Nelson and Jellicoe

[gardendowns]

^{Well, thought I would leave this for a while and come back and check the list, but alas there is no such beast. I have been told by ATM Jellicoe & Beatty had not lost their determination to get revenge on the Germans, determined to fight them, so where is the list of activities to produce this result. Being determined is having a will, and also a way, just having a will means little. And judging by the almost political spin of a speech I wonder what they were seeking revenge for when I have been led to believe from the machine that we won the battle of Jutland in the end, so what revenge? The will spoken of seemed to transpose into parliament being told there was no one who could think of a way to make the Germans fight. So there was a will, but not a way. Is that why I have no list?}

^{Oh not the Beatty & Jellicoe camps again, I wonder who would bring that old chestnut up, it is obvious to all that despite all his criticism, mistakes, destruction of ships, and on this story goes, Beatty did in fact not flinch and put the nail in it’s place for the hammer to strike. When the hammer came down it was a miss hit, it skewed off and did not drive it home, now having driven many a nail in my day, you straighten back up and strike it again until the job is done. I know the job would not be done when I told my boss the next day the nail was left standing. As I mentioned in an earlier post, is this the reason why we get so many laboriously long speeches on this topic because we can not say the words we want to say, what the British Public wanted to hear at the time, “WE DESTROYED THE GERMAN FLEET.” If there was such a desire to smash them Jutland would simply be a footnote, not a continual regurgitation of people tying to convince themselves otherwise.}

^{Now time to have a cuppa and watch the lads win the Ashes again, seems another test where we need a Botham & Willis to chance their hand, amazing the glory that can come your way by having a crack.}

Edited 11 July , 2013 by Alan Curragh

[AlanCurragh]

I've editted a few posts - pals have every right to choose whatever forum name they choose without comment from others

Alan

[ATM]

Firstly, I didn't reply because you seem intent on making snide immature remarks. Why you must do that I have no idea. If I am meant to be insulted then it isn't working. I am just rather bemused. Also I haven't replied with the list you want because as I have said before you just make sweeping statements without backing it up with anything. If you want to provide a list of deployments of the GF after Jutland to reinforce your point then feel free to do so. MikB asked you to clarify your point on the Jutland thread about the design of the Blucher but there was no follow up to this. You simply told us that we "must stop" as if your word is final.

You make out that I am adamant the British won the battle of Jutland in an outright victory like Trafalgar. I have never put anything of the sort. Here is my post in the Jutland thread on my view on Jutland:

Here are my thoughts on Jutland for what they are worth. As a young boy when I used to read about the naval battles of the First World War I used to see it as a British defeat. The Germans sank more ships and killed more sailors. It was without doubt a great tactical victory. In terms of the ships that really mattered, the battle cruisers, the Germans achieved a kill ratio of 3:1 in their favour. If they could have repeated this several times then they really could have come close to breaking the blockade and winning the war. However, now I am an old ****, I look on the battle with different eyes. I am less jingoistic than my youth but see the battle as a tactical German victory but also long term British strategic victory. The Germans never seriously challenged the Royal Navy again even though it was ultimately in their interest to break the blockade. Yes a fleet in being pinned down massive allied resources in the grand fleet, but this was not wasted as it kept the allied blockade in place as the Germans were unwilling to take the RN on. Germany was falling apart when the Hoch Sees Flotte mutinied rather than take on the British so mutinies across Germany weren't that uncommon at that point. The British were champing at the bit to avenge Jutland and were eager to engage again. This cannot be said of the Germans. I would describe it as a sort of psychological dominance that the British had. I have read several quotes from German naval officers about how pleased they were at winning, which tactically they did, but they also admitted that this was the best victory they were ever going to achieve against the British. In the short term the Germans won, however they did not follow this up, so in the long term the Royal Navy won as the blockade remained in place and unchallenged. Personally I don't fault Jellicoe for turning away from the German torpedo boat attack. He had always told his superiors and subordinates that that is what he would do in such an eventuality. My serious criticism of him is that he didn't train or equip his fleet for night action. He seemed to have the attitude that he would just avoid a night action and hope it wouldn't happen. This is very poor. This is the great failing of Jellicoe and the British at Jutland. The criticisms of Beatty are well known and I don't see the need to go into them as I generally agree with them. Just my thoughts.

