14th (Light) Division - Hooge Liquid Fire attack & later actions

[stiletto_33853]

Bob,

 

Ronnie was very much a Brigadier-General that was active. He was the Commanding officer of the 8th Rifle Brigade until January 1917 when he was promoted to lead a Brigade, 112th Brigade. His Divisional General wrote of him "the services he rendered during the Battle of the Scarpe and how he commanded his Brigade at Monchy on 9th to 11th April was a great success. We wondered how it was possible for the Germans to have let his men get to the summit of the ridge where there was not a blade of cover. It was his personal example and personal influence that did it. He was right up to the front, almost in the front line."

 

Unfortunately Ronnie was killed by a sniper whilst inspecting the trenches under his command. The Rifle Brigade was his home Regiment having served in various battalions since 1893.

 

Andy

Edited 30 May , 2017 by stiletto_33853

[MBrockway]

9 hours ago, bob lembke said:

I have never taken the time to figure out the British regimental system. I gather there was a historic, traditional unit, a regiment or in this case a brigade, but the unit (e.g. Rifle Brigade) was sort of a mothership for eight or 42 battalions, and these were the units that were fielded.

 

Bob,

Time invested in understanding the organisation of the British Army would be very well spent.  It is, for example, critical to understanding ORBAT's and in identifying the correct unit war diaries and where to find them.

 

The Rifle Brigade was not an Infantry Brigade, nor was the King's Royal Rifle Corps an Army Corps.  Both were regiments made up of varying numbers of battalions, but neither as many as forty-two.  Unsure where you've got that from!

 

Details of both regiments are clearly explained and easily located on the mother site following these links:

http://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/army/regiments-and-corps/the-british-infantry-regiments-of-1914-1918/kings-royal-rifle-corps/

http://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/army/regiments-and-corps/the-british-infantry-regiments-of-1914-1918/the-rifle-brigade-1914-1918/

 

Enjoy!

Mark

 

[MBrockway]

18 hours ago, seaJane said:

Ronald Campbell Maclachlan's memorial in Winchester Cathedral, photo taken by me today:

 

 

Lovely photo sJ - many thanks for posting this. 

 

As a Captain, Ronnie MacLachlan had been the Adjutant of the OU OTC.

 

Mark

[stiletto_33853]

Remembering the men who 102 years ago suffered and died in the first flamethrower attack on British Troops, and in particular the men of the 8th Rifle Brigade.

 

Andy

Edited 30 July , 2017 by stiletto_33853

[MBrockway]

Not forgotten 

 

[purvis15]

On 30/05/2017 at 10:12, bob lembke said:

seaJane;

 

I have never taken the time to figure out the British regimental system. I gather there was a historic, traditional unit, a regiment or in this case a brigade, but the unit (e.g. Rifle Brigade) was sort of a mothership for eight or 42 battalions, and these were the units that were fielded. 

 

In in view of this, how was a brigadier in a position to be killed in action? I imagine that each battalion would be commanded by a colonel, or a LTC?. (In contrast, at this time German field battalions would usually be commanded by a captain, and in some cases by a first lieutenant.)

 

There was a German flame attack in 1917 in which two British generals got "caught in it"; one was killed, one was captured. I think I discussed that a few months ago. They were inspecting the front lines when the attack kicked off. 

 

Hi Bob - in the infantry the Regiments were recruiting, training and welfare organisations and could vary in WWI from one to many battalions depending on the size of the recruitment area and general organisation; so the Black Watch had many battalions raised while the Atholl Highlanders (raised by the Duke of Atholl on his highland estate) had only one etc. It helped alot (and still does) with morale and identity, but also concentrated casualties from one area when they happened. The Battalion was the basic unit for the battlefield which would be grouped with other battalions usually from totally different regiments, so in the case of the Hooge attack 8th & 9th Bn Rifle Brigade (both recently raised Kitchener volunteer units) were grouped together in their brigade with two other infantry battalions I think including 9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps and one other non Rifle Brigade unit (Stiletto will know!).  The British moved to 3 Bns per brigade later in the war as manpower drained away.  Hope that helps a little.

