The Edwardian Army - Bowman & Connelly

[Steven Broomfield]

Mrs Broomfield isn't a great clothes-shopper, strangely. I'm lucky to have married a girl of simple pleasures.

[Guest]

At risk of stating the obvious, the supply of first editions of any Great War era published history is not going to increase. As we pass through the next five years of 100th Anniversaries, I suspect broader and deeper interest in the Great War will support prices for original material. As a passive collector of original histories I have noticed how prices have remained firm despite modern facsimile re-prints by the likes of the N&M Press. This would defy economic sense, but in my view simply reflects that the value of a book is more than just its written content or its scarcity value. Some of these books have historic value. Try buying a first edition of Seven Pillars of Wisdom and you'll see what I mean.... MG

[Steven Broomfield]

Also worth checking (if you can) other dealers' book lists. I bought a copy of the history of the South Notts Hussars a couple of weeks ago - £50.

I then saw it in someone else's catalogue for nearer £100!

Caveat emptor, I suppose (that's your actual Latin)

[Muerrisch]

never mind that Latin stuff, carpe diem is what I say.

[Gareth Davies]

never mind that Latin stuff, carpe diem is what I say.

Very popular in Poland I hear.

[Gareth Davies]

I know £63 is a lot of wonga, but it does look like a very important book for my area of interest, and for anyone with an interest in the British Army in the GW. I also console myself with the thought that I don't drink much, I don't smoke and I don't go out with expensive women so all in all it's considerably less than if I smoked 20 a day or sank a bottle of wine a night.

Put like that, £63 isn't so much. I think the weekly recommended maximum booze intake is 21 units. A pint is 2 units and costs about £3.20 in the sticks and so 21 units a week would cost over £30. So 2 weeks of abstinence and Bob's your Uncle.

[CarylW]

Put like that, £63 isn't so much. I think the weekly recommended maximum booze intake is 21 units. A pint is 2 units and costs about £3.20 in the sticks and so 21 units a week would cost over £30. So 2 weeks of abstinence and Bob's your Uncle.

There's a copy here for £39.99

http://www.oxfam.org.uk/shop/books/history/the-edwardian-army-hd_100113802

Any takers for Rifleman and Hussar £150? Signed dedication by the author on the title page

http://www.oxfam.org.uk/shop/books/antiquarian-rare-collectable/rifleman-and-hussar-790810

[Gareth Davies]

There's a copy here for £39.99

http://www.oxfam.org.uk/shop/books/history/the-edwardian-army-hd_100113802

Any takers for Rifleman and Hussar £150? Signed dedication by the author on the title page

http://www.oxfam.org.uk/shop/books/antiquarian-rare-collectable/rifleman-and-hussar-790810

Thanks Carly, I have ordered it.

[Steven Broomfield]

Carly. I like that ...

[Gareth Davies]

Thanks Carly, I have ordered it.

Carly. I like that ...

Whoops. Sorry CaryIW. Tired eyes this morning.

[CarylW]

Thanks Carly, I have ordered it.

I'm glad you did because I was very tempted by it! I'd really like this book but I have a lot to read at the moment (and I'm trying to be good) I'll wait for the next bargain.

[squirrel]

Like most things we buy what we can afford and are willing to pay a little extra for something that may not be widely available and therefore will increase in price as time goes by.

Personal choice in the end. I have bought ten books over the past few weeks including a couple that were published at over £50 plus, one of them being the subject of this thread.

Shopping around on the Abebooks and Amazon sites links saved me a not inconsiderable sum on the published prices.

[CarylW]

I think you're allowed to treat yourself at your age squirrel! Happy 96th birthday

[Muerrisch]

He is not 96, although not far short ....... and he is younger than I am.

[squirrel]

Tee hee...

[Muerrisch]

Got my copy yesterday. I fear the authors did not bother to find out what the Special Reserve was for, and failed to understand why very few Extra Reserve battalions served as units at the front.

Pretty basic stuff really.

