Schlieffen Plan & Plan XVII

[keithjk]

I agree Jim. This thread has become as enjoyable as a very unenjoyable thing. I think I'll go and cut my toenails.

Keith

[Steven Broomfield]

Personally I find one poster on this thread has that effect most times he appears.

[salesie]

Don't worry, chaps, you won't have to suffer my churlish attitude any longer. My last word in this thread is:

This is a short quote from the history of Field Artillery Regiment 3 (German) which should be of interest:

"For many years, the British army with its good riflemen and long service soldiers, which almost amounted to an army of NCOs, had only fought colonial wars. All its members, therefore, were well acquainted with everything to do with bush warfare and small scale operations, not to mention ambushes and other tricks. Their exploitation of the ground and its development at night for defensive purposes was absolutely masterly...

During the morning of 24 August [refers to the fighting for Frameries] the British, who were manning well constructed positions, let the Germans close up on them. Their firing tactics were to open fire at close range, so that our casualties were considerable, because the infantry did not wait for the artillery fire to become effective... In close quarter battle, the British were extremly tough and frequently allowed bayonet fighting to break out.

Against this was set the German style of attack. In this the infantry opened fire at medium range, from about 500 to 700 metres and began to win the fire fight with the enemy position. Then, without waiting for the artillery to achieve its full effect, there would be the launch of a violent charge with the infantry all in line, accompanied by great shouts of 'Hurra!' The oficers were deployed ten paces to the front and were involved directly in the break in to the enemy position.

Although this procedure in the attack had been proven in hundreds of battles since the time of Frederick the Great; although no enemy had been able up until now to withstand a German storm assault, it carried with it unnecessarily high casualties among the officers and men which, for the most part, were disproportionate to what was achieved. Therefore the infantry losses in the Battle of Mons were considerable, although, had more patience been shown, the majority of them could have been avoided."

And, a quote from a German general - Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff's successor, pretty-much summing-up German command failure when writing, post-war:

"Most generals (German) spent the entire war living under dangerous self-deception. They did not recognise the true strategic and political situation, they clung on to thoughts of wonderful successes on the battlefields, they were proud of the bearing and deeds of their troops and were in some cases inclined to not even take serious defeats seriously. Almost none of them realised the dangers arising from the failure to achieve our strategic goals in battle."

I'll now leave you to wallow in your self-righteous indignation about my rude behaviour (that is until the next time b*llocks is spouted about the "superior" German army).

Cheers-salesie.

[martin_sole]

Die Deutsche Soldaten waren wie die Löwen, von Eseln geführt.

Now where have I heard that before??

[Latze]

And, a quote from a German general - Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff's successor, pretty-much summing-up German command failure when writing, post-war:

And a quote from a German general - Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff's successor, summing up the reason for the failure of the campaign in the West 1914 and the relative combat power of the armies:

"The German army did not cause (verschuldet) the failure at the Marne. In warlike spirit, organization, training and performance it towered (überragte) over it's enemies. Tactical doctrine (Anschauungen) were not free from errors but one cannot see more in that than the necessary adaption to the war that every army faces. ... The well earned (verdiente) victory really was denied the army at the last minute. ... This study has undeniably shown that the reasons for that lay in the operational realm and that even the best performance of the troops cannot compensate when due to grave errors operations are derailed."

Personally I do not like unsourced quotes; this is from: Wilhelm Groener "Der Feldheer wider Willen", 3rd ed., Berlin 1931, p. 243; the transaltion is mine.

[Ken S.]

His source would be this thread:

 

 

[salesie]

And a quote from a German general - Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff's successor, summing up the reason for the failure of the campaign in the West 1914 and the relative combat power of the armies:

"The German army did not cause (verschuldet) the failure at the Marne. In warlike spirit, organization, training and performance it towered (überragte) over it's enemies. Tactical doctrine (Anschauungen) were not free from errors but one cannot see more in that than the necessary adaption to the war that every army faces. ... The well earned (verdiente) victory really was denied the army at the last minute. ... This study has undeniably shown that the reasons for that lay in the operational realm and that even the best performance of the troops cannot compensate when due to grave errors operations are derailed."

