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Remembered Today:

Nelson and Jellicoe


Gary Charles

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Q.E.D..... It is not rocket science, you simply have to sink the enemy's ships.

Not QED.

If Jutland proved anything, it's that it certainly isn't enough simply to sink the enemy's ships . If it had been, Jutland would be an indisputable German victory, like Coronel. You have to deny him the capability to operate in the contested sea area.

Regards,

MikB

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DulcetTone, I believe that the Inflexible hit a mine in the Dardanelles and survived, thought they did have to beach her to prevent the ship sinking.

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Also, if it has not already been mentioned, we must not forget the loss of the Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue to a single U-Boat in one incident with the loss of around 1,500 men. Surely this must have crossed Jellicoes mind too when he was taking all this into consideration?

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Q.E.D Mikey, Q.E.D......Simon demanded a page number and Tone was gracious enough to provide us all with one. Q.E.D.

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Q.E.D Mikey, Q.E.D......Simon demanded a page number and Tone was gracious enough to provide us all with one. Q.E.D.

The point nevertheless stands that Jellicoe followed his own declared policy, and was at least partially vindicated by the torpedo hit on Marlborough and by the spectacular evasion manoeuvres required by others, for example Revenge.

Beatty too had turned the damaged Lion away from a phantom periscope at Dogger Bank, a move that in combination with communication failures probably lost the opportunity to inflict further damage on Hipper's BCs. It was underhand of him to criticise Jellicoe covertly for doing the same.

Regards,

MikB

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Victory

I would be very interested to hear what your plan at Jutland would have been if you had been in Jellicoe's shoes, without the benefit of hindsight while sailing your keyboard, that would have ensured the absolute and total defeat of the German Fleet at that battle.

Douglas

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In fact we should also criticise Scheer and Hipper too. I mean all they had to do was simply sink the British ships and they could have won the war for Germany!

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Sailing my keyboard, that's a good one, nearly fell out of my armchair laughing!

"The point nevertheless stands that Jellicoe followed his own declared policy, and was at least partially vindicated by the torpedo hit on Marlborough and by the spectacular evasion manoeuvres required by others, for example Revenge."

That is what I find incredible, his declared policy of refusing battle. What happened to the 300 years to make a tradition? The Jutland dispatches say that a loud thump was heard and felt aboard Revenge, and this is reported as a U-Boat being run over. As no U-Boats were present we are left with the German version of Revenge being struck by a torpedo at an obtuse angle, at the same time as Marlborough. What would my plan have been? A better question is what would Nelson, Togo or Fletcher have done. One naval officer wrote after the war "In fact we believe that it will be admitted that for Jellicoe to have charged directly into the Germans at Jutland with every ship he had would have involved a danger far less than there existed in April 1917 from the German submarines. " This is not withstanding the benefit of hindsight. Does this put the author in the Beatty camp? Why are we always postulating about what Jellicoe could or should have done? Because he did nothing.

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Victory

What would you have done if you were in Jellicoe's shoes to ensure the absolute and total defeat of the German Fleet during the Battle of Jutland?

Douglas

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Mr. ATM, what can the objective reader do with your posts other than be objectionable; it is only a forum so please harden up a touch and debate your points without the emotion, why you take an event nearly 100 years ago so to heart is bemusing to me. Many people playing the historian game with Jutland suffer Rorke’s disease, by this you are using the old Isandlwana into a Rorke’s Drift ideology of covering what was in fact a shambolic disastrous day at the office for Jellicoe & his men, and really what else needs to be said? The only thing lacking on the day was the Benny Hill theme and a little bald guy to slap on the head, I hardly care for Beatty or Jellicoe, as this thread is about comparison to Nelson that man is my hero, the followers are only that. Rorke’s Drift diverts public attention away from a defeat of arms, but in the end Isandwana,’ people with your ideology would argue was a strategic Victory as it weakened the Zulus and we eventually won. So best we do not take about the day of disaster.

It was a tactical German Victory and in the end a Strategic Victory for Jellicoe was it? They had two Victories on the day, a material & technological Victory. They did in fact do so many things better than us, as an example, reforming their Fleet after the initial action, ours not so, we struggled. We had the hundreds of years of naval tradition, not them, but not fighting a war for about 100 years showed for us, maybe a legacy of my hero Nelson, too good a job old boy.

