101 years on, the anniversary of the Battle of the Frontiers

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Joe,

One example amongst many is at Rossignol: realising it would gain them an advantage, German infantry helped manhandle their unlimbered 77s through the forest to a reverse slope position to fire on the French. By contrast, one Colonial division battery commander refused to deploy his guns until he had the stipulated infantry cover, as prescribed in their training manual.

Steve

[phil andrade]

Another comment in the House rendition captured my attention.

He states that the Colonial units in the French forces were more fit for combat than their Metropolitan counterparts, who were shaky and fragile in morale.

Phil (PJA)

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Phil,

Just to avoid confusion to others, the Colonial units involved (3e DIC; 5e Bde IC and 2e DIC, the latter being the army reserve) were from mainland France and were historically used to fight France's colonial wars. Yes they were more fit for combat and certainly more disciplined (hence the high losses at Rossignol where they kept on attacking and didn't break) but any experience was in colonial wars and it was a rare example where proper training (on the German side) proved better than the "wrong" sort of experience. The 3eDIC were poorly led but fought bravely; the 5e Brigade (the best brigade in the Corps, from Paris) fought even more heroically at Neufchateau, waiting in vain for the 3eDIC to arrive to the east (and assistance from the inanimate regular army units to the west at Nevraumont, which both House and Delhez have identified as underperforming and under-committing).

Steve

[phil andrade]

Has ever a nation - in modern times - taken a more dreadful whack and come back fighting ?

I suppose the Soviets in the summer of 1941 must claim the prize, but if we assess the thing in proportionate terms, and bear in mind that the French population in 1914 was about one fifth that of the Soviet Union in 1941, then the loss of twenty six thousand lives, and scores of thousands of additional casualties in a single day is mind boggling....especially given the intensity of battle that raged for several days - and weeks -thereafter.

It's hard to decide which is the more remarkable : the severity of the blow sustained; or the resilience that allowed for such a superb risposte.

Phil (PJA)

[SteveMarsdin]

... he mentioned how Erwin Rommel was able to discern the pantaloons, but was more struck by the glint from the mugs and other eating/cooking implements that the enemy soldiers had stacked on the tops and backs of their packs.

Croonaert's recent thread has reminded me that I had forgotten to post photos from the weekend but I'll start by illustrating the point made above:

[SteveMarsdin]

To give some topographical context to the fighting, here are some views of Ethe:

Ethe from the route from Latour (south-north)

The first French forces to enter Ethe on the 22 August were from the 14e Hussards who decended this route from Latour. The main body of the French forces advance down a route further to the east (right) from Ruette, through Gomery

Ethe from the German artillery position (north-south)

The German forces had advanced south from Etalle (and south west then west from nearer Arlon). Their artillery advanced clear of the great forest to the north and positioned itself on the clear plateau to the north. Early in the morning the valley was covered in a thick mist, following the storm the night before and the high temperatures of the summer morning. When the heat of the sun cleared the mist, the Germans could see little of Ethe, hidden in the valley, except for the Church tower (to the right of the photo). However they were also presented with the sight of French infantry advancing down the slopes opposite and created havoc amongst this easy target. The route from Latour can be identified in the photo towards the right, the route from Gomery is a similar distance from the left. The French became trapped in the valley by the German artillery.

(southeast- northwest)

Advancing on Bleid the French ran into other German forces including the 124th Infantry Regiment, in which Rommel was a junior officer. These German forces, advancing by now westwards, were from a different army corps and also suffered extensively from friendly fire from the German artillery already mentioned. The hilltop at Gevimont was the scene of bitter fighting and the remnants of the French tried to retreat into Ethe itself or Gomery.

[SteveMarsdin]

On Saturday we laid flowers at the three graves that we have "adopted" (a system of "parrainage" was formally introduced in 1953 but sadly ended this year). My father-in-law has laid flowers at the grave of Ernest Jouvin since he was a child.

