N.Z.s machine gun New Army men?

[Guest bonza]

It probably comes as a shock, mate, but we differ on at least one point.

Bean is one of my Heroes.

He seems to be accused for originating the Myth that the Australians, and the Fern-landers were the only ones there. The relevant Volumes are THE STORY OF ANZAC not of GALLIPOLI, CAPE HELLES, SUVLA or DARDANELLES.

He was an Australian 'correspondent' voted into the Historian job by his oppo's.

So the recording of every movement in and around the penninsula might be a bit over the odds.

Now whats that definition of deja vu I'm lookin for?

Cheers Cobber

ooroo

Pat

[Geoff S]

Pat,

Suggest you start a new topic,as not to divert this one, or stay on the topic please!

Geoff S

[Guest bonza]

Geoff

Yep, close enough from memory its sure that old time feeling!

Cheers

Pat

[michaeldr]

Geoff

I do agree with you that “Events at the Farm read like complete & utter bedlam. Situation was critical. It was desperate….”

However, for all that, I have my doubts about any NA men at the Farm being the object of the fire from Temperley’s MGs; this is based upon the foll from Rhodes James:

“The New Zealand machine-guns at the Apex roared into life, and the warships sent shell after shell screaming into the Turkish hoards rampaging across the slopes in the weak morning light. The Turks were cut down in swathes as they stormed down towards the Farm, but they moved so rapidly, and were visible so briefly, that the survivors reached the plateau in great numbers, exultant and fanatical.”

This seems to imply that the while the Turks were en route to the Farm they were briefly in the line of fire from Temperley at the Apex, however, when at the Farm its self, they were not.

[This is in contrast to the Pinnacle, which when taken by the Turks did provide a line of fire for their MGs down onto the Farm]

I have to admit however that this line of thought is based upon mere words rather than the much to be desired contour map – can no one help us out here?

To return to my previous candidates, the Loyals and/or the Wiltshires: Steel & Hart writing in their ‘Defeat at Gallipoli’ have the foll from Corporal A. G. Scott [iWM DOCS A. G. Scott, ms letter dated 1 December 1915]

“As daybreak dawned at 4am everyone thought themselves safe, and we were just beginning to dig ourselves in again, when our covering party scouts came in and said the Turks were coming up on all sides in thousands and before we had time to prepare to meet them we were under heavy fire with shrapnel and machine-guns and men began to fall…. ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies was nearly all done for in no time…. Caught in the open and killed before we had time to get our rifles even, but ‘B’ and ‘D’ were more fortunate, as they were in a small trench, and they made a good fight for it....”

We still have a situation were Temperley is the only chronicler and no one is coming forward, backing him up. Interestingly, not only is no one backing him up, but also no one has come forward with a contrary opinion, asking ‘Why did you shoot at my men?’

We have rather less than half a picture here. He says that he fired on NA men and we know from where he fired, but we do not know either upon whom he fired or where they were positioned at the critical time. Parts of his story are frankly very hard to believe

Quote: “I saw 300 or 400 of them running towards the Turks with their hands up”

Frightened men do NOT run towards their attackers, especially when that would almost certainly have involved running UP HILL! This area is a series of intertwined ridges and gullies; the obvious line of least resistance is down hill.

This battle or series of battles over 4 days or so, cost about 12,000 allied casualties and a number on the Turkish side which is not far short of that. Officer and NCO casualties were particularly heavy, thus leaving not only a gaping wound in the regiments concerned, but also a series of unit histories which seem to be at best vague on these events.

While I am sorry if we have not been able to solve this puzzle, there is a part of me which is pleased in that [so far] no one’s good name has had a shadow cast over it.

Regards

Michael D.R.

Edited 10 November , 2004 by michaeldr

[curranl]

Hello All,

From "The Tenth Irish Division at Gallipoli" by Brian Cooper, possibly an answer as to who was on the left on the 10th:

"Meanwhile, on the left, the hostile attack developed with even greater force. Orders had been recieved to send the 5th Wiltshires to relieve the New Zealanders on the crest of the Chunuk, but one company had been retained as its withdrawal would have left part of the line completely unmanned. A company of the 9th Warwicks had come up to relieve the Wiltshires, but were found to be very weak. There were also on the left in addition to the Royal Irish Rifles, about 50 men, all that remained of the East Lancashires, and a few Gurkas and Maoris belonging to the left column who had retired down the hill and joined General Baldwin.

Against these few exhausted men, less than a thousand in all, the Turks were free to throw the whole of their reserves, since by this time (dawn, Tuesday) it was clear that the advance at Suvla was not likely to get much further"

Cooper was a Major in the 5th Connaught Rangers. He does not mention the machine gunning incident.

Regards,

Liam.

[RobB]

Some years ago possibly 15 there was a programme on New Zealand TV where

veterans were interviewed about the Chunuk Bair action.From memory one veteran described the condition of the Wellington Battalion after taking Chunuk Bair.He claimed that British Troops who had taken over from them came under attack and started running back and they were ordered to use their machine guns to keep them in line.

