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Remembered Today:

15 April 1915: exact position of German gas front


Aurel Sercu

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Thanks for the information on Fritz Haber. I have no reason to believe that he was not present. I only wanted to know where he was : Stampkot Farm, where A. v. Württtemberg was, only a few meters from the gas cilinders, or half a mile farther, "Smiske". Anyway, that's only a detail.

By the way : the experiment near Steenstrate was a failure. Most cilinders for some reason were not opened by the Stinkpioniere !

Most interesting - having concentrated on gas operations on the XXVII.RK and XV.AK fronts, I had no idea that the army commander observed the attack on 22 April so closely. No doubt due to the duke's personal faith in Professor Haber's new weapon, the Royal Württemberg Army formed its own company of Stinkpioniere on 8 April, which became the 3. (württ.) Kompagnie / Pionier-Regiment Nr.35.

The Bavarian and Saxon armies made no such commitment - on the Bavarian side Crown Prince Rupprecht strongly opposed the introduction of poison gas on both practical and ethical grounds, and as Roman Catholics the Bavarians were also undoubtedly influenced by the public opposition of the Pope after the initial gas attacks. I have been unable to find evidence of the Saxon attitude, but since the Saxon royal house was likewise Catholic (the King's brother Prince Max having even taken holy orders and become a Jesuit!) and closely allied to the Bavarians and Austrians on many matters, there is good reason to suspect that King Friedrich August III was not supportive of gas warfare.

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Aurel,

Thanks for the post 24. I've followed the route of the gas release on the 6th Apr by cycle. Sorry we missed Robert's presentation.

Andi

I'm particularly looking at the limit of the LEFT (German) flank of the gas release - the last white flag I can see is NE on the Langemark - Poelkapelle road.

My interest here is the effect on the 13th Battalion CEF. (North of Vancouver Corner).

Wayne

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I'm particularly looking at the limit of the LEFT (German) flank of the gas release - the last white flag I can see is NE on the Langemark - Poelkapelle road.

My interest here is the effect on the 13th Battalion CEF. (North of Vancouver Corner).

Sorry Wayne, I don't have similarly detailed diagrams for that part of the gas front. Seeßelberg chose the right flank as a detailed example in his book, and did not provide similar diagrams for other sectors.

While checking the source I noticed the following additional table which is keyed to the F-Batterien at Steenstraat. This shows which batteries would have to be excluded under various different wind conditions, and may explain why not all the cylinders were used there (as mentioned above).

post-24563-0-71327700-1428579903_thumb.j

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Yes but were these cylinders, left of the road (Ypres-Diksmuide) released? Prevailing wind on the day would suggest yes they would have.Blowing across

the front line at Lizerne.

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post-1365-0-12194000-1428584215_thumb.jp

This is the original Gas Memorial in Steenstraat

John

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Yes but were these cylinders, left of the road (Ypres-Diksmuide) released? Prevailing wind on the day would suggest yes they would have.Blowing across

the front line at Lizerne.

Frustratingly Seeßelberg does not say, merely describing the overall attack in very general terms. Based on my experience researching the attacks on the front of XXVII.RK in May, I would recommend the regimental histories of the infantry who conducted the attack at that end of the line as probably the best extant German sources.

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OK Andi - will follow that one up.

John - Thanks for reminding me of what the original memorial - I can remember seeing a photograph of the memorial being blown up when Germans were in occupation.

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Andi, Wayne, ...

Sorry, very busy right now ...

More later today (re : west of Steenstrate).

Just this : did you find in the German sources an irrtfutable reference to the wind direction ?

Was it North, North east, North north east ?

I just can't find an answer in my own sources.

Aurel

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Andi, Wayne, ...

Sorry, very busy right now ...

More later today (re : west of Steenstrate).

Just this : did you find in the German sources an irrtfutable reference to the wind direction ?

Was it North, North east, North north east ?

I just can't find an answer in my own sources.

Aurel

Hi Aurel -

Sorry, I don't have a clear reference to this (though bear in mind that I have not specifically researched this attack before).

Andi L.

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Jan Steen ("Boezinge 14-18") was the local historian whose book about my village in WW1 triggered my interest and enthusiasm. And ... obsession.

On page 150 he wondered why on the extreme left (west) end (west of the road to Diksmuide, west of "Stampkot") gas was hardly released.

I have a particular interest for that location, because it is not far from where I live, and my house is 3 km due south of Steenstrate. (But I wasn't here yet. :-) )

Also because on the west bank of the canal, opposite the German line Stampkot to the canal, is where the Belgian Grenadiers were.

Summarizing ...

There were 338 cylinders there, only a few were opened, thanks to the initiative of the Stinkpionier in charge.

Reason ?

1. Fear of releasing gas to their own (German) troops. "The north wind cpuld hinder the more southern troops, advancing." (Personally I am not sure I understand. Yes, northwest wind would do that. But northeast wind or north northeast wind ?) Hence my question : what was the wind direction ?)

2. The order to open the cylinders there was not received. Maybe because there was no order, maybe the communciation man had been killed, wounded, or was lost ...

Aurel

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I've just had a look again, more specifically at Andi's posting # 28, and it remains a mystery to me why the gas cylinders were not opened west of the road.