 

I have a letter from my cousin who was in 9th Bn Rifle Brigade describing what he called  the 'liquid fire' attack at Hooge as he watched it unfold.  I'll try dig it out and put the text up. 

[stiletto_33853]

Rob,

 

Great to see you posting here again.

 

Andy

[MBrockway]

My thoughts also.

Mark

[bob lembke]

16 hours ago, purvis15 said:

 

Hi Bob - in the infantry the Regiments were recruiting, training and welfare organisations and could vary in WWI from one to many battalions depending on the size of the recruitment area and general organisation; so the Black Watch had many battalions raised while the Atholl Highlanders (raised by the Duke of Atholl on his highland estate) had only one etc. It helped alot (and still does) with morale and identity, but also concentrated casualties from one area when they happened. The Battalion was the basic unit for the battlefield which would be grouped with other battalions usually from totally different regiments, so in the case of the Hooge attack 8th & 9th Bn Rifle Brigade (both recently raised Kitchener volunteer units) were grouped together in their brigade with two other infantry battalions I think including 9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps and one other non Rifle Brigade unit (Stiletto will know!).  The British moved to 3 Bns per brigade later in the war as manpower drained away.  Hope that helps a little.

 

I have a letter from my cousin who was in 9th Bn Rifle Brigade describing what he called  the 'liquid fire' attack at Hooge as he watched it unfold.  I'll try dig it out and put the text up. 

 

"Purvis15";

 

Useful explanation. Now that that is clearer, the German Army actually had two similar processes. In one, certain units, in particular units that were behind the lines, spun off other units that were needed, as the Army and the war expanded. I was reading a history of a unit, I think that it was the !st Guards Pioneer Battalion (in English), which was garrisoned in Berlin, and the history mentioned that it had sort of "fathered" about 20 other units, mostly Pionier units, several pioneer battalions, several searchlight companies, and several pioneer units which were temporary units formed to serve with the Turkish Army in Mesopotamia. Included was my father's "volunteer company" of pioneers formed to serve at Gallipoli with the Turkish Fifth Army, wearing Turkish uniforms. Usually these spawned units had a name that did not reflect its "parentage".

 

The second related mechanism was that a unit at the front, say an infantry regiment which was garrisoned at say Altona, may have had three battalions fighting in France as an infantry regiment in a division at the Western Front, but they also had a Ersatz battalion back in Hamburg, probably at the Kaserne of the regular regiment, serving as a training unit and as a depot for replacement, and possibly as a unit to house wounded recovering from wounds who had been discharged from hospital, but who had not yet been sent back to France. I am not sure that these units had been part of the peace-time establishment, but I think not, as I cannot recall ever reading of such a formation in the pre-war period. For example, during the war there probably was a 1st Ersatz Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment in Altona during the war, while there was a 1st Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment serving in France, along with the 2nd and 3rd battalions, comprising the regiment serving in combat.

 

That letter from the Hooge attack would be extremely interesting, and with your permission I might even cite it in the book that I am finally writing, as I am considering citing this attack in it, although my father was not yet serving with the flame-throwers. Does anyone have a sense of the British casualties in the original "liquid fire" attack, as compared to the counterattack launched later that day, which to my mind seemed rather ill- conceived, if not suicidal.  

Edited 9 August , 2017 by bob lembke
error

[purvis15]

On 08/08/2017 at 22:08, stiletto_33853 said:

Rob,

 

Great to see you posting here again.

 

Andy

I never left, but just not sure I had much to add!  I will always be interested in this site and the threads on 9th RB so have no fear.  I'm looking forward to your book coming out!  

[purvis15]

Bob - thank you for the info on German regimental practice.  I am sure in many respects the mechanisms were the same as you needed to recruit, train, repair soldiers and send them out to related units all the time.