Later that evening we attended the ceremony at Bellevue (Virton)

[SteveMarsdin]

On the Sunday the day starts with a ceremony at the site of a massacre of 70 French soldiers of the 103e RIF, who were taken prisoner:

[SteveMarsdin]

From there we went to the memorial to the 211 civilians of Ethe and 71 civilians of Latour who were killed by the Germans. Most of those killed were executed in the fields known locally as Flamiom, Ruau, Liégeios and Paquis, the later been the site of the execution of the 71 from Latour (and 25 from Ethe) on the 24 August. The memorial was built near these locations.

[SteveMarsdin]

After the open-air mass the commemorations moved to the Pont des Arminies, renamed after the war as Pont du 14e Hussards. This was the scene of the heroic but futile charge led by Lt.Col de Hauteclocque. As the French cavalry charged two abreast, uphill through the tunnel, they were met by a firing line of German infantry, firing from the prone position. Like a line of battleships "crossing the T" their superior firepower decimated the French ranks, wounding de Hauteclocque and killing his son, amongst many others.

Photograph from the German side (the exact position of the firing line is not known)

At the ceremony

[SteveMarsdin]

On the way to the cemetery at Laclaireau, wreaths were laid at the memorial to the French 7e Division

and at Laclaireau itself

[SteveMarsdin]

Rosalies at Laclaireau

[SteveMarsdin]

The weather forecast for the afternoon was for thunderstorms and this reduced numbers for the memorial walk with around 150 taking part. The guides wear uniforms similar to those of the day:

And I even got on television !!

[Auimfo]

Good point Tim !*

I notice I'd spelt anniversary wrong too, so I've taken the opportunity to amend the title and post

Cheers

Edit 09.16 20/08/2015

*Actually Tim, on reflection I was right originally: if the 1st anniversary was 1915 the 101st anniversary will be 2015 !

You're absolutely correct Steve.....back to maths class for me!!

My apologies. I've deleted my post.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[Christina Holstein]

Terrific stuff, Steve. Thank you.

[phil andrade]

Yes, Steve...this is a wonderful evocation : I find it captivating.

I was particularly struck by how much the views around Ethe reminded me of the sloping and quite open ground around Gettysburg : another encounter engagement.

Thanks !

Phil (PJA)

[lostinspace]

Thanks for the excellent photos and commentary. You're doing a great job of making known and keeping alive the facts concerning the French army and the crucial part they played in the opening battles of the Great War. However, I would say that without Joffre in command all could have been lost, I don't think he gets enough credit for the turn around (as mentioned in Phil's post no. 29). He managed to rectify many of the errors (including his own) displayed during the frontier battles and at the same time formulated and then executed the plan that resulted in the victory of the Marne.

Dave

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Dave,

I would agree; Joffre's speed of thought once he realised his armies couldn't continue to press home their attacks on the 23rd as he initially ordered, to formulate the outline of his Marne plan within 2 days was incredible. He was more than a match for Moltke.

His original idea, to attack the German centre by enlarging Langle de Cary's 4e army from 3 to 6 corps wasn't so bad either, as House and Delhez point out it was poor execution by his subordinate commanders that led to the scale of the defeat.

[phil andrade]

Croonaert's recent thread has reminded me that I had forgotten to post photos from the weekend but I'll start by illustrating the point made above:

French infantryman (240 x 600).jpg

A propos those glinting pots and pans that Rommel mentioned as making the French infantrymen so conspicuous, did the German soldiers carry their cooking paraphernalia in a more camouflaged manner ?

Phil (PJA)

[joerookery]

ps2035 by Joe Robinson, on Flickr

The entire feeding system in the German army was quite different. Infantry units had the device shown above which was really a secret weapon that worked wonderfully well. It was called a goulash cannon and the infantry units cooked as they went along. It was a company function as opposed to the French system of squad cooking. This was a complete disaster however for the cavalry. Not only was there no plan to feed the horses but there were designated areas for each Army Corps to "loot" for pots and pans and food. Cavalry was in excess to these areas and sort of freelanced. What is most different between the cavalry of those days and today is that the cavalry regiments actually pulled back out of contact to bivouac.

