Rawlinson 1914 letter to Lord Derby re:attrition

[bmac]

There is a section of the Wikipedia entry on Sir H Rawlinson which reads:

"Rawlinson wrote to the Conservative politician Lord Derby (24 December 1914) forecasting that the Allies would win a war of attrition, but it was unclear whether this would take one, two or three years."

The source for this is given as: Jeffery, Keith (2006). Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier. Oxford University Press, page 139. I am, I'm afraid, reluctant to part with £29 for a paperback concerning someone who is not my focus of interest so cannot check the details. I do, however, have Sir Frederick Maurice's biography of Rawlinson which gives all/part(?) of the text of the 24th Dec 14 letter which does not mention 'attrition' by name, does forecast 'a long war' and talks about the 'big offensive' not being possible until the New Armies arrived which 'may be next year', i.e. 1915. No mention of winning in one, two or three years. Also, this letter is not mentioned in Prior and Wilson's book about Rawlinson.

On the off chance that someone has Keith Jeffrey's book or has access to the full text of the Rawlinson letter I wonder if it is possible to confirm or not the substance of the Wikipedia quote: i.e. the Allies would win a war of attrition and the time period it might take?

Thank for any help given.

[squirrel]

On p139 of Jeffery's book, written by the author, after a quote from Wilson's letter to C. Wilson15th September 1914 (making the point that he felt that recruiting Kitchener's Armies was preventing Officers and NCO's from being used as reinforcements for the BEF), is as follows:

"First Ypres, indeed, provided a kind of pattern for the grim war of attrition which was to prevail along the Western Front for the next four years".

He then writes "While remaining optimistic, Rawlinson got it broadly right towards the end of the year". He then quotes Rawlinson: "There is no manner of doubt", he wrote,"that we are going to succeed in crushing the German Empire, It may be a war of exhaustion, it may take one, two or three years to complete, but we shall be daily gaining strength and wealth whilst Germany will be daily losing theirs". (Rawlinson to Lord Derby 24th December 1914).

The mention of "attrition" is the author's, not used by Wilson or Rawlinson.

[bmac]

Great, thanks for that. Maurice does not include the full text of the letter as none of that is in his book. Otherwise, just what the doctor ordered :-)

[David Filsell]

Equally acceptance that it would be a war of attrition by the army did not mean that the army approved the fact or blithely accepted huge losses as in themselves acceptable and could be ignored as a moral question.

[bmac]

But placed next to Rawlinson's comment about his original limited plan for the Somme, that it was designed to

“Kill as many Germans as possible with the least loss to ourselves”, and it says something about his thinking about the way in which attrition needed to work, i.e. it was not a 'last man standing' approach to the concept.

[keithfazzani]

Equally acceptance that it would be a war of attrition by the army did not mean that the army approved the fact or blithely accepted huge losses as in themselves acceptable and could be ignored as a moral question.

Accepting attrition as inevitable is making a moral judgement in itself, it assumes surely that extensive losses, on both sides are unavoidable.

[hazelclark]

In the Preface to Wolfe's "In Flanders Fields", Major General Fuller quotes General Kiggell, who was Haig's Chief of Staff. Speaking at the Staff College in 1914," he said, 'In the next war we must be prepared for very heavy casualties.' His theory of war was to mass every available man horse and gun on the battlefield, and by the process of slow attrition, wear down the enemy". There are several other references in that particular book to the fact that the army hierarchy accepted attrition as the means of winning the war.

hazel

[David Filsell]

Deep water but I should have my point more clearly. I meant the acceptability of the attrition of one's own forces. Attrition of enemy's forces was clearly acceptable. The recognition of heavy casualties does not mean that they were acceptable to men deploying people in battle even they were inevitable.

[hazelclark]

Deep water but I should have my point more clearly. I meant the acceptability of the attrition of one's own forces. Attrition of enemy's forces was clearly acceptable. The recognition of heavy casualties does not mean that they were acceptable to men deploying people in battle even they were inevitable.

But would they not have to have been acceptable if they were inevitable as a result of decisions made by the commander in chief and his staff? As you say, "deep water"and I am probably not the greatest swimmer.

Hazel

[salesie]

The inevitability of attrition (in the Great War) does not stem from decisions made by the C-in-C and his staff; they did not declare war. Once war was declared, their duty was to fight it. And seeing as no one, whether it be the commanders at the time or the very many armchair commanders since, has ever demonstrated a viable alternative to attrition in total war (attrition in its many forms i.e. not just military casualties but political, economic, social etc.) then the only morally viable alternative to attrition in total war is not to enter into it in the first place - but then, as was amply demonstrated in 1939, appeasement in the hope of avoiding total war only leads to much greater conflict. Moral stances are only good at stopping such wars if shared, and acted upon, equally by all sides.

Cheers-salesie.

[hazelclark]

The inevitability of attrition (in the Great War) does not stem from decisions made by the C-in-C and his staff; they did not declare war. Once war was declared, their duty was to fight it. And seeing as no one, whether it be the commanders at the time or the very many armchair commanders since, has ever demonstrated a viable alternative to attrition in total war (attrition in its many forms i.e. not just military casualties but political, economic, social etc.) then the only morally viable alternative to attrition in total war is not to enter into it in the first place - but then, as was amply demonstrated in 1939, appeasement in the hope of avoiding total war only leads to much greater conflict. Moral stances are only good at stopping such wars if shared, and acted upon, equally by all sides.

Cheers-salesie.

