N.Z.s machine gun New Army men?

[curranl]

Hello All,

I have just finished L. A Carylon's "Gallipoli" and a single sentence has me completely intrigued. I have a particular interest in the action on Chunuk Bair on the 9/10th August as these are the days my granduncle's battalion, the 6th Royal Irish Rifles, had their first action and took their heaviest casualties.

Carlyon describes the Turkish counter attack down the slopes of Chunuk Bair on the morning of the 10th led by Mustafa Kemal himself:

" The Turks overran the Pinnacle about five minutes after they ripped through the Loyal's trenches. Now the New Zealand machine guns at the Apex were knocking over the Turks by the hundred. Temperley (Arthur Temperley, a Brigade-Major in the N.Z.s) admits, 'with deep regret' , that he ordered the machine gunners to open fire on 300 or 400 New Army troops who ran towards the Turks with their hands up".

That last sentence is the one that intrigued me. I have read several accounts of that action, but have never come across this before. Can anyone shed any light on what happened, the units involved, etc?

Regards,

Liam.

[PhilB]

I`m also interested in this, Liam, the Loyals being my local regiment. The Loyals history says that 6LNL & 5 Wilts were overwhelmed by a whole Turkish division plus 3 battalions. It says the Loyals had 11 officers and 8 men killed, 30 ORs wounded and 445 missing presumed killed. Counting in SDGW shows 11 officers and 211 men killed 9-10/8/15. Difficult to know what to make of the figures. They mean 234 men were missing but not killed. They could have been wounded or they could have been POWs.

Phil B

[curranl]

Hello Phil,

I have come across the following while Googling. It is a quote directly from Temperleys memoir of the battle:

" On August 10 I saw 300 or 400 of them running towards the Turks with their hands up. To save a disaster of the first magnitude and to prevent our whole front line collapsing I gave the orders to the machine guns of our Brigade to open fire upon them and at some cost in life the movement was checked and they ran back to their lines."

(P11 Major A. C. Temperley, Norfolk Regiment, Brigade Major, NZ Infantry Brigade. " A personal Narrative of the Battle of Chunuk Bair, August 6th-10th, 1915", MS0017, Q.E. II Army Museum, Waiouru.)

If they went back to their trenches, they must have had to face another fight with the Turks on their way back up from the Farm. Admittedly there must have been few of the Turks left at that stage, as they had been machined gunned by the NZs and shelled by the naval gunson the way down, had a fight at the Farm, and then had to make their way back up to the top of Chunuk Bair (also presumably under fire). Since the 6th LNL and the 5th Wilts trenches were now inside the Turkish lines, any survivors of those two battalions must have been taken prisoner.

Regards,

Liam.

[Geoff S]

Hi All,

I think the situation at Chunuk Bair was by this stage quite desperate. Godley had thrown in his New Army battalions to replace the exhausted New Zealanders. The Wellington’s, Auckland’s & Otago’s (New Zealand) & the later Gloucester’s & 8th Welch Pioneer’s (New Army) fought with courage, but were completely spent by the evening of the 9th of August. The situation was critical. Godley needed fresh troops to consolidate his gain.

I think attempts were made by senior officers to stem the retreat of British, Indian & New Zealand soldiers from the front during this engagement. (unwounded) This would have included remnants of the 6th Loyal North Lancashire’s, and the 5th Wiltshire’s not over-run on the morning of the 10th of August. But, I believe it would be grossly unfair to blame 'New Army' troops solely for the loss of Chunak Bair. They were largely inexperienced, & the weight of the enemy counter-attack was such that it would have been near impossible to hold, given the failures elsewhere.

BUT, specifically the situation that had forced Temperley to fire his NZ machine guns on the last remaining ‘fresh’ troops were those intent on going forward to surrender, NOT those retreating back to their lines.

What I find interesting is the reference by Temperley to 300 or 400 New Army troops running FORWARD to surrender. Would it be safe to assume that the only New Army troops in a position to be fired on by the New Zealand gunners would have had to be the Leinster’s at the pinnacle?

Looking at the map they appear to be the only troops to have been in a position in that number (300 to 400) to have been running forward to surrender?