Is the presumption here that with the upcoming 100 year anniversary of the Battle as a Strategic Victory is the line that is going to be told and preached by people wanting to sugar coat what was in effect a rotten apple in terms of a Battle, it did not go our way and we all know it, you admit it so leave it at that, I have mentioned that we did not destroy their fleet and that is what we can’t say, and contrary to your views, it would have changed the situation for the Allies. You get halfway there then you can’t help but throw the twist in to soften the disaster, to remove the sour taste in the mouth the Battle has left you only try to artificially sweeten it. What you are suggesting is hardly your work or independent thinking either; it is the slogan of note for the current generation of historians, one of the many tick the box type of slogan.

How can it be a Tactical German Victory when their Tactics nearly lost them their fleet? There was in effect nothing wrong with our tactics either with the aim of defeating the enemy up to the critical point and minus the 1914 adjustments. You mention they sank more ships, killed more men and we all know this as a fact, this then equates into a Material Victory which many historians correctly claim. Tactically we got it right to cross their T but it was the decision making on the day, awful chain of command, the pre-planned to turn away from German Destroyers was always going to happen and this un-nerving aspect had been dealt with by Jellicoe, many may call that failed British Tactics or failed planning, or safe planning, does not matter, we could not lose the war using this tactic so this point is not worth pursuing, we covered this threat. But you are brushing off the effect not eliminating the HSF and downplaying the effect of it being destroyed. Remove the HSF, stop the Iron Ore from Sweden, Ludendorff said that would have stopped the war in 1917. The German Training & Command were sound enough to avoid disaster, but they had in fact played into our hands as we all know we had superior intelligence, bad British decisions, bad implementation of good tactics, and also basic chain of command failures were the reasons we failed and let the Germans off the hook and allowed them to cause more material damage than we inflicted. I do agree with that point of Victory’s, that Jellicoe must take the ultimate responsibly for these loses, here is a slogan for you, you wear the badge you take the bullet, but he never has. Whether he did right or wrong, does not matter, the responsibility of that German Material Victory is on his head, it is for the same reason many of our cooperate geniuses are walked when those under them are not performing to the desired level and the company suffers, they are either sacked or another way is to promote to avoid admitting failure.

Itching to get revenge were we? Whatever you say, more of a case of we knew we could not lose the war in the sense of being invaded and our Empire being broken up, we could be brought forward for negotiation only. Don’t risk revenge is more the point; with the knowledge of the fact we were not going to lose we played for the post war period, we did not want to lose the position we spent years building up to, why should we throw a fleet away when other nations, (notably Japan), were offering nothing. But this is at odds with our role, you also tend to forget that the offensive must be Britannia’s role in warfare & had been the case up until then & since the days of the Spanish Armada. I notice Victory mentions the book by Marder constantly, maybe start a thread on that works Victory as it would be a good one to pull apart, confusing work at times, and as an example Victory in one breath he says they have a distrust of Japan, in reality that distrust was teaching them carrier warfare post war, only stoped by US protests.

Rather than the German use of Torpedos, (which we did have countered), what unnerved us was to see how quick the Germans could lock onto a target when both sides were even in terms of visibility, hit it, and destroy it so quickly, so it was also a technological victory for the Germans as on points like this, with the ultimate aim of destroying a major warship quickly, the Germans were better, and it is also a technological Victory to have better shells & cordite on the day. One on one, each class of German and British ship the Germans were either equal or better, which for a new navy was very credible.

Where we were successful and got it right was in the numbers we built, and this was always un-nerving for the Germans and an unsurmountable problem they had. They did built a quality product I have to admit, which was all well and good, but they were unable to match our shipbuilding prowess in relation to output, and that was the key, not the sugar coated Jutland stretch offered up here. Can you not be proud at least that out shipbuilding was such a key, even if we failed in the field of battle we triumphed in the Shipbuilding yards? It is obviously if the Battle of Jutland is used as the performance indicator we would have faced very serious problems in containing the Germans and only our shipbuilding programme re numbers and out geological position were superior.