 

Here is the text of the letter from my cousin relating to the 'liquid fire' attack.  His name was John Ralph Purvis at the time a Lieutenant in 9th Battalion the Rifle Brigade who had joined as a Kitchener Volunteer while at University in Oxford via the Officer Training Corps there.  He was killed not long after on 25th September 1915.  I hope it illuminates a little what it was like on the other side!

 

August 6th 1915    "Bivouacs"

 

My dearest Mother & Dad

 

Well I have been up to the trenches and am now back again having had some luck.  We went up on Monday night a week ago and were to have been in the firing line four days and back in the ramparts at Y for six days.  Unfortunately our last night in the fire trenches the Bosch attacked our right flank held by R. Maclachlan's battalion (8th) and drove them out with liquid fire.  I was on our extreme right so saw the whole thing completely only a few hundred yards off, it was a horrible sight but most exciting being so sudden.  It was just at dawn when suddenly flares and star shells arose all together and then the horrible fire jets which look just like a fire hose except they are fire instead of water.  They come out first of all like dense smoke but are really a preparation of hot tar sprayed, and apparently light up from spontaneous combustion somehow.  Anyway, after a couple of minutes of this up went the Bosch red rockets which are the signal for their artillery to tune up, and from that moment till Monday night, about four days, we just lived through continuous bombardments day and night - our longest lasted 6 1/2 hours - absolutely distracting and makes me feel like a worm.  

 

The next afternoon I and another sub were ordered to lead our platoons up each side of the M road to support the 8th's counter attack on their left flank, but, grace a dieu, they saw it was a tougher nut to crack than was at first anticipated and instead of our two measly platoons they brought the whole of the 9th 60th to do it.  Result: most of the trenches were retaken but the poor 60th (the same that have trained with us ever since last September) came through with a mere handful of men (150 or so) and lost all their officers except five, their Colonel being killed also.  The same happened to R. M.'s [Maclachlan's] battalion except that his is more or less wiped out though he is alive himself.  I heard H.H.Hardy was killed in this show.

 

Well the next night at dusk another liquid fire stunt, but we kept the beggars off.  We were congratulated by the Higher-powers the way we held out and though the Bosch never actually came out against our line they shelled us day and night and we put up some firing against their flank.

 

I had no sleep from Thursday till Monday being on the go the whole time, so that when I got back here in the early hours of Monday morning I slept for 25 hours on end!

 

One thing jarred me a bit and that was a "Jack Johnson" which landed round the far side of a traverse from where I was, it exploded 150 bombs as well and I came out as black as a sweep and rather uncertain of my whereabouts.

 

It is rather funny, but 90 per cent of the battalion's watches stopped owing to the continuous H.E, but my good old thing is still going strong: a good test.

 

We only lost about 250, and ought to have lost a great deal more except that luck was in with us, also two subs wounded and one breakdown (dumb) and one Captain non compos mentis.

 

Got a frightful crop of lice but have now got rid of them - Horrible brutes - you might hunt round and send me a good remedy.

 

Just received cakes and "The Blue Horizons" and "Through the Wall" from Mrs Mac [Maclachlan?] - both very good.  Must race for the post so all at present - much love, John

 

[ps] No talk of leave - am not likely to get it for another two months I should think!  A rotten letter but I can't remember much that has been happening except incessant bombardment as far back as I can remember.

[bob lembke]

Great letter! I wrote a response and my evil laptop swallowed it, and now I have to apply myself to a

pressing chore. The letter does buttress the fact that the losses in the ill-conceived counter-attack

were many times the losses in the initial attack and the loss of trench. If I want to use the letter I will

properly cite both you and John, but in any case would reach out to you again for explicit approval

before I use it.

 

My father seemed to only have used the weapon against the French on the Western Front, and he 

told me that once they turned on the FW, the French usually simply ran away at the point of attack.

I have the complete casualty statistics for the flame regiment, and they did not "lose"

(killed, mia, or died of wounds) a single man in the majority of flame attacks, which were mostly on

the Western Front, which backs that observation up. In a letter from Verdun to his father, a staff officer,

he described a flame attack in which his company lost three men and had 12 wounded as a "disaster".