By a process of elimination is it fair to assume these were the men referred to by Temperly OR have I missed other British troops in the vicinity close enough to be fired on by the NZ MG’s on the Apex?

Cheers

Geoff S

[PhilB]

Any idea what the Leinster losses were that day, compared with the number killed?

Phil B

[curranl]

Hello All,

Not sure if the Leinsters were the men: From "Orange, Green and Khaki";

" At 04.30, just as dawn was breaking on Chunuk, the Turks charged against the three British battalions. The Loyal North Lancashires were overwhelmed in the enemy rush; the Wiltshires were caught in the open and annihilated. On their right, not quite in the main flood of the Turkish charge, the Leinsters stood firm. The two line companies held the first Turkish wave at the point of the bayonet in furious hand to hand fighting. The hard pressed Leinsters were then joined without delay by the support companies led personally by Col. Craske. Alerted by a shout of 'fix your bayonets, boys, they're coming' they grabbed their weapons. In whatever dress they slept, the supporters flung themselves with a cheer into the melee. They arrived at acritical phase and after a desperate hand to hand fight, the Turks were driven back"

From that it would appear that the Leinsters were to one side of the main Turkish charge, which gave the companies in the line a chance to get ready and the reserve companies a chance to come up. If they beat off the Turkish attack, it is unlikely 300/400 would have attempted to surrender.

My money is on the LNL and Wilts; inexperienced and exhausted troops who were simply overwhelmed by the huge Turkish assault.

One interesting point is that Temperley was a Regular. Would he have been as quick to fire on Regulars as he was to fire on New Army men? Or am I being unfair?

Regards,

Liam.

[PhilB]

This piece is from www.battle-of-chunuk-bair.wikiverse.org :-

There were about 2000 defenders on or below the summit of Chunuk Bair. Baldwin's brigade at the Farm numbered a further 3000. The Turks swept over the Lancashire battalion on the summit, wiping it out to the last man. The Wiltshires were killed or driven into the steep valleys. The Turks headed down Rhododendron Spur towards the Pinnacle, driving the New Army troops before them. New Zealand machine gunners positioned at the Apex shot down the Turks as they tried to continue down the spur. The gunners could not discriminate friend from foe so they also killed many New Army troops who were amongst the charging Turks. The Turks descended to the small plateau of the Farm and annihilated Baldwin's brigade. About 1000 British were killed, the rest driven off into the surrounding gullies.

Phil B

[Geoff S]

Liam and Phil,

I am still not sure that it would have been LNL and or Wilts. These men were for the most part in forward positions on or near Chunuk Bair. The assault by the Turks was decisive & fast. I get the impression that both the LNL and Wilt's would have been overwhelmed much too quickly to surrender on mass. (I.e. 300-400)- but perhaps I am wrong.

I think Temperly would have fired on 'New Army' or 'Regulars'. He may have felt that troops properly led by a 'regular' officer were superior to those led by a militia officer, but I think he would have fired on anyone given the circumstances he faced. He was trying to stiffen their resolve to fight. Being a regular he was biased against those he felt were unfit to lead. Malone, Temperley and Johnston, (NZ's) were by this stage at each other’s throats. Temperly was fortunate to have been one of the few remaining senior officers to survive and witness the assault on Chunuk Bair, and be able to depict the history as he saw it.

I am not sure but it appears from Phil's account that the Leinsters could still have been the men shot by the NZ gunners. My understanding is that they were in reserve at the pinnacle. I cannot find any figures for the casualties on the part of the Leinsters. But I think they would have been in a position to move forward on mass (300-400). And they were right in front of the NZ gunners.

For me the alternative of the LNL & Wilts retreating in such large number (300-400) & then turning around to run forward & surrender seems unlikely. All the books point to the LNL & Wilts being wiped out. And not by Kiwi MG's!

Cheers

Geoff S

Bryn D might like to give us his opinion about the troops likely fired on by the NZ MG's- after he has stopped betting on all the Enzed horses in the Melbourne Cup. The northern sector of Anzac is your specialtity mate. How about a comment? (R U about!)

[curranl]

Hello All,

We are all assuming, of course, that Temperley's figure of 300-400 is correct. Did he have that much time to count? Did he make an error or possibly up the figure a bit to justify having fired on them?

Or am I just being a cynic??