It is very poor research to be even linking the actions of our performance at Jutland to the revolutionary movement taking hold throughout Europe and a core reason of the Mutiny in 1918, there was also grave concern this cancer would spread to our shores as well, and this was nothing whatsoever to do with a naval battle.

Blucher, no I want you to prove me wrong. Just because it is written and pushed on this forum by people you have deemed as trusted and from books written in this country hardly make it the truth. Good to know you believe what MikeB tells you considering he is wrong, very trusting & devoted. Obtain the German design meeting notes and get back to me. You are saying your pals are correct until I prove you wrong, so I can also say I am correct until they prove me wrong as I see others have also agreed with me.

1 up in the Cricket, soon to be 2, and I thought life could not get any better! No need for Beefy when we have a Bell ringing aloud. We now have Root, and what a good one he is, bed now and happy.

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Gardendowns you need to calm down. I think rather than myself using emotional language it is perhaps you who is getting emotional. I did not stoop to snide remarks unlike you. A clear sign that you are getting wound up. I think perhaps the fact that people disagree with you and won't take your word as final annoys you. I doubt that there is any original research on your part even though you take a high and mighty approach. Alas your rants have done nothing to persuade me. If there is a genuine argument in your posts then it is lost with how you put it across.

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I know I sound like a football manager ! but "at the end of the day" (or war) the result was the same for both the French Fleet and the HSF neither succeeded to break the RN blockade and both France & Germany eventually suffered complete defeat of their land armies and regime change, partly as a result of the blockade.

Of course the German people were made to believe, by a further regime change that the war was not lost and to have another go.

Trafalgar was both a great tactical and strategic victory, although it could have gone drastically wrong, Jutland probably a draw tactically but in the longer term strategically an RN victory

Unlike Nelson, Jelllicoe survived the war, it is difficult to castigate a dead hero but a live, not so obviously heroic, commander is fair game especially when they can at least defend themselves to some extent before they die.

Again, "at the end of the day" :hypocrite: our opinions don't really matter that much.

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Blucher, no I want you to prove me wrong. Just because it is written and pushed on this forum by people you have deemed as trusted and from books written in this country hardly make it the truth. Good to know you believe what MikeB tells you considering he is wrong, very trusting & devoted. Obtain the German design meeting notes and get back to me. You are saying your pals are correct until I prove you wrong, so I can also say I am correct until they prove me wrong as I see others have also agreed with me.

... and your point is?

I don't recall mentioning Blucher in this thread.

When I did it was in another thread as a top-of-the-range Armoured Cruiser to illustrate that the Invincibles were not in that classification.

German design meeting minutes would be unlikely to illuminate the matter further - but it seems to me you're more interested in heat than light.

Regards,

MikB

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MikB. I made a point in an earlier post on here, about how he writes his posts, I put that gardendowns on the Jutland threaddisagreed about the origins of the Blucher but did not try offer anything to reinforce his point and told us that we must "stop" as if his word is final. Also you asked for elaboration on it and he didn't provide any.

I am actually open minded about the Blucher, however it being down in history as the German reply to what they thought the I's would be is well documented. Peter Hart, one of the contributors to this thread, in his book on Jutland, one of the first few pages makes exactly that point saying that the Germans thought they had 9.2's.

There are a lot of things Victory has said on here that I disagree with, however he has at least offered his views and tried to put forth an argument back, though I still disagree. However with Gardendowns he wants his opinions accepted by all. I started to reply in detail to his post but then I just thought what is the point? He has distorted what I have put and accused me of saying things that I haven't. Like accusing me of accusing him of trying to alter history and also about the Blucher saying "You are saying your pals are correct until I prove you wrong", err no. I haven't put that anywhere.

I made the point about the GF taking the fight to the HSF in port would have been suicide with the loss to U-boats, mines etc and that the loss of the GF would have been far more serious to the British than the loss of the HSF to the Germans. Gardendowns then says that the destruction of the iron ore trade with Sweden would have ensured the end of the war in 1917. To do this it would have meant taking the GF into the very same area and the same would have happened. Destruction of the GF to mines, U-boats and finally the HSF with the Germans then master of the seas with no GF to face it. There is also the fact that the British DID try to do something about it. They had a flotilla of submarines in the Baltic attacking that trade.

