Special Reserve: necessary but not sufficient

[ulsterlad2]

".....1,631 reinforcements sent out in 1914, assuming the 1st Battalions' casualties were made good, would imply the second battalion took 1,529 reinforcements."

Martin. I think you are spot on. Using the figures we know from Falls, Taylor and any mention of reinforcement or numbers in the 2nd War Diary that I've seen - - - - -

6th Aug 224 men

5th Sep 150 men 1st Reinforcement

7th Sep 93 or 60 men 2nd Reinforcement

20th Sep 3rd Reinforcement (no figure)

2nd Nov 40 men

4th Nov 40 men 6th Reinforcement

21st Nov 463 men

26th Nov 44 men

5th Dec 62 men

13th Dec 190 men

6th Jan 13th Reinforcement (no figure)

Going with the high figure for 7th Sep that's 1306 men. 1529 - 1306 = 223. Going with the idea (guessing really) that the 13th reinforcement had to have been sent in 1914 plus factoring in possible figures for the 3rd reinforcement and the 3 others not mentioned, 1529 reinforcements for the 2nd Battalion looks good.

[Guest]

An interesting discovery on the under age men. I was trawling the 1911 Census for the battalions based overseas to get a feel of the age profiles of the men in an attempt to understand how many would have had to be replaced by reservists because of age when the battalions redeployed to France.I was very surprised to find hardly any men under the age of 19. My assumption that the 19 age limit was not an issue for peace-time was wrong. It seems the vast majority (88.7% in fact) of under-19 year-old line infantrymen were stationed at Home.

The trusty "General Annual Report on the British Army" would have saved me the trouble as it rather conveniently has the stats (see below). The conclusion is that the 200+ men required to make up numbers by the typical overseas-based battalion returning to the UK before deploying had very little to do with replacing soldiers under the age of 19. The other implication is that it was for other reasons such as health and fitness and (possibly) age at the other end of the scale.

The other conclusion is that it is possible to model the average number of under 19 year-olds serving with the Home based battalions (12.8% using the 1911 Return data*). So a battalion such as the 2nd Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers which had 614 Rank & File on 31st July 1914 in Tidworth would likely to have needed 78 Reservists just to replace the under-19 year-olds. Similarly the 2nd Bn RWF at Portland with 699 Rank & File on 31st July 1914 would probably have needed (in theory) 89 Reservists to replace their under-19 year-olds.

Line Infantry.........................................Home..........Colonies..........India..........All Stations

Aged under 18.....................................1,866.............243................453.............2,562

Aged between 18 and 19.....................6,087.............126................194.............6,407

Subtotal (aged under 19).....................7,953.............369................647............8,969

Total Rank & File................................62,055........21,475...........53,735........137,265

Under 19 as per cent of Total............12.8%.............1.7%.............1.2%............6.5%

* The data is as at 31st Oct 1911. The data for 1902-1910 is very similar (the range is 5.9% to 7.3%). If I find the data for 1913-14 and it is materially different, I will edit this post. I severely doubt there will be any significant variance given the large turnover in servicemen.

MG

[Muerrisch]

how many would have had to be replaced by reservists because of age when the battalions redeployed to France.I was very surprised to find hardly any men under the age of 19. My assumption that the 19 age limit was not an issue for peace-time was wrong. It seems the vast majority (88.7% in fact) of under-19 year-old line infantrymen were stationed at Home.

An explanation for the above. No young man with any nous would enlist as a "17 year old" if he could pass for 18 or more ....... pay went from 8d per day to 1/- at 18, and no birth certificate was required. Thus very many soldiers were officially 18. Training was for 6 months at Home [the only exception being a handful of overseas enlistments], trooping was only in limited and pre-defined seasons, had to await a proper size of draft under an officer and experienced NCOs, and took several weeks, so many nominal 18 year-olds were indeed nominal 19 year-olds by the time they reached overseas posts. So no need to be surprised!

[Guest]

An interesting point. Seemingly not many were found out.... Only 28 line infantrymen in the 12 months ending 30th Sep 1914 "on conviction of making a false statement on attestation" ..... and only 388 in the whole Army between 1910 and 1914 inclusive. MG

Edit. That aside, the 18 year-olds accepted as 19 year-olds would not be replaced when the battalion returned to England before redeploying. I am trying to understand the breakdown of the 200+ men of a typical overseas battalion who were being replaced. Looking at the breakdown of age profiles I can't see age being a significant factor at the other end of the scale; less than 3.5% of infantrymen serving in India were over 35 (less than 2,000 individuals or roughly 27 per battalion).