[MBrockway]

 

An interesting snippet about a demonstration using a German flammenwerfer captured at Hooge has been posted by Brummel - see below.  It was in the 1st/13th Londons war diary.

 

Thanks Brummel - great spot!

 

Mark

 

 

[brummell]

No problem!

 

Bob has replied over on the other thread with his take on the demonstration, saying he believes the British operators would have used petroleum and compressed air in the demonstration, rather than the oil and nitrogen combination intended by the Germans.  The effect of this, Bob believes, would be quite unlike the actual effect achieved by the Germans and would result in a quick-burning flame relatively easily avoided by taking cover in trenches.

 

Two thoughts occur to me.  Firstly, isn't it reasonable to assume that, since the equipment seems to have been captured in working order, British engineers would have been able to assess what gas had been used, and potentially what fuel?  And that therefore they would have replicated this for demonstration?

 

Secondly, the Livens flame projector used a kerosene/diesel oil mix as the fuel and compressed air to pressurize.  Livens included diesel specifically to get burning fuel down into trenches and to linger there.  It seems to have worked at the time; and a 2010 reconstruction by the Royal Engineers, using the same fuel and propellant, achieved the result expected (the Time Team episode on this, thankfully featuring a less-annoying-than-usual Baldrick, is on youtube).  How far might Livens' thinking on these weapons have influenced the demonstrations?  Possibly not much, given that the large gallery flame projector was secret?

 

 

- brummell

 

 

[bob lembke]

Brummell;

 

Exactly. Livens was a good engineer and was on top of these issues. I describe most of the Allied sorts

hurredly working on FW design as "gentlemen tinkerers". I recall an event when Foulkes and some of

his staff attended a demonstration of a FW designed by a British officer. It exploded and set the officer

on fire; Foulkes and others put the officer out, but not with their tailored great-coats, they first got an OR's

coat to use. The sense of the description was amusement. 

 

If the British did not bother to use proper propellant in their own FW why should they bother to do so 

for demonstrating a captured FW? Or bother with mixing fuel oils and experimenting with that? It seems 

that the whole purpose of the demonstration described in a war diary was to show the troops that the

German FW were not that dangerous and that the "duck and cover" exercise would leave them safe.

So using the gasoline and compressed air served that purpose well, to create the impression that it

was not really a dangerous weapon. By the time of the demonstration the Germans had fairly well

figured out the organization of their flame units and their tactics, and in a platoon-sized attack the

attacking Zug had 6-8 FW teams, each team including a second man carrying a spare oil and

nitrogen backpack that could be connected to the flame-lance in seconds via quick-connection

couplings; maybe 20 grenadiers with stick and egg grenades, at least 10 grenades to each man,

usually six stick grenades and four "egg" grenades. The stick grenades usually had special 3 1/2

second short delay fuses for close-up action.  Every man had a P 08,

no rifles at all, a rifle with bayonet was considered too heavy and clumsy in trench fighting. Some

men carried short sharpened spades for close-up work, which my father described as "razor-sharp".

In my father's company's platoon two French light machine guns, fired from the waist on the advance 

by slinging it over the shoulder with two rifle slings. And possibly one light mortar specially built

at the flame regiment's own workshop in France. A few NCOs might carry a carbine.

 

I'm not sure that "duck and cover" was an adequate defense against this sort of attack. But it seems

that the British command was absolutely opposed to a short tactical retreat, which would seem to 

often be the most practical response in the face of such an attack.

 

And remember that many FW attacks utilized 30, 50, or even more FW teams. The largest was on the 

Eastern Front, with 154 FW teams in the attack on a limited area, a square km of Russian concrete

pill-boxes and other fortifications, which had resisted conventional infantry attacks.

Edited 18 August , 2017 by bob lembke

[brummell]

28 minutes ago, bob lembke said:

If the British did not bother to use proper propellant in their own FW why should they bother to do so 

for demonstrating a captured FW? Or bother with mixing fuel oils and experimenting with that? 

