The silent seven minutes - The Nek, an alleged myth debunked?

[moggs]

Congratulations to all involved in this riveting thread. I have followed it with much interest including being disappointed when it was temporarily shut down and very pleased when it reopened.

To read of the various versions of the source material and how it has been used (and abused) shows the great depth of knowledge that so many of you have. Along with wonderful patience and perseverance, what has been presented here is a lesson for all who are interested in history and research for the truth.

Hopefully the AWM can see the truth behind such research.

All the best

Jonathan

[Jeff Pickerd]

Ian,

You are quite correct, and I do owe you an apology for not making that point far more clearly, as is also the case for John Hamilton, but hopefully I may be forgiven in relation to trying to make the point that the Captain Tom Austin version held by the AWM was the only readily accessible manuscript available to researchers. Your references and acknowledgement of my work on the 8th LH were more than generous, it was a pleasure to have had the opportunity to be able to contribute what I could to the making of the 10th LH history, a remarkable history and a great credit to both you and Neville.

Jonathan,

Thank you. One is always a bit wary of voicing criticism of those who have made the effort to publish their research, opinions and conclusions. On the other hand, if such published accounts are thought to be wrong, and it can be shown that they are wrong, for the sake of presenting accurate history they must be brought to public attention and corrected where possible. If that leads to lively debate, and the discloser of new information, all the better.

Jeff

[Bryn]

Regarding the gap in timing that some believe existed and some don't: While trawling through some of the War Diaries for a completely different reason, I came across the following which is in reference to preparations for the Armistice at Anzac on 24th May 1915:

"Alla Franca" is "European time." So if your watch is set to European time, and the artillery's watches are set to Army Corps time, there will be a gap between the artillery ceasing fire and when you think they should have ceased fire.

In any case, here is proof that there was a known discrepancy in time at Gallipoli.

Source is the 1st Light Horse Brigade War Diary for May 1915, page 58/141, about half-way down the page: http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/bundled/RCDIG1013513.pdf

[gilly100]

HI Bryn

I think that was what Audrey Herbert referred to and which I made mention of somewhere. Interesting

Jeff - I am only anything but eternally grateful for all your generous assistance with my work. If you do write a book on 8LH, I would climb over an angry mob of trance induced, machete wielding Balinese villagers to get a copy!

[Bryn]

Right, Ian. I should have said, "here is further proof…."

[gilly100]

Finally managed to listen to the complete talk by Graham Wilson, courtesy of a GWF member. I can only say that in the opening minutes of the talk when it was made clear he had no respect at all for the works of CEW Bean I had to force myself to listen to the rest of it. As for the royalties coming in comment, gee whizz!

Still, there are plenty of other authors out there whose works one can buy and enjoy.

Ian

[Auimfo]

He just set the tone from the outset didn't he Ian. Unfortunately it appears to just be Wilson's standard practice............

I guess he never took the time to actually address any of the questions you put to him? Rather an arrogant attitude for someone who's research is on very shaky ground.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[gilly100]

Yes Tim. a very disappointing series of comments made throughout that talk that perhaps give a hint of what is yet to come. The biggest for me was the bagging of Bean. Of course he was not perfect and got things wrong here and there for whatever reason, but I and probably a good few others would challenge anyone else to even come close to his contribution to Australian WW1 military history. It is unsurpassed. Will anyone else from here on in get close? Probably not. He may get questioned and corrected here and there, and rightly so, but to try to pull down Bean across the board will result in failure for anyone that takes it on.

Ian

[judy7007]

Reading Dust Donkeys and Delusions gives, I think, a very 'interesting' insight into his research method and style.

[Auimfo]

For everyone else's benefit so they don't have to plough through listening to the whole thing again, here's how Wilson described CEW Bean:

"I will go right out on a limb here and say I have very, very little respect for Charles Bean; almost no respect for him at all."

