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Remembered Today:

Siege of Kut 1916


lancashire

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There seems to be interest in this judging by the numerous topics, I will add some comments as read in the book Kut and captivity 6th Indian Division to give an inkling of the events:

Christmas day: in one regiment of British Infantry out of 25 officers the Col, one subaltern and doctor remained, in the RE one Lt available for duties of the 8 that came from India.

Relief forces of Gen Younghusband the comparatively small relief force had now lost approx. 8000 men by 21st Jan after Umm-el-Hannah, thus making it unable to advance and had to wait reinforcements.

Wood and oil fuel (enormous quantities required) was now required for the HMS Sumana and the L.launch.

I will comment on how the RFC contributed separately if there is an interest as they became very inventive and will add the drawings.

The naval vessels were busy too.

John

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  • 2 weeks later...

An extract giving more RFC/RNAS details of the air supply to kut during the siege (April 1916)

credits to the Author major EWC Sandes RE.

Kut Air drops.pdf

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Dave,

Thanks from what I have read Kut should never have been a halting point as there were already better locations further south which had supply boat access all year round and Kut was not intended to be held against those with artillery. By chance my relative whom lost his life there had an Irish commanding officer lt Colonel Courtney I believe from the Wicklow area. Both died from wounds after a 40lb shell landed nearby on a building.

For the sake of moral and Townsend "ego" I believe that this is the first surrender since Cornwallis in America, despite the positive PR spin it should never have happened.

Before he surrendered Townsend even requested to be sent from Istanbul to London on parole as part of the initial surrender terms, I believe he died after the war in Paris, hopefully because he was no longer welcome by the British establishment.

I quote this from another General who was a Commander of a Field Army:

"it with the ground commander that the buck must stop for he can lead ..... or resign; Townsend did neither and is dammed for all time. Physical courage requires nothing more than brutal application od willpower and whilst the officers and soldiers who made up the Army were not short of this ....it was the moral courage that was lacking and that is the measure of a general"

John

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I also have been reading about this part of the war, but I am certainly not at the point where I would entirely condemn Townshend for the disaster. It would seem, on the surface, that the whole business was under funded, understaffed, and was a logistical mess. Promised reinforcements never showed up and when they did they were minus half their gear and medical supplies. By the sound of things, they should never have gone beyond Basra, or at least Qurna. They had already accomplished what they went there to do.

Think I'll keep reading a few more accounts.

Hazel

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Hazel,

With a balanced approach, the next extract (similar to Wikipedia) add a bit more to his eventual disgrace, I found this after my previous text.

Yes there was political pressure at what point he was ordered to stay at Kut or picked it himself may never be known despite it being a poor location, if the extract is correct his disgrace started after his book as it was deemed inaccurate thus others began to investigate further! Also his inaccurate reporting forced the relief force to act earlier which may has assisted in it's failure too.

Two of the books I am reading The fall of the Ottomans - Eugene Rogan (Oxford University lecturer) goes into detail that acquiring Bagdad was low on the list as it left the Army exposed, with insufficient resources and the final push was made after the had withdrawn considerably and the path was open and the Turkish Army had left a short while earlier.

The other book which is also excellent Kut and Captivity with the 6th Indian Division by Major EWC Sandes (archive.com) is also detailed, however the general I quoted was on the cover from another book Kut 1916 by Patrick Crowley.

In May 1915 Gen Sir John Nixon, GOC the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, sent Maj Gen Charles Townshend up the Tigris with a divisional-sized force. Townshend took Kut in late September, but his communications were fragile. Under political pressure to take Baghdad, Nixon ordered Townshend forward - checked at Ctesiphon, he fell back on Kut. (In 1895 Townshend had successfully defended the outpost of Chitral on the North-West frontier and hoped to repeat the achievement )

Townshend was encircled on 7 December. Relief attempts failed in January and March 1916, and, his supplies exhausted, Townshend surrendered with 10, 000 men in late April. His defeat dealt a serious blow to British prestige. Many of Townshend's soldiers perished in their harsh captivity. He himself lived in comfortable confinement in a Black Sea resort, and received a knighthood during his captivity. Although he was well received in 1918, he was rightly given no further military employment.