 

Bob - Livens used a mix of light and heavy oils (kerosene and diesel), precisely because he appreciated that a heavier, slower-burning fuel was needed to affect trenches.  I have also just read (The Somme: A New Panoramic Perspective, Peter Barton, 2006, p. 168) that he used deoxygenated compressed air - essentially nitrogen.

 

So, to say that the British 'did not bother' to think through the most appropriate fuels and propellants seems to be unfair.

 

[bob lembke]

Have to be brief, have to run to work, at an age when I should be sitting on a porch somewhere. 

 

Good for Livens for also figuring out the use of a sensable propellant as well. He was a good engineer. Was he behind the actual concept of that monster? 

 

I I think I have aggravated my Brit forum Pals enough, but most of the British work with FW was awful engineering, not surprising as most was done in a rush by mostly untrained people, whereas the German development in 1915 had been underway for 13 years. And Foulkes was a strange duck who made a number of bad technical choices and stuck to them like a junkyard dog defending a meaty bone. 

 

I don't want to go more into that, but I could. For example, the light FW developed by the RN in 1918 for the Zuggrebree raid was an astonishing mess design wise. So late in the war?

 

Aside from Livens, I have never seen an example of good FW design from the UK. And the basic concept of the gallery monster was crazy, a 4600 lb FW in the front lines in WW I trench warfare. But I see that he did put good engineering work into a basically strange concept. Foulkes went to the display of a 60 lb FW, decided that it was too heavy for the trenches, and then decided on a 4600 lb design instead. 

 

The standard German light FW adopted in mid-1916, the Wex, weighed 43 lbs loaded with oil and nitrogen. It was a more elegant design than the WW II German light FW. 

[stiletto_33853]

gentlemen,

 

Can I suggest a thread on flamethrowers!! The context of discussions is swaying far from the original thread topic, fascinating as the discussion is it does begin to bear little resemblance to the Hooge attack of July 1915.

 

If it is of any consolation the Regimental account of the attack states the following:

"On 26th July the Division Commander, General-Leutnant Von Bertrab viewed the position and arranged for the Regiment to be in possession of 8 large and 12 small flame-thrower for the pending attack, with whose effect we had been promised a great deal. 

On the 29th a demonstration of the flame throwers took place for the Companies that had been chosen for the attack, which in the meantime had been withdrawn to rest. The moral effect of this new fighting method had to be very strong anyhow; however in addition it's use excluded preparation for the attack by artillery and mine throwers, because the oil reservoirs of the flame thrower were very sensitive to any damage and with our own artillery preparations, the enemy reaction had to be expected. The co-operation of both these arms therefore had to be limited at the commencement of the attack through barrage fire to to prevent the enemy reserves from approaching, to hold down the enemy artillery and in association with the position battalions to hold down the enemy tenches that could flank the attack. The effective range of the large flame throwers amounted to approximately 30 metres, their fire spurt spread forth flat over the trenches, therefore made a fire effect from the same not possible but could probably cause a panic, but that men protected were not placed out of action. An immediate advance by the storm troops after the fire burned out (duration approximately 2 minutes) was therefore a requirement for success."

 

We know that 6 of the large flamethrowers were actually used, 3 either side of the crater, spread over a distance of 100 metres, some 16 and bit yards between each. The trenches at their closest were some 15 yards apart. The 8th Rifle Brigade had only taken over from the 7th Rifle Brigade a few hours before and this was their first stint in these trenches. The OC of the 9th Rifle Brigade had noticed some movement and slow build up of the area in the days leading up to the attack.

 

The German Engineers had been digging trenches to accommodate the attacking companies for some time before and some saps were the front line allowed it. The storm troops had been supplied with 12 small flame throwers, of these 4 small flame throwers would be kept in reserve.

 

Andy

Edited 18 August , 2017 by stiletto_33853

[bob lembke]

10 hours ago, stiletto_33853 said:

gentlemen,

 

Can I suggest a thread on flamethrowers!! The context of discussions is swaying far from the original thread topic, fascinating as the discussion is it does begin to bear little resemblance to the Hooge attack of July 1915.