Why is that Graham? No doubt because Bean's histories conflict with your notion of myth busting and you need to discredit him for your poorly researched ideas to look credible - very typical of your style. Even accepting that Bean made occasional mistakes, if we compare historical research and truly credible output, you have rather a long way to go before even remotely catching up to Bean. Unnecessarily applying the 'tall poppy syndrome' to historical figures purely to advance your own cause does your integrity no favours whatsoever.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[moggs]

For everyone else's benefit so they don't have to plough through listening to the whole thing again, here's how Wilson described CEW Bean:

"I will go right out on a limb here and say I have very, very little respect for Charles Bean; almost no respect for him at all."

Why is that Graham? No doubt because Bean's histories conflict with your notion of myth busting and you need to discredit him for your poorly researched ideas to look credible - very typical of your style. Even accepting that Bean made occasional mistakes, if we compare historical research and truly credible output, you have rather a long way to go before even remotely catching up to Bean. Unnecessarily applying the 'tall poppy syndrome' to historical figures purely to advance your own cause does your integrity no favours whatsoever.

Cheers,

Tim L.

Hear, Hear!

Jonathan

[b3rn]

Incredible. Every Australian is in debt to C. E. W. Bean.

[Auimfo]

Let's compare shall we....

CEW Bean

- With the Flagship in the South

- On the Wool Track

- The Dreadnought of the Darling

- Flagships Three

- What to Know in Egypt - A Guide for Australian Soldiers

- The ANZAC Book (Editor)

- Letters From France

- In Your Hands, Australians

- The Official History of Australia in The War 1914-1918 (totalling 12 volumes of which he wrote six and edited all, taking 23 years to complete)

- The Old AIF and the New

- War Aims of a Plain Australian

- ANZAC to Amiens

- Gallipoli Mission

- Here My Son

- Two Men I Knew: William Bridges and Brudenell White, Founders of the AIF

- Instrumental in the creation of the Australian War Memorial and the War Records Section.

Graham Wilson

- Bully Beef and Balderdash

- Dust, Donkeys and Delusions

............says it all really.

[Guest]

Hilarious.

[judy7007]

Hilarious.

Particularly so if one reads them (although I've only read 3/4 of Donkeys and that was as much as I could take)

Judy

[Guest]

Particularly so if one reads them (although I've only read 3/4 of Donkeys and that was as much as I could take)

Judy

I have a principle of not reading anything with a tabloid title. Anything containing Balderdash or Donkeys would fit the bill and my particular hate is anything with the words 'real' or 'true' or 'story' or 'bloody'. My impression from reading this thread is that this author has a deliberately sensationalist agenda. It is not analysis. It is simply a feeble attempt at stirring things up to get a reaction. A sort of publishing troll. There appears to be nothing measured or balanced in his arguments.

As a complete aside, Bean wasn't a saint in my view and made more than a few mistakes, but given the sheer scale of his works and his monumental contribution, I think he deserves to be given some leeway. He had an agenda too (doesn't every author?), but articulated his arguments with style and some grace.....however, if you were a recruit from the English slums (and could read) you might have a different view. I have Vol I and II and can't for the life of me recall where (page number) he alluded to the slum-dwelling English as poor fighting material. On this point I think he was ill-informed as the English slums appear to have provided a rather large number of volunteers who faced their destiny with some grim determination and were not given a voice like the men of Australia were. The fact that conscription was introduced in Britain should be a rather large hint that the British were scouring the counrty (and the slums) for fighting material by Jan 1916. In Bean's (rather successful) attempt to create Australian mythology (in a good sense) he rather unfortunately trod on a few English toes. Interesting reading though and in my view much better reading than the British OH..and I cant recall where he explains how many British born men were in the first batch of Aussies who fought and died at ANZAC. Probably because he didn't touch on this rather inconvenient truth. .. I don't mean to denigrate his work, but he was not above criticism. That observtion is of course made with the massive benefit of hindsight. Probably a subject for another thread.....MG

MG

[MartH]

Can I add something to this very interesting thread.

Bean like other Official History authors, had to include 3 elements to varying degrees in an OH, 1) the narrative of what actually happened, the sequence of events, 2) tried to articulate the process of, and command decisions that where involved, and 3) the political guidance and civilian background, often OH's where drafted 3 times with each successive layer added.