He did not mention what the British unit was.Having read Hickey and recently Carylon

both claim that the British units were the Loyals and Wiltshires.

RobB

[michaeldr]

The following details are from the diary of James Fyfe as published in ‘The Gallipolian’ No.87 Autumn 1998. Fyfe served in the ‘Otago Mounted Rifles attached to Maori Battalion.’

“New Zealand and Australian infantry successful in their part of drive forcing Turks over the top of the ridge and suffering heavy losses. Entrenched and defended positions against heavy counter attack. Relived by Leicester and Irish troops who run away leaving machine guns and gear behind when Turks attack. Entrench lower down hill and machine guns set behind Kitcheners army to prevent them running away. Maori machine guns do good work.”

It sounds as if he is describing the action we are interested in here but I must admit that I am not absolutely certain.

Who were the Leicesters? There were no Leicesters and since Irish troops are also mentioned then this could be a mistake or misprint for Leinsters.

The machine guns were positioned behind the Kitcheners army men; this would be the Leinsters at the Apex and beyond them, the Wiltshire and the Loyal North Lancs towards the Turkish line

Finally, please note that Fyfe does not confirm that the machine guns were actually used against the Kitchener army men.

Regards

Michael D.R.

[RobB]

Hi Michael,

I would like to make comment on what you have read. There was not a Maori Battalion in World War 1 .It was called the Pioneer Battalion and initially not armed The Chunuk Bair incident was purely a Wellington Battalion action together with a small number

of the Glosters. They were relieved by the Loyals who were overrun when the Turks counter attacked .The veteran on the NZ Documentary was in that action and he manned one of the machine guns.He related what he was ordered to do, to shoot them back into the trench. Hickey gives a good account of this action in his Book Gallipoli .

Loyals and the Wiltshires were the Battalions shot at.

What of course is not mentioned that the New Army troops were on the go for 24 hours before the battle.Birdwoods battle plan that day came unstuck. Like the rest of the carnage that day men died trying to do their duty.

I do not think a man from the Otago Rifles would be attached to the Maori group.

Cheers for now

RobB

[michaeldr]

RobB,

Thank you for your in-put on this. Your recollection of the

TV programme c15 years ago, with its interview of the veteran, is useful, as to date we have not been able to come up with anyone who corroborates Temperley’s claim to have turned his machine guns on Kitchener’s New Army men.

Carlyon is just repeating Temperley, as I believe is Prof Travers, who also adds some confusion about the exact date. Col Hickey does not mention the incident of NZ machine gun(s) firing on British troops.

What we have been searching for here in the past few months is

i] some contemporary account which backs up Temperley’s claim

ii] and supposing that the event actually happened as Temperley claims, then which New Army units were involved since Temperley does not identify them himself

Temperley has also not helped, since, as you will see from Geoff S’s posts above, when he repeated the story in 1938 he did not mention his firing on British troops.

It is worth rereading Geoff S’s posts as he gives details of which NZ units took part in this action in addition to the Wellington Battalion. I will also att below a copy of the August Order of Battle from the Official History – Military Operations – Gallipoli, Vol II

This shows the Otago Mounted Rifles (served dismounted) were part of the Maori Detachment. Personally, I am inclined to think that the men at the time such as James Fyfe, thought of themselves as a ‘Battalion’ and not as the Official Historian termed them, a ‘Detachment’ when he was writing all those years later.

Fyfe’s diary makes an interesting article and if you have not seen the copy of ‘The Gallipolian’ in question then please let me know and I will try to get something off to you.

Best regards

Michael D.R.

[RobB]

Hi Michael,

Many thanks for opening my mind. I have a copy of Gallipoli the New Zealand Story

by Pugsley.I read his account of Temperley's .However I am utterly confused as to what date is correct.

The account given by the veteran was that after being relieved

they had retired from the crest with only about 60 left .The rest were either wounded or dead.The relieving troops NA in the morning were attacked and started running back.

For what we had gone through we fired our machine guns to keep them in the trenches.

Yesterday I called TV NZ archives to see if I can obtain a copy of the programme.

Now correct me if I am wrong the attack on Chunuk Bair was on the 8th.So the night of 8th and 9th the Wellington Battalion was relieved. Col Malone died on the 8th.

If the Loyals and Wiltshires were attacked on the 9th .The remnants of the Wellington Battalion fired on the NA before Temperley did on the 10th.So was there more than

on incident when the MG's were turned on British Troops. That may account for other units being nominated as those running forward with their hands up.

Another issue was what piece of Artillery was responsible for Col Malones death

some accounts claim it was a NZ 4.5 Howitzer and others claim it was a naval

barrage. No one knows and like the campaign full of mysteries that will never be solved.

The Wellington Battalion was relieved by the Otago and Wellington Mtd according to Pugsley.

Michael I would grateful for anything you can send me re this incident.

Cheers for now

RobB

[Robert Dunlop]

This shows the Otago Mounted Rifles (served dismounted) were part of the Maori Detachment.