 

If it is of any consolation the Regimental account of the attack states the following:

"On 26th July the Division Commander, General-Leutnant Von Bertrab viewed the position and arranged for the Regiment to be in possession of 8 large and 12 small flame-thrower for the pending attack, with whose effect we had been promised a great deal. 

On the 29th a demonstration of the flame throwers took place for the Companies that had been chosen for the attack, which in the meantime had been withdrawn to rest. The moral effect of this new fighting method had to be very strong - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "

 

Andy

 

Andy's suggestion is to my mind superb; and I could get a new thread started, perhaps. I guess the best place for it is the

"weapons" section, which is a drop-down under "Paraphanalia of War" (spelling alert! - I am still learning English.) I feel that

that location is sort of remote, off in a corner, in the physical layout of the forum. But that is where it should be.

 

I want to apologize for frequently veering OT, part of that may be an undisciplined mind, but also, if we are chattering

about FW, I want to pass on what I heard at "my fathers' knee", as they say. He had a great memory, he was one of

that crazy 2% who loved the Great War, he often told me it was the best years of his life, despite him having a rather

good lifestyle in the say four years after the war; he loved talking about his experiences in the war, unlike the oft cited

stereotype of the WW I combat veteran who never talked about his experiences and heroism and was unrecognized 

until his trove of metals were uncovered in the barn, or his many wounds were discovered on his deathbed. When I first

seriously started studying WW I I first wrote down the oral history, as I remembered it, to record it before my memory

was colored by subsequent readings, including his letters, which I had just found, and had started translating.

 

So I want to preserve this material, and as I may never get to write a book on FW themselves, although I have finally

started my military biography of my father and grand-father, two very different and interesting people, both with

interesting (very different) careers in the Great War, I sometimes go on about his oral history, which I hope is 

interesting and informational, and which will probably be gone once I finally croak.

 

A final note. If you think it thru superficially, it made sense to have the same unit carry out gas warfare and FW activities. 

Actually, IMHO, it was a very bad idea, because while both involved technical stuff, and pressurized tanks and the like,

it really required quite different sorts of soldiers to successfully carry out their roles, if the FW were to be used as an

offensive weapon to break open the front, if possible, which was the German concept, and seemingly the British. The

French had a very large FW operation, but different in concept. a weapon that generally followed the attack, and mopped

up dugouts and the like, and some of their FW troops seem to have been middle-aged. The German FW troops were

mostly volunteers, and were picked to be athletic, very fit, under 25 (if possible), and unmarried. Similar criteria to the 

storm battalions which were forming, and some of which also had small FW sections in their organizational structure,

and which also often had FW sections from the Prussian Guard flame regiment detailed to them for specified attack

tasks. At Verdun my father fought with the Storm Battalion Nr. 5 (Rohr), the arch-typical and original storm battalion,

and like the flame regiment a Pioniere formation. 

 

So the apothecary men that were originally drawn into the British gas effort were very well suited for the gas warfare, 

especially Foulkes' beloved cylinder release method of attack, but not well suited for the German leading edge of the

attack form of FW warfare. I don't know how big a role that misfit factor had in the failure of the British (and their

mentored Americans) flame efforts. I really feel, after studying the UK and Yank flame efforts, that Foulkes and Fries

(Foulkes Yank counterpart) wanted their assigned flame efforts to fail. And fail they did. Sorry, guys. Foulkes was an

interesting character, but a "real piece of work". And made a series of really bad technical decisions.

 

Enough of my 4 AM ramblings. Will drag this effort off to a different corner of the forum. But I hope I have imparted 

several sorts of info that allows the Hooge FW attack to make more sense.

 

Andy;  Could we have a formal citation of the German regimental history with that rich mine of useful information?

(I just bought another 17 German regimental histories on CD for my library. I might have it, or can dig it up.)

Edited 19 August , 2017 by bob lembke

[stiletto_33853]

Bob,

I do think that a thread solely on Flame throwers, their use, engineering, propellant etc would be a valuable thread and one I would love to see and contribute to where i can. However this thread is not the place.