Then there was a continual cross checking of war diaries, facts, diaries, published histories, etc, and a vast correspondence trying to do the best, not just official sources. Evidence of this rigorous approach is the large amount of correspondence with people, (some with Edmonds, some of which where they disagree with each other), and this started during the war, examples being with Bean interviewing people and the CID office chasing up the War Diaries. However I am sure the debate got a lot of the narrative more correct. Every volume of Der Weltkrieg acknowledges this correspondence.

It is interesting today that authors like Jack Sheldon get singled out as something special for using sources from the other side, we often forget that both Edmonds and Bean did this obsessively. As an example look at the wonderful collection of German Regimental, Division, and Battalion level histories at the AWM, and Edmonds getting a copy of Volume 13 Der Weltkrieg via the Swiss Embassy in 1942.

In many cases their works where the first comprehensive history for what went on, they where the skeleton which others have built on, though often I am afraid to say not adding much to the narrative of the actions, though sometimes there are mistakes. Nor did the accept their works were the final word, witness the many corrects in revised editions and correction sheets for earlier volumes.

Unfortunately both works do not address the 3rd element, but that error of process was redressed by both sides in the Second World War volumes.

Without these people leading teams obsessively the published history of the Great War would be much poorer.

It is a great pity that this johnny come lately author does not demonstrate this obsession with the sources- bloody cheek!

[Plugges Plateau]

Hilarious.

x2 spot on..

[Jeff Pickerd]

With apologies in advance, I am unable to confine this post to but a few words.

TimL you have previously made a very good point with regard to Graham Wilson drawing the conclusions he wishes to seek from the comments left by those who were there that morning of 7th August 1915, as you noted, most of those statements can also be construed to intimate the opposite position. There is just so much that can be challenged of Graham Wilson’s talk, but to cover every aspect of his lecture is pointless, for already much has been discredited. I would however think that to try and build a reputation upon such a statement as this: “I will go right out on a limb here and say I have very, very little respect for Charles Bean; almost no respect for him at all.", will take far more than a throwaway opinion such as that; to gain acceptance and to substantiate the proof to back such an opinion will take an enormous amount of detailed evidence, which I would suggest would not be an easily achieved goal to firmly make the case.

I would however like to concentrate on a few points he has made from within his talk, and analyse the depth of research he has undertaken to come up with the conclusions with which to substantiate his claim of, there having not been a 7 minutes silence before the charge at The Nek at 4.30 am. It is all very well to rely upon selected quotes from some of the participants of the charge to establish your point of view, but the danger in doing so leaves one open to having further selected quotes being presented that will give a totally different interpretation of what took place, and in some cases these from the person first quoted.

Towards the beginning of his address Graham Wilson began by giving a brief outline of the objectives of the August campaign and the 3rd LH Bde’s charge, and to emphasise the point he presented a slide of what he termed: “... this contemporary trench map, showing the trench systems...”, or to give it its correct name, ‘ANZAC TRENCH DIAGRAM No. III (compiled from air reconnaissances) Corrected to 20th July 1915’. He then proceeded to give an outline of intended objectives of the three lines of the 8th & 10th LH Regiments, and following that as he puts it, “the reserves were to move up and consolidate”, across The Nek and upon Baby 700, or to be precise, a précis of ‘Operational Order No. 1, a consideration of an Attack on Baby 700’. For the purpose of his talk this was well and good, but as a basis of forming an argument to his theory regarding the missing seven minutes it was just another outline of the charge that has been repeated on numerous occasions. If Graham Wilson really wished to give his audience an appreciation to his depth of knowledge on the subject he would have expanded further on the outline of the charge by going to the next important map, the ‘Nek Forming-up Plan, G7432. G1 S65, Gallipoli x 1.12’. This map detailed the position and numbers of men for each line and the direction the men of each subsequent line would move through the reserve trenches, up to the firing line. This map also gave the position the key features and an indication as to where most of the key players were for the charge, that is, if one has an understanding of just what did take place there. If he is to be taken seriously with is theory he has to have a total knowledge of all the trenches and other features of Defence Section No. 4, for instance, just where the White Street trench was, where the advanced 3rd LH Bde command dug-out was situated, where the C.L.H. (Old AW) phone was positioned, No. 1 Sap, the Whispering Tunnel, the Main Street trench, the Broadway, so on & so on. All of these places are of relevance to his theory of the missing seven minutes, for they form the basis of movement and time. It is also interesting that he makes no comment of the date of ‘ANZAC TRENCH DIAGRAM No. III’; 20th July 1915. The depictions of the trenches on this map of Russell’s Top are completely out of date, the Saps No. 2 through to 8 are shown as not pushed forward to the point where the first line launched their charge. All of this may seem somewhat irrelevant to the basis of his talk, but if you do not know these things and their relevance, you cannot form a sound argument to mount the case.