Michael

I'm not sure about that. I think the Maori Detachment is the first of several lines - the other units below it are not indented (or should not be). It was not until after Gallipoli that the Maori contingent was large enough to form the Pioneer Battalion, in conjunction with some Niue Islanders and Pakeha (the Maori word for 'European' settlers and their offspring in New Zealand). The policy was to keep the Maori in units that were separate from their Pakeha countrymen.

Robert

[michaeldr]

RobB,

If you PM me with your postal address I will send you a copy of James Fyfe’s diary as it appeared in The Gallipolian back in ‘98

Robert,

When I have a second look at the OB, then you could be right and the entries may not be connected as I at first thought. I note that what I had taken to be a sub-heading is not in italics, as those above are.

The ‘attachment’ to the Maories is from The Gallipolian article’s title which in full is – “Diary of James Fyfe” sub-heading “Otago Mounted Rifles attached to Maori Battalion”

At Zietoun in Egypt on 5th Feb 1915, Fyfe describes his unit thus “The Otago Mounted Rifles are an independent battalion with machine gun, ambulance and transport of their own. We are attached (on paper) to two regiments of Australian Light Horse thus making up the strength of a brigade.”

It is much later, on Gallipoli, that he begins to refer to the Maori soldiers he was involved with, though at no time is there a full explanation of this position, as in the manner above.

Friday 2 July 1915: Issue of eggs and tobacco. Maoris take over No. 1 outpost from Australians.

……………

Sunday [not clear which, 25th Jul or 1st Aug?] ……………….Now at N0. 3 outpost…..

2nd Aug 1915: …………Church service in Maori. Two hundred strong Moari picquet singing. Maori Chaplain. 5th relieve 7th [squadron or troop numbers?] in trenches tonight……….

6th Aug 1915: Bush packing up and preparing for a general advance. We are going to a table top some half mile inland. A.M.R. to assist with Maoris in support……………….

7th Aug 1915: Our part of the attack completely successful. Filed out of trenches at 9.00 pm. Turks firing on us immediately with rifle, machine guns and bombs. Flares lighting up the position. Made down and formed up in firing trench in gully with fixed bayonets but no cartridge in rifle. Made across flat under heavy fire. Several men shot. Reached hillside. No. 3 and 4 troops mixed up together under McLeen S.M. Graham and Evens reinforced by Maoris and made attack on flank of Turk trenches under heavy machine gun fire. Maoris made good the left trench in rear and made for Bauchops Hill. Turks made strong resistance here. Heavy casualties amongst all our troops. In the 7th Squadron S.M. Cuff Corp. Webber, Capt Hay, J. Edgar and about three others killed. Also Ahern and Walmsley, Sgt. Williams seriously wounded. Turks retire and leave in a hurry leaving all their gear behind. Silver swords, silk quilts etc. During night Capt. Paddon, Sgt Hargest wounded. Mackay killed. Camped on hill for night. Entrenched during morning. Col. Bauchop seriously wounded. Several men sniped some killed. English dividion on left and Gurkhas make successful attack against Turks position, meeting with heavy casualties.” here the diary entry continues as I have previously quoted above.

Much later, on 2nd Sep 1915, Fyfe’s diary states “Otago Mounted Rifles attached to brigade now” alas without any further explanation.

Regards

Michael D.R.

[AndyMacdonald]

I have a Wiltshire diary that confirms this.

Andy M

[Geoff S]

Andy M

Sorry,,You have a Wiltshire Diary that confirms.......?

Cheers

Geoff S

I have a Wiltshire diary that confirms this.

Andy M

[AndyMacdonald]

I have a Wiltshire diary that confirms his particular New Army unit was raked by NZ machine guns to stop them fleeing. Obviously the man lived and later emigrated to NZ, which is where I got the diary.

Andy M

[michaeldr]

In time Andy I hope that you will be able to share that Wilshire-man’s Diary with us

Until then the foll may be of interest

Ray Westlake in his ‘British Regiments at Gallipoli’ gives the following in respect of the The Duke of Edinburgh’s (Wiltshire Regiment)

5th (Service) Battalion

“August

To Anzac (4th). Occupied reserve line – Walker’s Ridge and trenches – Russll’s Top. In action with South Wales Borderers at Damakjelik Bair (6th-7th). Withdrawn from Damakjelik Bair and moved to foot of Chunuk Bair (8th). Advanced up hill in reserve (10th). Enemy attacked over crest of Chunuk Bair - Lieutenant Colonel F. E. Whitton in his history of the Lienster Regiment (6th Lienster holding The Apex) recalls that 3 companies of the Wiltshire were caught in the open and “annihilated.” Withdrawn and to positions on Rhododendron spur. Casualties included Commanding Officer – Lieutenant Colonel J. Carden killed. One regimental record notes that …”more than half the officers and men were never seen again.”

