A technological revolution

[Old Tom]

I seem to recall, but can’t find, the use of this phrase to describe changes in equipment and perhaps usage during the war. I think that some identification of the elements of that revolution could be interesting. Three changes or elements that come to mind are below. If anyone bites, may I suggest opening a new thread for the change that you think is a contender.

Fire and Movement – essentially the tactic of one part of a unit being able to provide, or obtain, covering fire while the other part moves. Particularly when reacting to opposition not foreseen. In 1914 infantry had no easily portable machine guns and deployment of field artillery close enough to directly see the need for and provide fire was soon found impracticable. The provision of the Lewis machine gun, rifle grenades allowed the platoon to engage in fire and movement.

Accurate up to date maps – essential to enable artillery to engage targets without observed ranging shots. Aerial photographs enabled accurate mapping and location of targets.

Disruption of barbed wire – the introduction of the graze fuse and the use of tanks.

Old Tom

[centurion]

I think I would disagree with some elements of your statement. Light air cooled machine guns certainly existed well before the Lewis (and in the case of the air cooled Maxim and the Colt adopted by some British volunteer units). The use of fire and movement had already been ably demonstrated by the Japanese in Manchuria using Hotchkiss guns ( especially in support of an opposed major river crossing March 13th 1905) However it certainly took the pressures of WW1 to force some senior commands to learn the lessons.

[Old Tom]

I was thinking about the BEF in France. However you make a sound point re Russo-Japanese war and fire and movement. The Brits, French and Germans all, I believe, sent observers to that war yet in 1914 their tactics seem to predate the concept. The early French and German offensives were by massed formations; the BEF was on the defensive at first and I regret I do not know any detail of their tactics on the Marne. On the Somme in 1916 it might be argued that the BEF did not do much better but by that time the proportion of experienced soldiers was much reduced. I seem to be saying that in 1914 the major continental armies still employed tactics not much removed from those of Napoleon is that overstated?

Old Tom

[phil andrade]

Without knowing enough about weaponry to make a good account of myself in this discussion, I feel confident in asserting that something momentous occurred in the technology of the Great War that allowed armies to unleash unheard of amounts of firepower in small areas and in short space of time. Above all, the expenditure of shells and high explosive was simply stupefying. To exemplify this, I have noticed that in the great black powder battles fought fifty years before the Great War - and here I allude to the American experience at Gettysburg and elsewhere - commentators were astonished at the amount of small arms ammunition that was expended. In some battles more than one hundred thousand soldiers would be engaged, and, in the space of a day or two, in areas of several square miles, two or three, maybe four, million rounds of " musketry" were fired. Men were astonished at how so much lead was unleashed, and at how so many hundreds of bullets were required to kill a single man. Yet, in France and Flanders fifty odd years later, this rate of small arms fire was rivalled by that of artillery, with multi million shell firestorms crashing down into areas which - in relation to the destructive effects of the projectiles - were smaller by far than those old battlefields of the muzzle loading days. To a large degree, of course, this was a function of scale, in so far as the armies were so much larger ; but the technological advances allowed an exponential growth in rate of fire while munitions were infinitely more powerful in terms of destructive power. No doubt the Russo Japanese conflict had demonstrated this, as had fighting in South Africa. But it was the phenomenal merging of scale and technology that made the warfare of 1914-1918 so different from all previous wars. I would certainly refute the suggestion that in 1914 the major armies were employing tactics " not much removed" from those of Waterloo. I can understand why commentators tend to emphasise the dreadful outcome of, say, the failure of the French Plan XVII offensives in the opening weeks, and why they might suggest that these were redolent of Napoleonic tactics ; but if we reflect on the range, rate of fire and destructive power of artillery and small arms available to soldiers in 1914 - and compare them with their counterparts at Waterloo - how can we accept that the tactics were similar ?

