Artillerymen

[serreroad]

Apologies if this has been discussed before, but....

I would be very interested to know the composition of a gun team, ( I realise that this would probably differ depending on the type and size of gun, but some general pointers would be useful.)

I have frequently come across several headstones for artillerymen killed on the same day, presumably in the same action, and presumed they met with some accident or counter-battery action. What I don't know though is what percentage of the "team" the casualties might constitute and what their jobs would have been, eg drivers, gunners, etc.

Would anyone care to elaborate or point me in the direction of a text or website on the subject.

Thanks

Mike

[rflory]

As you indicate the number of men in a gun crew varies according to the type of gun employed. Using the 18-pdr as an example, the gun detachment was composed of 10 men; six who work the gun and four in reserve. They are:

No. 1: Commands the gun. Usually a Sergeant

No. 2: Opens and closes the breach. Usually a corporal or bombardier.

No. 3: Lays the gun. Usually a corporal or bombardier.

No. 4: Holds and loads the ready round.

No. 5 and 6: Maintain the ammunition supply and set fuzes.

Drivers are not normally at the gun position during action, but are with the horses at the horse lines some distance behind the firing battery.

Regards. Dick

[serreroad]

Many thanks Dick. So would the 4 in reserve be all-rounders or would they have specific tasks? And what sort of hours would a single team have put in? In a big bombardment like the opening b4 July 1st, would a single gun have been manned 24 hours and if so by how many teams and how many "shifts" per day?

With regard to your comments about the drivers, would they typically have been far enough behind the lines to avoid shelling? What I am driving at (excuse the pun!) is where I see groups of headstones for drivers, would it be safe to assume that they would most likely have been killed delivering/retrieving the guns rather than at their "rest" postions.

And while on the subject of "rest" positions, I don't suppose the army allowed them much rest, so what would their duties have been when not employed in physically moving the guns?

Thanks again

Mike

[johnreed]

In a typical 18 pdr Gun detachment manned by 10 men they all have specific duties in and out of action and especially when coming into action.

No 1 Commands the detachment (Normally a Sergeant)

No 2 Mans the Breech

No 2 and 3 The sights

No 4 Loading the piece

No 5 and 6 Prepares the Ammunition and passes it to the No 4 for loading

No 7, 8 and 9 The reserves and assist in the resupply of ammunition from the Wagon Lines to the gun.

No 10 The coverer and sec ond in command of the detachment (Normally a Bombardier) he is also in charge of the reserves in the Wagon Lines.

I'm afraid that during long Barrage or Fire Plan all the detachment would be fully occupied on their duties so there would be no reliefs available they would be in action till the end of the barrage unless the barrels became too hot then they would be taken out of action until they were cooled down or the gun became unserviceable.

John

[johnreed]

With regards to my last post, when not in action the detachment will normally be at rest behind their Gun doing exactly that resting or carrying maintenance tasks on the equipment as detailed by the No 1.

John

[serreroad]

Very many thanks for that John. I have read of overheating barrels, but I had no idea that was the only time the troops could expect any rest. So during the Somme bombardment b4 1st July the the gunners would have been going non-stop for 7 days, apart from when the barrels got too hot? Any ideas what sort of respite that would have given them?

Also, are there any anecdotal or actual casualty figures for "operator error". Quite apart from the dangers of counter-battery fire or duff munitions, the recoil of the bigger guns appears frightening. Presumably "avoidable" accidents must have escalated dramatically during long bombardments where the men would have been both physically and mentally exhausted?

Cheers

Mike

[Compo]

Mike,

Indirect fire:

Bombardments are not continuous. The order is for so many rounds at such a rate of fire then they stop and wait for the next order. There is a rest while they re-lay the gun and the next order comes. There could be quite a few minutes while there is communication with the FOO Forward Observation Officer about adjusting fire, then they calculate the new angle and bearing.

French 75's with recoil mechanisms could be fired without re-laying after each round but bigger and older guns without these mechamisms would need re-laying after each firing.

Direct fire;

Here you are aiming directly at something you pop up, shoot some rounds and skoot, before they fire back and you take cover. Horse artillery.

A lot of the casualties, though I do not know how many, would be from the No 4 man the loader, making a mistake and hitting the point of the round, now fused to explode on impact, against the edge of the barrel opening, or somebody dropping a round. This is called pre-ignition and would result in the burst occuring right among the 6 men serving the gun.

The immediate spare rounds are kept away from the possible explosion area with the bulk of ammo in a completely separate area 100 yds plus at least probably.

Rgds Bill

[Guest]

A lot of the casualties, though I do not know how many, would be from the No 4 man the loader, making a mistake and hitting the point of the round, now fused to explode on impact, against the edge of the barrel opening, or somebody dropping a round. This is called pre-ignition and would result in the burst occuring right among the 6 men serving the gun.

This would not - or should not - happen with WWII and later ammunition, because of the internal safety mechanisms in the fuze, operated by the forces acting on it once it is fired. These are:

1. Setback - caused by inertia, just like when you are pushed back into your car seat under acceleration. Various spring loaded mechanisms would operate.

2. Centrifugal force, cause by the spin imparted by the rifling, allowing internal shutter type mechanisms to work,

3. Creep forward - the reverse of setback, which allows the whole thing to be locked into place in the live position once the shell is on its way.

Are you saying that they had none of these in WWI fuzes?

[jhill]

I find these comments very interesting; especially those concerning what reliefs, if any, a gun crew might have been able to expect. Going through the artillery tables for the Vimy operation in April, 1917, I see this must have been a very long day for the gunners.

