Finding Out Who`s Opposite

[PhilB]

. The Germans had a particularly nasty one that involved a large, strong spring and a bolt.

A crossbow? Usually said to fire a bolt but once was called a quarrel.

[seaforths]

A crossbow? Usually said to fire a bolt but once was called a quarrel.

No, I have a description and possibly a sketch of one somewhere. It was used at close quarters being placed near or at the head of a person and the thump of the bolt against the head rendered them unconscious, or worse.

[seaforths]

Couldn't agree more- some of the information gained from prisoners and disseminated via Intelligence Summaries was of immense significance. The importance of trench raids needs to be viewed with 'military' rather than the 'civilian' values and is probably an argument that neither ethos will agree upon to meet in the middle. From the military perspective, soldiers should be predator rather than prey and any force that merely reacts to the enemy's raids comes into the latter category. Soldiers must 'know' that they are superior to their foe and if they are just on the receiving end, then the evidence suggests otherwise. Taking the initiative through raids helped foster aggression and improve soldierly skills and cohesion in a unit, which was of benefit in planned offensives and defensive actions.

I think there were many who, at the time saw the raids as being pointless and cost the lives of men. Just as today, and you rightly point out, it is more difficult for people years later to accept that the raids were absolutely necessary. I think they were necessary and, if properly planned and executed, they tended to be successful. Some of the early raids lacked planning and the loss of life didn't really justify the poor outcome. They learned and got better at raiding to plans and in many instances, the men taking part were withdrawn to spend some time in practice preceding the raid. However, there is one that stands out in my knowledge, in 1917, as a disaster that cost the lives of men and achieved nothing at all. The officer leading the raid and the men knew it was a suicide mission, before they even went out - in broad daylight.

Here is a quote from a book I'm currently reading; 'The Sixth Gordons in France and Flanders':

'A raid was an attack made on a small, well defined part of the enemy's position, and was carried out for definite purposes. One of these was to inflict damage on the enemy, to affect his morale, or make him nervous by sudden and destructive inroads on his trenches. An even more important object was the gaining of information about his troops, their distribution, power of defence, and general fighting qualities; while the capture of prisoners usually provided useful information as to the enemy's intentions, the spirit of his army, and conditions of the interior of Germany. The execution of these raids was invaluable in training our men, in gettig them accustomed to moving over the open, and in circumventing the defences and ruses of the enemy'

[SiegeGunner]

I've never heard of one being used as a weapon of war, Marjorie, but what you're describing sounds like the mechanical devices that were used for stunning and/or slaughtering cattle etc between the days of the freehand poleaxe and the modern era of captive bolt-pistols. How would you apply such a thing to the head of a man wearing a broad-brimmed steel helmet?

[Howard]

Couldn't agree more- some of the information gained from prisoners and disseminated via Intelligence Summaries was of immense significance. The importance of trench raids needs to be viewed with 'military' rather than the 'civilian' values and is probably an argument that neither ethos will agree upon to meet in the middle. From the military perspective, soldiers should be predator rather than prey and any force that merely reacts to the enemy's raids comes into the latter category. Soldiers must 'know' that they are superior to their foe and if they are just on the receiving end, then the evidence suggests otherwise. Taking the initiative through raids helped foster aggression and improve soldierly skills and cohesion in a unit, which was of benefit in planned offensives and defensive actions.

Haig took a lot of interest in this, see one of his raid maps in this post, a map that details raids all along the British August/September 1916.

Howard

[IRC Kevin]

Haig took a lot of interest in this, see one of his raid maps in this post, a map that details raids all along the British August/September 1916.