After the war, he resigned from the army in 1920 and wrote a book My Campaign in Mesopotamia (1920). He stood as an Independent Conservative candidate in a by-election in Shropshire and was elected to a term in Parliament as Member of Parliament (MP) for The Wrekin (1920-1922). However, as reports surfaced about how badly his troops had suffered at the hands of the Turks (more than half of the soldiers who surrendered died in Turkish captivity), his reputation lost all its lustre. Military experts attacked him for not beating the Ottomans at Ctesiphon, for his passivity during the siege of Kut, and for his inaccurate reports which lead to the hasty first relief expedition. He died in disgrace 18th May 1924 in Paris

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Mate,

I look at the other side of the coin, in that of the Turks.

We can discuss the problem with Townsend but the problems that the Turks found themselves in was just as bad.

Even as they besiedged the British at Kut the Turks were also suffering with little forces to draw on for the defence of southern Iraq. As with the native population both for and against them the Turks didn't have it all there own way.

Not to mention the limited food the Turkish Army could draw on and the limited or no rail line to carry supplies and later prisoners?

Little wonder that many hundreds died after their capture as Turkish losses were just as bad with both Turkish Divisions used in this early fighting were disbanded after the fall of Kut.

S.B

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On 11/07/2015 at 03:23, lancashire said:

There seems to be interest in this judging by the numerous topics, I will add some comments as read in the book Kut and captivity 6th Indian Division to give an inkling of the events:

John

John,

Here is a link to a previous GWF Thread on this subject, which contains information and photographs, including Townshend's final communiques sent just before the surrender and fall of Kut Al Amara, which gives us an insight into his thoughts at that critical time.

 

Regards,

LF

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Thanks for that L.F.

H.C.

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All,

Appreciate your comments, given the number of books available quite an emotive subject, just began reading Patrick Crowleys - Kut 1916 which does include various communiques be they HQ, Political (India and London) which still in my opinion Kut still was not the best place to make a stand!

Also still reading Kut and Captivity with the 6th Indian Division and I'm at the point some of the Pow's have got to Mosul still 150 or so pages to go not an experience any of us would wish to go through.

One interesting point is that the Gereral's refused to march on foot would only move with a pony / horse, despite the other officers marching much of the time. yes they do ever so often caught up with the others ranks columns whose plight is considerably worse! However to their credit the did supply monies and increase some medical staff and hospital beds for the other ranks that saved a few for sure.

I have by chance worked and lived in Turkey which make it more interesting.

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There are references to the various National Archives holdings in this TNA article https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/battles/mesopotamia.htm. Would make interesting reading if I ever have a few days to spare!

Also, lancashire, since the RNAS is in your field of interest, you may like this http://www.scottisharchivesforschools.org/shortLife/shortLifeIndex.asp

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It is/was not unusual for senior captured officers to be imprisioned in quarters rather more luxurious than those of lesser rank. Is not the key to this criticism of Townshend whether he knew or not of the plight of his troops? Does anyone know if he knew, suspected or - if he was made aware - sought to do anything about it. I am not aware if this has ever been looked into. Maybe it has?

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I can't believe he didn't know by the time he got to Constantinople, because the American consulate certainly knew, and in fact, in Baghdad, did all they could to help. The contrast in treatment, as David has pointed out, was always the case, with preferential treatment usually given to officers. The reasons for the ill treatment were legion also. The logistics as much as anything else were a problem. The Turks couldn't properly look after themselves, never mind feed, house and guard prisoners. I can't see that Townshend could have done a great deal personally to mitigate the behaviour of the Turks, and in particular their Arab employees.

As you say,most of the criticism surrounds this aspect, but there was also the question of whether he should have remained at Kut or whether at some point he should have attempted a breakout. Whose decision was it to stay put even after it became obvious that relief was problematic to say the least. After all, it took five months for the garrison to surrender. I have to wonder, (armchair general me!) whether somebody might have suggested a breakout at the same time as an attack by the relief troops rather than a surrender. In retrospect, it would likely have saved no few lives.