Looking at discharges: The numbers of infantrymen being discharged in the 12 months ending 30th Sep 1914 was 13,890 which equates to 94 men per battalion (148 battalions) each year... So I assume men being discharged from overseas would go in batches too, and it would probably make sense to send a reservist instead of a man about to be discharged, so maybe this explains some of the numbers being swapped out. Just some random thoughts. MG

[Muerrisch]

I shall apply a cold flannel to my temples and try to work out why my conclusions for 2nd RWF were so wrong.

[charlesmessenger]

Gentlemen, especially Grumpy and Martin G

I would like to congratulate you all on this most excellent thread. Some really first class research has gone in to these postings and I for one have learned much. This is GWF at its best.

Charles M

[Muerrisch]

Charles, very many thanks, praise indeed!

[Guest]

Big picture: There are some interesting statistics in the " OH Medical Services: Casualties and Statistics". Chapter VI France and Flanders 1914. There were roughly 90,000 British OR battle casualties in 1914. Note this does not included OR non-battle casualties which were roughly 73,000. Total OR Casualties of 163,000.

To put this into context the Army Reserve on 4th Aug was 80,668, and the Special reserve was 60,469 - a combined pool of Reserves of slightly over 141,000. If 800 Reservists* were required on average for each line Infantry pair of battalions on mobilisation that would take away roughly 59,000 leaving 82,000 for reinforcements for the whole Army i.e. less than the battle casualties. That's before we start educated (but still subjective) estimates for wastage in the Reserves.

Separately - cross referencing with Statistics 1914-1920 reveals that the ratio of fatal : non-fatal battle casualties: fatal battle casualties for the BEF in 1914 was a staggering 4.55 : 1 which makes some of my earlier rough calcs on the Cameron Highlanders look way too low. With these ratios it is very easy to see how an infantry battalion's total casualties were four times the fatalities and in the case of the Cameron Highlanders (584 fatalities) way more than the 955 trained reserves (AR and SR combined). This only captures half the picture as it does not include the sick and injured. Some 99.5% of non-battle casualties in the BEF in 1914 eventually returned to duty, but until they did, someone else had to hold the line. I think it would be nearly impossible to calculate the exact impact on reinforcements for non-battle casualties (56,000 sick, 16,000 injured). To my mind this all provides further evidence of the magnitude of the crisis.

One of the key questions is just how fast could the non-fatal Non-Battle Casualties recover to become effective. These men would be recycled through the reinforcement infrastructure. To my mind the speed of recovery of these 73,000 sick and injured would likely have played a very significant role.

MG

* Calc: 580 per Home based Bn and 220 per Overseas Bn making 800 per paired battalion (74 pairs of battalions)

[Muerrisch]

Little picture!

We know from Martin G's patient research that the Royal Welsh Fusiliers had fewer than 1400 regular reservists [of all three categories] available to mobilise. We also infer that some 3800 men enlisted during the relevant period mid 1902 to mid 1914. Paul Nixon confirms my figure of 3800 and assures me that he knows of no significant numbering gaps.

So how was it that these 3800 men were whittled down to 1400 during those "piping times of peace"? [W.Shakespeare, Richard III]

I have started a new thread, http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=201797

examining as best as I can the causes.

Thanks to all so far, especially Martin G. and Graham Stewart.

[Guest]

Having spent some time hunting down the data, it is possible to rebuild a significant part of the picture. Using the Cameron Highlanders as an example, the tables below shows

1. The Casualties (KIA) serving in the BEF by week and the cumulative totals

2. The numbers of available "Fully Trained and Effective" Reservists at the 3rd (Special Reserve) battalion

3. The numbers of "Fully Trained and Effective" men at the Depot plus Recruits etc.

Following column ( c ) it is evident that the Cameron Highlanders' KIA passed 500 in mid November 1914. There is strong evidence that wounded:killed ratios were in excess of 3:1 in this campaign which in theory would quadruple these figures if expressed as total casualties (KIA and WIA and POW), however for these purposes let us simply focus on the impact of the KIA which totalled 602 by the end of December (not shown).