Does anyone have Temperley's full account of the action and if they have, does he say any more on this than what is quoted above?

And where's Michaeldr??

Questions,Questions!!

Regards,

Liam.

[michaeldr]

And where's Michaeldr??

Like everyone else – doing a lot of reading

This action is very complicated and difficult to follow and what I have read up to now, I think that you have already covered

Temperley was one of the few to survive and as Brigade Major he was able to influence their write-up of the history – did he exaggerate the numbers to help justify his position? May be – as has been pointed out, who counted?

What most historians seem to agree on about this action is that Baldwin’s force of 3000 strong was very mixed up – that being so then I would not expect to see this particular group of 300/400 (?) missing to be all from one regiment.

Actually, even from Temperley's own account above the number of casualties is not clear; quote - "at some cost in life the movement was checked and they ran back to their lines."

This is a fascinating subject but I still have more reading-up on it to do

Where can I buy time?

Michael D.R.

Edited 2 November , 2004 by michaeldr

[Geoff S]

I agree a very interesting subject.

I remember reading about this event a few times over the years. I have gone through all my Gallipoli books and can find nothing more specific than 'New Army'. I do no think it is even mentioned in the NZ 'Official' history by Waite. Pugsley & Bean i think mention it, but not in greaT detail.

I think Temperley's account has never been published in full. It would have been dynamite at the time. As for the numbers (300-400) it must have been quite large as to warrant firing his MG's at the men.

The assault on Chunuk Bair was incredible feat or arms. Together with the landing of Anzac (first week) I find the most compelling of the whole campaign. Anyone interested in the campaign cannot help but be fascinated by this phase of the campaign.

It is interesting that the Aussies & Fern-landers after this assault of Chunuk Bair & Suvla never trusted the the 'Tommy' again. Indeed for the Kiwis the events at Chunuk Bair were for them the beginning of their self identity. (i.e their Anzac)

The Anzac's would never really trust or rate the New Army men again. This comes across fairly clearly on the books published in Australia after Aug 1915.

Cheers

Geoff S

[michaeldr]

As with the case of the VC awarded to G.R.D. Moor on the Helles front, historians seem reluctant to comment one way or the other on actions of this sort, and in consequence tend to omit any mention of it at all. Temperley’s action is however covered by one other historian; Prof Tim Travers in his ‘Gallipoli 1915,’ chapter 6, ‘The Anzac Breakout,’ page 133, when describing the events of the 9th August:

“At the same time, according to Temperley, morale in Baldwin’s column generally became poor, and some 300 men from the column tried to surrender to the Turks. Temperley stopped this by turning a machine-gun onto them. No doubt morale was low because Baldwim’s column was punished heavily in the Farm area that day, although the war diary of the 6th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, part of Baldwin’s column, merely recorded on 9th August that they were told to take the left ridge of Sari Bair (either the left flank of Chunuk Bair or Hill Q), but stopped 250 yards from the summit, and entrenched, while suffering just one man killed, and a few wounded. Later on, when the Turks attacked with a massive assault at dawn the next day, 10th August……”

[my emphasis]

Notwithstanding the direct quote from Temperley ( see Curranl’s post of Mon, 1 Nov 2004 12:04:55) Prof Travers seems to imply that he thinks Temperley’s action against the New Army men was on the 9th August and not the 10th. I also read him as implying that he thought that the RIR were the men concerned, however this is less clear-cut than the issue of the date.

Has Prof Travers made a mistake here or does he believe that Temperley’s recollection of events in the heat of a very complex battle, is a day out?

Has anyone else read Travers?

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Robert Dunlop]

Michael

I have read his book. Quite good in parts but somewhat uneven. Travers explains that this is because he does not want to cover ground dealt with in depth by others. Fair enough too. I don't really have enough understanding of the campaign to comment on your very sharp observation.

Robert

[curranl]

Hello Michael,

I haven't read Travers book, but at least some of his comment doesn't stand up. I have a copy of the diary of 2nd Lieutenant Campbell of the 6th RIR. It is, as far as I know, the only surviving first hand account (other than the War Diary) of the action by the 6th RIR on the 9th. He was injured on the 9th during the assault.