This is a fascinating story but depressing to say the least, when one reads the memoirs. I find it much more disturbing even than Gallipoli. "Complete McAuslan" finally arrived today, so that can be my light relief in between the Mespot. saga.

Hazel

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Hazel,

Is it likely that Townshend would have been made aware of the situation by the American Consulate? Equally I think you are quote right about the Turkish attitude and own problems - not least it was far from a democratic or wealthy country in which living standards, for many, differed greatly from those in the west. Accepting the Bushido creed as being beyond our understanding, similar low standards of living and lack of democracy were clearly an influence on the standards of treatment meted out to European and US pows durin the second half..

Regards

David

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SJ, David, Hazel,

I'm now at page 280 of Sandes book, and I can confirm the following:

  • They have met American Council's twice and on both occasions money was given to them of which communications went back up the line to UK interests for sure) I am happy to go back a few pages and quote exactly if any one wants the details.
  • On numerous occasions they have met German officers and had conversations and local help.
  • Some RAMC staff were left at various town and hospital provisions were increased as a result. names given
  • Other British troops (some captured from the relief forces attempts) were met and taken on board along the way, names an units tend to be given
  • The Orderlies were acquired / transferred to help the railway construction near by Mosul area
  • The book has maps of the route and describes halts and locations - I am reading the ebook version I have all the maps on the pdf
  • The general ic of the officer convoy held meetings with senior Turk as they went along too

A lot of detail, fell free to ask any questions I will look it up, this is not taking in account any of Crowleys book, I'm still at the early part.

SJ, there are even descriptions of medical issues, hospital allocations and more!

All as you know my initial interest is Kut (and where other relatives served / died, the list is sadly increasing) however having worked in the region (Erzurum, Ankara, Istanbul, Yemen,) and travelled (the other parts of Turkey I know s ome of the areas literally. I have expanded to the Mesopotamia region, I have also have RNAS links and thus I will also follow up air operations too. Having progressed to semi retired after working in the Oil Industry the region (Baku, Persia, Oil, Anatolia etc keep propping up). Now that we have to be trained by SAS lookalikes to work in some of these places now, I felt it time to stop before one is also blown up

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Thank you lancashire.

Time I had a proper look at Sandes methinks! although to be honest I am more interested in the naval side of things.

All best wishes,

sJ

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Seajane,

Don't worry on that account lots of data on the River transport operations and the RN river boats, naval personnel, for the next part of the Mespotamia campaign either Sandes or Crowley mentions a new order of I think 18 "boats x UK and India" if it Crowley I can sent you scans etc, just depends if you consider the River craft as naval or RIM!

I had placed you for Medicine, Hospitals, Medicines side of things, just having looked at your interests why the West African squadron?

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Either RN or RIM suits me, the ships seem to have cadged personnel from both!

I have Crowley on order and I think you said Sandes was on archive.org, so I should be able to look at that too.

sJ

(PS: The West Africa Squadron because of two particular naval surgeons, not Great War so I hesitate to post, but Sidney Bernard, Alexander Bryson and HMS ECLAIR http://blog.wellcome.ac.uk/2011/08/17/victorian-naval-medicine/ http://www.jrnms.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/JRNMS-961-45-53.pdf )

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sJ

I suspect I am being thick or have totally missed the point: but

They have met American Council's twice and on both occasions money was given to them of which communications went back up the line to UK interests for sure) I am happy to go back a few pages and quote exactly if any one wants the details.

I assume consul but who they and how does this money relate to Townshend's knowledge of the pows plight.?

On numerous occasions they have met German officers and had conversations and local help

Again who.Just not sure of the relevance

Some RAMC staff were left at various town and hospital provisions were increased as a result. names given

Other British troops (some captured from the relief forces attempts) were met and taken on board along the way, names an units tend to be given

The Orderlies were acquired / transferred to help the railway construction near by Mosul area

The book has maps of the route and describes halts and locations - I am reading the ebook version I have all the maps on the pdf

The general ic of the officer convoy held meetings with senior Turk as they went along too

Again not sure of the relevance to my point - was Townshend aware of the privations being suffered by the prisoners?

Genuinely not being difficult just a bit lost.