So in other words the Germans won tactically and in the long term it was a strategic British victory. As I put, the Germans achieved a kill ratio of 3:1 in their favour. This is what the British wanted revenge for. The wanted to even up. You brush off Beatty's mistakes because he didn't "flinch". However this resulted in the loss of the lives of men. In his lobbying of Jellicoe prior to Jutland to get the 5th Battle Squadron he said that he would concentrate the 5th BS with the BCF when taking on the HSF. He didn't do that. Instead of having 6 battle cruisers and 4 of the most powerful warships in the world in the initial clash it was 6 battle cruisers for those critical first minutes in which the Indefatigable and the Queen Mary was lost. Beatty had a "crack" as you put it, and he cost men their lives. Jellicoe did not risk everything in trying to eliminate the HSF. He tried to fight it on his terms so that the RN dominance would remain. The loss of the GF to the British would have been far more serious than the HSF would have been to the Germans. Unless the HSF was willing to come out again and take on the GF then the only way that the British could have eliminated the HSF would have been to actively enter German waters and try to obliterate it in port. This would have been suicide, mines, U-Boats etc. So of course the British would not do this. (Though Fisher had the Furious, Courageous, and Glorious created for operations in the Baltic). The British did not destroy the HSF but they kept the blockade in place. Winning a battle is not simply about the butchers bill at the end. Like I have said before, tactically it was German victory as undoubtedly they sank more ships and killed more men, however in the long term the blockade remained in place and remained unbroken. In the end the HSF mutinied rather than fight the British in 1918. Hence in the long term the effects of the battle favoured the British.

I have never put anything other than the above. I am not trying to make out that Jutland was an outright British victory like Trafalgar, but you keep on as if I am. You accused me of accusing you of trying to alter history. I made no such remark. You seem to ignore what has been written and take from it what you want even if it is inaccurate. Political spin? What political spin is that exactly?

One thing you should remember is that the GF & BCF would leave Scapa Flow, Cromarty & Rosyth to engage the HSF whenever it left port. The GF would respond to the HSF. That is why there was no follow up with another Jutland, because the HSF avoided it. Off the top of my head they sortied in August 1916 and the GF duly went to meet them though when the HSF realised the GF was out and about they headed home. The British also had another pop at Heligoland Bight in early 1917. The only truly offensive action by a German ship larger than a destroyer after Jutland was when the Brummer and Bremse wiped out a Scandinavian convoy. If you want a list of GF deployments after Jutland then feel free to look it up to back up your point. But remember that the GF left when the HSF left in order to engage it. So in fact if there are only a limited number of sorties by the GF it shows how very few times the HSF left port in order to engage the British.

It would be nice if you didn't stoop to snide remarks in your reply.

[simonharley]

ATM, your criticism of Jellicoe with regards to night fighting is valid up to a point. The Grand Fleet, was equipped and trained to fight at night - and had been for many years - but clearly not to a high enough standard. Jutland put a boot up the Fleet's backside in that respect and kicked it out of its complacent attitude in regard to it. And if Jellicoe is to be criticised for this state of affairs then surely he can't be held solely responsible, as the Admiralty was fully aware of what was going on in the Fleet. If memory serves Alexander Duff, Second-in-Command in the Fourth Battle Squadron at Jutland, makes plenty of references in his diary to Jellicoe's deficiencies as a tactician (whilst agreeing with his strategic principles) but makes no reference to a deficiency in night fighting. I suspect there is plenty of blame to go around.

Simon

[ATM]

That is fair enough. I hadn't really thought of it as an inherited problem. I knew that they would have had some night training but to the exact extent I don't honestly know. I suppose it can be put into the same category as the quality of British shells. Something that Jellicoe wanted to do something about but didn't necessarily have the time to rectify it before Jutland. Also, in all fairness, the Germans didn't exactly excel either, though they were certainly better equipped for it with their searchlights.

Like I have said, I think this is for me the point on which Jellicoe can be criticised. I think if there was a lost opportunity at Jutland it wasn't when Jellicoe turned away either time, which to me makes perfect sense, but rather during the night fight. I think some of those German battle cruisers were ripe for being finished off. Especially the Seydlitz

[simonharley]

The failure of a number of captains in the Grand Fleet to take the initiative and open fire or inform Jellicoe that the enemy was within sight is one of the great mysteries of Jutland. As far as I can tell no one can has adequately explained it. People have tried to blame the "system" or variations thereof, but that is a deeply unsatisfactory reason. Possibly the same faith (in Jellicoe) as manifested itself in the collision between Victoria and Camperdown in 1893.

Simon

[bill24chev]

ATM

Your understanding of the outcome of Jutland and after, is I believe a sound assessment.

After the destruction of the convoy you mention in your post, a Battle Squadron was often sorted to give distance cover for the Norway convoys. I think that the USN squadron participated in at least one of these. This should have give the HSF the opportunity to attempt the destruction of an element of the GF.

The HF made one sortie and because the German navy had become aware that radio transmission somehow gave their position away, strict radio silence was enforced throughout the HSF.

A fault with one of the Battle Cruisers required radio messages to organise a tow so the HSF returned to port.