The Wiltshire War Diary entries below are taken from http://www.thewardrobe.org.uk/wardiary.php...nth=8&year=1915

[6th - 7th] On that evening (Friday) at 8p.m the Battalion moved from White Valley accompanied by the S.W.Bs. Route taken was through Rest Gulley and over the cliffs through the cutting, reaching the shore again beyond Ari Burnu. Thence they were sniped and encountered considerable shrapnel fire.

Finally a position was taken up on DAMAJELIK BEIR A,B & C companies take up position from Track 92 N8 to KNOLL

92 O 8-9 inclusive D company in Bde reserve in

Gulley S. of Pt. 40

This position was taken with but slight opposition. Number of prisoners taken during the operation by the SWBs and WILTS is estimated at 250 (Reports agree that a number of the prisoners taken on this occasion were old men and very willing to fall into our hands. There was every indication of a hasty retirement of those previously occupying the ground. The fires in the cottages were warm and there were signs throughout of recent habitation. Excellent honey and water was found here. HBLB)

Officer casualties on march from ANZAC

Lieut A.G.O. Wigmore R.A.M.C (wounded slightly)

Lieut A.C Belcher (killed)

Remarks:

Reference Gallipoli Map 1.20,000 KURIJA DERE

[8th - 9th] This line was held during Sunday - casualties

Capt J.W Greany (slightly wounded)

Lieut G.D Bidwell (seriously wounded)

At 7p.m of Sunday evening this line was taken over by the 4th South Wales Borderers and the trenches begun by us during Sunday completed. We learn that they were attacked in this position on the following day and were completely successful in holding it.

Move into CHAILAK DERE and here remain until after dark. Then move into AGHYL DERE in rear of the HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT. At this period we were attached to 38th Bde. Casualty on march Capt F Spencer (wounded)

Monday

Remain behind Hampshire's, in rear of the FARM position below crest of hill. Heavy fighting was in progress in front, and the Battalion was shelled. Capt R.W.F Jesson (wounded).

During the day counter attacks by the Turks were expected but did not develop. Rations were drawn at 5.30p.m and rumours were current of 24 hours rest.

It should be noted that the men had had no rest, and very little water and food since Friday evening and were consequently in a very exhausted condition.

1a.m (01.00)

Battalion moves away in single file less D company and part of B company [The history of this party will be given separately as far as possible. H B L B] Order of march C - Machine guns - A - B companies "Move by a steep and winding course to a cup-shaped deformation at the head of the Gulley to the right and some distance in front of our salient." (Words of 2 Lieut R.W.M. Dewhurst one of the few officers on the march who subsequently survived.) The Battalion was guided, as far as I am able to ascertain by a New Zealand Officer. Here they arrived two hours before sunrise (circa 0.300) and the men were told to dig into dugouts and make themselves comfortable as the position was quite safe. Men therefore removed equipment and rifles.

This position I take it to be just N. of the H in Chunuk Bair and the march to it from the Aghyl Dere must have been via the APEX (Ref. Gallipoli Map 1.20,000 Koya Dere)

(Circa) 4.30 a.m. As soon as it was light machine guns opened on the men lying in their dug outs. About 1/4 of an hour later there was a rush of Turks from both sides of the depression which drove the men, unarmed and unequipped down the gulley (SALZLI BEIT). The bottom of the gulley commanded by machine guns and so escape was cut off. Three courses were possible:-

1. To rush past the machine guns down the Sazli Beit, this was tried but in nearly all cases proved fatal.

2. To climb the northern slope of the ravine under fire and try to escape over the top. This was done in a few cases with success.

3. Hide in Gulley till night, this also was done with more success. (A party of 5 men was rescued from the Gulley having been there 16 days - ie:- from Aug 10 - Aug 26th. They reported numbers of men who were wounded, were unable to get away and died of exhaustion and starvation. H.B.L.B )

Parties arrived on the Beach in fours, fives, and some carried bodies during the 11th, 12th and 13th unarmed, unequipped and demoralised.

The Battalion when mustered on the Beach mustered

roughly 420 (This includes 76 men lately arrived as Details from Lemnos.)

Officer casualties:-

Lt Col. J Carden (missing) 2nd Lieut J.E.R Firmin (killed) 2nd Lt G Gamman (missing) Maj. F Ricketts (killed) 2nd Lieut W.Y. Radcliffe (killed) Lieut A.J Hinxman (missing) Maj. W.S Hern (killed) 2nd Lieut C.G.C Fisher-Brown (missing) Capt & ADJ A.C Belcher (killed) Lieut A.W. Huckett (missing) Lieut F.E Hill (wounded) Lieut Brown (wounded - attached)

Best regards

Michael D.R.

[michaeldr]

Quote from the Wiltshires’ War Dairy as given above

“1a.m (01.00)

Battalion moves away in single file less D company and part of B company [The history of this party will be given separately as far as possible. H B L B] Order of march C -

Machine guns - A - B companies "Move by a steep and winding course to a cup-shaped deformation at the head of the Gulley to the right and some distance in front of our salient." (Words of 2 Lieut R.W.M. Dewhurst one of the few officers on the march who subsequently survived.) The Battalion was guided, as far as I am able to ascertain by a New Zealand Officer. Here they arrived two hours before sunrise (circa 0.300) and the men were told to dig into dugouts and make themselves comfortable as the position was quite safe. Men therefore removed equipment and rifles.