Personally I do not like unsourced quotes; this is from: Wilhelm Groener "Der Feldheer wider Willen", 3rd ed., Berlin 1931, p. 243; the transaltion is mine.

Groener tells us that the German army failed to achieve any of its objectives in the west in 1914 (and don't forget 1915/16/17 & 18) - we don't need a quote from Wilhelm Groener to confirm it, we already knew.

Now, grave operational errors are one thing - spotting those errors and taking advantage of them are quite another (a la Joffre); how is it when the French make grave operational errors they are inferior to the Germans, but when the Germans make grave operational errors and the French outwit and outfight them then the Germans are still superior?

I'll repeat yet again, no matter how many quotes are produced, no matter how much wishful thinking is voiced, the bottom line is quite simple - the German army failed to achieve any of its objectives at any stage of the war in the west (i.e. they failed completely, and that failure cost them dearly). Anything else is just hyperbolic bullsh*t.

Cheers-salesie.

[Latze]

Groener tells us that the German army failed to achieve any of its objectives in the west in 1914 (and don't forget 1915/16/17 & 18) - we don't need a quote from Wilhelm Groener to confirm it, we already knew.

Really? Does Groener tells us that the German army failed to achieve any of its objectives in the west in 1914? Could you point me to the relevant page?

[salesie]

Really? Does Groener tells us that the German army failed to achieve any of its objectives in the west in 1914? Could you point me to the relevant page?

That's what your own post #30, quoting Groener, says (the clue lies in "failure and victory denied"; those words have a certain meaning and it's not high achievement).

Cheers-salesie.

[martin_sole]

Salesie, you might want to look up "Contextomy"

as you seem to have accidentally or intentionally misattributed something to General Groener and then accidentally or intentionally quote-mined Latze when called on your mistake.

It's not what honest debates are made of...

[salesie]

Salesie, you might want to look up "Contextomy"

as you seem to have accidentally or intentionally misattributed something to General Groener and then accidentally or intentionally quote-mined Latze when called on your mistake.

It's not what honest debates are made of...

Not so, Martin, I intentionally pointed out that both mine and Latze's Groener quotes basically said the same thing i.e. that the German army failed to achieve its objectives in the west - which is certainly true, and in context to this thread, and reinforces my point about the illogical fallacy (another name for Contextomy) of some posts . What next, if I shut up - an "honest" debate full of hyperbole creating intellectual excretia saying the "best team lost"?

Cheers-salesie

[martin_sole]

Not so, Martin, I intentionally pointed out that both mine and Latze's Groener quotes basically said the same thing i.e. that the German army failed to achieve its objectives in the west - which is certainly true, and in context to this thread, and reinforces my point about the illogical fallacy (another name for Contextomy) of some posts . What next, if I shut up - an "honest" debate full of hyperbole creating intellectual excretia saying the "best team lost"?

Cheers-salesie

Logical debate doesn't involve playing fast 'n' loose with misattributions and misquotes, even if your special pleading is that they "basically said the same thing" - which I don't think they did, but never mind.

That sort of thing is sloppy at best, dishonest at worst.

The crux of almost all your posts on this topic is always scathing criticism of those who apparently claim that "the best team lost"

So who are these people?

Where are the posters who have stubbornly insisted that the German army did achieve its initial objectives in 1914?

Where is this tide of intellectual excreta that you are so determined to stem?

No matter how often you're told that an admiration for the Germans doesn't equate to "best team lost", you always insist it does.

For someone so keen on "illogical fallacies" [sic], I'm surprised you don't see your argument as the strawman it is.

[Latze]

"Contextomy" - great! I learned a new word today. Thank you, Martin.

Salesie, could you maybe tell me the book your Groener quotes comes from? I would like to see it in context and in German.

I still think that you misunderstand Groeners argument culminating in the part I quoted. You did not read 'Der Feldheer wider Willen', did you? One of the objectives of the German army was to avoid a battle to breach the fortress belt of eastern France in order to come to grips with the French army. That was achieved (page 1 of said book).

[salesie]

"Contextomy" - great! I learned a new word today. Thank you, Martin.

