Scimitar Hill

[Guest]

Ten times the number of British servicemen died in the Battle for Scimitar Hill on 21st Aug 1915 than Australians did at their doomed charge at Lone Pine. While the short and gallant lives of those Australians are memorialised in two rather imaginative films and a number of good books, the worst day of the British at Gallipoli has little by comparison.

Like most of the campaign the attack on Scimitar Hill it was an utter disaster but the 21st Aug has an unenviable place in the history of Gallipoli: there were more casualties on this date than any other. No-one has really been able to accurately calculate the losses, such was the chaos. This day's place in Gallipoli's history might suggest it is a potentially rich source of first hand narratives. I am interested in trying to unearth unpublished first hand accounts of this day. If anyone has anything worth pursuing I would be interested. Here is an unpublished account written by the Adjutant of the 2nd Bn South Wales Borderers to Aspinall-Oglander, the author of the OH Gallipoli. MG

Account of 2nd Bn South Wales Borders at Scimitar Hill

21st Aug 1915

By

Capt & Adjt A B Williams

I have always been specially interested in what happened on 21st August 1915 as I was one of the few who survived and for several hours seemed to be the only Officer in action on the western slopes of Scimitar Hill

I have no records to refer to and so hesitate to correct statements which you have obtained from War Diaries and orders; I should however like to make it clear that during the time I was on Scimitar Hill between 18:30 and the early hours of the morning there was no panic. Confusion – Yes!

The panic referred to when the Yeomanry line swept back after a loud shout of “retire” must have occurred before I arrived. It is possible it did as there were no signs of Yeomanry on the left of the South Wales Borderers when I got up onto the Hill. I have a very vivid recollection of what happened that night and the following is the story from the time that the South Wales Borderers were called upon to make one last effort to capture the position.

About 17:30 the order to advance which we had been expecting since 15:30 was given. Everyone knew that this was to be a final effort to capture the Hill against which the two leading Battalions of the 87th Infantry Brigade had thrown themselves without avail.

It was not quite the order we had been expecting as in the original orders we were expecting to attack the southern end of Scimitar Hill and link up the attack of the 86th Infantry Brigade. We knew that the Yeomanry were to cooperate on our right and our left flanks but I am afraid that very few of us had much idea as to exactly where they were going and what their objectives were. At this time was a thick haze over the whole countryside and the Turkish shrapnel was sweeping the space between the front line trench held by the KOSB and the slopes of Scimitar Hill. The gorse too was burning and an endless stream of wounded Inniskillings and of the Border Regt testified to the reception awaiting us.

We did not appear to have any artillery support. The Battalion advanced with two Companies (C and D) leading, the remainder following in support.

Battalion HQ started to advance with the support but after a short time the CO decided that it would be better if we remained stationary and tried to keep up communication with telephone and runner.

It was just possible to make out the outline of the hill and the leading Companies were given points to advance on.

At first all seemed to be going well and the Companies could be seen moving forward through the Turkish shrapnel with surprisingly few casualties. As they reached the foot of the hill they deployed into line and commenced to assault. The mist and the smoke then obliterated everything and no-one could tell what was happening. Not a single message was received at Battalion HQ and all information we could obtain was from wounded who had very vague ideas of the situation.

I spoke to one Officer on his way back wounded, Capt Walker who informed me that all was going well until the leading line was half way up the slope when it was swept from both flanks with MG fire which practically wiped everyone out. This must have been more or less correct as every Officer in the four Companies and the four CSMs were casualties and only about 50 of the men who went over the top were ever collected again.

As it was quite impossible to get any information I persuaded the CO Maj Going to let me go up and see what was happening and started off with my Orderly, Pte Porter. We passed crowds of wounded and groups of men of different regiments. No-one seemed to have any idea where they were or where the enemy were. Rifle fire and MG fire was coming from both flanks. The men themselves thought they were being fired into from our own lines.

I could find no proper firing line so moved up to the top of the hill to reconnoitre. I found nothing there but a large number of British and Turkish dead.

The Orderly and I crawled over the crest and about 30 yards down the other side could make out a line of Turks. Many of them were kneeling in the open firing at the top of the hill. Every few minutes bursts of MG fire swept the crest; most of seemed to come in enfilade from the right. It was obvious that there was no hope of being able to hold the crest. We crawled back and started to organize a line about 30 yards below the crest.

As units were terribly mixed up I passed the word along ‘SWB on the left, Yeomanry in the centre, Border Regt on the Right, Inniskilling to move back to the bottom of the Hill, where they were to reorganize’

The Turks must have heard us moving about as they suddenly advanced to the top of the hill and both lines faced one another, kneeling in the open about 30 yards distance. The Turks showed up against the skyline whilst we were in the shadow. They soon had enough and withdrew and we went on with our reorganization.

Moving along the front we picked out the NCOs and put them in charge of sections of the line, pointed out the general line, told them to collect ammunition and prepare what cover they could.

Everyone was perfectly calm and collected and in moderate safety as the whole centre of our position was defiladed from right and left by the spurs at the horns of the hill.

I did not meet any Officer or WO with the exception of a CSM of the Inniskillings who was busy reorganising his men as they were withdrawn from the front line.

I saw very few Yeomanry until quite late in the proceedings when I met a number of them withdrawing from somewhere beyond ‘A’ [southern horn of Scimitar Hill].

They had an Officer with them and from what he told me I gathered that they belonged to the columns which had been attacking towards Hill 112 further to the South.