David

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sJ

I suspect I am being thick or have totally missed the point: but

They have met American Council's twice and on both occasions money was given to them of which communications went back up the line to UK interests for sure) I am happy to go back a few pages and quote exactly if any one wants the details.

I assume consul but who they and how does this money relate to Townshend's knowledge of the pows plight.?

On numerous occasions they have met German officers and had conversations and local help

Again who.Just not sure of the relevance

Some RAMC staff were left at various town and hospital provisions were increased as a result. names given

Other British troops (some captured from the relief forces attempts) were met and taken on board along the way, names an units tend to be given

The Orderlies were acquired / transferred to help the railway construction near by Mosul area

The book has maps of the route and describes halts and locations - I am reading the ebook version I have all the maps on the pdf

The general ic of the officer convoy held meetings with senior Turk as they went along too

Again not sure of the relevance to my point - was Townshend aware of the privations being suffered by the prisoners?

Genuinely not being difficult just a bit lost.

David

Hi David, I understand your confusion! However I think it is Hazel who has been discussing this particular point, not I.

(Personally I think that, whether or not Townshend was aware at the time of what was going on, the animus against him seems mostly to stem from the fact that he had a comfortable post waiting for him when he finally made it back to England; as per Kipling's poem 'Mesopotamia.' The extracts supplied by lancashire which you quote seem to support how random and difficult it might have been to know what was happening if you weren't on the ground at the time, although it would seem that some individuals did what they could).

My interest in Kut and the Tigris is mostly out of fascination with the RN side of things and the random "little ships" (to be anachronistic) nature of the flotilla.

Regards

sJ

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David,

Your line:

Is not the key to this criticism of Townshend whether he knew or not of the plight of his troops? Does anyone know if he knew, suspected or - if he was made aware - sought to do anything about it. I am not aware if this has ever been looked into. Maybe it has?

I added those points to try and illustrate (maybe poorly) that as the prisoner columns marched from Kut, there were numerous meeting with others who had good separate secure communication links so that surely without doubt this would have led to communications to those in Higher Authority (London, War office, foreign office etc) especially Townsend who is the common link here.

I am not suggesting that he did anything about it, at the end of the day it cost him a seat as an MP and military disgrace which in the submitted quote I provided from another General is well deserved. I am reading two books on this at the moment out of sequence time-wise.

This part of the topic came up as I question the competence of Townsend, Hazel made a some comments and I am in effect adding proof to my thoughts as I read more!

I am aware of lots of studies on Kut many after the war, I will try and see if they comment on Townsend as I read more.

For example there were request for the supply of medicines, increased hospital facilities, etc. As the officers of this column were aware of the issues with the other ranks in particular I thing its fair to sat that Townsend and others certainly knew the issues!

time wise the latest is written first as I flip backwards page and time wise

  1. for example June 22 Gen Mellis met with a senior Turkish officer who telegraphed Mosul for assistance,
  2. On the evening of 12 june ...the US Consul arrived and his assistant arrived with money for us from the British prisoners Relief fund which was signed for..
  3. our party of ten went to the US Consul and vice consul ..he took our names as having arrived safely at Aleppo...I believe he sent out names with those of the remaining British officers of the 1st echelon by letter to Constantinople whence they were communicated by wire or letter to London

Lancashire

Edited by lancashire
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Hi David,

I do understand your frustration, but I think maybe some of us are at cross purposes. I have read the various books including the Sandes. I don't think the treatment of the troops is at issue, nor the fact that some people knew and tried to alleviate the situation. If Townshend's reputation is based on that issue alone, as Jane mentioned, I think it is undeserved. That is based on the perception of others, and in the circumstances, not unusual.

What I would like to see, like you, is some idea of the military strategy and tactics behind his reputation, and who was giving Townshend his orders and how much autonomy he had in the entire campaign, because I have not been able to figure that out from my reading.

Not REALLY being an arm chair general but trying to understand the situation.

Hazel

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Hi David,

I do understand your frustration, but I think maybe some of us are at cross purposes. I have read the various books including the Sandes. I don't think the treatment of the troops is at issue, nor the fact that some people knew and tried to alleviate the situation. If Townshend's reputation is based on that issue alone, as Jane mentioned, I think it is undeserved. That is based on the perception of others, and in the circumstances, not unusual.