Salesie, could you maybe tell me the book your Groener quotes comes from? I would like to see it in context and in German.

I still think that you misunderstand Groeners argument culminating in the part I quoted. You did not read 'Der Feldheer wider Willen', did you? One of the objectives of the German army was to avoid a battle to breach the fortress belt of eastern France in order to come to grips with the French army. That was achieved (page 1 of said book).

Some achievement - that's like saying the Titanic fulfilled its objective of being unsinkable by staying afloat for 2/3 hours after hitting the iceberg. Here's context for you; for Titanic substitute German army, for 2/3 hours substitute 4/5 weeks, for the iceberg substitute the Marne. Comparisons between the German army and the Titanic are glaringly obvious i.e. they were both designed to be unsinkable, they both set off on a maiden voyage with an aura of invincibility, they both travelled very smoothly for most of their journey, they both failed to reach their destination.

What exactly are you trying to prove, Latze, what point do you wish to make about the German army in the Great war (especially 1914)?

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Logical debate doesn't involve playing fast 'n' loose with misattributions and misquotes, even if your special pleading is that they "basically said the same thing" - which I don't think they did, but never mind.

That sort of thing is sloppy at best, dishonest at worst.

The crux of almost all your posts on this topic is always scathing criticism of those who apparently claim that "the best team lost"

So who are these people?

Where are the posters who have stubbornly insisted that the German army did achieve its initial objectives in 1914?

Where is this tide of intellectual excreta that you are so determined to stem?

No matter how often you're told that an admiration for the Germans doesn't equate to "best team lost", you always insist it does.

For someone so keen on "illogical fallacies" [sic], I'm surprised you don't see your argument as the strawman it is.

Are you actually going to contribute to this debate or just keep whingeing on and on and on - you're beginning to do a pretty good impression of Waldorf & Statler from the muppet show - contribute some substance don't whinge!

Cheers-salesie.

[martin_sole]

Are you actually going to contribute to this debate or just keep whingeing on and on and on - you're beginning to do a pretty good impression of Waldorf & Statler from the muppet show - contribute some substance don't whinge!

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie, False attribution isn't OK.

If I cited Lord Kitchener on something he hadn't actually written, supported it by quote mining one of your posts and then tried to justify it by saying you both "basically said the same thing", you'd be all over it like a fat kid on a cupcake, and rightly so.

You need to explain why you feel it's OK to give yourself a free pass on logical errors that you wouldn't tolerate from others.

Now I know it's irksome to be called on your presuppositions but the previous questions still stand:

Unless you can point to a group of forum members (or even one) who hold their hands up to actually subscribing to this theory that you so enjoy "debunking", your argument is a strawman, an Aunt Sally, a windmill tilt.

[martin_sole]

Here's context for you; for Titanic substitute German army, for 2/3 hours substitute 4/5 weeks, for the iceberg substitute the Marne. Comparisons between the German army and the Titanic are glaringly obvious i.e. they were both designed to be unsinkable, they both set off on a maiden voyage with an aura of invincibility, they both travelled very smoothly for most of their journey, they both failed to reach their destination.

Let's run with that metaphor then...

Let's say I hold the opinion that in many ways Titanic was a superior ship to, say, City of Paris, does that mean I am attempting to rewrite history by not focussing exclusively on Titanic's sinking?

If I admire Titanic's design and engineering, respect the actions of many of its senior officers, is that defined as "intellectual excreta" by reason of the ship not achieving its objective?

Would my attempt to rectify some historical errors concerning the crewing of the Titanic or its route make me into an apologist for Bruce Ismay and the Board of the White Star Line?

Or be irrelevant due to its sinking?

[Latze]

Oh, salesie, you made me laugh again

Up until now I was under the impression that the topic of the thread were Lord Wavell's sentiments about the relative merits of the German and French warplane. What gives you the impression that I want to "make points" about the German army especially in 1914 here?

In my first post I wanted to point out that at least in his book from 1931 is saying the very things you seem very much opposed to. That's why I was asking (and do so again very politely) to tell me where that quote comes from. And just maybe you can give me a clue what an 'objective' might be - besides from 'just winning the war' - the German Army might have had in 1914?