See the Auxiliary Forces chapter, for example.

[Charles Fair]

I know £63 is a lot of wonga, but it does look like a very important book for my area of interest, and for anyone with an interest in the British Army in the GW. I also console myself with the thought that I don't drink much, I don't smoke and I don't go out with expensive women so all in all it's considerably less than if I smoked 20 a day or sank a bottle of wine a night.

I find the same rationale - with the addition of the round of golf that I don't play weekly or the football match that I don't go to watch every Saturday - works wonders for justifying the occasional splurge on pricey academic books.

I read the subject of this thread a few months ago and can confirm its importance in filling a gap in the historiography. Its up there with the Mitchinson book which I reviewed on another thread (see here http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=121592). I'm looking forward to the third Mitchinson book though I think that may be a few years away.

Charles

[jmoha]

"I find the same rationale - with the addition of the round of golf that I don't play weekly or the football match that I don't go to watch every Saturday - works wonders for justifying the occasional splurge on pricey academic books.

I read the subject of this thread a few months ago and can confirm its importance in filling a gap in the historiography. Its up there with the Mitchinson book which I reviewed on another thread (see here http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=121592). I'm looking forward to the third Mitchinson book though I think that may be a few years away.

Charles"

I asked the question of Dr Mitchinson after his presentation at the WFA Presidents conference, apparently the planned release date was two years ago but "there's only the final chapter, the conclusion and the fiddly bits left" to do. This is good news on two levels, 1) It can't be "that" far off and 2) I have time to save up for it!

[Charles Fair]

Dr. M said something similar to me when he spoke at the London WFA branch earlier thus year. When my book was at that stage it still took the best part of three years. The 'fiddly bits' took forever and there were endless rounds of proofreading. By all accounts the academic publishers don't tend to rush these things. I'm reckoning on 2-3 years, which should be time enough to save my loose change.

[Old Tom]

The Hampshire Library service is better than suggested earlier in this thread. They borrowed one for me a £2.50 fee. A book with a lot of statistics, to my mind not worth £ 63. Although the authors deductions about the shortfall in recruiting and the shortcomings of reserve training and contrasting these with the Official History well known statement that the BEF was the finest etc etc are thought provoking; particularly in relation to a current thread about numbers of reservists joining the regular battalions in 1914. I had not appreciated that the home service battalions were, to such a degree, a lower priority than those on Imperial service, even though the mounting of an expeditionary force was at the bottom of a list approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence (that may not be its correct title) which started with the defence of coaling stations.

This might lead to the consideration that the first 5 divisions to deploy were in some respects inferior to the ones that formed as the regular battalions were withdrawn for their stations throughout the Empire.. Not an argument that I have seen.

I hope that does not raise too many hackles. My lap top is going away for repair later today. Like me it needs a better memory!

Old Tom

[Steven Broomfield]

I'm currently reading it and finding it interesting. Whether or not it's worth the money I will wait and decide, but so far I'm not regretting it.

This might lead to the consideration that the first 5 divisions to deploy were in some respects inferior to the ones that formed as the regular battalions were withdrawn for their stations throughout the Empire.. Not an argument that I have seen.

Old Tom

I think I have seen that mooted somewhere before, and it is probably worth a thread on its own. It certainly always makes me wonder why the 27th and 28th were shunted off to Salonika and the 29th frittered away in Gallipoli.

[Muerrisch]

The Hampshire Library service is better than suggested earlier in this thread. They borrowed one for me a £2.50 fee. A book with a lot of statistics, to my mind not worth £ 63. Although the authors deductions about the shortfall in recruiting and the shortcomings of reserve training and contrasting these with the Official History well known statement that the BEF was the finest etc etc are thought provoking; particularly in relation to a current thread about numbers of reservists joining the regular battalions in 1914. I had not appreciated that the home service battalions were, to such a degree, a lower priority than those on Imperial service, even though the mounting of an expeditionary force was at the bottom of a list approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence (that may not be its correct title) which started with the defence of coaling stations.

