Schlieffen Plan & Plan XVII

[Latze]

Finally, the infeasibility of the Schlieffen Plan was demonstrated when the badly outnumbered French Fifth Army and BEF successfully broke contact with the attacking German First, Second, and Third Armies on the Namur-Charleroi-Mons line and retreated too fast for the Germans ever to catch up with them. This showed that the combination of the fog of war and the great unwieldiness of hundred-thousand-man formations meant that it really was not possible to gain operational victories over enemies commanded even by the likes of Sir John French. Despite Sir John's ineptitude and the poor British and French doctrine, and a great German advantage in numbers, it simply was not possible to carry out envelopment at the operational level absent some advantage in mobility. Reading Kluck's messages about his efforts to catch the BEF over the next ten days is pathetic. Kluck was a far better commander than Sir John, his forces were superb, and he enjoyed superior numbers, but he simply did not have the means to bring the BEF to action. And Bülow was able to engage the French only when they decided to hit him—after which they were able to escape once again.

Since the advancing Germans lost strength faster than the retreating Allies (as Schlieffen had understood), the inability of the Germans to achieve operationally meaningful victories combined with the ability of the Allies to operate on interior lines made it quite likely that the front would stabilize at some point without annihilation of the Allied forces, and thus that the Schlieffen Plan could not succeed. And so it proved.

He's given little credit for it, but Moltke was wise to fall back behind the Aisne before Joffre could do a proper job of concentrating forces in a chosen critical sector.

There's little doubt that Moltke was not up to the challenge. But it's far from clear whether anyone else might have done better.

A well argued point. Still Wavell thought that it was the better plan. Why? Maybe this is an artifact of old school officer education? Because Schlieffen involves a clear embodiment of Clausewitzian or Jominian principles even if unworkable in practice?

Groener says that the cardinal error was not the retreat but that Moltke was not able come up with a solution to the new strategic situation. Which according to him would have been to give ground along the whole front in order to assemble a new force of about 24 divisions and attempt a new envelopment on the right... If it failed a first time why should it fail a second?

[Latze]

Some concluding remarks:

1) I really wonder how Joffre imagined himself investing Metz if his plan succeeded. The German army had a clear appreciation of the problem of attacks on modern fortresses and trained and equipped itself accordingly. The fortresses encountered in 1914 were accordingly no problem (another of the achieved objectives in my view). But the French army attacking Metz with its meagre amount of heavy artillery? I think that would not have gone well for the French army.

2) The German position after at the end of 1914 in the West was not so shabby: the frontline was clearly on French territory, large parts of important French industries and raw materials were in German hands, the possibilities to prosecute guerre de course against Great Britain were better. The big battles against the French had shown that this frontline was defensible even against great pressure. Hard to tell if Schlieffen or Moltke had planned that consciously. In any case that was a side effect of the German plan that allowed a further prosecution of the war.

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Latzke,

As you said, earlier Joffre's Plan XVII was more a reactive plan, The extra army in the centre to be used to move to strengthen either wing depending on the German move. It was then adapted further, strengthening 4th army to become the major attacking force through the Ardennes. All of these options avoided the question of investing Metz; I don't know of any documented plan to tackle Metz, particularly in the opening stages.

Your second point highlights the major loss of the Battle of the frontiers(from a war perspective); not 26,000 Frenchmen but the industry and mineral resources of the Longwy-Briey basin. Schlieffen or Moltke may not have planned it but pre-war German railbuilding certainly faciiltated it and the speed of which German industrialists were sent to the area, suggests they knew the magnitude of its importance. These resources allowed the German industry to better withstand the effects of the naval blockade.

[Latze]

All of these options avoided the question of investing Metz; I don't know of any documented plan to tackle Metz, particularly in the opening stages.

Terence Zuber in "Ardennes 1914" says that investment of Metz was the objective of 3rd army. The footnote he uses points to the French OH, Annex 1 of Volume 1. I have that tome as a pdf but my French fails me here ... Cannot verify that Zuber is right here.

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Latzke,

My understanding was that 3rd Army's role was to counter/neutralise any attacks from Metz, rather than to attack it directly. I'll check the OH and Jean Claude Delhez' books which go into it in more details the Terence Zuber, particularly from the French perspective.

[cdr]

This is from some of my French notes :

La IIIe armée doit assurer la liaison entre les deux actions principales sur la rive droite de la Moselle et au nord de la ligne Verdun, Metz.

Elle doit se tenir prête : soit à rejeter sur Metz et Thionville les troupes ennemies qui en auraient débouché ;

– soit à préparer l’investissement de Metz par l’ouest et le nord-ouest ;

– tout en gardant constamment de forces disponibles pour prolonger l’action des IIe armée au sud et Ve armée au nord.

III army is charged with the liaison between the two principal actions on the right bank of the Meuse and to the nord of the line Verdun, Metz.

It has to be ready : either to push back on Metz and Thionville enemy forces that came from that direction

either to prepare the siege of Metz from the west or the north west

while keeping forces ready to help the actions of the II army in the south and the V army in the nord.

So doing a lot of things at the same time for one of the smaller French armies !

hope this helps

Carl

[SteveMarsdin]

Thanks Carl,

As you say a lot of responsiblitiues for the "small" 3rd army. My interpretation of the vocabulary in context is that one specific task not been given to them is the taking of Metz by assault.