[salesie]

Ok, chaps, I get the message - neither of you have a direct point to make on this topic, you simply admire/respect failure so much you see it as an achievement in and of itself.

Cheers-salesie.

PS. My quote comes from the thread Ken S posted a link to. It was posted by Halder, a respected member of the forum and published author of many post WW1 works on the German army. If you pm him, Latze, I'm sure he'll oblige you with a reply.

[martin_sole]

Ok, chaps, I get the message - neither of you have a direct point to make on this topic, you simply admire/respect failure so much you see it as an achievement in and of itself.

Cheers-salesie.

PS. My quote comes from the thread Ken S posted a link to. It was posted by Halder, a respected member of the forum and published author of many post WW1 works on the German army. If you pm him, Latze, I'm sure he'll oblige you with a reply.

Good Lord...

Salesie, did Frederick the Great eat your hamster or something?

PS. Appeal to Authority is another logical fallacy

PPS. As the Hun baby killers sometimes say: "Kein Antwort ist auch ein Antwort"

[Ken S.]

This is from another thread...

 

On 14/11/2013 at 06:47, Latze said:

"Contextomy" - great! I learned a new word today. Thank you, Martin.

Salesie, could you maybe tell me the book your Groener quotes comes from? I would like to see it in context and in German.

I still think that you misunderstand Groeners argument culminating in the part I quoted. You did not read 'Der Feldheer wider Willen', did you? One of the objectives of the German army was to avoid a battle to breach the fortress belt of eastern France in order to come to grips with the French army. That was achieved (page 1 of said book).

[bill24chev]

Some times the best team does lose. Aa number of non league football teams have beaten teams from the old First & Second division of English football in the FA Cup and a few years ago the great Bayern Munich was beaten by Osnabruck Kickers from the 3rd or 4th tier of German football. However the top teams recover and are usualy in the hunt at the end of the season to win their league. This was not the case, I beleive with the German army of 1914 especially Frst and Second Armies on their right wing.

Having stopped the French plan XVII causing many French casualties on the German left wing and Centre the right wing of the German Army progressed across North East France down to the Marne. During this advance First Army only came into serious contact with the BEF (actualy only II Corps) twice and were stopped both times and the British troops broke conact and withdrew avoiding destruction. The French 5th Army also achieved a similer outcome at Guise.

When they did reach the Marne having realy succeeded in doing not much more than burn a few dwellings and wear out their boots they were stopped and defeated by Joffre being given the time to reorganise his Armies, helped a bit by the BEF.

For me this 1914 performance by "the best trained, equipped and officered army of the time" is hardly Premiere League Champions form.

[Guest woneil]

Plan XVII was not a plan in the same sense as the "Schlieffen Plan"—more like a war plan as those of use who have served as professional plans officers use the term. Schlieffen's 1906 Denkschrift was more like a wargame played out with Schlieffen taking both sides. These exercises can be very illuminating, and every commander-in-chief I ever worked with did some, albeit not so elaborately.

The trap that's hard to avoid with one man (or team) playing both sides is unconscious bias and tilting of the scales, and that's in evidence in the Denkschrift. Without that he would surely not have glossed over the fact that the French would be able to shift forces on interior lines with an intact rail net, while German movements would travel on exterior lines over a partly-destroyed rail net (i.e., partly destroyed in the occupied territories). This presented a very big problem for the plan, which was not nearly well enough addressed.

Execution depended on a very substantial increase in German force levels. To achieve this by 1914 it would have been necessary to increase active force levels by two corps or so starting in 1906, which was politically impossible in Germany. Even if the German states and Reichstag had somehow been persuaded to do this, the French and Russians could scarcely have been expected to stand by with their arms folded while Germany stole a march on them.

Even if the forces required had been available in 1914, it was not possible that they could have been moved to envelop Paris in a timely way through the narrow Belgian corridor. And if they were to get there, they could not have been supplied.