If the wind was North, then 2 of the 18 batteries were not to be opened (17 and 17a)

If the wind was North North West, then 3 batteries were not to be opened (17, 17a and 16)

There is not mention of : what if the wind was North West ? I guess that in that case the order would have been : not to open any of the gas cylinders west of the road.

But as the wind was not North North West, nor North West, then batteries 1 to 16 were to be active. But they were not ! (Well, that is what I have learned.)

A mystery ...

Aurel

P.S. I think someone asked a question : what was the extreme east end ?

As far as I know : this was Halverwegehuis (not sure of the spelling at the time ; Halverweghe ? Anyway, it means Halfway House.) This location is on the road Langemark - Poelkapelle, nearer to Poelkapelle than to Langemark. When leaving the built-up area of Langemark, there is a bend in the road, at the hamlet Schreiboom. I'd say Halverwegehuis is halfway between Schreiboom and Poelkapelle.

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Hi,

It seems that at Steenstraat a normal quantity of gas cylinders had been placed, but he wind direction sent the gas rolling past Steenstraat or back in the German trenches.

Cnock

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John,

No your sat pic is Schreiboom (the bend just north of Langemark built-up area).

Halverwegehuis is where, on Cnock's map, the dotted line crosses the road Langemark - Poelkapelle. (There is a light bend in the road there. And should you go there, there is a small signboard now mentioning the name.)

Now I see that the dots continue for some short distance to that other road from Langemark to south of Poelkapelle centre (can't remember the name now.)

I still am puzzled by the fact that the cylinders were not released from the line Stampkot - Canal.

Also wondering : from the direction of the arrows showing the advance of the German troops (from north northeast, at least at the beginning), can we conclude that the wind direction was from north northeast too ?

And also wondering : why doesn't (on Cnock's map) the German line west from Stampkot go "down" to the canal, but instead : up, northwest ?!

Aurel

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Post 40 seems to open another can of worms.

Cnock's map shows the German advance across the canal between the Steenstraat bridge and Het Sas.

Question - Did the Germans 'bridge' (according to the map in several places) the area between Steenstraat and Het Sas attempting to force into Lizerne from the south east?

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Orke,

I have always known the Germans crossed Steenstrate bridge, and also crossed the canal at the Lock (Sas). (The former certainly true, for there were heavy fights for Luzerne, the last week of April.) As to the "Sas", that's true too, for a year or two I found German (spent) cartridges there. (I am interested in the part just west of the Lock because my grandad was there.)

But whether the Germans crossed the canal between Steenstrate and the Lock ? I don't know. But there is so much recent stuff published nowadays (centerary of gas attack) that I have not had time to read yet ... :-(

And I must say I am a little more interested in what happened north of the road Lizerne - Steenstrate than what happened south of it, because north of it was the Belgian Grenadiers ...

Aurel

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...And I must say I am a little more interested in what happened north of the road Lizerne - Steenstrate than what happened south of it, because north of it was the Belgian Grenadiers ...

You'll probably be interested in this French sketch then, Aurel. It depicts the situation in that area as on 26th April 1915 (just before the French counter-attack and advance of 27th-29th April) ...

Dave

post-357-0-77412700-1429311049_thumb.jpg

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...the advance on the west bank above Het Sas 27th/28th April 1915...

post-357-0-22146800-1429311369_thumb.jpg

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Trench sketch of the area as on 29th April 1915 (German-held trenches in grey)...

post-357-0-70931900-1429311729_thumb.jpg

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Dave,

That is so interesting ! Thanks ! And indeed : also the area between het Sas (Lock) and Steenstrate!

By the way, am I right when your 3rd map (# 46) says the Germans had reached the main road (Boezinge - Lizerne) ? Not that it surpises me. I had read that. And were standing there (on 23 April) wondering why the Allied troops let them do that. Some even had - individually - reched the next road a little west. (Ravestraat.)

(Just asking because I am a little colourblind, and for me green sometimes is grey, or vice versa. :) )

As to the first sketch (posting # 44) ... This is from a Belgian (French writing) source ? Or is it French ?

Aurel

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Hi Aurel.

Yes, the Germans reached the Boezinge-Lizerne road (and beyond) and were not pushed off it until the 26th April.

All 3 sources are French.

Dave.

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Andi,

In relation to the 'non-release' of the cylinders west of Steenstraat road.

What do we know about the commander of 212 RIR- if anything - and who - in the immediate vicinity - would have the responsibility for the order to 'open valves'? The infantry commanders or the gas pioneers, once the order had been given by Korps.

Wayne

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Andi,

In relation to the 'non-release' of the cylinders west of Steenstraat road.

What do we know about the commander of 212 RIR- if anything - and who - in the immediate vicinity - would have the responsibility for the order to 'open valves'? The infantry commanders or the gas pioneers, once the order had been given by Korps.

It is my understanding from my study of other gas attacks that the decision to discharge would be made and orders issued to the gas pioneers by their own commander (battalion or regimental staff of Pi. Regt. 35 or 36, depending on the size of the operation) based on reports from their weather stations. The infantry would then be notified, and would then follow their own pre-rehearsed attack plan based around the discharge time decided by the gas pioneers. I believe that the gas pioneer officers on the ground ultimately had discretion over whether and which batteries to discharge.

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