Now please look at column (e) which shows the steady depletion of "Fully Trained and Effective" Reservists. At the peak on 31st October 1914 they numbered 614 but just 4 weeks later on 28th Nov 1914 the numbers had crashed to just 43. Things were so desperate that the 3rd Bn didn't have time to complete the returns for the following week - the only one of 101 Reserve battalions to fail to submit the weekly report. To save you the calculation the difference between the peak of 614 and the nadir of 43 is 571, which exceeds the numbers killed by just 48. Remember, these numbers make no account of the inevitable wounded which would have been at least 1,000 and probably more. The numbers of Trained men begin to rise again - we're still on column (e) - but the only way this is achieved is by shifting 100 or so Recruits - see column (g). The decline in Recruits (104) is very close to the increase in Trained Reserves (97) -we're back at column (e) again. The remainder would have been made up from small numbers of recovered wounded.

Now kindly look at column (l) "Sick, Prisoners and Absentees". Originally this was the men in prison in the Depot, plus the sick. Note how the numbers suddenly rise and fall on 7th Nov and then rise again on 28th Nov. These are the lightly wounded men who had been evacuated and then sent to the Depot while they recovered (many more would still be in hospital). By 26th December, there were 426 of these men at the Depot.

These are the official returns. The only other regular Cameron Highlanders in the system were the K1, K2, K3 men of the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Service Battalions, mostly untrained men with a small cadre of old regulars as NCOs.

On this data it is difficult to see how the Cameron Highlanders could not have been in an absolute crisis from late November 1914. It seems fairly clear that things were very finely balanced and the acceleration in the Recruits' training to bring more men into the pool of available *ahem* "Fully Trained and Effective" men. This is I think one of a four critical dynamics. There is a delicate interplay between casualties, available reservists, accelerated training of recruits and the speed at which wounded and sick men would recover and become available again.

I will cross-check the data against the War Diary and add any additional comments. At the very least this begins to shed some light on the dynamics impacting the Army's ability to reinforce the BEF. Any mistakes are mine.

MG

All data sourced from WO 114 at The National Archives. Numbers chaecked twice against the original documents. Casualty data sourced from SDGW.

[Guest]

Some graphic illustration of three Regiments which ran out of "Fully Trained and Effective" Reservists......the data comes from the Weekly Returns courtesy of the National Archives WO 114/25 and WO 114/26. This is the hard evidence that some Regiments did indeed reach the bottom of the barrel. There are around 30 other Regiments that saw available 'Fully Trained and Effective' Reservists dip below 100 of which 10 Regiments' Reservists dipped below 50 each.

[Guest]

This chart shows typical extremes - the number of 'Fully Trained and Effective' Reservists with the Reserve Battalion of the Welsh Regiment and the Royal Scots. The data runs to 26th April 1915. By this date the two Regiments had suffered 610 and 571 KIA respectively - casualty levels not orders of magnitude apart, yet the drain on the Welsh Regt Reservists appears to have been far more rapid.

I am not sure why these charts should be so different. MG

Sources:

1. Data: WO 114/25 and WO 114/26

2. CWGC data courtesy of Geoff's Search Engine.

[Scalyback]

Fantastic stuff MG. Reading very slowly and getting the information absorbed. So your work is appreciated. Also Grumpy with his sterling work.

[Muerrisch]

Whether a man is KiA, DoW, wounded in the field, wounded and sent home, or sick, he is a CASUALTY and needs to be replaced if the unit is kep to strength.

So, did RS and Welsh have the same number of battalions on the Western Front? Were RS not kept up to strength and Welsh were? Were the Scots more stoical about sickness? Was there an unusual Wounded/Dead ratio affecting the Welsh? Was the RS CO and RMO better at retaining slightly sick/ off colour? Etc etc!

[ss002d6252]

* The data is as at 31st Oct 1911. The data for 1902-1910 is very similar (the range is 5.9% to 7.3%). If I find the data for 1913-14 and it is materially different, I will edit this post. I severely doubt there will be any significant variance given the large turnover in servicemen.

The figure for the Oct 13 return is pretty similar.

Craig

[Guest]

Whether a man is KiA, DoW, wounded in the field, wounded and sent home, or sick, he is a CASUALTY and needs to be replaced if the unit is kep to strength.

So, did RS and Welsh have the same number of battalions on the Western Front? Were RS not kept up to strength and Welsh were? Were the Scots more stoical about sickness? Was there an unusual Wounded/Dead ratio affecting the Welsh? Was the RS CO and RMO better at retaining slightly sick/ off colour? Etc etc!