Finally, the infeasibility of the Schlieffen Plan was demonstrated when the badly outnumbered French Fifth Army and BEF successfully broke contact with the attacking German First, Second, and Third Armies on the Namur-Charleroi-Mons line and retreated too fast for the Germans ever to catch up with them. This showed that the combination of the fog of war and the great unwieldiness of hundred-thousand-man formations meant that it really was not possible to gain operational victories over enemies commanded even by the likes of Sir John French. Despite Sir John's ineptitude and the poor British and French doctrine, and a great German advantage in numbers, it simply was not possible to carry out envelopment at the operational level absent some advantage in mobility. Reading Kluck's messages about his efforts to catch the BEF over the next ten days is pathetic. Kluck was a far better commander than Sir John, his forces were superb, and he enjoyed superior numbers, but he simply did not have the means to bring the BEF to action. And Bülow was able to engage the French only when they decided to hit him—after which they were able to escape once again.

Since the advancing Germans lost strength faster than the retreating Allies (as Schlieffen had understood), the inability of the Germans to achieve operationally meaningful victories combined with the ability of the Allies to operate on interior lines made it quite likely that the front would stabilize at some point without annihilation of the Allied forces, and thus that the Schlieffen Plan could not succeed. And so it proved.

He's given little credit for it, but Moltke was wise to fall back behind the Aisne before Joffre could do a proper job of concentrating forces in a chosen critical sector.

There's little doubt that Moltke was not up to the challenge. But it's far from clear whether anyone else might have done better.

[Latze]

Least somebody accuses me of having no point to make (sigh) I take the opportunity to give some thoughts and reply to woneils good points.

Plan XVII was not a plan in the same sense as the "Schlieffen Plan"—more like a war plan as those of use who have served as professional plans officers use the term. Schlieffen's 1906 Denkschrift was more like a wargame played out with Schlieffen taking both sides. These exercises can be very illuminating, and every commander-in-chief I ever worked with did some, albeit not so elaborately.

What I took away from Terence Zuber's work on the German war planing is the argument that the Denkschrift is a thing rather distinct from any actual war plan. I think that Zuber very much overstates his case when he claims that the concept of Moltke's plan was to counterattack after the French invasion. Nonetheless while "Schlieffen plan" can be used as a shorthand for the plan enacted in 1914 as the basic concept was developed in the Denkschrift it is a distinct thing and was planned with the force levels at hand, etc.

Plan XVII on the other hand was something that in German would be called a Aufmarschplan - a plan that served to guide the assembly of armies. Clearly several variants for proceeding from there were prepared by the French staff, so we generally call the one chosen by Joffre Plan XVII. Maybe somebody can tell if there is a good monograph on French planning??

For me this is still something of the dark matter of the historiography. While the whole business of Schlieffen was analyzed to death I am not aware that the same was done for the French side of things in the last 100 years.

To the point that Schlieffen's analysis of his own plan was partly wishful thinking and that he transferred that mindset to the staff officers he trained I would agree.

Execution depended on a very substantial increase in German force levels. To achieve this by 1914 it would have been necessary to increase active force levels by two corps or so starting in 1906, which was politically impossible in Germany. Even if the German states and Reichstag had somehow been persuaded to do this, the French and Russians could scarcely have been expected to stand by with their arms folded while Germany stole a march on them.

I am not sure on this point. As far as I know the French side was already using all available manpower in the pre war years and Russia was arming itself full-tilt. I see not much room for a reaction by them if Germany passes a new army bill. The main opposition in Germany was the old army hierarchy (Militärkabinett) that wanted to preserve the social cohesion of the officer corps.

Would have some more to write on this but have to care for my son now... so long.

Matt

[Latze]

An aside to Terence Zuber's thesis that the 'real' German warplane was a counterattack after a French invasion: When I reread Groener's "Der Feldherr wider Willen" I noticed that he criticizes the French plan because they leave their strong defensive position based on their fortress belt and unnecessarily expose their army. Instead they should have waited for a German invasion and then counterattack. He calls that a 'defensive offensive' and than goes on to say that this is the strongest possible operation according to Delbrück. Here I started to think: Why is he using Delbrück as reference? Hans Delbrück was no officer but just a historian. He had a long argument with von Kuhl mainly before the parliament when the finger pointing started after the armistice. Is this a veiled critique aimed at Kuhl? Or even at Schlieffen? Or am I over interpreting.