Howard

Thanks for posting that map, Howard. There's actually quite a lot about the 55 Division raids shown on that particular map in my forthcoming book, 'The Lion and Rose 2'. Very mixed results from these seven daylight raids involving 400 men, beginning at 5.35 P.M., 28 June 1916- with some achieving all objectives with virtually no casualties while others were the complete opposite. One was abandoned almost immediately when the wind veered and blew the smoke screen away- a decision that was totally supported by Divisional command. Interestingly, considering the date and location, 55 Divisions' 18-pounders and trench mortars successfully cut every single stretch of wire along the 1,000 yard frontage of the raid in the three days allocated for this. (Artillery and TMs fired 57,570 rounds off) The date and time of the raids was dictated by Corps as part of six-days of 'demonstrations' to divert attention away from the Somme offensive, just eight miles to their south. The very detailed divisional post-raid analysis and 'lessons learned for next time' makes for very interesting reading. Jeudwine believed that the high rate of casualties (34% killed, wounded or missing) was down to the advance notice given to the enemy by the bombardment and that in future the element of surprise was essential for any raid. (It was not normally 55 Division's practice to bombard proposed raid sites for days- preferring to cut their way through the wire on the quiet just before the raiders assaulted, protecting the latter with a box-barrage. By this time, divisional raiding parties routinely consisted of mixed groups of infantry and Sappers with explosives to destroy dugouts.) He also stated that casualties would have been even higher had the smoke not been so effective.

[seaforths]

I've never heard of one being used as a weapon of war, Marjorie, but what you're describing sounds like the mechanical devices that were used for stunning and/or slaughtering cattle etc between the days of the freehand poleaxe and the modern era of captive bolt-pistols. How would you apply such a thing to the head of a man wearing a broad-brimmed steel helmet?

I'm fairly sure it was before the issue of steel helmets. I'll try and find the article tonight. The Jocks had a nickname for it which escapes me at the moment.

[Howard]

Thanks for posting that map, Howard. There's actually quite a lot about the 55 Division raids shown on that particular map in my forthcoming book, 'The Lion and Rose 2'. Very mixed results from these seven daylight raids involving 400 men, beginning at 5.35 P.M., 28 June 1916- with some achieving all objectives with virtually no casualties while others were the complete opposite. One was abandoned almost immediately when the wind veered and blew the smoke screen away- a decision that was totally supported by Divisional command. Interestingly, considering the date and location, 55 Divisions' 18-pounders and trench mortars successfully cut every single stretch of wire along the 1,000 yard frontage of the raid in the three days allocated for this. (Artillery and TMs fired 57,570 rounds off) The date and time of the raids was dictated by Corps as part of six-days of 'demonstrations' to divert attention away from the Somme offensive, just eight miles to their south. The very detailed divisional post-raid analysis and 'lessons learned for next time' makes for very interesting reading. Jeudwine believed that the high rate of casualties (34% killed, wounded or missing) was down to the advance notice given to the enemy by the bombardment and that in future the element of surprise was essential for any raid. (It was not normally 55 Division's practice to bombard proposed raid sites for days- preferring to cut their way through the wire on the quiet just before the raiders assaulted, protecting the latter with a box-barrage. By this time, divisional raiding parties routinely consisted of mixed groups of infantry and Sappers with explosives to destroy dugouts.) He also stated that casualties would have been even higher had the smoke not been so effective.

Raids seem to be a controversial area of British practice. I am most curious to know why that map was made, its construction is so bizarre- all the information is there but in an almost useless format. It took two of us hours to decipher it, so what good was it at a Haig's HQ? Hardly a quick reference to know what went on where.

Howard

[PhilB]

An interesting comment on a raid by 6th Seaforths in Autumn 1916:-

The raid was deemed to be a success, although it was felt that more prisoners should have been captured. It would appear that the Germans were frightened by the sight of the lassoes that the Seaforths were carrying and, perhaps thinking they were to be hung, they lay down in the trench and refused to move, leaving the raiders little choice but to kill them. In fact the lassoes were just intended as a method of quickly tying up a prisoner and leading him back to the British lines without him being able to escape in the dark and confusion.http://www.scotlandnorthbranch.webspace.virginmedia.com/research03.htm

The raid was carried out by 40 men and garnered 2 MCs, 1 DCM & 5 MMs. Was such a high award rate common after successful raids?