 

Andy

[bob lembke]

Just agreed. "Great minds think alike."

[bob lembke]

Just looking thru my Hooge material. Just noticed this poem about Hooge, written by a British soldier. Don't

remember this having been posted before.

 

HOOGE: (JULY 31st 1915) 

" Hooge! More damned than Sodom and more bloody,
`Twas there we faced the flames of liquid fire.
Hooge! That shambles where the flames swept ruddy:
A spume of heat and hate and omens dire;
A vision of a concrete hell from whence
Emerged satanic forms, or so it seemed
To us who, helpless, saw them hasten hence.
Scarce understood we if we waked or dreamed. 
"Stand To! Stand To! The Wurtembergers come!"
Shouting vile English oaths with gutter zest.
' And boastful threats to kill they voice, while some,
In uniforms of grey and scarlet dressed,
Wear flame-projectors strapped upon their backs.
How face a wall of flame? Impossible!
"Back, boys! Give way a little; take the tracksThat lead to yonder wood, and there we'll fill
Such trenches as are dug, and face the foe,
And no Hell-fire shall move us once we're there.
We're out to win or die, boys; if we go
Back and yet back, leaving good strongholds bare,
We'll save our lives, perhaps, but not our name.
There's no one in this well-trained company
Who'd save his skin and perjure his good fame." 
We hold the wood, but, oh, how can it be? 
The shells are raining down amidst the trees,
Snapping the full-girthed trunks that downward crash
In dire proximity to us. The breeze
Bespeaks hot human blood. The scarlet splash
Shows everywhere, and everywhere the maimed
Are crawling, white-lipped, to a dug-out where
The doctor in a drip of sweat seems framed, 
So hard he works to hide the horrid stare
Of wounds adrip; while many pass away,
And need no lint to bind their frailty,
For God has ta'en them; 'tis their triumph day,
And all their sins shall expiated be. 
Thus are we thrown in Life's great melting-pot,
Humanity much matrixed; but the ore ,
Looms purer when the crucible is hot:
'Tis on this truth that we should set our store. "

RIFLEMAN COLIN MITCHELL 
8th (later 3rd) Battalion The Rifle Brigade. 
Born: Mere, Wiltshire. Killed: 22nd March 1918. 
Pozières Memorial, Ovillers-la Boiselle, France. 
Colin Mitchell served as a Rifleman in the 8th Battalion the Rifle Brigade in July 1915. 
 

 

 

[bob lembke]

I am trying to feed this thread material strictly on the Hooge attack, without my 3 AM night-time ramblings.

 

Here is the communiques from the German High Command for July 31 and August 1st. These daily communiques 

earned a good reputation by not feeding "false news" into them, but of course engaging in a bit of spin by 

selecting which engagements to stress. I know that the US high command accepted them at face value, from

recorded conversations between Pershing and a three-star.

 

 

Großes Hauptquartier, 31. Juli.
Westlicher Kriegsschauplatz:
Gestern früh stürmten wir die bei unserem Angriff auf Hooge (östlich von Ypern) am 3. Juni noch in englischer Hand gebliebenen Häuser am Westrande des Ortes, sowie einen Stützpunkt südlich der Straße nach Ypern. Nachmittags und nachts wurden Gegenangriffe des Feindes zurückgeschlagen. Wir eroberten 4 Maschinengewehre, 5 Minenwerfer und nahmen einige Engländer gefangen. Die in den Gräben des Feindes gefundene Zahl Toter beweist seine großeBlutigen Verluste.

Oberste Heeresleitung

          

 

     Great Headquarters, July 31st.
                                                    Western War Theater                        
Early yesterday we stormed the houses that still remained in English hands on the west side of the area after our attack on Hooge (east of Ypers) on June 3rd, as well as a strong-point south of the road to Ypers. In the afternoon and night counter-attacks of the enemy were thrown back. We captured four machine guns, five mortars, and took some Englanders prisoners. In the trenches of the enemy we found a number of dead, proving their great bloody losses.