Graham Wilson to support his theory uses the statements of the senior officers submitted to the 3rd LH Bde war diary, namely Brigadier Godfrey Hughes commander of the 3rd LH Bde, acting CO 8th LH, Major Vivian Deeble, and the CO 10th LH, Lt Col Noel Brazier. All of these reports were written on the 7th August, and despite Wilson’s argument that none mention a seven minute delay, all confirm that the 8th LH first line charged at 4.30 am. What does amaze me is the fact that Wilson cannot comprehend that the artillery and Naval bombardment onto Baby 700 ceased at 4.30 am, and the first line of the 8th LH charged at 4.30 am, both 4.30 but different 4.30’s. He also quotes the experiences of three men who went out in the charge, Troopers Ronald Ross (No. 181, “D” Troop, “A” Squadron), Alexander Borthwick (No. 529, “A” Troop, “A” Squadron) and L/Cpl Walter McConnan (No. 429, “A” Troop, “C” Squadron), sighting each as giving evidence to the cessation of the bombardment and start of the charge being at 4.30 am, but he also states these are the only accounts he has sourced to-date. It should be pointed out that there are a further nineteen comprehensive accounts of men and officers from the 8th LH that describe the charge, covering both the first and second lines, and of each troop of those lines. A number give no reference to a time for the charge; the next group give the time as 4 am, followed by those giving the 4.30. Two give a five minute delay, two more as one minute, and only Lt Robinson the seven minutes. What is apparent is the fact that all seem to conform to the 3rd LH Bde time.

To this purpose and to conform to Graham Wilson’s practice, selective quotes are required.

Tpr J. J. Faulkner No. 61, “A” Troop, “A” Squadron: “Just before the first peep of day (about 4.30 a.m.) the bombardment began to slacken and Lieutenant Colonel White looked at his watch. He passed the word along. ‘Five minutes to go’, then, ‘Three minutes to go’, and then, ‘Get ready’, and finally, ‘Jump parapet’! His orders followed in quick succession. In an instant our first line eagerly leapt over the parapet. Not a stone’s throw away were the trenches of the enemy, and as soon as our heads appeared above, the Turks opened fire with machine-guns and rifles.”

Captain Leslie Hore, “C” Squadron, officer commanding the right of the second line: “The attack would be in four lines to be followed by others if successful. At four am we stood to arms in our trenches, the bombardment started and in twenty five minutes it stopped. Immediately a fierce crackle of fire came out of the Turkish trenches. We knew we were doomed. The bombardment had failed and had simply advertised our attack. I was in charge of the right wing of the second line, under me three subalterns and about one hundred and seventy five men. We were to start our charge after the first line had gone fifty yards.”

Sgt Robert Rankin, No. 47 “D” Troop, “A” Squadron: “Our regiment had to supply the first and second lines, and each line had 150 men. My Troop was on the extreme right of the second line, and we had to follow the first line in 10 seconds, and those seconds seemed like hours. The first line was in the sap in front, and we had to rush from the fire trench. No sooner had the first line got away when it started to rain lead, and then we got word to go, and they climbed the parapet as one man, and off we went.” What these three quotes from other survivors of the charge show, is a time difference was recorded, and of men’s conception of time under exceptional circumstances.