This position I take it to be just N. of the H in Chunuk Bair and the march to it from the Aghyl Dere must have been via the APEX (Ref. Gallipoli Map 1.20,000 Koya Dere)”

Question 1: Can anyone post a copy of the map referred to here?

Speaking personally, I would find it most helpful.

Question 2: regarding what I take to be 2nd Lt Dewhust’s comments in the same dairy entry – “(Circa) 4.30 a.m. As soon as it was light machine guns opened on the men lying in their dug outs. About 1/4 of an hour later there was a rush of Turks from both sides of the depression which drove the men, unarmed and unequipped down the gulley (SALZLI BEIT). The bottom of the gulley commanded by machine guns and so escape was cut off. Three courses were possible:-

1. To rush past the machine guns down the Sazli Beit, this was tried but in nearly all cases proved fatal. “

Even though I have not yet seen the map, am I correct in thinking that this is the probable explanation for the suggestion contained in Liam’s post No.3 above;

“I have come across the following while Googling. It is a quote directly from Temperleys memoir of the battle:

" On August 10 I saw 300 or 400 of them running towards the Turks with their hands up. To save a disaster of the first magnitude and to prevent our whole front line collapsing I gave the orders to the machine guns of our Brigade to open fire upon them and at some cost in life the movement was checked and they ran back to their lines."”

[my emphasis]

ie: Temperley’s ‘running towards the Turks’ = Wilt’s War Dairy’s ‘rush past the machine guns’

is it possible that Temperley was mistaken and that the Wilts were not in fact surrendering, but merely trying to get out of the mg’s range by rushing past them as suggested by the War Dairy entry? Or is this a case of the War Diary's ‘after-the-event justification’?

Personally, I am not sure that we will ever know the answer to this one, but I would like to hear any comments which the Pals might have

Regards

Michael D.R.

[aconnolly]

Dear Pals

I have followed this post with probably more interest than any other and thank all the pals who have contributed, especially Michael and Geoff. And a special thanks to Liam for starting this all off! I’ve rekindled my interest in learning so much more about Gallipoli. Attached in the following posts are two maps from Bean, Off. History, AIF, Story of Anzac, vol 2 for the situation at the time the Wellingtons captured Chunuk Bair and at the time the Turks counter-attacked on the 10th.

Bean gives a detailed narrative of the events as he believes them to have occurred. Note than italics or bold highlights are added for emphasis.

Bean gives the most detail of any of the Official accounts of Chunuk Bair that I have, and does so by some distance (these are the Australian, NZ, and British official campaign histories, plus the official histories of all the NZ regiments involved). In addition, there is less detail in Pugsley as it concentrates on the NZ war in the Dardenelles. Pugsley does repeat Temperley’s assertion regarding the machine-gunning at the centre of this debate, but does so in the same way Carlyon does – a one-off statement. Apparently Temperley’s report is in the Waiuru Army Museum archives.

From Bean, from pg 706 onward: August 9: “Arrangements had to be made to relieve at nightfall both the troops upon Chunuk Bair and the Auckland Infantry which was still holding the advanced support line at the Pinnacle…The two battalions which could most conveniently have been sent forward were the 6th Loyal North Lancashire (who had been in reserve all day at the Apex) and the 6th Linster, which had been brought up the Chailak Dere at midday. By Godley’s orders, however, the Leinster, being the one fresh reserved battalion, was not to be thrown into the fight if it was possible to avoid doing so. [General] Shaw accordingly chose … the 5th Wiltshire. The relief was to begin at 8pm…but The Wiltshire, which had to come form the Argyl Dere, could not arrive until 1am. The 6th Loyal NL was therefore sent forward alone.”

Bean goes on to state that Chunuk Bair was now entirely in the hands of the New Army battalions. The plan for a further assault was abandoned; the relief battalions were to be on the defensive.

“The LNL held both the advanced foothold and the Auckland’s old half-way position at the Pinnacle. The 6th Leinster occupied the Apex.”

“Eventually about 2 am [10 August] two and a half companies of the [5th Wiltshire] battalion reached the Apex and were then guided into position by a New Zealander”. Bean notes the time is disputed amongst various sources.

“As all the trenches on Chunuk Bair were shallow and the rearmost full of wounded, it was decided that the 5th Wiltshire should not occupy them, but should remain lower down in the spoon-shaped hollow at the head of the Sazli, near the point where the wounded were mainly collected. Here, having been told by the guide that they were in shelter the Wiltshire waited; but at dawn [10 August] they found themselves under sniping fire, and consequently took off their equipment and began to entrench.

“Although these new British battalions, one on the fringe of the summit and the other in rear in the Sazli, were waiting practically unmolested for the day-break, on the other side of the crest there was preparing a most formidable attack.”