Indeed. What is particularly noteworthy is that on 21st Nov 1914 the available "Fully Trained and Effective" Reserves (hereafter FTE) at these two Regiments were very similar on 21st Nov 1914:

Royal Scots....1,150

Welsh Regt.....1,088

Variance:.........5.7%

Thereafter things deteriorate at remarkably different rates. By the last return of 1914 (26th Dec 14), the FTE at the Royal Scots had actually increased by 7.0% to 1,158 whereas the FTE at the Welsh Regiment had collapsed by 90% to 112. It may not be a fair comparison as their respective battalions in the Field were serving in different Divisions and might have had radically different experiences in terms of Casualties. The numbers killed were not drastically different (Welsh: 610, Scots 571 - a difference of 6.8%), and I can't bring myself to believe that the wounded/killed ratios were so different that they would have distorted the data so much. I will revert on this if the diaries and histories provide reliable stats, but my expectations are that variance in total battle casualties will be less than 10% over the period between these two Regiments

It will be a combination of factors which will need to be examined individually. I suspect in this instance the politically driven decision to raise a Welsh Division might be the underlying cause. The Welsh Div and the drain on trained Reservists to staff cadres for new battalions must have been a factor. The Welsh Regiment contributed six battalions to the 38th Welsh Div. (The Royal Scots contributed three battalions to the 9th and 16th Scottish Divisions). The raising of a Welsh Division is another example of the asymmetry between population densities, recruiting areas and the ability to sustain reinforcements - a debate for another day. Blame Lloyd George.

With regards to the number of battalions, both Regiments (as you will no doubt know) had two regular battalions in the field once the India based battalions had arrived. I assume (maybe incorrectly) that the 3rd (Special Reserve) battalions were only providing reinforcements for the Regular Battalions, not the TF (both had TF battalions overseas for small part of the period in question and no Kitchener battalions overseas in the period in question). If one measures 'battalions in the field' by the number of days, the Royal Scots' two Regular battalions were in the field for 382 'battalion days' and the Welsh Regiment's two Regular battalions for 354 'battalion days'. To save you the calculation the Royal Scots were in the field for 8% more 'battalion days' than th Welsh Regiment for te period under consideration. Clearly this runs against the direction of the depletion in Reserves as one might expect a battalion in the field for longer might incur higher levels of non-battle casualties.

These are the only factors we can isolate at this stage. I chose these battalions as extreme examples of Regular regiments that had served for similar lengths of time in the field and had similar levels of (killed) casualties. Neither factor seem to explain the huge difference in the rate of erosion of available FTE's. I will revert with more analysis and may well return with two more examples of Regiments with battalions in the same Bde.

I have a very high degree of confidence in the integrity of the transcribed WO 114 data as they have been checked four times and the automated summations tally. Despite this, any mistakes are mine. MG

P.S. I have the history of the Royal Scots and access to the War Diaries but I don't have the history of the Welsh Regiment (Welch Regiment?) so if anyone can add any colour as to why the Welsh would have drawn down so many Reservists so quickly, it would be welcome. MG

[clive_hughes]

Marden's The History of the Welch Regiment 1914-1918 states that on the outbreak of war the 3rd Battn. consisted of about 400 men. By 8 Aug. the battalion had mobilised at the Cardiff Depot. It says there were 1100 Regular Reservists of which 570 were needed to bring the 2nd Battn up to strength, and the surplus went to the 3rd Battn. which was now over 1000 strong.

From the 3rd Battn. various detachments were made to guard vulnerable points etc., though I don't think that would have reduced the theoretical strength of the unit? On 19 Aug. its strength was 1374 all ranks, recruits having been added. A draft of 100 was sent to France, but by early Sept it was about 2000 strong. The attached Regular officers had been sent to the 8th & 9th Service Battalions, but no mention of ORs until 3 November, when the "pressure" (on accommodation & admin) was eased by sending 350 men to the new 12th (Reserve) Battn. Indeed the account of the formation of the 9th Battn. says that its 12 senior NCOs transferred across from the 8th Battn. which was at the same place.

Up to 14 Sept. there had been few casualties in the 2nd Battn. with the BEF, but after that the Aisne, 1st Ypres and Givenchy demanded a continuous flow of reinforcements. By the end of January nearly 1900 men had been sent to France, including 250 to complete the 1st Battn. on its arrival from India just before Christmas. By this stage, of 17 officers sent from the 3rd, 14 had become casualties.

The 38th Divn is mentioned, but only as a generally approving remark on the various forces raised by South Wales before recruitment began to slacken off in February 1915. On 11 March the 20th draft from the 3rd Battn. left for France and the total reinforcements supplied to date were 2269. It then jumps to the situation in 1916.

Hope this helps. I may come back to comment on the 38th Divn. idea.