As has been commented upon, for someone who has no respect for C.E.W. Bean, Graham Wilson sure likes to quote him, and with just such a quote from Charles Bean’s note book of August 1915 he attempts to make his case: (quote) “Third Light Horse Brigade compared watches 10 minutes before. McKenzie, Colonel White, Hughes had watches in their hands. At the time gave them the order to go. Bombardment finished 4.30 on tick. Last shell burst after first man over the parapet.” (end quote). Now for Wilson, the point of those brief notes is the 4.30 finish of the bombardment, but for me the significant point is the very beginning of the quoted passage. Here is further confirmation that all brigade watches were synchronised, and probably more importantly, by those who were dictating the timing for the charge. Colonel White is obvious, as the commander of the 8th LH Regt, he would lead the charge, but does Wilson comprehend who the other two officers are? It could be thought that Hughes was Brigadier General Frederic Hughes, CO 3rd LH Bde, but it was not, the officer in question was in fact 2nd Lt Wilfrid Kent-Hughes, acting Staff Captain for the 3rd LH Bde. McKenzie the other officer was Lt Kenneth McKenzie seconded from the 9th LH to 3rd LH Bde Headquarters as a Staff officer for the charge, both these officers were assigned to direct the timings for the charge on the right and left of the front line, and then to watch for the flags, which would dictate the timings for the advance of the third and fourth lines.

Wilson quotes Kent-Hughes with regard to his response to the questions of C.E.W. Bean for the time of the cessation of the bombardment, (quote) “Hughes wrote back that he could not help Bean. He said that front line views are often distorted by a wrong perspective. Hughes went on to say, as far as he remembered the bombardment may have stopped early, but in his own words, he would hardly care to hazard a guess at the length of period.” (end quote), which is to say at the best, inconclusive, but what Wilson does not reveal is the following: - Wilfrid Kent-Hughes in his same letter to C. E. W. Bean on the 29th Feb 1924, stated that his watch was; “synchronised with all other brigade watches. How brigade time was synchronised with other times is a matter for higher command.” This would also seem to indicate that Kent-Hughes was not prepared to be emphatic about the bombardment ceasing as the 8th LH charged.

There is one officer of the 8th LH who did give Charles Bean a comprehensive account of the time leading up to the charge, and this is the officer that Wilson brands as, ‘the culprit’, to his: (quote) “where did Charlie get his information...”.

This officer was 2nd Lt Wifred Robinson, OC “B” Troop, “C” Squadron, 8th LH from whom Charles Bean was told of the events leading up to the charge, and recorded in the official history: “Lt Col White and Lt Dale then made their way up to the front trench to take up their positions for the charge. At about 4.22 a.m. Colonel White and Lt Dale were standing with Major Redford and Lt Robinson near the entrance to the Secret Sap. At 4.23 a.m. the artillery fire ceased, C. E. W. Bean states according to one account, “cut short as if by a knife”.

Lt Robinson later recalled the scene in a letter he wrote to C. E. W. Bean, 16th May 1924: “I am quite certain that the discrepancy in the timing at the Nek on 7/8/15. When the last shells burst in front I was standing with Col White, Major Redford and Lt Dale. For a few moments no one spoke. Then the colonel said: ‘Come along Dale’, and then walked along the trench from the ‘secret sap’ and I remarked to Redford: ‘What do you make of it? There is seven minutes to go.’ He replied: ‘They may give them a heavy burst to finish!’ For three minutes hardly a shot came from the Turks and then a scattered rifle fire broke out, above which could be heard distinctly the rattle of about 10 shots as each Turk machine gun was made ready for action. I got my men ready and shook hands with Major Redford a few seconds before he leaped out. He remarked as he did so, ‘See you later Robbie’. His watch also showed the same time. We received our instructions and set our watches at 4.20 on the evening of the 6/8/15. Major Deeble remarked that he was not sure the time was correct but he would find out. Later when I asked him, he said it was correct but from his manner when I asked him I thought to myself that he had not made any inquiries. But evidently he had regimental time, as Redford belonged to B Squadron and his time was the same as mine. But I am sure that the bombardment ceased at 4.23 according to Redford’s time and mine, and that the attack was launched seven minutes after the bombardment ceased and by the time the rifle and machine gun fire of the Turks had swelled to terrific fury and was supplemented by shell fire from the French 75 guns with which they used to bombard us with before for some weeks.”