This might lead to the consideration that the first 5 divisions to deploy were in some respects inferior to the ones that formed as the regular battalions were withdrawn for their stations throughout the Empire.. Not an argument that I have seen.

I hope that does not raise too many hackles. My lap top is going away for repair later today. Like me it needs a better memory!

Old Tom

I regret parting with that amount of money: I found the book a poor follow-on to the marvellous [and more detailed] Late Victorian Army Spiers and Victorian Army at Home Skelley.

In particular the index is so thin as to be threadbare. All my attempts to look up three aspects failed for want of reference.

Regarding the Special Reserve, they clearly failed to understand its raison d'etre, complaining on p 121 that when war broke out they were stripped of their best men who were drafted ......... !

There are many instances of the phrase "the Militia and the Special Reserve" which again demonstrate a lack of awareness of the essential differences. More surprise by the authors complaint that "no SR units served overseas as a unit"

Surprise surprise!

Not a useless book, but could do better if they tried.

[Guest]

This might lead to the consideration that the first 5 divisions to deploy were in some respects inferior to the ones that formed as the regular battalions were withdrawn for their stations throughout the Empire..

Old Tom

I think there are some simple arguments why this might be the case. The first five Divisions were heavily dependent on Reservists to make up the numbers, on average somewhere in the region of 590 Reservists each. There is some strong evidence that the training and fitness of these men was way below that of the Regulars serving in the battalions - for obvious reasons. The 1st Bn Northumberland Fusilers sent 300 back to the depot they were so unsuitable as one example. The 27th, 28th and 29th Divisions, while still requiring Reservists to make up numbers required far fewer - somewhere in the region of 250 per battalion - less than half of the requirements of the Home based battalions. If one accepts that this simple statistical truth, and accepts that a Reservist is by definition going to have less training (some allegedly had to be show how to use the SMLE for example) then it is very easy to construct an argument that the first five Divisions to deploy were not as efficient in terms of trained manpower than the 27th, 28th and 29th Divs.

It is of course very difficult to find quantitative measures of 'inferior' standards or efficiency, but the simple hard facts on the relative numbers of Reservists might be one tangible measure. The 1st Bn Northumberland Fusiliers appear to have specifically requested Reservists who had most recently left the Army to replace the 100 they were sending back to the depot. The implication being those most recently in the Army were better trained and fitter than the men who had left in previous years.

MG

[edwin astill]

'My copy was waiting for me when I arrived at work this morning'. How are you planning to get it indoors, without Mrs B noticing?

Anyone noticed this one - Fighting on the Home Front: The Legacy of Women in World War One by Kate Adie. Yes, a celeb, but a very fine journalist IMHO.

Heard Ms Adie talk about the book at "Off the Shelf", Sheffield's book festival. Her talk was a bit thin, and tended to the feminist angle - breakthrough for women etc. Nice pictures including one of a woman tarmac-ing the road. Thinks "not noticed many women doing that in the 21st Century so clearly that breakthrough didn't happen". That's not to say that the book is not worth buying, I've not bought or read it!

Edwin

[Guest]

I regret parting with that amount of money: I found the book a poor follow-on to the marvellous [and more detailed] Late Victorian Army Spiers and Victorian Army at Home Skelley.

In particular the index is so thin as to be threadbare. All my attempts to look up three aspects failed for want of reference.

Regarding the Special Reserve, they clearly failed to understand its raison d'etre, complaining on p 121 that when war broke out they were stripped of their best men who were drafted ......... !

There are many instances of the phrase "the Militia and the Special Reserve" which again demonstrate a lack of awareness of the essential differences. More surprise by the authors complaint that "no SR units served overseas as a unit"

Surprise surprise!

Not a useless book, but could do better if they tried.

Grumpy, I think your well meaning comments are slightly unfair. I fear you give the impression that Bowman and Connelly don't know the difference between the Militia and the Special Reserve.