He describes the orders they recieved on the 8th:

" During the afternoon we received our orders. They were "Make good Hill Q at dawn, Farm B is already in our hands". That was all and now that I have been through a few properly organised attacks, I realise how totally inadeqauate they were"

He goes on do describe the battalion recieving very heavy casualties as they try to take Turkish trenches on the morning of the 9th: " I saw no troops suceeding in getting across the field. In front of me there was a ragged line of infantry lying on their faces on the ground. They were not digging in nor were they firing, they were just lying still. Behind them scattered over the ground were many others, also ominously still"

Campbell was wounded twice in the leg on the 9th and was not present on the 10th, so he doesn't make any comment on the Turkish assault on the 10th. He does not mention the machine gunning incident at all. Perhaps it did happen to the RIR and he simply kept quiet about it, but I always thought the RIR were down at the Farm, some distance from the summit. I also gather that the War Diary for the RIR for these days is far from complete as there were only 2 officers left able bodied after the 9th/10th and I suspect they had better things to do than make detailed entries in the War Diary.

Travers comment just doesn't seem to make sense in light of the above.

Regards,

Liam.

[Geoff S]

I have re-read Travers book, and while it is better than some other accounts it is a bit unstructured around the events we are investigating. I realise their was mass confusion around the 9th & 10th of Aug around the Farm, Pinnacle,Apex, Chunuk Bair, but have gone back to C E W Bean as the most detailed source of the what was happening on the ground. It does not mention the specific incident, but covers much of all else to some degree

Suggest you guys might like to do the likwise. It is on-line at the AWM

Cheers

Geoff S

[Geoff S]

I have located an article submitted by Temperley in April 1938 to the Reveille (official Journal of the NSW Branch of R.S.S.I.L.A) in my collection detailing events on Chunuk Bair. In appears Temperley chose to exclude the specific details regarding this incident in this article.

His memory of events more than 20 years prior were as follows:

' Of all the battles in which I have ever fought Chunuk Bair, from August 7th to 10th. 1915 remains mostly deeply graven on my memory. There was the night advance from No. 2 Outpost, the failure to take the ridge the following morning, and the almost unbelievable good luck in finding it temporarily unoccupied when we attacked at dawn the next day. We had a brief respite, but we were enfiladed by machine-guns, the ground was rocky and difficult to entrench, and the Turks were above us. For two days and nights, at the cost of enormous losses, the Wellington & Otago Battalions, the Wellington & the Auckland Mounted Rifles, and the 7th Gloucesters and the 5th South Wales Borders of the New Army held the ridge. I remember, too, how the New Zealand Bde Signals. with Bassett, Dignan, and Hearn, tried to keep a line going from the front to brigade headquarters under terrible fire.

On the night of the 9th the New Zealand Brigade was completely exhausted. We had Sari Bair alone. The 29th Indian Brigade, for a brief half hour, had reached the crest and had been driven off it. The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade had had heavy fighting in the foothills and had never been able to reach the point 971 (Koja Chemen Tepe) at all. On other side of the ridge that man of destiny, Mustapha Kemal, had been placed in command and was organising a counter-attack. During the night two battalions of the New Army took over from us, and the exhausted remnants of the New Zealand Bde withdrew to the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur.

We had tempted fate too long. As dawn was breaking, I heard the brigade machine-guns in action at The Apex, and, as I went to them, I saw the whole of the slopes of Chunuk Bair alive with Turks. At the same time a few fugatives arrived to say that we had lost the hill. The execution done by the enfilade fire of the machine guns was immense. A few minutes later the naval guns joined in the chorus, shooting direct over the sights. The Turks pressed on with superb gallantry right up to the Farm and along Rhododendron Spur to The Apex. Few oi those who came over the crest can have returned. The situation at The Apex was critical, and it seemed to me we had reached the end. I collected a few signallers and odd men and, with fixed bayonets, we awaited what I expected to be the full weight of the counter-attack, but for some reason it never came. A certain number charged right up to us& were dealt with with rifle & revolver. I remember Maj Wallingford, the champion shot, rushing out & accounting for one or two with his pistol'

So I guess we will never know for certain what occurred!