[seaforths]

There is a photograph of the raiders holding a board stating 'The Spirit of the Troops is Excellent' which Derek Bird used as the title of his book. One of the officers bodily carried one of the uncooperative Germans back. There was some confusion over the raid itself as the battalion diaries state that all the men returned from the raid. However, the officer that organised the raid but didn't take part in it himself co-authored a book after the war and stated in 'Campaign Reminiscences' that a Sgt was missing and was in fact killed. The War Diary for Bde/Div does show that there was indeed an unnamed OR missing and the Morayshire Roll confirms his details and 'last seen on the Lille line'. Looking at the raid photograph, I can see that they were from different companies but they were all also volunteers, apparently.

In another raid by the Seaforths, they blacked their faces and (this bit seems counter-productive) because it was particularly hot, they removed their kilts and everything else and just went out wearing nothing but their white shirts (which surely would have made them more visible), creating quite a ghostly effect for the Germans!

There was also something called petticoat raids carried out during the war. They raided the abandoned homes of the local civilians and took the night-dresses and wore those on raids!

[seaforths]

Oh, it's not a bolt it's a nut that they used to dunch or dunt on the head!

I hope this attachment works. I've tried to make it bigger to make it easier to read but it's not great quality:

[SiegeGunner]

Ah, not the implement I visualised. That's a sort of trench club.

[PhilB]

The photo attached to post #35 shows 2 men carrying similar weapons. It`s not clear whether they were British or captured German.

[seaforths]

Not a massive fan of the book because of the large amount of typo errors contained within but from Anthony Saunders 'Raiding on the Western Front':

With regard to the 6th Seaforth raid from same source:

Best I can do with the image of the raiders I have:

I don't think they have the springy 'dunter' things on the photograph. There is an interesting reference in the book about the British helmets offering more protection than the German helmets because the British had a padded liner in their helmets that the Germans didn't have. Also, they were made of different materials.

I cannot see from the sketch of the 'dunter' how it could have been used effectively as a cosh, boinging about on a spring. My initial thought was that the spring would be drawn back toward the handle and then let go, creating a punch type action. As a cosh, I would have thought it would be difficult to control...

Other weapons used (by the British) knobkerries, maces and triangular bladed stabbing knives.

[seaforths]

Raid report as filed in the Bn diary.

1. Torpedo Party.
--------------------
No. 1 Party under Lieut. J.D. Sainter left our trenches at8.5 pm. and placed a Torpedo as arranged under the German trenches at I.11.a.5.0 ½ . This Party had not sufficient time to return to
our trenches and Raiding Party was sent out to meet them along wires connected to Torpedo. This Party was waiting about ten minutes 30 yards from the Torpedo before it was fired.
No. 2 Party under Lieut. D.F. Jenkins left our trenches at 7.57 pm. and placed Torpedo as arranged under the German wire at I.11.a.6.3 ½ . This party then returned to our trenches and the
Officer led his Party out to within 30 yards of the German wire. This Party was waiting about ten minutes in “No man’s land” before the Torpedo exploded. The placing of the Torpedoes in position was done without
difficulty and though some noise was made it was not spotted by the enemy’s sentries.

2. Torpedoes.
-------------------
Punctual on Zero time the two Torpedoes exploded almost simultaneously, leaving Gaps absolutely clear through the German wire 15 feet broad and 25 yards deep.