Incidentally the Norwegian convoy destroyed by the German light cruisers included HMS Mary Rose as an escort and was sunk. If you ever get a quiz question asking when was the Mary Rose lost giving the answer October1917 would be correct if you can't remember July 1545 for the Henry VIII ship.

[Bart150]

The failure of a number of captains in the Grand Fleet to take the initiative and open fire or inform Jellicoe that the enemy was within sight is one of the great mysteries of Jutland. As far as I can tell no one can has adequately explained it. People have tried to blame the "system" or variations thereof, but that is a deeply unsatisfactory reason. Possibly the same faith (in Jellicoe) as manifested itself in the collision between Victoria and Camperdown in 1893.

That's Andrew-Morton-Talk, Simon. I thought you weren't keen on his work.

[simonharley]

I'm as keen as you are on it, Bart! Hence the "possibly," I had Gordon in mind with the references to unsatisfactory "blame" above.

Simon

[ATM]

Thanks for that Bill. It had slipped my mind about the covering force for the Scandinavian convoys. You are absolutely right. The 6th BS of the GF was made up entirely of US Dreadnoughts and as you say it contributed to at least one of these operations. In fact was it screening when the convoy was attacked?

I like that about the Mary Rose. Always good for a trick question. I believe the other destroyer lost was the Strongbow. Reminds me of the drink!

[Gary Charles]

There are plenty of Jellicoe supporters out there, but you can't discount the Beatty supporters just because they are. That would be like saying all Tories are Prats just because the labour party says so. Personally I think they were both to blame for the loss. However, Jellicoe must assume responsibility because he was the overall commander. It is like being the captain of a ship, or aeroplane, if you are in charge you must accept the responsibility for the mistakes, no matter how bad they are. When I started my working life in the 60's, 70's and 80's the management took responsibility for their decisions, but it seems Jellicoe was ahead of his time, and was a man of the 90's, refusing to take the responsibility or the blame.

I find it incredible that he could write a set of Grand Fleet Orders that stated he would refuse to pursue an enemy flying, because he was afraid of underwater weapons. At Jutland he must have been surprised that Scheer twice attacked him, even though he outnumbered Scheer two to one, before the Germans finally turned away and Jellicoe was able to put his grand tactic into practice. What a master stroke! He refused to pursue a fleeing enemy, exactly as he said he would. He didn't let the fact he outnumbered him 2:1 get in his way, he simply stuck to his preconception. I wonder what sort of fools he thought the Germans were, carrying a deck load of high explosive mines into combat? What a shame Admiral Byng didn't have a set of grand fleet orders to hang his hat on, that way he wouldn't have been shot on his own quarter deck.

I know I will never convince some people, but at least this has been food for thought.

[simonharley]

I find it incredible that he could write a set of Grand Fleet Orders that stated he would refuse to pursue an enemy flying, because he was afraid of underwater weapons.

Which part of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders are you referring to there, Victory?

Simon

[PMHart]

Fascinating 'debate'. Glad to see the 'butchers and bunglers' school has its aficionados all at sea as well as on dry land. ... I haven't seen such simplistic analysis in a long time and have thoroughly enjoyed the 'thinking' behind it! Keep up the good work!

Pete

Edited 14 July , 2013 by Kate Wills

[bill24chev]

Victory

When Jellicoe wrote the fleet orders no fleet had ever been in an action with the same threat of underwater weapons such has mines, torpedoes fired from surface ships and a submarine threat. He knew that losses in the Grand Fleet could prove fatal to Britain's war effort. Therefore he was I believe, quite correct to er on the side of caution, and turn from danger.

I have said that a turn towards the enemy, combing a torpedo attack would have meant the less vulnerable stem and bows of the ship in danger of a hit, instead of a crippling torpedo strike to the stern where the screws and rudders are found. Actual events from WW2 with the Bismark and Prince of Wales showed the danger of hits in this, stern, area. I suspect that Jellicoe expected torpedoes to be released at a range that would have enabled the Grand Fleet to out run them and he did not have the evidence of the second round of war with Germany for guidance.

[simonharley]

Please don't try to claim the intellectual high ground. Try coming up with something original yourself. If you can't manage that try Marder page 114 or Jellicoe himself page 403 and following. And please don't interrupt the cricket again.

No really, please quote the exact page and/or paragraph of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders which backs up your argument. Not Jellicoe writing three years later, or Marder fifty years later, but the actual orders in effect on 31 May, 1916. I happen to have a copy of the orders, and I've looked through Jellicoe's personal copy at the British Library. Have you?

Simon

[ATM]

One thing to remember about the orders Jellicoe wrote is that he submitted them to the admiralty beforehand for approval. They fully endorsed them. He wrote in plain English that he would turn away in such an event as a mass torpedo attack and they whole heartedly backed him.

