to overcome the wireless message 'leakage'.  However, as we have seen the telephone communication was then targeted during 1915, so 'solutions' had to be found to overcome that, and so it went on.  This is one of the reasons that the problem of communications is seen as a major problem during WW1 and why an awful lot of paperwork was produced by various HQs to try to find a solution on both sides of the wire.

 

Mike

[Guest]

Thanks for all the contributions. Gratefully received. Happy to expand the scope of the OP so don't be shy...

 

So far my trawl for the timeline of the British awareness of the Moritz listening devices is as follows:

 

Feb 1916:  First discussed in Feb 1916 at GHQ conference (Ref WO 157)

Mar 1916:  Corroboration by intelligence reports (Ref WO 157)

Apr 1916:  Confirmation through German POW (Ref WO 157)

Jun 1916:  26th June deliberate deception aimed at Moritz carried out by 2nd Division (ref WO 95 HQ 2nd Div war diaries)

Jul 1916:   5th July Charteris/Macdonogh correspondence discussing the amount of material picked up by Moritz (mentioned in Haig's Intelligence by Jim Beach)

Jul 1916:   14th July deliberate deception plan: false messages aimed at Moritz.

 

The following published books mention the Moritz listening apparatus:

 

 

The Signal Service in the European War of 1914-1918 (France) by R E Priestley (pub 1921)

At GHQ by Charteris (pub 1931)

British Official History France and Belgium 1916 Vol 1 (pub 1932). The Somme by Farrar-Hockley (pub 1954)

Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War by Michael Occleshaw (pub 1987)

 

So, in summary (so far) The British were aware in Jan/Feb 1916 according to existing documents in the war diaries. In addition the earliest publication on the Moritz was in 1921, some 95 years ago. Any advance on these dates or further references would be gratefully received. 

 

What is clear is that while the British were aware, their counter-measures in the shape of voice procedure disciple were wholly inadequate. During the early part of the Somme campaign Charteris was surprised by the "extraordinary amount" of information that the German's had gathered by this technology. This is touched on by Charteris in his book 'At GHQ' (1931) and is covered in the WO 157 files at the National Archives released in 1967.

 

One interesting question: When did the Germans first realise that the British were sending false messages? 

 

MG

 

Edited 6 September , 2016 by Guest

[SteveMarsdin]

Martin,

 

The book that I referred to, along with Mike and Charles: John Ferris ed The British Army and Signals Intelligence during the First World War (Alan Sutton for the Army Records Society 1992) has few specific examples of Moritz' use prior to July 1916 but more generic comments in the introduction. The introduction is referenced to other sources some of which you have quoted from (secondary - Occleshaw) and some you haven't. I'll have a look when I get home, Perhaps the other sources will provide more clues to the first half of 1916 ?

 

Steve

[SteveMarsdin]

To quote from the paragraphs, I summarised on Saturday (relating to field telephony and telegraph):

 

"Here Britain suffered one of its gravest failures in signals intelligence of this century. Once the German Army became aware of the problem and the prospect in 1915 it quickly established efficient security and interception systems. Through these means it gained much and lost little, because of the incompetent British response. By July 1916 on the Western Front Britain only had five listening sets. It failed to take even elementary steps within the "dangerous zone"........According to one signals authority (Priestley "Signal Service")these failures were "so unnecessary as to border on the criminal" ............"

 

The paragraphs are also referenced to the walter Kirke papers at both the IWM and Intelligence Corps Museum, as well as various Army memos, the earliest of which is WO 95/637 from 25/04/1916.

 

A First Army memo of 27 October 1916 states that "Listening sets have been in use by the French and Germans for nearly a year; by the British for 8-9 months, although no definite organisation was established until April"

 

Steve

 

[QUEX]

There are two recent (open access) articles in The Journal of Intelligence History examining the British 'IToc' effort - the background to them, and links to the articles, can be found at

 

https://historyatnorthampton.com/2019/10/02/a-tale-of-two-articles/