3. Raiding Parties.
--------------------
No. 1 Party under Lieut. Sainter entered the German trench by Gap made by Torpedo at I.11.a.5.0 ½. Immediately after the Explosion of the Torpedo and found the trench very well held.
The party found two sentries who were promptly killed and a dug-out with four men in it which was bombed. All were killed. At the next dug-out two Germans had come out. One offered
Resistance and was shot by Lieut. Sainter. The other was also shot. The dug-out was bombed with good results. Next, three Germans were killed in the trench and one passed back to clearing
party as a prisoner. This man refused to leave the trench and was killed. The Party then crossed the Railway and left the trench y Gap of exit i.11.a.4.1 ½ . The wire at this Gap was
found to have been successfully cut by our Trench Mortars except for Chevaux-de-Frise. The Party was about six minutes in the German trench. The German trenches are revetted with wicker work and
seem in this part (i.e. from I.11.a.5.0 ½ . to Y.11.a.4.3 ½ .) to be badly knocked about by our Trench Mortars. The parapet was found to be very broad about 13 to 15 feet and dug-outs made of concrete
were found under the parapet. No. 2 Party under Lieut. Jenkins entered by Gap made by Torpedo At I.11.A.6.3 ½ . and found a ditch full of water and mud in front of the parapet. This may be an old German trench.
No sentries were seen at this point but rifles and equipment were found hanging up on the parapet. This trench had a dummy parados made of boards about three feet high behind which were the dug-outs.
Four dug-outs were bombled with good results and after proceeding ten yards along the trench the Party encountered an organised German Bombing Party. These were bombed for about two minutes
and seemed to be all knocked out. Our Party sustained five casualties, two slightly wounded, and three seriously. Orders were given to retire by Gap of entrance. The Party met a number of Germans coming from the rear. Three men of our Party caught one and carried him out into a shell-hole in “No man’s land”. The remainder were bombed and many killed. The Party then retired by Gap of entrance having been in the German trenches for
about six minutes. The trenches were found to be in good condition and revetted with wicker work.

4. Withdrawal.
----------------
On a Bugle sounding (the withdraw) and three Very Lights being fired in quick succession No. 1 Party withdrew to our trenches without loss. During all the time they were in the trenches and
withdrawing no German machine guns were fired. No. 2 Party withdrew at the same time to our trenches where Lieut. Jenkins found that three men of his Party were missing and went back to the German trenches accompanied by No. 2266 Pte. A.F. Macdonald. They made three journeys bringing in a wounded man each time. No fire to speak of was opened by the Germans till this Party were bringing in their last wounded man,
The Parties were reported all in by Lieut. Macdonald at 9.35 pm.

5. Barrage.
-----------
The Barrage opened punctually and can only be described as perfect. All Ranks taking part in the Raid were unanimous in their praise. The efficiency of the Barrage is borne out by the fact that no German machine gun fired for 40 minutes. The casualties caused by the Barrage must have been fairly heavy as both Parties report on entering the trenches parties of the enemy were seen rushing away from the Salient and thus running into our Barrage.

6. Morale.
-----------
The enemy were evidently taken entirely by surprise and nearly all seemed to be in a dazed condition, only two beside the bombing party offering any resistance. The prisoners taken were all so frightened that they refused to move over the parapet, and the sight of the lassoos seemed to make them worse. All had therefore to be killed except the one, whom Lieut. Jenkins had carried bodily out.

7. Weather.
-----------
The weather was ideal.

8. Bombing Shields.
-----------------------
The Parties wore Dayfield Bombing Shields which were found to be a great success saving many minor casualties from splinters.

[David Filsell]

The question of spies opens up an empty worm can. Early accounts of the war are riddled with Brits finding, or more usually suspecting people of being, spies. I am not aware that any of the claims been ever fully evaluated, let alone proven. Both of course have been the subject of fiction. Equally there are accounts of RFC/RAF landing people behind German lines. Again I an not aware of any accounts noting their achievements, who they carried, what the results were. Nevertheless it seems hard to believe there were no reports of troop movements, formations in the line from spies of any nation in four years of war

[PhilB]

For those who, like me, weren`t familiar with it, the Dayfield Body Shield:-

http://www.worldmilitarycollectables.com/viewitem.php?id=9

Incidentally, I don`t see any among the Hun Snatchers.