Clive

Edited 24 November , 2013 by LST_164

[Guest]

Clive...thanks for the detail. It is extremely useful.

I have yet to find a regular battalion in the period Aug 1914 to Apr 1915 that recorded every draft either in its War Diary or its History. I have little doubt there is one out there but having trawled over a dozen battalion War Diaries I cant find one yet.

Back to the Welsh Regiment the data from the weekly returns is below. It would be interesting to see how your data resolves with this. It is worth noting that as the War progressed the authorities changed the way they recorded the numbers and as time passed they created finer sub-categories. There are two main changes between the dates under consideration which are clearly laid out below. I have shaded the Fully Trained and Effective men over the age of 19 to highlight just how many men were available. You will see the numbers hit zero in 1915. The data is clean and checked. The only caveat is that the 31st Oct 14 data was blurred so I have had to interpolate the numbers until I can get better focused photo of the original doc.

Perhaps the most important observation is that there were often big differences in the Total Rank & File and the Fully Trained and Effective - unfit, recovering wounded, under 19 years of age, old men and recruits could not be sent as reinforcements. Sometimes the headline numbers are misleading as you wil see from the tables below...

MG

[Guest]

The Monthly Returns rather conveniently tell us the number of Reservists available to each Regiment. Here is the data from Dec 1913. The measure is per paired-battalion so the numbers of the four-battalion Regiments are adjusted accordingly. It is clear from the data there are four out-liers at the top end. Not surprisingly these are the Regiments which were once four-battalion Regiments but by 1913 had become two-battalion Regiments having been reduced during the Haldane reforms in 1907/08 - the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, Northumberland Fusiliers, Lancashire Fusiliers and the Manchester Regiment. The number of available Reservists generated between 1904 and 1907 by these larger structures has inflated the numbers available to their 1913-14 two-battalion structure.

At the bottom end, inevitably, are the Irish Regiments suffering their own recruiting challenges. The average is 1,098. The Regiment with the highest number which did not have the advantage of a four-battalion structure to 1907 is the Essex Regiment with 1,354. To save you the calculation that represents 23% more than the average and a full 50% more than the Lincolnshire Regiment - the weakest of all the English regiments. ...which comes to an important point that two Regiments with seemingly similar structure (both always two battalions) in the previous decade should have such enormous differences in the number of available Reservists. ..

Here are the visuals and the underlying data. Any mistakes are mine. MG

Source: Monthly Returns: December 1913.

..

[bootneck]

Martin

A rough table showing Other Ranks drafts to the 1^st Battalion, ESR, between September 1914 and June 1915. I have taken the figures from the typescript war diary on the regimental website.

7 September: 98 (1^st reinforcement)

8 September: 111 (rejoined from missing)

10 September: 191

24 September: 201

16 October: 65

25 October: 83

3 November: 35

4 November: 54

26 November: 83

2 December: 50

18 December: 160

21 December: 40

24 December: 108

13 January: 91

28 January: 90

8 February: 80

24 February: 50

6 April: 12

15 April: 18

22 April: 25

25 April: 35

30 April: 300

11 June: 25

I am not sure whether these figures are complete so I have included the following returns from March to May 1915 to show how things fluctuated and how the information was recorded.

7 March 1915

Fighting Strength: 26 Officers, 951 Other Ranks

On Command (Not included in Fighting Strength): 36 Other Ranks

21 March 1915

Fighting Strength: 25 Officers 1043 Other Ranks

On Command (Not included in Fighting Strength): 42 Other Ranks

3 April 1915

Strength (Actually Present): 27 Officers, 994 Other Ranks

On Command (Not included in Actual Strength): 1 Officer, 52 Other Ranks

24 April 1915

Strength (Actually Present): 13 Officers, 720 Other Ranks

On Command (Not included in Actual Strength): 17 Other Ranks

1 May 1915

Available Strength: 22 Officers, 1016 Other Ranks

Details (formerly On Command): 2 Officers (Hospital), 7 Other Ranks

Fighting Strength: 24 Officers, 1023 Other Ranks

8 May 1915

Available Strength: 29 Officers, 1060 Other Ranks

Details (formerly On Command): 7 Other Ranks

Fighting Strength: 30 Officers, 1067 Other Ranks

29 May 1915

Available Strength: 26 Officers, 1020 Other Ranks

Details (formerly On Command): 2 Officers (Hospital), 30 Other Ranks

Fighting Strength: 28 Officers, 1050 Other Ranks

Whether it helps I'm unsure.