Pg 709: “Of the actual incidents of this famous assault, few are recorded. At about 0300 or 0330 am on August 10th, … some bombing began at Chunuk Bair and at The Farm, and also a little later at the advanced position of the 9th Worcester below the crest between Chunuk Bair and [Hill] Q. ….As daylight increased the enemy’s artillery shelled the position. There was a renewal of bombing and the North Lanc. in the front trench of Chunuk Bair was firing sharply at the bomb throwers when over the crest came a line of Turkish infantry advancing with the bayonet. This was followed by other waves topping all parts of Chunuk Bair from its southern shoulder near Battleship Hill to its northern slope above the Farm.”

Battleship Hill is below and left of the Turkish line. Essentially this attack was from 2/3rds of the rim of the amphitheatre that was Chunuk Bair and the surrounding land, leaving the forward defences on Chunuk Bair as a most unpleasant salient.

Now must be about the time the (alleged) machine-gunning took place.

Bean goes on: “The North Lanc. Appear to have had no bombs with which to reply to the enemy’s preliminary bomb-attack; but the New Zealanders camped in the Chailak heard a tremendous out-burst of British rifle-fire. Then the North Lanc. broke both at Chunuk Bair and at the Pinnacle. A remnant appears to have stayed and to have been bayoneted by the enemy.” Bean adds a foot-note here: “Those watching from below [? If he means on Rhododendron Spur / NZ Brigade HQ where Temperley was] could see ltttle, except against the sky-line.” Rhod. Spur and the Apex are essentially due-West of Chunuk Bair therefore the rising sun would have been directly behind the Turks, and potentially in the eyes of the defenders. The actual position of the NZ HQ was on the northern slope of the Spur, just below the plateau of the Spir. Observation of Sazli Beit could not be made from the HQ itself – it would require being on the plateau or the southern (exposed) slope.

Pg 710: “When the 5th Wiltshire, who had been digging, saw the Turkish line descending upon their right, they also ran back, down the Sazli Dere. Four or five lines of the enemy ….had begun moving down the slope when the warships opened upon them, firing broadsides, the four or five shells from each ship bursting almost simultaneously on the seaward face of the hill. At the same time the Anzac batteries were heavily shelling the inland slope. With even more deadliness ten machine-guns of the NZ brigade, carefully posted about The Apex, caught the Turkish lines as they swept down toward The Farm”

This is where confusion really sets in….Despite recording the Wiltshires ran, Bean’s subsequent text implies no-one further down the hills knew the Wiltshires, or at least some of them, ran into the Dere. Bean notes some of the Wiltshires took up a new position just below the Pinnacle with the Turks taking up position at the Pinnacle. Bean also makes a very important footnote on page 714. “ It was not know at the time [? Circa just after the Turkish infantry came over the hill] that a remnant of the 5th Wiltshire had on being driven from Chunuk Bair sought shelter further down the Sazil Dere. With them was one of their majors who had been shot through the spine. They appear to have not known where they were and one, climbing towards the NZ trenches on Rhododendron spur was shot either by his own side or by the enemy. Consequently for a fortnight they lay hidden in the depths of the valley. Water was obtained from a spring and food from dead men’s haversacks…..On August 27, 63 of the 70 remaining [bean notes the numbers may be exaggerated] decided to make a rush down the valley. They never reached safety, but it is recorded on this day a post of the 8th Light Horsemen at Camel’s Hump at the foot of the Valley saw a body of “Turks” in no ordered formation coming down. The 8th fired and the “Turks” ran back. But Lt. Higgins looking through his glasses observed: “Those men have no arms”. There can be little doubt that they were the Wiltshire and that afterwards they were shot down by Turks near Snippers Nest….Of the 7 that did not accompany them, two made their way to the NZers on Rhododendron Ridge. Captain J W Greany of the Wiltshires with NZ stretcher-bearers at once went out…and in two nights rescued the other 5 men.”

This essentially completes Bean’s record of the fighting of August 10. So, it appears the Wiltshires were partly in the Sazli Beit Dere, partly at the Pinnacle. Bean reports many deaths in the Wiltshires that ran as the Turks attacked occurred after August 10th.

As Michael DR has stated, a map is vital! I’ve tried as best I can to interpret the topography as shown on various maps, but I may well be wrong in what I conclude about the NZ machine guns. However, here goes… The Apex is the point of an imaginary triangle with a line from the Wiltshire Trench to The Farm forming the base. The triangle slopes down from base to apex. Bean refers to the NZ guns firing toward The Farm. This is “topographically sound”. The Wiltshire trench position on the morning of 10 August was above the Apex, but the Sazli Beit Dere drops rapidly away, and it would not seem likely for guns at The Apex to have fired down into it as they would have had to rotate almost 180 degrees from their selected fields of fire to achieve this. In addition, Bean does not record the Wiltshires running toward the Turks. To do so, the Turks would have already come over Battleship and run down into the Sazli Dere below the Wiltshires. Certainly the fact the Wiltshires were digging may well explain why the ran – no time to grab weapons etc. They seem to have made a rapid exit, so would the Turks have had time to get below them? I doubt it given the terrain below Battleship Hill. Turkish machine guns on Battleship Hill probably could fire into parts of the Sazli Beit Dere as they could toward the NZers on Rhododendron. Certainly this supports the information posted by Michael DR as contained in the Wiltshire’s diary. It seems inconceivable that the Wiltshires would have run up toward any Turks, but they (the Wiltshires) may have run around and down the Sazli Beit to descend in some degree of control on the steep ground – the gradient looks steep on the maps. Could this have given Temperley at Rhododendron Ridge the impression of running toward the Turks coming down from Battleship?