[simonharley]

If anyone wants to read Jellicoe's famous 1914 correspondence regarding the torpedo menace, it just so happens to have been transcribed. By me, funnily enough.

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/Jellicoe_Letter_to_the_Admiralty,_30_October,_1914

Simon

[ATM]

Victory, I respect your difference of opinion, though obviously I disagree.

[simonharley]

For the uninitiated PMHart is none other than Peter Hart, historian, and co-author of the rather good "Jutland 1916: Death in the Grey Wastes."

Simon

[Gary Charles]

Oh Simon, now that is really funny!!! I just had a look at some of the references he used, and he has quoted some work I did years ago for someone. Fancy old "Pete" quoting me!!!! I always get a good laugh out of you.

[Kath]

I just had a look at some of the references he used, and he has quoted some work I did years ago for someone.

Could we have details of the work the references came from, please? Was it published?

Kath.

[simonharley]

I note that you have yet to answer my question above, Victory. Any time you're ready.

Simon

[amlovell]

Which part of the Grand Fleet Battle Orders are you referring to there, Victory?

Simon

Hi Simon... unless I've failed to follow the thread, I'd suggest that GFBOs Page 13, para 8 & 9, under "Battle tactics" conveys to his fleet the same intent as the letter to the Admiralty.

8. Exercises at sea and exercises on the Tactical Board shew that one of the most difficult movements to counter on the part of the enemy is a "turn away" of his line of battle, either in succession or otherwise. The effect of such a turn (which may be made for the purpose of drawing our fleet over mines or submarines) is obviously to place us in a position of decided disadvantage as regards attack by torpedoes fired either from ships or destroyers. If the turn is not followed the enemy runs out of gun range. If it is followed we have to accept a disadvantageous position for a length of time dependent on our excess of speed over the enemy's battle line. This excess may be expected to be 1.5 to 2 knots, due to the presence of the German 2nd Squadron.

9. It may be expected that I shall not follow a decided turn of this nature shortly after deployment as I should anticipate that it is made for the purpose of taking us over submarines. The Flag officer leading the line of battle should exercise great judgment therefore, in "leading in" to keep the range or close to it.

[Gary Charles]

Q.E.D. The accepted tactic against a torpedo attack is to either turn away, or turn towards the torpedo tracks. There can be no criticism of this tactic. What I find difficult to believe is that the stated policy of the Grand Fleet was to refuse to pursue a fleeing enemy, the old "enemy flying". Jellicoe knew exactly what he was doing and thanks to SImons excellent transcribing we have this:

"10. The second move can be countered by a judicious handling of our Battle Fleet, but may, and probably will, involve a refusal to comply with the enemy's tactics by moving in the invited direction. If, for instance, the enemy Battle Fleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, and should decline to be so drawn.

11. I desire particularly to draw the attention of their Lordships to this point, since it may be deemed a refusal of battle, and, indeed, might possibly result in failure to bring the enemy to action as soon is expected and hoped.

12. Such a result would be absolutely repugnant to the feelings of all British naval officers and men, but with new and untried methods of warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them. I feel that such tactics, if not understood, may bring odium upon me, but so long as I have the confidence of their Lordships I intend to pursue what is, in my considered opinion, the proper course to defeat and annihilate the enemy Battle Fleet, without regard to uninstructed opinion or criticism." I just don't know how he got away with it. As far as being "simplistic" goes, it doesn't get much simpler: "he who lays his ship alongside that of an enemy cannot go far wrong", or words to that effect. It is not rocket science, you simply have to sink the enemy's ships. Only those with something to hide or be ashamed of seek to hide the issue in post battle spin, rhetoric and diversion, as has been the case with Jutland. Every conceivable argument has been raised in a vain attempt to hide the fact that Jellicoe blew it.

Edited 19 July , 2013 by victory

[amlovell]

I think, however, that the Admiralty's acceptance of this letter and the fact that they did not replace Jellicoe for having prepared them for such a reflex on his part speaks loudly that no one upstream of him had serious issues with the wisdom of assigning underwater weaponry a very great deal of credence.

Hindsight naturally showed such concerns to be quite small, but prior to Jutland a large number of battleships (Ocean, Goliath, Irresistible, Audacious, Formidable, Triumph, Majestic, Russell, King Edward VII) had shown that one underwater explosion was one more than they could handle. I am not sure that I have an example of a British capital ship that was able to save herself from such a mishap prior to Marlborough in the Battle of Jutland itself. Consequently, I think a great many could be forgiven for assuming an underwater hit meant the loss of a major unit, full stop. They might easily have forgotten that there had been little data to establish the ease with which a submarine's attack or a mine's tactical use in battle might be accomplished. It was this second factor which belatedly proved "periscope-itis" to be a false worry.