Coming back to - “where did Charlie get his information...”, if Wilson really had looked hard enough, the answer for 1915 was in the note book, where Charles Bean notes on a couple of occasions of having been given information by Antill (Lt Col Jack Antill, Brigade Major 3rd LH Bde).

Lastly I must thank the remarkable Bryn Dolan for the information at post 53; here is further confirmation of the time difference between the British and Turks. This I have added to the following and put forward to add another dimension to the topic.

One explanation for the difference in timings could lie in the 8-minute difference between the Turkish time and the English time. This difference was discovered by Lt Col Aubrey Herbert of Gen Godley’s staff, when he was co-ordinating the armistice on the 24th May. While he was arranging the timings for the start and finish of the truce with the Turkish staff officers the discrepancy came to light. In his book “Mons, ANZAC and Kut” written after the war, he noted: “I found the Turks’ time was eight minutes ahead of ours, and put on our watches.” Further evidence of the eight minute time difference, and action taken, is found within the war diary of the 1st Light Horse Brigade (AWM Item No: 10/1/19 Part 1. Title 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade. May 1915. Appendix No: 15, page 58) where the two page document titled – ‘Special instructions for action during suspension of arms, 24th May 1915’, giving the 13 articles of agreement for the armistice, where on the second page the following note is stated: “O: The hour referred to is “ALLA FRANCA” which is 8 minutes ahead of Army Corps time.” It is possible that this Turkish or European time was still that in use with Divisional Headquarters and the Headquarters staff and officers of the artillery, and possibly the Navy. To further complicate this, the Official History states (Vol 1, p.141):- “Eastern Mediterranean Time was used by the army and navy i.e. two hours in advance of GMT. The time was given daily to GHQ Signal Coy by the flagship, and communicated to all formations at 8am. Hours were reckoned 0 to 24, one minute after midnight being written 00.01 and one minute before midnight 23.59.”

If that was the case the 3rd Brigade was clearly still using the English time, or failing this scenario, a mistake had arisen and the time had been set 7 minutes on, if the official time for allied forces on Gallipoli had reverted back to the Eastern Mediterranean time. No matter what the real situation was there was definitely a clear difference in the time, as borne out by the following statement.

Lt Col J. Talbet Hobbs, commanding officer for the 1st Australian Division Artillery, later told the official historian: “I remember that General Hughes and Col Antill endeavoured to saddle Johnstone’s 2nd Field Artillery Brigade with the responsibility of the disaster, owing as they said, to its failure to support or cover the Light Horse attack. I proved that these charges were unfounded and that Col Johnstone was clearly and distinctly ordered to stop firing at 4.30 a.m.”

Major General H. B. Walker, CO 1st Australian Division also stated: “As Colonel Johnston points out, he was not provided with a copy of General Hughes’ operation order for the attack on the Nek and he was therefore not aware of the trenches to be attacked or the time.”

Colonel Bessell-Brown later told Lt Col Noel Brazier: “He had not been informed of the attack. He had watched the Light Horse go into action feeling, ‘they could have been helped’.”

It is also contested that the Royal Navy had stopped the bombardment on the Turkish positions at the Nek and Baby 700 seven minutes earlier than planned. It was apparently common practice for the warships to cease fire slightly earlier before an attack, so as to avoid inflicting casualties amongst the advancing troops. The Navy and artillery would have been working to the same times for the commencement and cessation of the bombardment, and there are other reports that the warships lifted their range and continued to fire on the trenches further back on Baby 700 and the Chessboard after the artillery ceased firing at 4.30 a.m. The logs of HMS “Edymion, Chelmer and Coln give the opening of the bombardment as 4.00 am, only the Edymion’s log gives the cessation of fire to be 4.30 am. This claim of the Navy ceasing fire early would have probably arisen from those observers using the time of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade staff.

The consequence of the seven-minute pause between the cessation of the bombardment and the launch of the attack, gave the Turks time to man their front trenches and prepare for it. The tactical advantage of surprise was lost.