Like I say I could go on, but what is the point? He distorts what is said and demands that what he says is fact and final.

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Mr ATM, your day is going well? Thought I would reply to you prior to lunch. Having just read through your last post all I can say is here we go again; it is becoming fashionable to again be objectionable to your latest offering. I would suggest to try & remove yourself from behind the Union Jack and the emotion associated with it, I am a little biased to our lovely Red White & Blue offering myself, but you have deliberately lied for you own benefit here or simply have no idea, where did I say anything about the Royal Navy going into the Baltic and stopping the Iron Ore from Sweden as it seems either unbridled arrogance or ignorance on your part to put these words as mine on this forum, please go back and tell me where I said this? Another point, to do such a thing it would require a leader doused in the daring do attitude which Jellicoe was not. I can only assume you think we fought the war at sea as individuals, can you not think there were other countries fighting in what was a World War? It is a known fact the removal of the HSF would enable the Russians to carry this aspect of stopping ore shipments, but I guess that can only pass you by, my time in shipbuilding lends me to the knowledge that empty vessels make the most noise.

Your Posts I note Victory ATM does not agree with, but reading yours a little deeper reveals all you have done is used the words of others of the time, something I think ATM has missed, how can he disagree with you when they are not even your words. I also see the sharp end of your offering is you believe no matter what happened Jellicoe never ever intended to pursue an enemy flying, am I correct here?

Yes MikeB as ATM states, I replied to Blucher here as he decided to raise the point again, so design meetings tell you nothing? Wrong, they tell you Blucher was the next progression from Scharnhorst, Blucher was to have 4 funnels like Scharnhorst which was only changed at the 11th hour, and she nothing whatsoever to do with Invincible and they never talk about something they know zero about, MikeB you have strong opinions and no factual evidence or education on this topic, but you just need to say it anyway as it pleases your audience and yourself. Do you not think at design meetings they discuss all aspects, requirements, and budget forecasts, of what is being built? I was flabbergasted to read your answer of Blucher was built to what they perceived Invincible would be.

Now ATM, in relation to your stance of the manipulation of Jellicoe’s days’ work in May 1916, (and your pals), I have used your psychobabble jargon on some other world events and revisit them in the same context you have in your support of Jellicoe. Our education system and national predisposition to forget failures has bested me once again so here are some you may not have heard, with this in mind and using your psychobabble jargon stretch methods I have revisited many battles to show the futility of this stance and how easy a defeat can be credited as a Strategic Victory with nothing else but words, freely available from our wonderful English language. These same techniques I note are also now being applied to small land gains such as, the Battle of the Somme & Passchendaele, seems any disaster on the any given day is part of the overall strategic plan, if you come out on the winners side everything in the conflict is part of the victory.

The Battle of Agincourt in 1415 was initially a British Victory, but in the end was a Strategic Victory for the French as eventually all British land in France was ceded to the French.

Battle of the Yellow Ford in 1598 was initially a decisive Irish Victory over the British, however this only served to escalated a war in which the British eventually remained occupiers of Ireland, thus the Battle of the Yellow Ford was a British Strategic Victory.

The Raid on Medway in 1667 was initially a decisive Dutch Victory, but it only hindered the British Fleet for a few years and the resulting new Ship building programme put in place after the battle restored Britain’s sea power and led her to dominate all navies and the world’s sea lanes, as the Dutch failed to invade England the Raid on Medway can now be seen as a strategic British Victory in the long term.

At the Battle of Cartegena de las Indias in 1741 was initially a decisive Spanish victory, but the huge losses the Royal Navy Suffered were easily replaced and the reinvigorated Royal Navy gained its revenge 64 years later a Trafalgar and was never challenged again by the Spanish, thus the Battle of Cartegena de las Indias can now be seen at part of the strategic long term defeat of Spain..

The Battle of Coronel in 1914, although initially a German Victory, it was in effect a British Strategic Victory in that it highlighted the presence of von Spee and caused the British added incentive to hunt him down and destroy him, thus riding the oceans of this threat.