What I would like to see, like you, is some idea of the military strategy and tactics behind his reputation, and who was giving Townshend his orders and how much autonomy he had in the entire campaign, because I have not been able to figure that out from my reading.

Hazel,

I know you have looked at these final signals sent from Townshend at the time of the surrender, and what is obvious, is that he clearly blames others for his being in that dire situation, and he seems to accept no blame for his own actions, or lack thereof.

He also mentions that were he to " have to go into captivity, it will kill me ", and obviously the relatively very comfortable life he led in captivity, as opposed to that of his men, did him no harm whatsoever, and it certainly did not kill him !

For those who have not yet seen his final signals sent from Kut, here they are, along with my original post :-

Regards,

LF

In an Article on the Capture Kut by Major Donald Clark, he states :-

" The surrender of Kut was an inglorious end to a sad chapter of British military muddle. The Turks, having closed the ring around Kut, were content to fight off the relief attempts while waiting for the town to starve into submission, yet during this time of waiting Townshend made no attempt to break out or join up with the relieving force. Nor did he immediately conduct a thorough assessment of his force's food supply. Certainly Townshend's conduct, his character and personality, are at the centre of the controversy which surrounds the surrender of Kut. "

Attached are two signals, one personal and one official, sent by General Townshend at the time of the Kut surrender. The personal signal was a message to his wife sent c/o Sir Wilfred Peek just two days before the surrender, which seems to be full of self-pity and devoid of self-blame.

The signal to his wife reads :-

" Write Alice tell her the hole I am in here through the fault of others, when I think, tell her how all conduct of operations was put on to me and not one word of praise and no thanks for all I have done throughout this campaign. I have only one desire that to leave the Army as soon as peace comes. I am ill and weak but a little better today. Tell her I have some six or seven hundred pounds in pay at ? which I will instruct them to send her. If I have to go into captivity, it will kill me.

signed - Charles Townshend - April 27th.

The final official signal sent 29/4/16 from Kut to HQ. B.E.F. at 1.20 pm reads :-

" A Turkish regiment approaching fort to take over guards in Kut. I have hoisted the " white flag " over town and fort. Troops commence going into camp near Shumran at 2 oclock. Will shortly destroy the wireless, it is worn out as it is.

1.35 pm - General Townshend

To All Ships and Stations from Kut, Good-Bye and Good Luck to all.

The surrender followed a failed attempt to buy the Garrison's freedom, first with 1 million pounds, and then with 2 million pounds.

On April 29 Townshend destroyed his guns and ammunition and told Khalil he was ready to surrender. At 1300 hours the Garrison wireless tapped out ' Good-Bye ' and was destroyed.

The strength of the Garrison when surrender came was 13,309. The total casualties amounted to 3,776 of which 1,025 had been killed or died of wounds, 2,446 were wounded and 721 had died of disease. The hospital in Kut contained 1,450 sick and wounded on April 29 most of whom were exchanged at once, followed by a further group three months later.

Copies of the 2 signals attached.

LF

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post-63666-0-60685200-1437760277_thumb.j

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Hi L.F.,

Yes, I had read all that stuff, and yes his character doesn't look too great at the end, and certainly he fell short in being somewhat lackadaisical in terms of keeping on top of food left available. Likely he relied on subordinates to keep him informed. I realise that doesn't excuse him. However, did he personally make the decision, initially, to keep going to Baghdad? Of course he would have had input, but from what I have read so far, he maintained that he did not have the logistical requirements to keep going, although he was promised relief that never turned up, all the way through the campaign.

While he may have chosen Kut as the place to hole up initially in the retreat, why did he stay there? I thought he was told to hang on pending relief. However, I can't get my head around why nobody ordered him to attempt a breakout if he wasn't about to do it off his own bat. Where, in fact, for the whole mess, does the buck actually stop?

Some time ago, I read the memoirs of Henry Wilson and Charles Repington, both of whom made mention of Townshend being held responsible for the decisions of others and as I have not read enough to know the truth (if anyone ever will) I have tried to keep an open mind about him.

Hazel

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