As I received no reply to any messages I sent to my CO and as the line was now stable I started off back to report in person. On the way I met our RSM Westlake and later on a couple of signallers with several drums of wire.

We tapped in on a wire which ran past us and found that it was connected with Battalion HQ. Having cut it we joined one of the drums to the end and proceeded back up the Hill laying out the cable behind us

At about point x [gully between the two horns of Scimitar Hill] we opened up a station and I spoke to Major Going who ordered me to return at once.

Before doing so I took RSM Westlake up to the front and pointed out line to him. He said he would go along and see that everything was all right.

When I reached Battalion HQ and reported to the CO he rang up the 87th Infantry Brigade and spoke to Gen Lucas. I also spoke to the General. I think this must have been about 21:00.

I told General Lucas that it was perfectly useless to try and hold the crest of the Hill and that if we were to go down the forward slope we would have to work round the flanks. He said we were to dig in where we were. As our forward station was now working well, Major Going decided to move the Battalion HQ forward. We accordingly moved up point X taking with us all the tools we could carry.

As soon as we arrived there the signaller in charge told me there was a call through from Brigade. It was General Lucas again and he ordered me to go back to the Brigade HQ to report for the information of Division what the situation was.

Porter and I ran back as quickly as we could and on the way stumbled upon the Battalion HQ of the Border Regt. I told the CO what was happening on the Hill and that there was not a single Officer of his up there. He at once agreed to send someone up to assist Major Going. On arrival at Brigade HQ I explained the situation drawing on a small diagram. I was present when Lucas rang up Gen Marshall and gained the impression that we would be ordered later to withdraw.

I then returned to our old Battalion HQ and rang up Major Going. He told me that a Major of the Border Regt had arrived and that they were forming a support line. I told Major Going that I would collect all available men and start away collecting the wounded in case we received orders to withdraw.

I collected about 50 men including some RAMC stretcher bearers from a Bearer Post much to the disgust of a RAMC Officer who said it was not the job of the RAMC to work forward of a bearer Post. Anyhow after a bit of an argument they came with me and wonderful work they did too.

We started collecting from right to left and working backwards and forwards parallel to the front we covered the whole area between the front line on Scimitar Hill and our old front line. Some time during the night but I do not remember the time, the troops in front withdrew through us and as they passed we made use of them to help the wounded back.

We remained out collecting the wounded and when we could find no more started on arms and equipment. We even reeled up a lot of the telephone lines which were lying about in all directions. Dawn was breaking when we finally got back within our own lines.

I have read through the chapters you have sent me with the greatest interest so much so that it has brought the events of that night back to me as if it was but yesterday. This is my apology for haying typed so much.

I could give you lots of lurid details about the collection of the wounded but I d o not suppose you want anything like that. I have often wondered why we made three disjointed attacks on Scimitar Hill instead of one properly organised one, but it is easy to be wise after the event.

It is not up to me to criticize the plan but I should like to say that the gallant regiments of the 87th Infantry Brigade did all that was possible to make it a success. They fought themselves to a standstill, consolidating the ground won and only withdrew after clearing the battlefield when ordered to do so.

I hope you will find some of this of interest. I may be a bit out in some of the timings but otherwise the details are correct. I am of the opinion that we could have got onto the top of the Hill at any time after dark but we were so badly enfiladed that we could never have maintained ourselves there.

Yours very truly

A E WILLIAMS

Bt. Lt Col

(At the time in question Adjutant 2nd Bn South Wales Borderers).

[gilly100]

Thanks Martin

As usual, most illuminating. And just a bit further south at Hill 60 the 5th Connaught Rangers took heavy losses gaining the Kabak Kuyu wells and moving onto the outer trenches on Hill 60 proper, and to a lesser extent the 10th Hants in their efforts at Hill 60 that day.

I couldn't imagine a book written by you not doing well.

Ian

[Guest]

Hello,

Would be interested in the source of Captain Williams' letter as I am re-writing a history of SWB in Gallipoli.

My grand father Private Arthur Martin was with the 4th Battalion and KiA in 21st August.

Jack Kemp 

[johnshep]

Jack

 

You will find Rodney Ashwood's book Duty Nobly Done a valuable resource for 4SWB, and I'm sure he is contactable via the Regt Museum of The Royal Welsh in Brecon for any queries.

 

I have been going thorough the material relating to Scimitar Hill for several years now and have been on the battlefield on three occasions.  Actually this action has become a bit of an obsession for me, again for family reasons!  If you need any pics send me a PM.

 

There is one source that would throw quite a bit of light on the positions of 2SWB, 1 Border and 2nd Mounted Div and how far they got beyond the summit of Scimitar on 21 August - in my opinion quite a way beyond.  It is a letter written by Capt Douglas Pass of 1/1 Queens Own Dorset Yeomanry to Aspinal Oglander, the Official Historian.  He encloses a map marking the spot at which he was surrounded and captured.  The letter is in TNA (CAB 45/244 P - S) but unfortunately the map has become separated, as have all the other maps from Aspinal's correspondents.  I did start a search a couple of years ago and discovered that in the course of the records being transferred from PRO to TNA maps and large size documents were removed and packed in larger containers to aid preservation.  Unfortunately there seems to be no detailed cataloguing for these orphaned records and it will probably need a labour of love for somebody to sort painstakingly through them, either researchers like ourselves or the TNA staff in the fullness of time. 

 

If anyone believes events have overtaken this in the interim do let me know.

 

John Shephard

(ex SWB)

[gilly100]

Great stuff. Very interesting. 

Ian