At the Dardanelles the Turks initially could claim a victory in stopping the Allied advances, however the Turks allowed the Allies to withdraw undefeated due to their weakened state and later these Allied troops were re-deployed on different fronts, thus in the end the Dardanelles was a Strategic Victory over the Turks in that they were eventually defeated by armies not beaten at the Dardanelles.

The Dieppe Raid in 1942 was at the time a German Victory but in the end an Allied Strategic Victory in that the lessons learnt from the encountered enabled the Allies to regroup and apply them in the successful invasion in June 1944 thus defeating the Germans.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass in 1943 was a Tactical German Victory but in the end a Strategic Victory for the Allies as the Axis Forces never again challenged and were pushed from North Africa.

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Q.E.D Mikey, Q.E.D......Simon demanded a page number and Tone was gracious enough to provide us all with one. Q.E.D.

I demanded it from you but you declined to share.

Out of interest which naval officer wrote "In fact we believe that it will be admitted that for Jellicoe to have charged directly into the Germans at Jutland with every ship he had would have involved a danger far less than there existed in April 1917 from the German submarines." It's nice to know who's making such wide-ranging accusations.

Simon

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Gardendowns

What you say in post 67 implies that any defeat in a war that is eventually won is a Strategic Victory. This I believe is nonsense.

For example Coronel, an obvious victory at the tactical level it did not change the strategy of either side. Von Spee's to inflict as much damage on British interests in the Pacific and then attempt to return to Germany whilst still inflicting damage.

The British strategy was simply to deploy the forces available to hunt down and destroy Von Spee's Ships.

This did not change.

The Cartagena campaign of 1741 was both a strategic and tactical victory for Spain, it secured their empire in mainland South America and their remaining Caribean colonies for about 100 years and after Trafalger, which was fought in a different war for later different reasons. Saying that Catrtagena was a strategic victory for Britain is akin to saying Waterloo was a strategic victory for France because the Prussians or their descendents were eventually defeated in May 1945.

AND using your logic Agincourt was a strategic English victory because France was defeated in 1815 by armies including many English but commanded by an Irish and a Prussian general.

Of your list perhaps Dieppe could be counted as having strategic implications because it probably convinced the Americans that it was to early to launch an invasion of NW Europe and the need for some method of logistic delivery through the beach head as capturing a port in working order soon after an invasion was not possible.

Jutland was a strategic victory,for Jellicoe & Beattie, because the strategy of the HSF was to isolate and destroy a small but significant part of the GF to gain equality and then break the blockade. the HSF did not sink enough British ships at Jutland to achieve this aim so therefore it was a strategic defeat for Scheer and Hipper

Edited: years of Spanish Empire post Cartagena edited and corrected to 100

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Here is the quote. I am not going to disclose where it came from, but perhaps you can guess. The reason is that you refused to believe a quote from R.A. Burt's book on battleships, and that in post 41 you also refuse to believe the writing of Admiral Jellicoe, so I am not going to give you the opportunity of questioning another great author. While you are at it, here is another quote, this time from First Sea Lord Jackson: "It cannot be overlooked that the Commander in Chief lays great stress on the injury the enemy can inflict on our forces in the North Sea, but offers no suggestion as to the employment of his forces to inflict similar losses on the enemy. It is also to be noted that practically all large movements of the Fleet have to be initiated by the Admiralty. I suggest the Commander in Chief might again be informed that we should welcome any suggestions from him as to the employment of any of the vessels under his command with the object of inflicting similar injury to the enemy." Do you have this letter amongst all your correspondence? I think Garden Gnome was suggesting that any victory can be viewed in hindsight as a defeat, depending on the outcome of the particular war. It is a popular propaganda to say Jutland was a strategic defeat for the Germans, to disguise the fact it was a victory for them.

post-37940-0-63640200-1375180425_thumb.j

Edited by victory
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...

Yes MikeB as ATM states, I replied to Blucher here as he decided to raise the point again, so design meetings tell you nothing? Wrong, they tell you Blucher was the next progression from Scharnhorst, Blucher was to have 4 funnels like Scharnhorst which was only changed at the 11th hour, and she nothing whatsoever to do with Invincible and they never talk about something they know zero about, MikeB you have strong opinions and no factual evidence or education on this topic, but you just need to say it anyway as it pleases your audience and yourself. Do you not think at design meetings they discuss all aspects, requirements, and budget forecasts, of what is being built? I was flabbergasted to read your answer of Blucher was built to what they perceived Invincible would be.

