Attitudes towards TF units

[bmac]

I wonder if anyone has any suggestions for sources of British senior officers' attitudes (both pro and con) towards TF units (of all sorts) both before and in the early months of the war, i.e. mainly before they had seen action but after early actions would do. I will spend some time looking stuff up myself but am currently indexing a 640 page document which takes a bit of time and concentration.

Thanks in advance for any suggestions.

[centurion]

There were some strong comments from Wilson & Haldane on the CID when it was suggested before the war that rhe BEF might include the TF. Must be minuted.

[rickpreston@nasuwt.net]

Kitchiner had a negative view of them because of his experiences.. I think it was the territorial forces in the Franco Prussian War ...hence he established the New Army

[centurion]

Kitchiner had a negative view of them because of his experiences.. I think it was the territorial forces in the Franco Prussian War ...hence he established the New Army

Didn't know that Kitchener had experience of the Franco Prussian War - I wait agog.

[Jim Hastings]

With a French Field Ambulance unit before being commissioned into the RE

[centurion]

Well I never! Howevr the French Territorial Army of this period was nothing like the later British TF as it was in effect the French Reserve and consisted of men who had done 3 years with the colours in the regular army and would now serve a further 6 years in the reserves. They were not volunteers like the later British TF as service was compulsory albeit part time and the men were already fully trained. Only the name territorial was in common so its difficult to see how it could have been the influencing factor on Kitchener, Wilson and Haldane's objections appear to have been that the TF did not have an good enough transport and supply train and their artillery was inadequate being made up with older guns. This was sufficient for a relatively static . defensive role but inappropriate for an offensive one such as a BEF would be expected to adopt. Moreover only about 6% of the TF had signed up for overseas service pre war

[sw63]

Lieut. Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson (IV Corps Commander) was full of praise for the TF btns of 51st Highland Div after the first day of the battle of Festubert:

" The Corps Commander wishes you to convey his appreciation to the troops of the 51st Division for their gallant conduct of yesterday and to-day, particularly the assaulting battalions - viz the 6th Scotish Rifles, the 4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the 8th King's Liverpool Regiment."

General Sir James Willcocks, commander of the Indian Corps expressed himself very satisfied with the performance of the 51st Division in improving the defences in their sector.

Lord French wrote of the newly-arrived TF divisions:

"At first certainly they were crude and untrained, but every day they improved under instruction, and developed great intelligence under a thorough and practical exposition of the objects to be aimed at."

By August 1915 the 51st Division was considered experienced enough to instruct the newly arrived 18th Division, then the 22nd Div, 32nd Div and 36th Div.

Major General F. I. Maxse (GOC 18th Div) said of the 51st Div:

"I must write you a line to say how grateful my Division is for the great assistance we have received from yours. General Ross has done more to help us than I have experienced from any other GOC... All my people swear by the 51st Division. May we long soldier together."

All quotes from "The History of the Fifty First (Highland) Division 1914-1918" by Maj. F. W. Brewer

Simon

[Guest]

There is lots in CAB 45. Gallipoli. particularly with regards to 53rd Welsh Div.

You will doubtless know the definitive books on the TF which address this issue.

MG

[Guest]

Lieut. Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson (IV Corps Commander) was full of praise for the TF btns of 51st Highland Div after the first day of the battle of Festubert:

" The Corps Commander wishes you to convey his appreciation to the troops of the 51st Division for their gallant conduct of yesterday and to-day, particularly the assaulting battalions - viz the 6th Scotish Rifles, the 4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the 8th King's Liverpool Regiment."

General Sir James Willcocks, commander of the Indian Corps expressed himself very satisfied with the performance of the 51st Division in improving the defences in their sector.

Lord French wrote of the newly-arrived TF divisions:

"At first certainly they were crude and untrained, but every day they improved under instruction, and developed great intelligence under a thorough and practical exposition of the objects to be aimed at."

By August 1915 the 51st Division was considered experienced enough to instruct the newly arrived 18th Division, then the 22nd Div, 32nd Div and 36th Div.

Simon

I am always suspicious of the integrity of any senior commander's praise of his subordinate units, especially after a catastrophic human disaster. Particularly so when the causes of the disaster might be pointing to the author of the catastrophe and his poor judgement. Just because one can find a eulogy of a Bn, Bde or Div does not necessarily mean they did well. One has to temper the eulogy with a small dose of reality.

If, for example, one was to read Hamilton's explanation of Gallipoli, we would be far from the reality. In another era he would have been tried as a war criminal such was his incompetence and flagrant disregard for staggering levels of casualties. The TF in particular were abused on a gigantic scale in this campaign on many levels. MG

[squirrel]

I would suggest that this also applies to senior commander's denigration of othe divisions "having let them down"...

[seaforths]

Lieut. Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson (IV Corps Commander) was full of praise for the TF btns of 51st Highland Div after the first day of the battle of Festubert:

" The Corps Commander wishes you to convey his appreciation to the troops of the 51st Division for their gallant conduct of yesterday and to-day, particularly the assaulting battalions - viz the 6th Scotish Rifles, the 4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the 8th King's Liverpool Regiment."