Either way,Bean’s report of how most of the Wiltshires in Sazil Beit Dere ultimately died does not support Temperley’s view that in ordering the NZ machine guns to fire onto the Wiltshires, he “caused” the deaths of many Wiltshires.

Where were the NZ guns seems a vital question. Captain Wallingford had 10 guns at The Apex, but were there NZ guns at Rhododendron Spur for Temperley to order into action against the Wiltshires? Guns there presumably would have had a field of fire into ( at least the upper) Sazli Beit Dere . One problem I have is that some sources inter-mingle Rhododendron Spur and the The Apex as one position, but “tactically” it seems to me to have been two – or at least the Apex was the forward extension of the Spur. There seems no doubt that Wallingford (who commanded the NZ machine guns) wanted/had all his machine guns at the Apex.

So, anything solid from all this? It is possible Temperley ordered NZ guns to fire into the upper Sazli Dere, but Bean’s version of events does not seem to support large numbers of Wiltshire dead in the Sazli Beit Dere. In addition, given the broadsides from the battleships, the artillery and the Turkish bombardments of the dry dirt of Chunuk Bair, could Temperley really have seen clearly that the figures running headlong were in fact the Wiltshires? I don’t know, and I guess I never will. Seems based on Bean that at least one Wiltshire was possibly shot by the NZers on Rhododendron Spur, causing many others to stay in the Dere.

Why would Temperley be so emphatic regarding ordering the guns to fire if he did not in fact do so? Seems impossible to answer this, so perhaps he did order fire, but if Bean’s version is correct, perhaps the NZ gunners “aimed high” so to speak, restoring order to some degree.

I, like all the others who have posted, guess we will never know the total story of that dreadful fight on Chunuk Bair, but via this topic I have come to appreciate in even greater depth the extraordinary struggle by all the brave men who went up those bloody hills

Regards

Andrew

[curranl]

Hello All,

I have to admit to being chuffed at having started this thread! The confusion of that day probably means we will never get a definitive answer as to exactly what happened. However, it has been a fascinating jigsaw and many thanks to all those who shed some light on a piece of that terrible day. Please keep posting!!

Regards,

Liam

[Geoff S]

Hi Andy,

I would also be interested in getting a copy of the diary that relates to the events that took place on that day.

The Wilts were very exposed that day, & I can imagine that they must have been over-ran quite quickly.

Cheers

Geoff S

I have a Wiltshire diary that confirms his particular New Army unit was raked by NZ machine guns to stop them fleeing. Obviously the man lived and later emigrated to NZ, which is where I got the diary.

Andy M

[The Plummed Goose]

Dear Pals,

I have read this with interest but unfortunately due to lack of time have not been able to contribute. I do not have the time at the moment to do alot of reseach but there are two things that -knowing the terrain rather well- that come to my mind.

1. I think that, although the majority of the NZ MG at the Apex were facing the farm and hill Q (See also Pugsley -picture on page 287 - edition of 1998), there could have (and in fact should have) been a few guns placed to cover the Turks Hump. An attack could be expected from there as well. These would not command the upper slopes (the cup) of the Sazli Dere but would be able to fire on the slopes below Turks Hump and into Sazli Dere just past from where the Wiltshires were stationed. (See also Pugsley -picture on page 279 - edition of 1998). Therefore I think is must have been possible for the NZ to fire at the Wiltshires. Also at 5 am the MGs would not have the sun against them as they would be firing South East ...

2. There is something which I do not understand when reading all the above quotes. This is about the location of the Turkish machineguns as sometimes they are said to be COMMANDING the Sazli Dere, sometimes it seems the Wiltshires had to PASS them to get back to safety, towards the beach. Turkish machine guns at battleship would only be able to command a very small part of the Sazli dere, maybe 50 meters as the southern slope of Sazli dere -going up to Battlefield Hill- is rather steep and would not give a good line of fire... but there is another Turkish location that has a rather good command of several stretches of the Sazli dere on the way down to the beach and that is Snipers Point which is a Turkish position off Baby 700. Unfortunately I don't have any information if there were any Turkish MG there.

Eric

[aconnolly]

Eric

Very good point about the machine guns at the Apex. Whilst the official records state all the NZ machine guns fired toward the Farm, it does seem tactically sensible to have had some at least covering the area to the south - south-east. I can't find any reference to guns further down on Rhododendron Spur, but there may have been some there.