Cheers

Geoff S

[michaeldr]

Robert/Liam; Thanks for your comments

Until one of us gets to the U of Calgary and elicits a fuller explanation from Prof Travers, perhaps we had better go with Temperley’s own words/date; 10th August 1915

As not all of us have access to all of the literature I thought it would help if it could be established who was in the area at this time. Col Michael Hickey on pp 285/6 of his ‘Gallipoli’ provides information which can be made up into a useful list

Chunuk Bair/Pinnacle

6th Loyal North Lancs

With two and a half companies of the 5th Wiltshires in support below the crest

Apex:

Some Wellington Mtd Rifles [pos the 63 unwounded men Hickey previously referred to]

Elements of 6th Leinsters

Temperley’s NZ Machine-guns [the Holts refer to 10 MGs]

The Farm:

Units of Baldwin’s Brigade, previously given by Hickey as

9th Royal Warwickshires

7th Gloucesters

9th Worcesters

7th North Staffs

Plus 10th Hampshires

The rest of the 5th Wiltshires

6th Royal Irish Rifles

One and a half companies of 9th Royal Warwicks

[Hickey notes that two brigade HQs were sited just yards apart on the edge of the Farm plateau]

Opposite side of Aghyl Dere:

6th East Lancs

Rest of 10th Hampshires

Mixed in “between this group of loosely associated battalions was Monash’s 4th Australian Brigade and a mixture of Gurkhas, elements of 39th Brigade, the rest of the Warwicks, and fragments of 6th South Lancashire’s, 9th Worcesters and 7th North Staffs. If ever there was a prescription for military confusion it lay here.” [my emphasis]

So what chance do we lesser mortals have of sorting out this ‘military confusion’?

I att a map from Rhodes James’ ‘Gallipoli’ however it provides only a very rough guide. Beneath the Farm, P = Pinnacle and A = Apex.

Without access to a contour map it is not possible to say how many of the above units were in a line of fire from Temperley’s position at the Apex.

My own quick run through Westlake’s ‘British Regiments at Gallipoli’ produced nothing firm, but then which unit historian is going to own up to Temperley’s accusation of surrender? Several reports mention the havoc caused by MG fire, however none seem to suspect that it was anything other than Turkish in origin. There is one enigmatic note which interestingly came from another NZ officer [was he with Temperley’s MGs at the Apex?] and it refers to the 9th Warwicks –

“They had immense difficulties to overcome. They were led the wrong way and had to retrace their steps; they had to attack in full view of the enemy.”

A possible red herring?

PS: Geoff, I typed up the above before having a chance to read your last post; many thanks for that. I see that in this article Temperley does not mention the particular incident of firing on NA men. I think that in the end we will have to go along with your final statement and that certainty on this matter is now beyond recall.

Regards

Michael D.R.

[curranl]

Hello All,

It would appear from the contributions that there was such a stew of bits and pieces of units that we are, as Michael says, never going to get a definitive answer to this one.

Very interesting topic, though and thanks to all for the contributions.

Regards,

Liam.

[michaeldr]

In an earlier post I mentioned the case of 2nd Lt. Moor who was awarded the VC on the Helles front for a somewhat similar action to that of Temperley. Unlike the New Zealander, Moor left no personal account of his desperate act and it is possible that no one would have heard of it had it not been for the officers of the 2nd Royal Fusiliers who were convinced that by his prompt, if ruthless, action Moor had saved them and their men from a catastrophe; it was they who put his name forward for an award. [strangely, there is also a mix-up with the dates in this case too; the citation refers to the 5th June however the action took place on the 6th!]

I mention this because I am reminded of Sherlock Holmes and the story of ‘Silver Blaze’ where the detective was suspicious of why the dog did not bark. Why has no one else come forward to support Temperley’s story or to thank him for saving their troops?

Possible answers to this are

It never took place

It took place, but no one saw it

No one else needs to thank Temperley, because the positions he was protecting were in fact his own

This latter would seem to suggest that the troops upon whom he fired were directly between him and the Turks; viz the Loyals and the Wiltshires

When the Wiltshire had arrived the previous day they had not slept for about seventy hours and it is reported that they took off their equipment, piled their arms and made no attempt to dig in. Detailing the attack on the 10th Hickey says that the Loyals put up fierce resistance but were overwhelmed by the much greater numbers of the Turks

“As the survivors tumbled down the reverse slope, they found the Wiltshires still not under arms and with their rifles piled. Both units continued down the hillside in disarray.”