Unlike the infantry where this food could be cooked and prepared by the mobile field kitchens on the march, the troopers of the cavalry had to cook food themselves in their field dinner sets, usually over an open fire. Furthermore, unlike the army corps, the cavalry did not have any field bakeries. For a mobile cavalry regiment of 710 officers, NCOs, and EM, the demand was about 532.5 kg of bread, 266.25 kg of raw meat, 1,065 kg of potatoes, 17.75 kg of salt and 17.75 kg of coffee per day. But these supplies were only for the men; in addition, the 750 horses would need 6,000 grams of oats, 2,500 grams of hay and 1,500 grams of straw each and per day, summing up to 4,500 kg of oats, 1,875 kg of hay and 1,125 kg of straw every day.[1] If oats were not available, they could be replaced by barley. Since the horses would need oats and roughage (hay and straw), an important component of the horse rations was already missing.

[1] (Urach, 1905), pp. 16-17.

[phil andrade]

I quoted a figure of approximately 40,000 for both sides as German casualties are hard to discern but most estimate them to be 40% (Zuber) to 60% of the French figure; either way as a percentage of 26-27,000 it is still very high and is the main reason why there was no real pursuit of the retreating French. The largely orderly retreat contributed to the victory within three weeks on the Marne.

Since returning home, I've been able to find some official sources of German casualties for the Western Front in August 1914.

They do indeed indicate that their casualties against the French were in the order of sixty per cent of those they inflicted. There is a striking difference, though : in numbers posted as killed or missing, they appear to have been only one third of the total suffered by the French in this fighting. Since the missing included prisoners - of whom the Germans lost relatively few, and the French very many - the disparity is not so surprising. In terms of the number reported wounded, there is little difference between the two sides. My belief is that the French figure of deaths for 22 August 1914 was rendered tragically high because thousands of wounded who could not be recovered were left to die.

I would, on this premise, hazard a guess that the twenty six thousand French military fatalities that day were countered by as few as ten thousand Germans killed outright ; but that the German wounded might have exceeded thirty five thousand, of whom two or three thousand would have died later.

What has shocked me is the revelation about the number of Belgian and French civilians who were killed, and the atrocious way in which they were rounded up and executed.

Phil (PJA)

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Phil,

1. as few as ten thousand Germans killed outright .............

2. What has shocked me is the revelation about the number of Belgian and French civilians who were killed, and the atrocious way in which they were rounded up and executed.

Phil (PJA)

1. Ignoring the figure as a percentage of the French total, It is still a very high number. Bearing in mind the intensity of the fighting in many cases, that this was the first combat encounter that most of the units had been involved in and that the French retained possession of the battlefield in a few instances, it may have not seemed such an obious victory to the Germans at the time and certainly one that they (would have) struggled to press home.

2.Not only civilians but prisoners too (see above post #33, at Belmont). One of the reasons that the French losses are so well commemorated to this day is that the civilians suffered so terribly too at Ethe and Latour; what was a common bond between the grieving now continues in the acts of remembrance.

Steve

[phil andrade]

Agreed, Steve : ten thousand killed in action is a grim figure, especially when the greater number of wounded is allowed for.

This implies casualties in the order of forty or fifty thousand.

I wonder if the viciousness of the German reprisals against local civilians, and the massacre of prisoners of war ( such as the one you allude to) might be attributed to the outrage that these heavy German casualties entailed.

Phil (PJA)

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Phil,

I think it is one of the factors, along with: internal German propaganda and press fever whipping up the fear of franc-tireurs and 1870, poor discipline, red mist, official encouragement. etc. etc. Schmidt & Nieuwland undertook an extensive study in the years immediately afterwards, more recently revisited by Horne & Kramer.

There were some terrible acts committed and I know some of the individuals there that day were evil but I don't think, despite what happened later in the 20th century, that it is and was, sadly, a unique Germanic trait.

