Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[edwin astill]

Haig would have had a full FM pay, and presumably had private means (he was able to bail out Sir John French before the war).

Edwin

[keithmroberts]

Can I just say that the comments by Nigel Cave and Chris Baker represent my views entirely. All wars are pretty horrendous - and as technology developed the impact became more widespread and substantial. The military are an instrument of state policy, except in countries where they have become the state, which is not I think relevant here, and the war that cost so many lives started with governments. There were economic forces, military theories whatever, but only governments started the great war, and those who objected publicly to the whole idea, (there were a few), had little influence and in most cases also little public support.

The generals must take their share of blame for strategic or tactical errors, but they did not make the decisions to go to war and were ultimately under orders.

So far as rewards were concerned - successful commanders of an earlier time were well rewarded, Marlborough and Wellington come to mind, and although the old order was changing quickly, the political elites that dominated politics were still not so far different from those of earlier centuries.

Keith

[Muerrisch]

"The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there."

We have here, I suggest, a version of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, in that he was judged by his peers, soldiers and his generation as a great general and a good man, but, other than fighting or experiencing the war and suffering its consequences, they had access to little information.

On the other hand succeeding generations do not, cannot, fully understand the mores and conditions and mind-sets of a 100 years ago, but know so much more in terms of Hansard, War Diaries, and the legion of autobiographies and books published thereafter. Emancipation, capital punishment, unmarried mothers and homosexuality were all seen very differently, for example.

This is not to say that history cannot make a judgement on his merits and demerits, but it is to say that this judgement is not a fixed point on a scale of 1 to 10, but varies as historians, professional and amateur, come to their own conclusions. Thus he probably started as a 10/10 in 1919, fell to about a 1/10 in the 1930s to 1970s, and is somewhere around a 7/10 in many informed peoples' minds but still a zero in others'.

For a balanced view, "warts and all", I like Gary Sheffield's "The Chief" but I do not delude myself that it is definitive or the last word.

What I cannot buy into is to blame him for anything much [possibly less than 10/10 for Le Cateau qv] until he became GOC in C, and then blame him at all for the dilemmas caused by fighting with allies and fighting against politicians.

[squirrel]

Spot on Chris.

[Gareth Davies]

Politicians don't make decisions to go to war unilaterally, they speak with their military advisors who give the politicians their estimates of likelihood of success, time and resource (men and materiel) requirements and so on. This happens now and it happened in 1914. Politicians may well be the ultimate decision makers but they make these decisions based on the advice they get. And sometimes the military give politicians duff advice.

[nigelcave]

This is true; the military act as advisors. They are there to indicate what might be practical and what the risks might be. Muddying the water at the time, of course, was the fact that Asquith was also acting as Secretary of State for War. Amongst other things, it would appear that the senior British military (as opposed to naval) officers) indicated that they thought the war would be a long one. This seems to indicate that they were suggesting that it was likely to be expensive in treasure and human lives. I am not too sure what they could have said in 1914 that would have made much difference? The evidence was tha Britain had a small army, some reserves, a relatively inadequate militia type system; in fact so small and insignificant that the German General staff lumped the British army in with 'the others' as opposed to the individual departments that they had for the French and the Russian armies. (This turned out to be something of an error, as the Germans in the early weeks of the war completely misunderstood what the British meant by 'regiment', for example; and were oblivious about much concerning the TA divisions.)

The point I am trying to make is that the British military contribution in 1914 would likely have been perceived or understood (even if never stated) by the politicians as a gesture, given the size of the continent armies; and the main and most significant contribution would be that provided by the Royal Navy.

So, in conclusion, all the military could do as advisors would be say: this is what we can do, this is what is practicable, this is what we suggest is a plausible future scenario and we recommend builidng up the strength of the army immediately. Now, over to you ... what are your orders?

[Muerrisch]

Gareth and Nigel: do we actually know what military advice was offered to the government in the June/July of 1914: I have no visibility whatsoever.