In Chapter 4 "The Auxiliary Forces" when they refer to "the militia and Special Reserve.." it is clear that they are referring to factors that affected both the Militia and the Special Reserve in their respective times. For example when they say [page 117] "Re-engagement was also a serious problem in the militia and Special Reserve battalions" it is clear (to me at least) they are saying they both experienced the same issues in their respective periods either side of 1908. They examine in some detail the transition from the Militia to the Special Reserve: [page 119] "Haldane's conversion of the militia into the new Special Reserve..." in fact they devote nearly four pages to the challenges; [page 120] "The numbers transferring from the militia to the Special Reserve were vary variable..."

As for their awareness of the essential differences: [page 108] "Nevertheless after 1902 as had been its fate during the Victorian period the militia was to remain little more than a feeder for the regular army........Haldane's compromise was to incorporate the militia into the Special Reserve formed in 1908. The Special reserve, unlike the militia did have an overseas service commitment for its members and, in wartime it was seen the Special Reserve battalions would take on the twin roles of home defence and draft finding for regular units". and [page 119] "Crucially, unlike in the militia, recruits enlisting into the new force would have an obligation to serve overseas in time of war..." To me the authors seem to understand the differences perfectly.

When they mention "...no SR units served overseas as a unit" the clipped quote might give the wrong impression. The full quote is "Indeed during the entire conflict, no Special Reserve battalions was to serve overseas as a complete unit, something which had supposedly been guaranteed, at least to Extra Special reserve battalions, by the Haldane Reforms". The authors express no surprise. It is a tacit reference to the misleading reassurances given to militia colonels during the discussions on the formation of the Special Reserve. This is important as the reassurances had been given to Lt Col R H Wallace and eleven other militia colonels giving evidence to the Esher Committee. Wallace, commented on the Army Council: "Their idea is to render the men liable to be drafted in driblets to re-inforce their Line Battalions on service and this we all strongly objected to" The authors point out that the Militia Colonels advocated the drafting of whole Militia companies into regular units or for entire regiments [read Militia battalion] to serve overseas.

In the case of Wallace, it is doubly interesting as he was the CO of the 5th Royal Irish Rifles which became an Extra Reserve battalion. Irish regiments, having no Territorial Force battalions might have had higher expectations that their ER battalions would be used as complete battalions overseas. The authors are tacitly alluding to the Militia colonels' expectations (and subsequent disappointment) when they say "..no Special Reserve battalions was to serve overseas as a complete unit" I believe they are making an oblique reference to fears in the Militia that when converted into SR battalions they would be used overseas (in time of War) piecemeal rather than as complete units. Note the use of 'complete'.

As we are discovering, the history of the SR and ER in the Great War is an arcane subject and one that needs lots more research. One could probably write a book just on the Auxiliary Forces during the transition. While the authors might have dug deeper in this area, given the wide scope of the book I think they have done an excellent job explaining the complex transition from Militia to the Special Reserve. We also have to be mindful that even as late as 1911 (and possibly 1914*) there were still Militiamen who were serving out their Militia obligations having decided not to convert to the Special Reserve, so technically speaking Militiamen and Special Reservists did co-exist. As for the role(s) of the Special Reserve, while Haldane and the Army Council might have had clear ideas on its roles, members of parliament clearly didn't. There is plenty of evidence in Hanzzzzzzzard (sic) that the dual role of the SR was severely questioned in the Commons and in the Lords between 1908 and 1914 in a similar way to the debates that raged around the role of the Yeomanry. It wasn't clear to everyone [edit] and some questioned whether both roles could be fulfilled.

I only mention this as I think your well meaning comments might deter people from reading the book. I think the book is extremely well researched. The 38 page chapter on the Auxiliary Forces has 199 footnotes alone, most referring to primary sources.

The only thing that slightly annoyed me was writing about the Militia as militia.

MG

* [Edit] There were 856 remaining Militiamen whose engagements terminated in 1911-12, and 636 in 1912-13 and 163 in 1913-14 some five years after the reforms.