Is this the point when Temperley opened fire with his MGs? Hickey thinks that it was [continuing on from the quote above]

“The Turks also got back onto the Pinnacle, but then the New Zealand machine-guns and the Leinsters at the Apex caught them in the open and wrought great execution.”

Let me be the first to say that this very speculative, but as a possibility, it seems to suggest that Temperley may have turned his MG on to either the Wiltshires or a mixed body of Loyals and Wiltshires

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Geoff S]

This information is from "The New Zealanders at Gallipoli" by Waite published in 1919. I thought it might provide a little more insight.

It would appear that you may be correct Michael. '...the Wiltshires ran in towards the Lancashires on the machine guns, and so masked their fire',

But, how were these men to going attempt surrender anyway?? I cannot understanding how 300-400 men at this point of a massive attack by the Turks have time to be gunned down by NZ MG's attempting surrender,before being over-run & wiped out'. It these regiments were involved, I would have thought that the NZ gunners perhaps were aware that they were firing on these men, but were not in a position to distinguish either surrendering friend or foe as a target.

unless

the incident was later when the Turks 'endeavoured to get at the New Army regiments at the left of the Apex'- as noted in the text below. Are we sure the incident was not a N.A. regiment at the left of the Apex, having viewed the destruction of the N.A. regiments in front of them decide to surrender when the Turks came down the hill towards them??

Cheers

Geoff S

[michaeldr]

"On August 10 I saw 300 or 400 of them running towards the Turks with their hands up.”

This is Temperley as quoted by Liam above

I have great difficulty with Temperley’s statement here that they were “running towards the Turks.” This goes completely against human nature and natural instinct, which, when mortal danger presents itself, tells one to quickly turn and run the other way i.e to run in the opposite direction and away from the danger.

Your quote Geoff puts it in a slightly different and perhaps more believable light i.e. they were running towards their comrades, the Loyals.

I am still however somewhat confused by the second half of the sentence “the Wiltshires ran towards the Lancashires and the machine guns and so masked their fire.”

At this point is the NZ writer describing the Turkish MGs? Surely if they ran towards the Loyals then they would be running away from the NZ guns? By “masked their fire” does the writer mean that these men were between the Turkish guns and the NZ position, thus masking the latter from the Turkish fire?

Or he is describing the NZ MGs and trying to put Temperley’s position [perhaps seen as awkward in the eyes of the writer] in a more acceptable light? The writer does admit “So were these two battalions wiped out!”

Geoff, I have to admit that I am still not clear on this and perhaps you are right that we should look a little more closely at the NA men on the left of the Apex. The impression given by the NZ writer certainly seems to be that it was only at this point that their MGs came into action.

Can the NA units on the left of the Apex be identified?

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Guest bonza]

Geoff, Michael,

I had never heard of this incident, am greatly impressed by the depth of your examinations, but openly admit to almost total lack of comprehension.

I simply cannot understand how killing these men helps the 'good guys'

The incident does illustrate the 'miraculous' results achieved, by Bean in particular, in recording the Official Histories of the Campaign.

Pat

[Geoff S]

Pat- if memory serves me correctly I think you will find C.E.W Bean was wounded on the 6th of Aug, and would have been unable to document any of this engagement first-hand. It is pretty hilly country we are discussing.

Given the situation/casualties it is not surprising the evidence is hard to define.

Michael,

As per your comments

"am still however somewhat confused by the second half of the sentence “the Wiltshires ran towards the Lancashires and the machine guns and so masked their fire.”

I spent some time thinking about this comment as well. I agree it is quite confusing. I had hoped you may have been able to unravel it. I cannot!

(I agree it is certainly an oportunity for the incident to have occurred i.e Wilshires being shot by NZ guns)

The other interesting issue near this location is noted in the Aust Official Hist

'Then the North Lancs broke, both at Chunuk Bair and at the Pinnacle. A remnant appears to have stayed, and to have been bayoneted by the enemy. When the 5th Wilts, who were digging, saw the Turkish line descending upon their right, they also ran back down the Sazli Dere.