For the unit I am looking at, the barrage was scheduled to die out at ZERO plus 510 minutes. Starting at ZERO, the 18 pounders would fire between one and four rounds per minute per gun (depending on whether the barrage was moving or temporarily stationary). There were also more than forty lifts in this period, so the gunners would be continualy relaying their guns. The only hint of relief is that after ninety-nine minutes batteries were only to fire five guns (unless responding to S.O.S. or L.L. calls!) so as to give commanders an opportunity to "rest their guns".

Considering that the batteries had been firing the previous night, and would continue on duty the next several days, I find it hard to believe that some means were not found to spell off the men somehow. Perhaps a reduced crew could man a gun during slower periods.

[johnreed]

It would be virtually impossible to initiate the initiation of a Time and Percussion due to the action of dropping the round nose first, even dropping the round (I'm talking about 13 pdr & 18 pdr ammunition) base first would only cause the proppelling charge to ignite. The last thing the No 4 before loading the round is to knock off the cruciform before loading thew round. The Safety devices incorporated in the fuse would not operate if just the fuse was knocked against the breech all you would have is a damaged fuse. Most accidents would occur in the bore and would be classified as a Bore Premature anywhere between the bore and 100 yards in front of the gun, normally cause by a fuze malfunction. With the m.v of the 18 pdr being in the region of 1,600 ft/sec nearly all prematures detonated some distance from the barrel. I have known instances of bore prematures where the round has detonated in the barrel and the barrel has fractured the barrel just in front of the trunnions and no injuries were sustained by the Gun Detachment, the calibre of the weapon was 7" or 175 mm. All the fuzes used in WW 1 had most of the safety features incorporated which are in use today. I would say that 99.9% of all ammunition incidents are caused by errors in drill or tampering.

John

[Compo]

A lot of the casualties, though I do not know how many, would be from the No 4 man the loader, making a mistake and hitting the point of the round, now fused to explode on impact, against the edge of the barrel opening, or somebody dropping a round. This is called pre-ignition and would result in the burst occuring right among the 6 men serving the gun.

This comment originates in Artillery training I was given at Larkhill in 1960 while with an OTC unit. You mean the gunners were pulling our legs? I may have some of it wrong after so long but the main points seem pretty clear.

At least in 1960, all the gunners 1-6 were crosstrained in each other's functions so that the gun could be operated even if there were casualties. There would seem to be nothing to stop them switching around functions to give each other a spell.

The noise would be something else, must have used a lot of Aspirin after a hard days work.

Regds, Bill

[johnreed]

I agree with your comments re: cross training many a time during dry detachment training I have given the order detachments rear, change round, tell off, take post. Of course the gun can function with reduced detachments with the duties of some being doubled up but on sustained Fire Plans or Barrages due to the weight of ammunition being used it would be impossible for the to keep it up for any length of time with reduced detachments.

I quote "The concentration was one gun per 12 yards of front. The tasks of the guns were to:

a. Open a creeping barrage at H hour, 200 yards ahead of the infantry

b. A second barrage was to be fired 200 yards in front of the barrage.

The rate of fire was rapid from zero to +28 minutes (4 rounds per minute) up to the stream(feature), then normal (2 rounds per minute) to the end of the barrage at +180 minutes (08:15 hrs)".

I have calculated that each gun would fire a total of 416 rounds, just imagine how many ammunition boxes would be in the vacinity(very close) to the gun plus salvage, meanwhlie the reserves would be fully committed to ammunition resupply from the waggon lines also there were no mechanical handling devices in those days.

[ALANJONES]

With 4.7 inch gun the crew was No 1 and a detachment of 9 others. Let me know if you need specific duties.

News of the World article quoted a gunner of 123 Battery at the 2nd Battle of Ypres having gun barrels 'hot enough to cook bacon on' - whether the BSM let them is a different matter!

Alan

[Guest]

This comment originates in Artillery training I was given at Larkhill in 1960 while with an OTC unit. You mean the gunners were pulling our legs? I may have some of it wrong after so long but the main points seem pretty clear.

I think they were. Frankly, regular soldiers would regard OTC members as fair game.

In my MOD career between 1967 and 1979, I was trained to know how every component of every piece of British land service ammunition worked. This included anything bought from abroad, notably American ammunition. I have also personally handled thousands upon thousands of rounds of all descriptions, plus grenades, mines, demolition charges, etc. This included ammunition produced in WWII and some produced in WWI, or to WWI designs, such as .45 Webley and 13 pounder blank cartidges (for Kings Troop saluting purposes).

Believe me, you wouldn't get anyone to touch it if it was dangerous.

It only gets dangerous when mishandled by fools who do not know what they are doing, or when it gets to the enemy.

[johnreed]

In my 27 years as a gunner I think that you summed it on your last line.

Regards

John

[KONDOA]

Hi Chums,

Would a similar number of gunners be required for say 6" Siege Battery guns (wheeled) ?? How would the composition and duties differ???

Roop

[johnreed]

I spent last friday at the James Cavell Library getting data on Artillery equipments. In the time I was there I managed to obtain details on the 4.5 in and the 60 pdr both were operated by detachments of 10 men, I would say thet 10 men was the optimum strength of a Gun detachment the equipment that were manned by that number were:-

13 pdr, 18 pdr, 4.5 in, 60 pdr., I will confirm 6 in and the rest of the guns at a later date, after my next visit to the library.

Regards

John

[KONDOA]

Hi John,

Would appreciate that. the reason being I have recently acquired some photographs of a battery prior to departure to France and cannot at this point decide what the photo is really of ie a section, a gun or other.Look forward to any information. The particular battery was armed with 6" Mark XIX Guns.

Roop

[terryb95]

Hi Roop,

I asked the same question of the National Army Museum. They couldn't give me the answer but said the detachment size for the 6" How was ten men.

Terry

West Aust