It should also be noted that most of the officers and men of the 8th & 10th Light Horse Regiments, other than those already quoted, do not make any reference to the time discrepancy with the cessation of the artillery bombardment, most stating that it ceased at 4.30 am, 4 am, or just before they charged. This does not dispel the fact that there was a time discrepancy, only that it was not noticed by many with the lifting of the bombardment to targets higher up on Baby 700, the Chessboard and Chunuk Bair, as per the artillery orders.

Jeff

[gilly100]

Thanks Jeff for a very full and insightful response. Given Graham Wilson's lack of response, perhaps in the long run it might have been better if The Shrine in Melbourne had held out for David Cameron's talk, or perhaps better still, got you to do one yourself. Certainly would have been more knowledgeable and balanced. 'Nuff said.

Ian

[Guest Kiddo]

Hello.. I am new to this forum, and I don't claim any great expertise like others here. (Ian Gill, your book is my 'bible'! Congratulations.)

I’m a journalist by profession, so I'm anal about fact-checking and tend to question everything I read. I’m also Major Tom Kidd's great grand-daughter, and I have spent several years absorbing and transcribing his remarkable diaries from the 10LH campaign. Last year, I spent an incredible five days on the Gallipoli Peninsula, exploring the areas that my great grandfather, AKA The Bomb-Proof Kidd, had mapped out so carefully. It was a powerful experience reflecting on the tragedies that unfolded there.

Can I buy into this debate about the silent seven minutes at the Nek? I’d like to raise more questions than answers, based on different accounts, attributed to the same man. A man who was actually there when it happened.

In Thomas Kidd’s diary, (albeit a reconstructed record after the original was stolen,) he wrote:

"Apparently, there was some confusion in synchronising watches, and the bombardment stopped 7 minutes early at 4.23am."

In his Reveille article, 'The Struggle at the Nek' (August 1 1932) there were two intriguing lines:

"With dawn breaking, and precisely at 4.30 on the morning of August 7, the bombardment from our guns, supported by single shots from the Destroyer streaming close inshore, ceased abruptly..."

"At 4 o'clock the first line of attackers (8th Regiment, six troops) moved quietly into position, and immediately the artillery fire ceased at the half hour, leaped on top, only to be met with an intensive, devastating fire."

Note - my bolding of key words, not his.

And now you have brought a Daily News article into the equation, which you say was also written by him in early 1916, with a focus on the inadequacy of the bombardment and no mention of the delay. (It is an incredible article, and it does look like his work, so I’d really love a private message about why you believe he wrote it.)

Given the diary was in his handwriting and composed soon after the events, I tend to prefer that version. It reads like the honest account, warts and all, of a seasoned soldier who was part of a shocking charge. It was so brutally honest, and so painful to write, that he stopped it mid-page, mid-sentence.

However, it is not 100% convincing on the seven minute delay. He does start the sentence with the word ‘apparently’. Does this mean that he didn’t know about any delay until somebody told him? Hardly. Or did he know about a delay but had been informed by somebody else about the problem with synchronising watches and the amount of time in question. That sounds more likely.

There are several possible explanations for the different detail in the Reveille article. Perhaps he forgot the silent seven minutes when he put pen to paper 17 years later? Unlikely. You don't forget details like that.

Perhaps something had changed his mind and he was trying to correct his earlier diary record? Also unlikely, as the diary already contains several annotations and corrections that he made after the events in question. I'm inclined to think he would have added this detail back then if he'd had reason to do so.

Which leaves me to suspect his copy was edited for the Reveille article. Perhaps somebody higher up the food chain got to it before it got to the printers. That's not unheard of, is it? Perhaps it was a genuine correction by an honest sub-editor, who believed it to be correct. Perhaps it was changed to appease military leaders at the time.

That last theory is based on my personal observation of modern warfare and the media management that surrounds it. When all else is equal, Defence PR nowadays tends to lean towards a sanitised version of events for public release. I’m not blaming anybody for that. Just stating it like it is. When we report modern war incidents, like suicides or accidents or mistakes, the hierarchy tends to play down stuff-ups and it avoids commenting on things that might distress living relatives. Is it possible that this type of media management was at play back in 1932?