I do know that from 1907 the known and agreed position was that the army was manned, designed, trained and equipped to maintain 6 infantry divisions and cavalry as an Expeditionary Force anywhere in the world FOR SIX MONTHS after which the effort could not be sustained without the full resources of the state.

As we now know, six months was pushing it!

[David Filsell]

Here we go. So who is this fabled figure who might have 'caused' fewer casualties?

[Gareth Davies]

Nigel - Indeed.

Grumpy - No, I haven't a clue what military advice was given.

[nigelcave]

I am afraid that I do not either; the necessary books are elsewhere (if they cover it, which I expect at least one does, though to what length?).

In this particular case, as at least obliquely pointed out in my last, much political energy in the run up to the war would have been directed to the 'Irish question' and the consequent fallout within the military.

There might have been the idea of an Expeditionary Force of six infantry and one cavalry divisions in 1907, and there might well have been a faithful attempt to try and keep to that, but again we know that it was something of a snare and delusion, at least as regards the envisioned time scale. Great progress had been made on the situation that existed pre 1907, but ...

[kenneth505]

It is remarkable how this general conversation seems to lurk just below so many threads on this forum. War Causes, competence, relative successes, it indicates to me how current so much of the exploration remains.

Haig's post war compensation is but one way the nation memorialized and thanked its participants. From my perspective as a visitor no people do a better job of this then the UK.

[Muerrisch]

Nigel, thank you, but the Expeditionary Force as designed was indeed deliverable within a very few days of the Declaration ...... the fact that some of it was held in the UK was political, rather than military.

The fact that it could not be sustained for longer than 6 months was fully understood.

Kitchener's military advice from the outset was that the war would last three years and would require huge augmentation of the army.

The fact that more than half of the men were reservists was integral to the design, as being all that Haldane could get away with in Parliament on a cost/benefit calculation.

If you do not already have visibility of it, Hamilton and Haldane's "Compulsory Service" 1910 is a very good description of the mind-sets and the realities before the war.

[nigelcave]

I agree, naturally, but there were always going to be political factors, hence the snare and delusion bit, even if it were being despatched to deal with some crisis in India. The Irish situation would not have helped in getting a complete force as envisioned shifted either.

Some time I must sit down and do a schematic showing which units came from which posts, ie which ones came from the closer outposts of Empire, which from Ireland and so forth.

What is without question (I hope) is the efficiency with which mobilisation was effected, at least in getting the manpower in place; text book stuff.

[Steven Broomfield]

Ken (Post 36): thank you for that. I appreciate the comment regarding our ability to show thanks.

[squirrel]

Don't know if this helps the orginal poster - from p258 The Man I Knew by Lady Dorothy Haig:

"At the end of February (1919) Douglas was still having communications from the Government regarding the title they were so anxious to confer on him. I had written him imploring him not to accept a large grant, but he had already sent Philip Sassoon armed with a long list of instructions to guide him, to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister. In these notes Douglas definitely stated that he only wanted a sufficient pension to enable him to live in a simple way without monetary anxieties for the rest of his life."

[nigelcave]

Given how Haig and LG did (or rather did not) get on, it seems at least odd that PS should be the private secretary of the one and then the PPS of the other.

[towisuk]

Chris had answered my initial enquiry way back in post #8, but it seems that as soon as Haig is mentioned the forum is alive with the tapping of keyboards...

So if the forum ever seems to be having a quiet time of it all we have to do is mention H**g and the forum springs to life...

many thanks to all for their replies....

regards

Tom

Oh I may have missed it...did anyone post what the actual men that fought recieived as their "reward" at the wars end...or don't they have their supporters....!

[Guest]

" it seems that as soon as Haig is mentioned the forum is alive with the tapping of keyboards... "

That does seem to be the case Tom, but understandable maybe?



" Oh I may have missed it...did anyone post what the actual men that fought recieived as their "reward" at the wars end...or don't they have their supporters....! "

As ever, I don't think they received much. Medals. To be fair to Haig, he spent the rest of his life fighting to get them some reward?