[seaforths]

I suspect they were the first things they got off after getting back. Although they offered more protection I don't think they were popular because of their weight. They were available and advertised in the papers for private purchase but I've no idea of how many were sold and worn privately. They had enough problems trying to get the men to accept and wear tin hats initially, even though they were undoubtably life savers.

On the subject of spies, Switzerland was a hotbed of spies. Their prisons were overflowing with spies of all nationalities. They were at a loss as to what to do with them. If they turned over the accused to their accusors, they would invariably be shot. If they repatriated them to their own country, they turned up again weeks later. There are accounts of German spies turning up in British lines posing as British officers during the confusion of battle; countermanding orders etc. I was reading files last week regarding the possibiity of an award being given to a French lady who spied for the British and passed on information. I strongly suspect that troop movement information whether planned or reactionary, would be more often gleaned through aerial observations and prisoner interrogations. Given the availability of secure means of communications of the day, information from spy rings on troop movements, might be historical data by the time it reached its intended destination.

Edit: typo

[seaforths]

Back stepping a bit to Haig's raiding map, There is a snippet in Anthony Saunders book to the effect that on 28th May 1916, Haig issued an order to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies, that raiding was to be increased along the front. They were to deceive the enemy as to the real front of the attack (the Somme), wear him out. The raids were to be of Company strength or upwards and include artillery.

The raiding map might be a snapshot of of those raids of 1916 after promulgation of the order. The purpose being a bit different to securing identification and seem more in the line of miniature attacks. However, at this time, the 51st HD had to relieve troops further north to release them for the start of the Somme offensive and they were put into trousers so that the enemy were not alerted to large scale reliefs taking place and large troop movements heading further south. The line elsewhere was held very thinly.

[Howard]

Back stepping a bit to Haig's raiding map, There is a snippet in Anthony Saunders book to the effect that on 28th May 1916, Haig issued an order to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies, that raiding was to be increased along the front. They were to deceive the enemy as to the real front of the attack (the Somme), wear him out. The raids were to be of Company strength or upwards and include artillery.

The raiding map might be a snapshot of of those raids of 1916 after promulgation of the order. The purpose being a bit different to securing identification and seem more in the line of miniature attacks. However, at this time, the 51st HD had to relieve troops further north to release them for the start of the Somme offensive and they were put into trousers so that the enemy were not alerted to large scale reliefs taking place and large troop movements heading further south. The line elsewhere was held very thinly.

That is the first explanation I have seen that makes sense about this bizarre thing. Perhaps it kept track of whether raids took place rather than the specific details of any one raid. It does not look like it was "used" in the sense that the strips did not have the permanent folds that paper develops when bent, so people (Haig) did not frequently refer to it looking for a particular raid, rather a good spread of strips may have been used simply as evidence of "lots of raids". I have not seen nor heard of any similar map covering other periods, so presumably it was key to the attacks centred on Courcelette. Haig chose to keep it in his private papers so must have thought it was important.

Howard

[seaforths]

That was a bit of serendipity finding that snippet as I was actually looking for something else regarding an Australian. Yes, I think it helps to put the map into some sort of context. I have seen that map or something very much like it and it could have only been on a Kew visit. I usually copy maps but that one stood out as, well, unachievable in terms of the time it would have taken me and what I wanted to get done. I recognised it was information on raids and that it contained far too much information for me to be able to do it justice and be able to make sense of it afterwards. Disappointed though I was, as I have a keen interest in raiding, I passed on it.

Some information on Australians - they wore British uniforms when taking part in raids. The piece I actually did want, is still eluding me at the moment.

[PhilB]

An odd question, but was raiding strictly an occupation for line infantry? I haven`t come across a Guards raid, though presumably they did their share? And how about the cavalry - only when in dismounted units? Support arms - not their scene?

[charlie962]

Support arms supported raids. Artillery creeping and box barrage,;Engineers sometimes accompanying the raiders for demolition etc.