So perhaps the North Lancs should still be considered? They were about 300 yards behind Chunuk Bair, at the Pinnacle and may have moved FORWARD to surrender, if they had enough time?

The 5th Wilts also atop, or almost atop Chunuk Bair would I think only have been going mainly backwards, with very little limited time for a surrender forward.

"Can the NA units on the left of the Apex be identified?"

I suppose this would be Baldwin's force, excluding the 5th Wilts and 6 LNL atop Chunuk Bair.

So that leaves the 6th East Lancs. 10 Hants, & 6th RIR at or near the Farm.

This is where I feel the situation was at it's most desperate. Birdwood was even compelled to throw in his last fresh men to hold the place later. These troops were far enough back, at the start to attempt surrender FORWARD, and appear to have also been within range of the NZ gunners. Most of the officers had been killed. Events at the Farm read like complete & utter bedlam. Situation was critical .

It was desperate, enough here perhaps even for Temperley to fire on his own men, to stiffen them up!

I assume Cox's force were too distant (toward Hill 971) to have been able to be fired on by the NZ MG's at the Apex. Which leads me back to the units listed above as the maps seem to indicate they were able to be targeted.

The Aust official history indicates how desperate things were on the ground at the Farm. Here is an example.

"..at 10.30, when the Rifles had lost almost all the officers, there appear to have been some falling back., and Lieut- Col Bewsher of the Hampshire, who, though wounded in the head, had taken command, decided that the place was no longer tenable. At the foot of the hill however, Capt Street, staff Capt of the 39th Bde, who fetched up water and ammunition, and a NZ staff officer Maj Dodington, reformed the retiring men, and Street led them forward. But he was killed near the Farm, and the troops withdrew to Cayley's headquarters near the easternmost fork of the Aghyl Dere.'

I think it is still more likely to have been the N.A.men at the Farm that forced Temperley to fire on them. But again I stress. I think we will never know for sure.

Cheers

Geoff S

I checked 'Voices of Gallipoli' by Shadbolt published in 1988 with but with no success. I had hoped to find a a personal account by a NZ gunner. I did,,, but he did not mention firing on N.A. men. The small book contains a selection of very moving personal accounts by New Zealand soldiers who fought at Gallipoli/Chunuk Bair.

[Guest bonza]

Geoff

I seem to be constantly saying "I'd didn't know that".

And one does learn not to dispute facts proferred by Michael or yourself

The events at The Nek & Lone Pine at this same period have been a major interest and the literature on these appears very heavilly dependent on Bean's Works.

Whilst these could not have been an eye-witness account of the numerous individual 'incidents', it is perhaps even more 'miraculous' that it covers a period in which he himself was wounded.

The difficulty in "Us" establishing just what happened in this particular incident, does IMHO vividly illustrate the debt we owe Bean and the other ' recorders of that History' as opposed to those who are now accepted as "Historians". Before committing any account, eye witness or or not, to the Official History, what a process of evaluation, corroboration etc must have been taken, and now into the next century there are certain amongst us who suggest they were driven by 'varying' agendas.

Goodonyer!

Pat

[Geoff S]

Thanks Pat, but I am no expert, just an enthusiast for the truth.

I recognise the immense contribution of Charles Bean. But I do not hero-worship him mate. I also think he improved on his accounts later on in France. (But that is just my personal opinion)

Are you aware that many diggers were not happy with some of his reporting at Gallipoli? He witnessed the events of Lone Pine unfold- agree, but if memory serves me saw nothing of the Nek & Chunuk Bair engagements. So his writings are not first-hand where I believe he did his best work.

I reckon he knew about as much about the events at Chunuk Bair, The Apex, The Farm,Pinnacle etc as Gen. Godley did in August 1915!!

The fact that he went back to Gallipoli in 1919, is evidence enough for me that he had some considerable gaps he wanted to try to cross-check. Gallipoli Mission published in 1948 was an attempt to better explain some of the events missed in the Official Histories Vol1/2. I think having read his account? of the 6th to the 10th of August 1915 at or near Chunuk Bair he did not have all the facts. The terrain just was just too difficult to get a full view of all the movements.

Some issues like the one we are detailing were either completely ignored, altered, or specific details just omitted for whatever reason.

Cheers

Geoff S