Gardendowns, your flabber may be truly ghasted, but references to rival developments of which the team had only incomplete knowledge might well not be made at all in a design meeting, or if they were, not minuted.

Absence of reference wouldn't establish absence of influence.

I for one won't prefer your unsupported word to experienced, multiply-published researchers in this field who are more-or-less in agreement.

If you want to refute that, it's for you to present the evidence, not command others to chase moonbeams for you.

I'll read your book when it comes out, if it's at an affordable price and gets reasonable reviews. :D

The design of Blucher was greatly different to that of the Scharnhorsts - the change in funnels alone requires considerable changes below upper-deck level to make room for the trunking, but the change from casemated side

armament to sided turrets is major, as well as the different conning tower design. The ship is very obviously of a later generation, whereas the resemblance between the Scharnhorsts and the Roons is much closer.

But really, whether either of us is right or wrong, the point is peripheral. What matters is that Blucher was a top-end armoured cruiser, and the Invincibles weren't - and all you're doing prolonging this issue is arguing for the sake of it,

which I suspect is what floats your boat.

Regards,

MikB

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Mikey, get a grip! Please don't tell me and the forum you are basing your beliefs on imaginary conversations that were not minuted. Instead of waiting for Gardendowns to write a book why don't you simply read one in print by someone who knows what they aretalking about, instead of referring to imaginary conversations. Axel Greissmer wrote his book about the development of German battlecruisers and he devoted a chapter to Blücher. He says that on 5 March 1905 the design criteria for Blücher were laid down, and were: "Project A: (main artillery) just as C, nevertheless 8x15cm instead of 6; Project B: 12x21cm QF L45 in 6 double turrets, possibly 8x15cm in casemates, small QF etcjust as with C." Therefore Blücher Blücher was designed with 21cm guns from the very start. The five sketch proposals for Invincible were presented on 12 January 1905, just six weeks before the German specifications, but they were kept secret until 1906. British planning had no effect on the design of Blücher, and the stories about Fisher using mis-information are just more propaganda. However, this discussion has no place on my thread about Jellicoe and Nelson. Perhaps you should start a new thread about great myths of the Great War. Here are a few starters: Invincible having 9.2 inch guns influenced the design of Blucher. Or the German crews did not live on their ships, like every other navy in the world, but used their ships like tanks, boarding them to go to sea into combat and disembarking when they returned to port! Or the German Fleet did not come out again after Jutland. Now Eric Grove has a university course disproving this one, but according to Mikey's criteria for research this one is true simply because lots of authors have written it. All thes myths are absolute rubbish, and those who perpetrate them are just plain liars with no knowledge of the German Navy. So, please try to use factual information and not imaginary conversations.

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Victory

Have you decided yet what would you have done if you were in Jellicoe's shoes to ensure the absolute and total defeat of the German Fleet during the Battle of Jutland?

Douglas

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Victory, I think you should get a grip.

For a start, you can stop being patronising. Secondly, you can stop conflating what I'm saying with other things other people might have said about HSF accommodation and sorties after Jutland.

Axel Greissmer may have written a book which may be authoritative on many matters, but it can't be proven from any amount of primary source material that German designers weren't attempting to counter what they believed the British might be building. But it can be established that the British were intentionally concealing the intended armament of the 'I's and that German intelligence became aware of the actual configuration shortly after authorisation of construction for Blucher. It's therefore a reasonable deduction that a successful deception had been carried out, and Greissmer may possibly have an axe to grind about that.

As it was, Blucher was a considerable departure in architecture from previous ships of her type and may have helped provide the experience that made the subsequent battlecruisers as good as they turned out to be.

Regards,

MikB

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Can EVERYBODY please get a grip - there is an undercurrent of hostility and lack of respect in the recent comments in this thread - and it would be a shame to have to close it

Thank you

Alan

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Can EVERYBODY please get a grip - there is an undercurrent of hostility and lack of respect in the recent comments in this thread - and it would be a shame to have to close it

Thank you

Alan

I think the whole thread has been about disrespect to men who did the best they could with the ships and information they had.

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