Or perhaps Major Kidd himself was trying to get back in the good books with the powers that be? He'd been a bit outspoken through his career and I reckon this might have cost him the Military Cross that he was recommended for at Hill 60. He’d had a really rough trot after the war, troubled by ill health and other issues. Perhaps he was trying to make peace with old colleagues by letting this 'small' issue of timing slide in such an important article so long after the event?

Whatever the reason, these inconsistencies give us plenty to write about 100 years down the track. They fuel the journalistic axiom that truth is the first casualty of war, even if the key elements of the story are accepted fact. And they give determined ‘myth busters’ even more reason to chase themselves in one-way circles.

Thanks for the interesting discussion and the new article. It certainly got me thinking.

I’d love more feedback.

Kelly B

[gilly100]

Hi Kelly

I think Jeff Pickerd's post 69 pretty much says it all and if anyone could write the most accurate and comprehensive account of that day at the Nek, it is he. No one else comes close in my opinion. The credit for our 10LH history account, where accurate, lies with Jeff, Bill Woerlee and Steve Becker. Where there was anything wrong, and there are a few, well that was my doing.

As far as Tom Kidd goes, he was, without doubt, one of the best officers in the 10LH, and I feel he was definitely overlooked, and his MID was not commensurate with his fighting efforts. Of course, this happened to many throughout the war. He certainly did not think much of Major Love, same as a few others. On Brazier I am not sure, although I got the sense Brazier cared greatly for his men.

Kidd did not get everything right in his writings, but most of it he did. His writings were crucial to our book. You can take great pride in your great grandfather. I was just so chuffed to have been allowed to use it all and get some great snaps of him into the book.

Cheers

Ian

[Jeff Pickerd]

Kelly, greetings,

Pleasing to have you join the discussion. Ian Gill is far to gracious with his praise, if it was not for Ian's work in researching the events of the charge for his part of the 10th LH history, I would have just left the role of the 10th LH that morning as all too hard. I am indebted to Ian and Neville for their generosity and professionalism as accomplished historians.

You posed the question as to why I believe Tom Kidd wrote the 'Daily News' article, but the one in question was but the fifth such articles under the heading, "WITH THE 10th A.L.H. On The Field Of Glory. From W.A. to Gallipoli. Notes from an Officer's Diary."

It has been a number of years since I have read through all of those five articles that outline the activities of the 10th Light Horse Regiment on Gallipoli, and for the purposes of research for the charge at The Nek, it was the fifth that was of significance. From memory there are a number of clues gained from aspects of the five articles that clearly indicate that it is the hand of Tom Kidd as the author.

If you have not already done so I would recommend you to access all of the 'Daily News' articles from 'Trove' using the above heading.

1. Thursday 16 December 1915, page 6.

2. Monday 27th December 1915, page 6.

3. Wednesday 5th January 1916, page 6.

4. Tuesday 18th January 1916, page 7.

5. Saturday 5th February 1916, page 11.

Cheers,

Jeff

[gilly100]

Hi all

There seems little doubt that this series of articles came from Tom Kidd. The Feb 1916 account which covers the Nek action is valuable in that Kidd's sketches of the form up positions and trench layouts are well annotated.

On reading all 5 contributions it is apparent there are some mistakes with dates and even some of his recollections of the events at the Nek on 7 August in comparison to Kidd's diaries, notebooks and field message books. All of the latter are now available to be viewed online via the AWM Collections part of the website. Or one can go to Honours and awards on same website and punch in Thomas Anderson Kidd. His biography and what is available in the collection relating to Kidd can then be sought and fully downloaded.

His notes on Hill 60 are amazing, so lucky me!

Ian

[David Filsell]

This has proved a fascinating thread upon which I am totally unqualified to comment. However in fairness to Jack Sheldon it should be pointed out that he is now singled out by reviewers like me because he is currently the only historian looking seriously at German records in depth and actually publishing material on " the other side of the hill". He has made a very large contribution - particularly to non German readers and researchers - on our knowledge in a series of books - and he doesn't have the resources of a team like the official historians (which is not a criticism of either Bean or his British counterpart whose objectives were rather different to Sheldon's).