There are degrees of attrition, but, as you say the army didn't get us in to the war. I suppose what people are talking about in terms of criticism of attrition, is that well debated question of whether battles such as the Somme and Third Ypres should have been perpetuated when conditions became intolerable for little gain. I certainly don't have the answer but am endeavoring to read everything about 3rd ypres on which i can get my hands, together with some books on the Commanders, and try to form some sort of informed opinion - or not!!

Hazel

[salesie]

There are degrees of attrition, but, as you say the army didn't get us in to the war. I suppose what people are talking about in terms of criticism of attrition, is that well debated question of whether battles such as the Somme and Third Ypres should have been perpetuated when conditions became intolerable for little gain. I certainly don't have the answer but am endeavoring to read everything about 3rd ypres on which i can get my hands, together with some books on the Commanders, and try to form some sort of informed opinion - or not!!

Hazel

Why focus on 3rd Ypres, Hazel? The opening premise was Rawlinson's prediction of highly attritional warfare in December 1914, some 3 years earlier (Rawlinson wasn't the only accurate seer; Haig, for instance, predicted the same when fighting on the Aisne with I Corps in September 1914). The question of continuation of the Somme and 3rd Ypres is a different premise, in many ways a distraction from the opening premise. The whole war, every battle, was highly attritional, and not just the attempts to breakthrough from static positions either; the open warfare of 1914 and 1918 was equally attritional in percentage terms, sometimes more so i.e. any ground gained, at any time of the war, was bought at very high cost in human terms.

The bottom line is that total war is inevitably highly attritional - WW2 in Europe, for example, was actually far more attritional than WW1 (on the Eastern Front that is, where the burden of facing the main enemy in the main theatre fell on the Red Army).

Cheers-salesie.

[hazelclark]

Why focus on 3rd Ypres, Hazel? The opening premise was Rawlinson's prediction of highly attritional warfare in December 1914, some 3 years earlier (Rawlinson wasn't the only accurate seer; Haig, for instance, predicted the same when fighting on the Aisne with I Corps in September 1914). The question of continuation of the Somme and 3rd Ypres is a different premise, in many ways a distraction from the opening premise. The whole war, every battle, was highly attritional, and not just the attempts to breakthrough from static positions either; the open warfare of 1914 and 1918 was equally attritional in percentage terms, sometimes more so i.e. any ground gained, at any time of the war, was bought at very high cost in human terms.

The bottom line is that total war is inevitably highly attritional - WW2 in Europe, for example, was actually far more attritional than WW1 (on the Eastern Front that is, where the burden of facing the main enemy in the main theatre fell on the Red Army).

Cheers-salesie.

Hi John,

What you are saying is of course perfectly correct, and I suppose what has sunk in as far as I am concerned with respect to attrition is as much because of perception as anything else with respect to the Somme and 3rd Ypres. Chiefly I suspect because, certainly in my own case, there has always been discussion about whether those battles in particular should have been halted when it became obvious that conditions had changed. The only reason I concentrate on ypres is because it is the only place I know without doubt that my grandfather fought. (He lost his arm and got his MM in that area.)

While the original premise is not really what I latched on to, I nevertheless still feel that there were degrees of attrition and although accepting that some attrition in terms of manpower has to be swallowed when the decision is made to go to war, there are, as you say, other things to consider. The blockade conducted by the British navy had a huge effect on both the civilian and military populations of Germany. However, most people when talking about attrition are referring to men in the field.

At least you made me think about what i was muttering about!

thanks,

Hazel

[David Filsell]

And of course there was often the (understandable?) view that the enemy is on the on the rocks, one more push will do it. In 1918 after the failure of the German Offensives this proved quite correct.

[hazelclark]

And of course there was often the (understandable?) view that the enemy is on the on the rocks, one more push will do it. In 1918 after the failure of the German Offensives this proved quite correct.

It did seem to take a while for this to actually be the case though. I have ordered Gary Sheffield's "The Chief" which will likely make interesting reading.

Hazel

[salesie]

Hi John,

What you are saying is of course perfectly correct, and I suppose what has sunk in as far as I am concerned with respect to attrition is as much because of perception as anything else with respect to the Somme and 3rd Ypres. Chiefly I suspect because, certainly in my own case, there has always been discussion about whether those battles in particular should have been halted when it became obvious that conditions had changed. The only reason I concentrate on ypres is because it is the only place I know without doubt that my grandfather fought. (He lost his arm and got his MM in that area.)

While the original premise is not really what I latched on to, I nevertheless still feel that there were degrees of attrition and although accepting that some attrition in terms of manpower has to be swallowed when the decision is made to go to war, there are, as you say, other things to consider. The blockade conducted by the British navy had a huge effect on both the civilian and military populations of Germany. However, most people when talking about attrition are referring to men in the field.

At least you made me think about what i was muttering about!

thanks,

Hazel

Hazel if you read some of this thread from this post, you will see my opinion as to why Haig continued with 3rd Ypres into the winter "closed season" (and upgraded Cambrai from a raid in force to a full scale offensive even later in the winter).

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=69261&page=16#entry846604

Cheers-salesie.

[hazelclark]

Hazel if you read some of this thread from this post, you will see my opinion as to why Haig continued with 3rd Ypres into the winter "closed season" (and upgraded Cambrai from a raid in force to a full scale offensive even later in the winter).

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=69261&page=16#entry846604

Cheers-salesie.

Thankyou! this will take me a while!

H