Phil (PJA)

[centurion]

I was thinking about the BEF in France. However you make a sound point re Russo-Japanese war and fire and movement. The Brits, French and Germans all, I believe, sent observers to that war yet in 1914 their tactics seem to predate the concept.

Essentially many of the reports were ignored or selectively recieved. Thus Russia made effective use of the Maxim in a defensive capacity and Russia was regarded as a European power (sort of) so that was in part adopted. Japan used the Hotchkiss in the offensive and the Japanese were regarded as some odd Asiatic lot so that was ignored..

[Greg]

Worth remembering that in the First World War target acquisition equipment for the artillery was very limited and consequently inherently inefficient techniques such as the 'creeping barrage'(amongst others) had to be adopted. The point of this kind of barrage was that the gunners (and infantry) did not know exactly where the enemy was and so had to neutralise a large area to ensure effectiveness. The process also had the disadvatage of chewing up the ground especially in wet weather .

Greg

[phil andrade]

Predicted fire was developed in the Great War, and was used to great effect at Cambrai in November 1917.

The inadequacies of artillery as it laboured to deploy indirect fire necessitated constant development of new techniques. The earth is a very big place and a man occupies a very small area on it. Just as it took a couple of hundred rounds of rifle fire to strike down one man at Gettysburg, so, I believe, did it require at least one hundred shells to inflict a casualty at Verdun.

Phil (PJA)

[IRC Kevin]

The TF battalions I'm researching are very definitely using 'fire and movement' in their pre-war training, in as much as half the men provided covering fire, while the other half rushed forward a certain distance and then the roles were reversed. (A tactic I was taught in the 70's under the name of 'Pepper Potting') However, their attacks in F & F between March 1915 and September 1916 appear to be a more like a concerted rush at the objective and not the tactics trained for in the UK. This may possibly be for a number of reasons, e.g. the attack is on a limited front, or the objective was very close to the jumping off position. If the defences are continuous, there was no practical way to outflank them whilst keeping the defenders heads down with suppressive fire and commanders may have believed that fewer casualties would result from a rapid frontal advance in strength.

In the Salient in July and September 1917, the modern definition of 'fire and movement' certainly applied, with platoons/sections advancing in artillery formation towards the objective, switching to line abreast upon contact to the front and if the opposition was serious, leapfrogging forward in short bounds, using Lewis, rifle and rifle grenade to suppress fire. Attacks against strongpoints were also carried out using these tactics, allowing the bombers to attack the flanks and rear of the isolated strongpoint. However in November 1917 at Gillemont Farm, the concerted rush comes back into play. (edited to add- 'Walking Fire' was also used in attacks from 1917 onwards, though the brigade Commander did complain about the high rate of ammunition use this caused, the tactic was deemed effective.)

On the Givenchy front in May-August 1918, speed of attack seems to have been the main criteria and again, the concerted rush to overwhelm defenders was effectively used in both attack and counter attack, with only the most stubborn defences needing to be flanked. (An interesting tactic in the attack against the Givenchy Craters was the use of snipers in elevated positions behind the attackers to suppress enemy machine gunners etc. This seemed to have been very effective and interestingly, each sniper was allocated a couple of runners, as it was thought that their superior positioning would allow them to report events more quickly than a runner returning from the attacking troops.)

The key difference between results achieved in 1915/16 and 1918, using similar tactics, must be down to the effectiveness of artillery support, which was virtually non-existent in the 1915-6 attacks.

[Old Tom]

The 'fire and movement' point has been well discussed and there is some agreement to the technique having been readopted during the war. As to artillery; my point was related to accurate maps which is, of course, not the whole story. Aerial reconnaisance, flash spotting and sound ranging togther with calibration of guns and howitzers all played a part. I have seen sound ranging described as the 'Manhattan project' of WW1. Could one say that the development of artiller, or perhaps the evolution of artillery from 'open sights' to accurate predicted fire was, in itself, a technological revolution?

Old Tom