                                                                                          Highest Army Command           

                                

August 1, 1915  - OHL communique from Wolff:     The German Army Communique

Einnahme von Cholm - Im Juli 22  1861 Russen gefangen - Erfolgreiche Luftkämpfe im Westen

Großes Hauptquartier, 1. August.
Westlicher Kriegsschauplatz:
Ein englischer Angriff gegen unsere neue Stellung bei Hooge brach völlig zusammen. Ebensowenig Erfolg hatten nächtliche Vorstöße der Franzosen gegen Souchez. In den Argonnen heftiges Artilleriegefecht. Am späten Abend wurden unsere Stellungen auf dem Reichsackerkopf in den Vogesen angegriffen; der Feind wurde zurückgeschlagen.
Die Tätigkeit in der Luft war auch gestern rege, der englische Flugplatz St. Pol bei Dünkirchen wurde mit 30 Bomben belegt. Ein deutscher Flugplatz bei Douai wurde ergebnislos von einem feindlichen Geschwader angegriffen, einer unserer Kampfflieger schoß hier ein feindliches Flugzeug ab. Ein französischer Flugplatz bei Nancy wurde heute früh mit 103 Bomben beworfen, 18 Treffer sind in den Zelten beobachtet, die zur Abwehr aufgestiegenen feindlichen Flugzeuge konnten den Angriff nicht hindern. Sechs deutsche Flugzeuge griffen über Chateau-Salins fünfzehn französische an; in dreiviertelstündigem Kampf wurden mehrere feindliche Flugzeuge zu Notlandungen gezwungen. Als ein weiteres feindliches Geschwader in das Gefecht eingriff, zogen sich unsere Flieger ohne Verluste zurück. Nördlich von Saargemünd mußte ein französisches Flugzeug landen. Die Insassen sind gefangen.
In den Argonnenkämpfen vom 20. Juni bis 20. Juli nahmen wir 125 Offiziere, 6610 Mann gefangen und erbeuteten 52 Maschinengewehre sowie sehr zahlreiches sonstiges Material.

Oberste Heeresleitung.

 

August 1, 1915 - OHL communique from the Wolff Telegraphic Bureau.            

Great Headquarters, August 1st.                
Western War Theater
“An English attack against our new position by Hooge was completely broken up.”
 

 

 

 

 

[stiletto_33853]

Thanks Bob,

Once again the German Regimental History makes note regarding this:

 

"the English garrison, as far as those who did not flee, were taken prisoner or killed; only two machine guns in the attack area of the 6th Company afforded stubborn resistance; however in a reckless attack after that they finally became settled after a tough fight.

 

during this the 3rd Company moved into the crater, attacked the western most houses of Hooge with a platoon that was still occupied by Englishmen, out of which strong machine gun fire flanked the 2nd Company and hindered further advancement. Filled with a platoon from this Company the connection to the 3rd Company was established and with this fierce fighting took place about the second trench and the attack goal was reached.

 

On the left the 6th Company was detained anew by a third English machine gun that was skilfully operated by an officer and caused heavy casualties. They had already put in their third platoon and received reinforcements from the 1st Company that advanced into C sector. Therefore the 3rd machine gun was taken."

 

This reckless attack was a frontal attack on the machine gun and caused quite heavy casualties.

 

Yes, the counter attack was stopped. Nugent stated that a Division would be needed to retake the position, which proved absolutely correct. The Counter Attack faltered and Nugent asked for it to be abandoned however was ordered to continue with most of the 41st Brigade decimated.

 

Andy

Edited 19 August , 2017 by stiletto_33853

[bob lembke]

Again, thanks for the expanded quote, but could you cite the regiment and the regimental history? I am sort of old school about that. If you wish I would be happy to take another pass at the translation. 

Looked at Major Dr. Reddemann's brief description, and I think he said they sent 11light FW and 9 heavy, with one light FW held in reserve from the 11. The attacking formation was Beck's company of the flame unit, which then was still a battalion.