Bootneck

[Muerrisch]

Strange indeed. Bootneck: thank you, a very near complete drafts/ reinforcements list. You will have, or know of, a comparable list for 2RWF? Available if needed.

Martin, #70 a great piece of work. I have had a stab at three regiments with recruiting figures available: one near the top, one near the average, one near the bottom of your reservists league table.

All for as near the exact 10 year period 1903 to 1913 that Nixon regimental numbers allow;

RWF 3250

W Yorks 3239

S Lancs 2675

but, just when a crude relationship between recruits and reservists might be imagined,

Lincolns about 3300!!!!!!!

There is something going on here that no-body has fully understood yet ........... we can sort of understand the draining of potential reservists from all the causes adduced, death, illness, desertion, imprisonment, buying out .........

But the discrepancy between the net reserve assets of regiments is far from understood.

I am sure the forum will crack this, I am working on several aspects.

[Guest]

There are I think a number of ways the numbers get distorted, each of which should be quantifiable on an absolute or relative basis;

1. Historical Establishments. The establishments differed depending on where the overseas battalion was stationed other than India; Gibraltar, Malta, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mauritius, Bermuda, Egypt, Sudan, South Africa all required establishments of 840 compared to 940 for India. Some battalions went from one of these lower establishment stations to another in back-to-back postings, which means they could have spent half of the previous decade with 100 men fewer than battalions in India. If for example they had spent 1904-1909 in two of these places rather than India, it might have had a noticeable impact on the absolute numbers as the starting point each year is from a lower base. Easy to model. Additionally I would assume serving in India required higher turnover of personnel due to the climate compared with, say, Malta or Gibraltar.

2. Strength. The actual strength of each battalion is available on a monthly basis, so it should be possible with a bit of patience to calculate which battalions were consistently under strength. Assuming overseas stations were generally up to strength, this will be more pertinent to the Home station battalions in each Regiment which appear to be consistently short of men. It will be interesting to see if there is any relationship between regimental stregths and the service numbers used during the period.

3. Attrition of Line Infantrymen. As we know from the annual returns it is possible to model the attrition of the average line infantry battalion from the long list of causes; death, desertion, illness, discharge, prison, etc....

4. Attrition of Army Reservists. The second derivative; all the same factors as above, but applied to the Army Reservists

5. Emigration. Not covered in the above.

6. "Other". I am sure we will discover a few 'other' causes, but here is one example; I noticed when reading the "Edwardian Army" that in 1911 it was possible for men with Army Reservist commitments to join the Special Reserve. One Regiment boosted its Special Reserve battalion strength by 200. Robbing Peter to pay Paul. Clearly if these Army Reservists had come from the same Regiment there is a direct cost/benefit. The Army Reserve numbers fall by 200 and the SR numbers rise by 200. If however Army Reservists could sign up with a different Regiment than the one they originally served with, this might explain some shifts in numbers between Regiments. It is definitely worth exploring the rules and regs for 1911 on this specific issue.

MG

Edited with overseas establishments.

[ss002d6252]

In 1910 some of 2000 reservists were trained to be medics and re-assigned to a RAMC reserve and another group were re-assigned to form an ASC reserve as drivers - this will add to the various other factors.

Martin, #70 a great piece of work. I have had a stab at three regiments with recruiting figures available: one near the top, one near the average, one near the bottom of your reservists league table.

What were the re-enlistment rates for time-expired men ? - it may be a factor if some battalions had a better rate of men extending their army service rather than entering the reserve commitment. If a battalion was pretty much up to strength constantly yet had a low enlistment rate/allocation of new numbers then it would be indicative of men staying on. Over a few years this could make a big difference to the reserve strength.

If, for example, the South Lancs men extended their service more often than W Yorks men the there would be a noticeable difference over a few years in the reserve strength.

Craig

[Guest]

One other factor. The six ( seven?) regular battalions left in India would have been a small source of trained, experienced men for their paired battalions . I have no doubt these battalions were kept at establishment but I suspect the good men were drawn off to the Western Front being replaced with less fit and able men who would not have made it to the Western Front....so in theory Regiments with battalions left in India might have had less pressure in the available Reservists in the first few months, particularly so as the typical battalion returning from India heading to the Western Front still needed around 280 Reservists to make up numbers, swapping out the weak and weary... I will revert with the Regiments. DLI was definitely one of the Regiments if I recall correctly. MG

[ss002d6252]

This is included in Oct 13 army report:

Craig