General Sir James Willcocks, commander of the Indian Corps expressed himself very satisfied with the performance of the 51st Division in improving the defences in their sector.

Lord French wrote of the newly-arrived TF divisions:

"At first certainly they were crude and untrained, but every day they improved under instruction, and developed great intelligence under a thorough and practical exposition of the objects to be aimed at."

By August 1915 the 51st Division was considered experienced enough to instruct the newly arrived 18th Division, then the 22nd Div, 32nd Div and 36th Div.

Major General F. I. Maxse (GOC 18th Div) said of the 51st Div:

"I must write you a line to say how grateful my Division is for the great assistance we have received from yours. General Ross has done more to help us than I have experienced from any other GOC... All my people swear by the 51st Division. May we long soldier together."

All quotes from "The History of the Fifty First (Highland) Division 1914-1918" by Maj. F. W. Brewer

Simon

Having recently read 'Engine of Destruction: The 51st (Highland Division in the Great War' by Colin Campbell, he states that there were disciplinary problems early on which were addressed by replacing some of the leadership with regular officers to stiffen the discipline and address issues with familiarity between the officers and men.

[clive_hughes]

The pages 40-46 of Peter Simkins' Kitchener's Armies suggest that K's supposed Franco-Prussian War prejudices are exaggerated. He was a private in General Chanzy's First Army of the Loire, but was laid low with pneumonia. It was principally Churchill who later said that K mentioned the poor performance of the French citizen army to him several times; others suggest he also had an unfavourable view of the volunteers who served under him in the South African War.

In point of fact K just shared a widespread professional prejudice against the Volunteer & Territorial Forces. Simkins quotes him a few times as making derisive comments about a "Town Clerk's Army", "the joke of the regulars...men who were allowed to put on uniform and play at soldiers", and so on.

As Centurion suggests, the paucity early on of Territorials who had signed the Imperial Service obligation also had its effect on K. Simkins also remarks that he needed the Home Service Territorials to be mobilised and in their war stations as a guard against a possible German raid or invasion while the main Regular force was over in France; which threat he took seriously enough to delay the dispatch of 2 Regular divisions to the BEF.

Clive

[Guest]

I wonder if anyone has any suggestions for sources of British senior officers' attitudes (both pro and con) towards TF units (of all sorts) both before and in the early months of the war, i.e. mainly before they had seen action but after early actions would do. I will spend some time looking stuff up myself but am currently indexing a 640 page document which takes a bit of time and concentration.

Thanks in advance for any suggestions.

BMac - Here are the observations of a regular Officer serving with a K1 unit commenting on some TF units. Note it was the first time these units had seen action. The comments on the 53rd Welsh Div are particularly interesting. As you might know, this formation was stripped of some of its better trained units and had them replaced with second line Home Counties TF unitsthen sent half trained to Gallipoli with disastrous consequences. The quote comes courtesy of TNA from CAB 45 correspondence between Aspinall Oglander and surviving Officers of the Dardanelles campaign. (Crown copyright). MG

Re “Gallipoli” 29^th Oct 1921. To Sir Julian Corbett.

Dear Sir, I enclose the narrative of the operations of the night of landings 6^th Aug 1915, Suvla Bay. The matter contained was official but abridged naturally in my report when I commanded the 6^th Bn of the YORKSHIRE Regt (Green Howards). Brig Gen HAGGARD 32^nd Bde 11^th Div being severely wounded the following day, seems to have resulted in the information not being dealt with at the time.

It is in my opinion, of some historical interest as it was the first occasion in which a unit of the New Regular Army was employed in an offensive operation. From my own knowledge it does not seem to be sufficiently put forward that the difficulties met with were owing to the very heavy loss in Officers, especially senior Officers in the initial fighting who could not be replaced. The 11^th Div and the two Bdes of the 10^th Div at Suvla were available for attack and took positions with heavy loss in Officers and NCOs. The two Territorial Divs 53^rd and 54^th were not as Divs “Troupes d’assault”. This meant in the first few days, original troops landed 11^th & 10^th Divs doing double duty. I know a number of Officers were sick [with] Gallipoli dysentery or fever and went on duty of themselves to land for attack.

More than two years later I acted as Officer in charge of training KANTARA Egypt. I found the Territorial Divs (from Gallipoli) still hopelessly untrained and reported this officially to GHQ/EE Forces. They must have greatly effected (sic) offensive operations in Egypt. The New regular Divs were effectively retrained six months after leaving Gallipoli. The 13^th showed it in Mespot [Mesopotamia] , The 11^th on the Somme in France.

Had the 53^rd and 54^th been of equal fighting value at Suvla it would have had a tremendous effect on that operation. There is another point that has always struck me: There were senior wounded Officers in Hospital Ships in KEPHALOS BAY, MUDROS who could have given information to the staff there had they been interrogated almost immediately after landing. The absence of information which seems to have hampered operations at Suvla was largely owing to casualties amongst senior Officers.