Steve

[joerookery]

Francs-tireurs

One semi-doctrinal issue that the Germans faced was what to do with irregulars and civilians known as francs-tireurs. Who exactly were francs-tireurs? One army corps deputy commander tried to define them as any citizen of a combatant nation not in a uniform, who in any way disrupted German operations communications or supply. They had been a major concern to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War. The French considered them partisans and the Germans regarded them as terrorists. If caught by German troops, the franc-tireurs could be shot out of hand if in the act or provided a one-officer court-martial that had the power of handing out death sentences. Residents of Alsace-Lorraine found with weapons could be shot and those suspected of being a franc-tireurs would be handed over to a formal court-martial.[1]

This “francs-tireurs doctrine” really dealt with the application of the rules of war and has been the food for atrocity discussions for decades. There certainly were atrocities and standing orders to shoot civilians who were resisting. In the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, there were many stories of francs-tireurs. For four decades, stories abounded and were embellished about how francs-tireurs had ambushed, mutilated, and poisoned German forces during that war. The advancing armies in 1914 expected to encounter francs-tireurs whether they were there or not. As early as 3 August, shots fired from the small Belgian town of Battice at a cavalry patrol scouting the way into Liège were interpreted as franc-tireurs. This event led to the execution of three civilians and the burning of the town.[2]

A view of the inevitability of civilian involvement in combat and an "appropriate" military response permeated the German military. There was an anti-French feeling against the "people's war" or “levée en masse,” which was seen as legal, but reprehensible. Julius v. Hartmann, a noted theorist, said, “where the people's war breaks out, terrorism becomes a principle of military necessity.”[3] Senior commanders in their 60s and 70s during the invasion of 1914 had been young officers during the Franco-Prussian War and had distinct views based on their experiences with francs-tireurs. In the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, there was an international endeavor to more tightly define the laws of war. The intent was to make things more civilized and less barbarous. As a result of the first convention, the German General Staff developed a "war book" to offer some guidance. It required that prisoners of war be conditionally identified, if there was some proof that they were operating as enemy soldiers. The negotiations involved a seesaw battle between smaller countries that wanted the ability to have a mass “people’s war” and imperial Germany that did not. In 1908, the German Army issued the Felddienstordnung,[4] which provided guidance that preventive security measures were justified when there were possible attacks by enemy civilians. This guidance included threatening the inhabitants with penalties, taking hostages, and burning streets. This rule was in direct conflict to the previous endorsment of the Hague Convention, which was actually published as an appendix to the Felddienstordnung in 1911.[5]

Despite this conflict, there was no change to the language of the Felddienstordnung. Imperial German officers were trained to expect civilian resistance and to treat it as a criminal act. Specifically, the Kriegs-Akademie taught that Article 2 of the convention did not comply with the German viewpoint. The noted theorist and writer v. d. Goltz dismissed the 1907 Hague Convention as hypocrisy because none of the signatories had any intention of sticking to it.[6]

In the long run, the franc-tireurs situation did not turn out well for imperial Germany. Not only did Germany sustain a propaganda defeat, but also a tremendous amount of energy was used chasing reported sightings in 1914. Some of them may have been true, others of them false. There certainly were atrocities that in the German literature may have been justified, but they did not stand up in the court of international opinion. The actions could not be justified with the extant Hague Convention. It seems as though inexperienced soldiers, in total fear—sometimes fueled with alcohol—and a lifetime of stories, overreacted in many cases shooting at the "bogeyman" and taking revenge on entire cities for the actions of a real or imagined few.

[1] (Herwig H. , 2009), p. 79.

[2] (Herwig H. , 2009), pp. 108-109.

[3] (Horne & Kramer, 2001), pp. 142-143.

[4] ( Kriegsministerium, 1908). The Bavarian Army adopted this issue in the field manual in 1914.

[5] (Horne & Kramer, 2001), pp. 143-149.

[6] (Horne & Kramer, 2001), pp. 149-151.