Mike

[geraint]

Chris_Baker, on 24 May 2014 - 08:38 AM, said:

The military forces are the instrument of foreign policy. They are sent to do a job. There is only one thing with overall responsibility for deaths in war and that is the political foreign policy that commits men to fight. What, in all seriousness, do you expect the military commanders to have done once they had been ordered to the fight? Win a bloodless victory? How? By killing lots of enemy without incurring any casualties? Or by not fighting? You can argue all you like about how efficiently or effectively the command carried out its instructions, and whether that contributed to more deaths that might otherwise have been incurred, but in a war of continental scale it was 100% inevitable that there would be many deaths regardless of what the military command did if it was to carry out its instructions. That seems to me an irreducible minimum that can only be placed at the feet of politicians. And then we must ask: which politicians?

The British military prior to 1914 hadn't been involved in an European powers war since Crimea in 1854, and on a larger scale the Napoleonic Wars ending in 1815. These were wars that were fought to keep the balance of power amongst the European powers of Russia, Prussia/Germany, Austria Hungary, France and Britain. Conflicting armies were small professional armies of regular soldiers. The idea of mass conscription existed in Russia and France due to the inherent situations of both countries. Russia due to the immense boundaries and its failure against Japan in 1902, and in France due to the continuous but periodic warfare with Prussia/Germany including the 1871 war. Britain as an Imperial power had no real interest in mainland European affairs apart for the continuation of a balanced power in which no single power emerged to threaten the equilibrium. Napoleon had been such a threat, Bismarck and Prussia were attempting to recreate that threat during the 1870s. Britain was a seagoing power whose sole aim was to keep the empire thriving. All it's naval and military powers were geared to imperialism and to its successful Expeditionary small scale thrusting armies- and not to large scale European standing armies. Expeditionary forces proved itself time after time in China, Africa, India and all over the world. The various Congresses from Vienna onwards were diplomatic summits in which the European powers could and did control problems and belligerency and did keep the balance of power in check from 1815 onwards - almost a century of peace (Crimea excluded).

By 1903 the European powers shifted in their perceptions and a desire for war grew. The dreadnaught race and the increasing expenditure and reforms of the European armies being indicative. Incidents in the Balkans, Agadir etc were again indicative of this shift. By 1914 the powers were spoiling for a fight - and it came.

It wasn't inevitable. It could have been diplomatically avoided had the various monarchs and presidents wished it. They didn't - so havoc was cried and the dogs of war were unleashed.

[geraint]

towisuk, on 24 May 2014 - 9:59 PM, said:

Oh I may have missed it...did anyone post what the actual men that fought recieived as their "reward" at the wars end...or don't they have their supporters....!

Lloyd George in one of his speeches promised "four acres and a cow" to each soldier. I forget which speech. He also promised "homes fit for heroes". He also promised a just and better society.

All lies. The Great Depression, the hungry twenties and thirties, the means test, the Poor Law and workhouses stuffed to the gunnels during 1918-1946 with washed-out veterans says it all. Public antipathy, hatred and derisory attitudes towards veterans. War pensions being deliberately removed, wrongful diagnosis of medical conditions to avoid payments on a government scale. My widowed (1917) grandmother living with her sister who lost her fiancé in 1916 and striving to live a life of poverty until their deaths during the 1960s.

God it makes me so sad...

[kenneth505]

God it makes me so sad...

Aren't these political machinations to a greater or lesser extent a representation of the government the people establish? Someone said we all get the government we deserve.

[PhilB]

As a matter of interest, did Lord Roberts get a payout after the 2nd Boer War to add to the earldom?

[Chris_Baker]

Newspaper reports suggest that "Bobs" also got £100k, and that Kitchener got £50k, at the conclusion of the Second Boer War. I am not sure whether these sums are accurate.

[PhilB]

http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a=d&d=MT19020729.2.45

Yes, it looks like £100,000 was the rate for the job!

[towisuk]

Smacks of money for the "boys"........the establishment looking after its own.......

Tom