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Gareth Davies

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I don't know who started writing first but Monash certainly plays a part.  In 1923 he wrote, in Australian victories in France in 1918, "Tanks had become anathema to the Australian troops. For, at Bullecourt more than a year before, they had failed badly, and had “let down” the gallant Infantry, who suffered heavily in consequence; a failure partly due to the mechanical defects of the Tanks [...], partly to the inexperience of the crews, and partly to indifferent staff arrangements, in the co-ordination of the combined action of the Infantry and the Tanks."  Peterson helps perpetuate the myth as does Adams-Smith.   And some of the WDs are scathing - 13th Bn said "the Tanks [were] the primary cause of our failure".  

 

But if tanks were anathema surely this would come out in accounts from later 1917 and early 1918?  There was wariness at Messines but I haven't seen any suggestion that the Australians wouldn't work with tanks in Jun 17.

 

Yes, some Australians blamed the Tanks/Tank Corps for the casualties/failure at Bullecourt.  And yes, some Australians were no doubt wary of relying on tank support well into 1918.  But what I take exception to is the use of "the Australians" which implies that it was all of them - and there is no evidence to support that assertion.  

 

 

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The quote from Monash is telling - surely he would speak with some authority?  It's clearly a generalisation, but if he said this I would be hesitant to dismiss it as a myth. However as you say, it would be relevant to examine the Australian records on Messines to see if they provide any evidence for this.

 

I'd say it would be well worth investigating if someone happened to be writing a book about the Tank Corps in early 1917...

 

John 

 

 

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"It is therefore hardly to be wondered at that officers and men of the 4th Division vowed never again to rely upon tanks, an attitude which was generally maintained in the A.I.F. until 1918." - CEW Bean, Official History, page 353, Volume 6. (my underline)

 

Yes, Gareth, my comment was a generalization, but I don't think it was an over-generalization considering that the inclusive term was also used by Bean, Watson, & Ellis, who were all far closer to that war and the prevailing attitudes than we are now. 

 

Mike

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I do think that Bean, who was such a rigorous researcher, should be considered an important witness for the prosecution - or is it defence?  I'm not sure, and those terms aren't particularly helpful here.

 

However I think what emerges is that some highly regarded experts held this view after the war, both within the Tank Corps and on the Australian side.  But I also agree with Gareth that as historians we should always challenge these accepted views to see if they really were widely held by the men on the ground, and whether they really did influence the planning and conduct of operations.  As you point out, for instance, the ANZACs seem to have co-operated with tanks at Messines - though from my (limited) knowledge of that battle, I don't think tanks were used to lead the attack in the same way as at 1st Bullecourt.

 

Interesting topic for a book, thesis or research paper.  To what extent did the Australians distrust tanks after their experience at Bullecourt? Discuss.

 

John

 

Edited by johntaylor
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Hi John,

 

I agree that researching the accepted view is always valid, but dismissing the 'accepted view' as a 'myth' or 'assertion' is not helpful either. Having looked at the relevant Australian War Diaries and many of the post-war writings of people with a direct experience of the war, both in command positions and, or course, Bean with his remit to conduct interviews, research, etc during the course of the war, I came to the same conclusion: Australian troops, in general, were at least very wary of relying on tanks until well into 1918.     

 

To start to answer your last question, here is Bean's take on the plan for Second Bullecourt: 'The 62nd Division would be assisted by 10 tanks, but after the experience of April 11th the Australians preferred to attack without them.'  (Vol 4, page 421). This was 2nd Aust Inf Div - not the same troops as at First Bullecourt, so an example of how the wariness of the new weapon directly influenced an attack plan.

 

Mike

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While, perhaps, the Australians could not get to grips with fighting with tank support, others simply could and did both with both success and failure. 

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Certainly the 14th Division were distrustful of tanks until quite late in the war. 15/9/16 no assistance from the tanks, division suffered one of the highest of any division. Arras a very scathing report regarding their lateness, leading to the loss of lives, especially during the attack crossing The Harp, and then tanks becoming bogged down on The Harp, in the words of one of the brigade officers "no use at all". August 1917 a tank firing into British trenches and generally a hinderance rather than a help.

However given that, towards the end of the war I believe that they were invaluable having matured operationally and mechanically, and the Army having learned how to use them effectively with troops?. Several thoughts regarding them, negative until say mid 1918, henceforth positive. Reading their diaries and other unit diaries brings up large discrepancies in actions, preparations and operations though. Just my thoughts, and mine alone (getting tin hat now) their earlier diaries seem to reflect trying to justify their existence, because they do not exactly tie in to battalion, brigade, division, corps and army diaries, as I said just my take and mine alone having studied various actions with tank usage. So both positive and negative, and Cambria showed what they could do on land suited and picked by the tank's themselves. So did the Army use them unwisely in earlier actions??

 

Andy

Edited by stiletto_33853
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Now that we're on that topic... I'm just reading Gregory Blaxland's account of 1918, and he mentions that before the battle of Hamel, July 1918, in order to "restore confidence in the tanks, which had stood at zero minus ever since the Battle of Bullecourt", men of the 4th Australian Division were brought out in busses, like a trip to the countryside to meet up with the tanks and the drivers and gunner to get to know them better. They had got a ride in the tanks, and saw them in action, got the technical details and with that were sufficiently confident to attack alongside them.

And this time it worked!

For the reference: it's BLAXLAND, 1968 Ed p. 146.

 

I think that was some good thinking from Monash in terms of preparation of the battle.

 

M.

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  • 4 weeks later...
On 21/09/2018 at 23:15, Gareth Davies said:

But if tanks were anathema surely this would come out in accounts from later 1917 and early 1918?  There was wariness at Messines but I haven't seen any suggestion that the Australians wouldn't work with tanks in Jun 17.

 

Yes, some Australians blamed the Tanks/Tank Corps for the casualties/failure at Bullecourt.  And yes, some Australians were no doubt wary of relying on tank support well into 1918.  But what I take exception to is the use of "the Australians" which implies that it was all of them - and there is no evidence to support that assertion.  

 

 

The tanks at Messines were not used to support the AIF advance like at Bullecourt. Thus the 4th Division maintained their distrust of the tanks. Essentially the 4th & 12th Brigades at Bullecourt advanced without the tanks. The 2nd Division at the Second Battle of Bullecourt chose to advance without tanks. As the 2 Div was reinforced by 1 Div, and rotated out of the line with 5 Div, this represents 4/5 of the AIF divisions which built no sympathy towards tanks in 1917.

Jacka VC MC* tank report heavily criticised the employment of tanks and their officers. He was one of the most respected men in the AIF. Gough wanted his report struck from the records. Other Bn and Bde commanders at Bullecourt, were obviously later promoted up the command chain and could be more influential in their roles.

 

Monash, who was the 3 Div commander in 1917, the most unbloodied body in the AIF - which did not participate at Bullecourt would have been less 'biased'.

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