Agree that the reference to the Turkish guns is confusing. The Wiltshire diary entry suggests to me that the Turkish guns from the area of Battleship Hill were likely the ones that blocked any retreat as the Turks would not have had time to bring any machine guns into action elsewhere. Agree the geography suggests the Turkish guns here could cover the upper Sazli only. But I'm very interested in your point about Snipers - Could the Wiltshire have seen Turkish guns at Snipers and therefore turned back up the Sazli, giving the impression to Temperley that they were running toward the Turks further up?

Fascinating.....

Andrew

[The Plummed Goose]

The attached picture is taken from the northern slope of Sazli, so not really down in the valley but when I last walked (Sazli) I remember very clearly that on at least 2 or 3 occasions I could see Snipers. I remember this because once you're down in Sazli there are hardly any recognisable features and this was sort of the only one.

eric

PS : The first "hill" is snipers post the second "camels hump".

[central]

just came across this post,excellent read and very intresting! it has revived my intrest in the campagin

[Jack Wyatt]

On ‎09‎/‎11‎/‎2004 at 13:58, Geoff S said:

Pat- if memory serves me correctly I think you will find C.E.W Bean was wounded on the 6th of Aug, and would have been unable to document any of this engagement first-hand. It is pretty hilly country we are discussing.

Given the situation/casualties it is not surprising the evidence is hard to define.

Michael,

As per your comments

"am still however somewhat confused by the second half of the sentence “the Wiltshires ran towards the Lancashires and the machine guns and so masked their fire.”

I spent some time thinking about this comment as well. I agree it is quite confusing. I had hoped you may have been able to unravel it. I cannot!

(I agree it is certainly an oportunity for the incident to have occurred i.e Wilshires being shot by NZ guns)

The other interesting issue near this location is noted in the Aust Official Hist

'Then the North Lancs broke, both at Chunuk Bair and at the Pinnacle. A remnant appears to have stayed, and to have been bayoneted by the enemy. When the 5th Wilts, who were digging, saw the Turkish line descending upon their right, they also ran back down the Sazli Dere.

So perhaps the North Lancs should still be considered? They were about 300 yards behind Chunuk Bair, at the Pinnacle and may have moved FORWARD to surrender, if they had enough time?

The 5th Wilts also atop, or almost atop Chunuk Bair would I think only have been going mainly backwards, with very little limited time for a surrender forward.

"Can the NA units on the left of the Apex be identified?"

I suppose this would be Baldwin's force, excluding the 5th Wilts and 6 LNL atop Chunuk Bair.

So that leaves the 6th East Lancs. 10 Hants, & 6th RIR at or near the Farm.

This is where I feel the situation was at it's most desperate. Birdwood was even compelled to throw in his last fresh men to hold the place later. These troops were far enough back, at the start to attempt surrender FORWARD, and appear to have also been within range of the NZ gunners. Most of the officers had been killed. Events at the Farm read like complete & utter bedlam. Situation was critical .

It was desperate, enough here perhaps even for Temperley to fire on his own men, to stiffen them up!

I assume Cox's force were too distant (toward Hill 971) to have been able to be fired on by the NZ MG's at the Apex. Which leads me back to the units listed above as the maps seem to indicate they were able to be targeted.

The Aust official history indicates how desperate things were on the ground at the Farm. Here is an example.

"..at 10.30, when the Rifles had lost almost all the officers, there appear to have been some falling back., and Lieut- Col Bewsher of the Hampshire, who, though wounded in the head, had taken command, decided that the place was no longer tenable. At the foot of the hill however, Capt Street, staff Capt of the 39th Bde, who fetched up water and ammunition, and a NZ staff officer Maj Dodington, reformed the retiring men, and Street led them forward. But he was killed near the Farm, and the troops withdrew to Cayley's headquarters near the easternmost fork of the Aghyl Dere.'

I think it is still more likely to have been the N.A.men at the Farm that forced Temperley to fire on them. But again I stress. I think we will never know for sure.

Cheers

Geoff S

I checked 'Voices of Gallipoli' by Shadbolt published in 1988 with but with no success. I had hoped to find a a personal account by a NZ gunner. I did,,, but he did not mention firing on N.A. men. The small book contains a selection of very moving personal accounts by New Zealand soldiers who fought at Gallipoli/Chunuk Bair.

I read a personal account by the batman to Colonel Levine of the 6th LNL.  He indicated only 2 companies of the 6th LNL were at Chunuk Bair with the remaining two sent back to the rear for rations.  This could explain why men were at the Pinnacle.  

 

On another thread, Pugsley includes  comments from a Sergeant Allen of the Otago Battalion leading 1 Platoon onto Chunuk Bair.  He also reports New Army soldiers (around 200) sheltering in a valley under a Sergeant like a flock of sheep (he believed these to be Gloucesters).  At the time, he also comments that wounded making their way back to the Apex advised how badly reinforcements were needed on Chunuk Bair.

 

 

Edited 1 December , 2018 by Jack Wyatt