The final attack in that action the 20^th Aug failed owing to loss of direction. The 6^th Bn YORKS was the directing unit. They lost direction thro’ all the Officers becoming casualties in the first few hundred yards. The ground to be covered was some 1,000 yards. Only one was heard of again. Capt A C T WHITE who was wounded (VC at operations in Somme 1916). As the senior Officer of my battalion I went to a lot of trouble in obtaining all information from survivors, the Officers killed or died of wounds in my unit were a score. The attack here was a justification of Lord Kitchener’s policy in forming a New Regular Army. It was superior to the Territorial in general as shock troops.

There is a further point – we were on duty at 5:45 a.m. the day of the landing. The troops worked hard all that day on various duties. We landed seventeen hours later roughly. This accounts for some of the fatigue later noted. As is [it was] very hot weather the water difficulty has been noted. The scrub bush country made contact very difficult in advancing and would have made it so even in a peace operation, for practice. I hope this information may be of some value. The constant change in Battalion command thro’ casualties also created difficulty.

To contain commissioned losses before the final attack my battalion had Officers lent from each unit in Bde and three or four NZ Officers who joined at night and had to lead without seeing their men in daylight. The battalion continued to advance after all Officers were casualties. This should merit commendation they had not sufficiently received.

W Boyd Shannon. Major, late 6^th Bn Green Howards

Naval and Military Club, Piccadilly.

[rolt968]

Well I never! Howevr the French Territorial Army of this period was nothing like the later British TF as it was in effect the French Reserve and consisted of men who had done 3 years with the colours in the regular army and would now serve a further 6 years in the reserves. They were not volunteers like the later British TF as service was compulsory albeit part time and the men were already fully trained. Only the name territorial was in common so its difficult to see how it could have been the influencing factor on Kitchener, Wilson and Haldane's objections appear to have been that the TF did not have an good enough transport and supply train and their artillery was inadequate being made up with older guns. This was sufficient for a relatively static . defensive role but inappropriate for an offensive one such as a BEF would be expected to adopt. Moreover only about 6% of the TF had signed up for overseas service pre war

Unfortunately I cannot now quote the books since I read them many years ago, but some authors believed that Kitchener's sidelining of the TF resulted from his not understanding that the term "Territorial" did not mean the same in the British and French armies. It is interesting to see that more modern thinking raises exactly the last point which you make.

Roger.

[AndrewFrench]

Hi Martin

I regard to Kitchener's dismissal of the TF as a "Town clerks army" not that it was full of town clerks but that it was administered by town clerks ie TF Associations which their links to civilian organisations ? Anyway that's by the way

I only just found this read. Major-Gen Peyton wrote about his TF 2nd Mounted Division thus

Suvla

13 .10 .15

My dear Henderson,

Many thanks for yours of 16th Sept. which only reached me yesterday. I was indeed sorry to lose your services and you have my entire sympathy. I know it must have been a severe blow to you to leave your Regiment when you did, but you have this satisfaction - that, where all did well, none did "better or distinguished themselves more than the Berkshire Yeomanry, and they have stuck to it well ever since under the most adverse circumstances and dire sickness and disease. All this they could not have done had you not instilled into them the excellent spirit and discipline you did, and which they still maintain.

Wigan, of course, was a dreadful loss and I hope he may return shortly but numbers are so reduced at present that we have too many officers. Hughes is carrying on well but it is not a Regiment now - indeed, barely a squadron. We cannot get reinforcements and each day we lose more by sickness.

I am so glad they gave Potts the V.C. He thoroughly deserved it. Hurndall did magnificent service and probably earned a V.C. half-a-dozen times that day; he is now a D.A.A.G. at Corps Headquarters which is some reward. If you have any influence, get us reinforcements sent direct here - not to Egypt where they poach them. Every man in the trenches here is doing the work of three men.

You will be sorry to hear Randolph Baker[1] was wounded yesterday - I understand not badly, shrapnel in his foot; he has done splendid work from the very start.

Much as I am delighted and proud of the rank and file of this Yeomanry Division, I am still more so of the officers who one and all are a pattern of devoted, self-sacrificing leaders of men. The best trained Army in the world could not produce more gallant or devoted officers who know their responsibilities and accept them with earnest courage. The real secret is they are gentleman and their breeding sees them through. It makes me hot to think of the half-hearted recognition these same officers received at all our hands; I mean from officers of the regular Army, before they had an opportunity of showing themselves. I hope you will let it be known what my opinion now is of the Yeomanry Officer - he, and his men, the salt of the earth, God bless them!

I must get this off for the King's Messenger bag. My most sincere sympathy and also my gratitude for handing me over the Regiment as you did.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) W.E. PEYTON.

[1]Major Sir R Baker - 1/1st Dorset Yeomanry