The Battle of Jutland - 31st May 1916

[MikB]

Actually MikB, to say that Blucher was the reply is just as bizarre as what Terry is saying about Invincible being and armored cruiser. Blucher was just a further development of Scharnhorst with two funnels instead of four. Prinz Adalbert and Yorck had a broadside of 4x8.2 inch, this increased to 6x8.2 inch with Scharnhorst and then 8x8.2 inch with Blucher. Blücher was never designed as a "reply".

Oh, gor blimey - 'ere we go again...

Blucher had 12x21cm, not 8, and the Scharnhorsts had 8, not 6 - and Blucher was 5000-odd tons bigger and a good couple of knots faster, though still slower than the 'I's.

She looked, and was, was a very different ship from her predecessors.

Von Tirpitz authorised her build in 1907 after intelligence reports of the British 'Large Armoured Cruiser' under construction which was actually the first 'I' class Battle Cruiser.

If that ain't a reply, I don't what is.

Regards,

MikB

[bill24chev]

Oh, gor blimey - 'ere we go again...

Blucher had 12x21cm, not 8, and the Scharnhorsts had 8,

.

Regards,

MikB

But a broadside of 8 Guns for Blucher 1*X2 for'ard, 2X2 port, 2X2 starboard and 1X2 Aft: only fore and aft turrets on centre line so only eight guns could be brought to bear on a given target.

[Terry Duncan]

No problem, though I was quite enjoying discussing this matter.

This just gets more bizarre. Most writers say that, far from the LLCs being a way to consume surplus 15", the Renown class only got six guns because there weren't enough in the pipeline.

This can easily be addressed via easily located works by John Roberts (Battlecruisers) and D K Brown (The Grand Fleet) but I must admit I am somewhat unsure of what writers have ever claimed the Renown and Repulse only got three turrets each due to a shortage. When the last pre-war capital ship construction was halted it meant the cancellation of two battleships to be armed with 8 x 15" guns in four turrets each, leaving eight mounts spare. These were used on Renown and Repulse and still left two turrets spare from that project alone, whilst the spares allowed for four more turrets, meaning there were twelve 15" twin mounts looking for hulls after September 1914. To quote from D K Brown's 'The Grand Fleet' p 97;

Twelve 15" turrets were in hand for the first of the 1914 battleships of which Replulse and Renown had six, while two more had been allocated to monitors. This left two each for Courageous and Glorious.

[Gary Charles]

Thank you Bill. Despite British propaganda German books and files make it clear that von der Tann was the "reply" to Invincible, not Blücher. Blücher was conceived and designed before the Germans had any idea of what Invincible would be like. In fact the first "battle cruisers" were the Japanese Tsukuba class. After the 1904-05 war the Japanese realised cruisers could also fight in the battle line and gave these ships 12 inch guns, and with a 7 inch belt they were better armored than the Invincibles. However, they lacked turbine propulsion and so even though their speed was sufficient when they were designed, they were bypassed by the turbine powered British and German ships. And they were classified "battle cruisers" in 1912, when the term became common.

Edited 21 June , 2013 by victory

[Terry Duncan]

Thank you Bill. Despite British propaganda German books and files make it clear that von der Tann was the "reply" to Invincible, not Blücher.

Blucher is somewhat more a reply to the Minotaur class than to the Invincibles, also with consideration to the Rurik and Tennessee type designs in other foreign yards. The Invincibles did have some aspects that could be anticipated by the Germans in that they realised that the British were going to move to a single calibre main armament in the class after Minotaur, and the Germans presumed this would be the 9.2" gun. Blucher was already too far advanced in the design stage to mount larger guns than the 8.2" without considerable delay.

[ATM]

I have been fascinated reading this thread. Can I just chip in a couple of things? MikB saying the Blucher was a reply to the Invincibles is hardly bizarre, as whether rightly or wrongly, several authors have stated that the Germans were deceived by the British who misinformed Janes so that the Germans would in turn be misinformed. Whether it is true or not I have read it several times. Terry, I agree with your point on gun size not determining what type a ship was. It reminds me of the Deutschland class of WW2. The British famously called them pocket battle ships and the Germans classed them as heavy cruisers. Though personally I would class a vessel with a broadside of 6 11inch guns, a speed of 29 and a half knots but the armour of a cruiser as a battle cruiser. But that is for another forum. I would still class the Invincibles as battle cruisers though. They broke the mould in so many respects, not just in gun size, gun numbers but speed too. They were just very inferior compared to later British but especially German designs. Just as the later Orions were super-dreadnoughts compared to the Dreadnought the Lion onwards were super-battlecruisers compared to the Invincible. But it doesn't make the Invincible any less of a battle cruiser. As for the Blucher could she be considered more of a prototype for the worlds first heavy cruiser rather than the Hawkins? She isn't quite a conventional armoured cruiser and she isn't a battle cruiser either. A Broadside of 8 8.2inch and a speed of 24 and a half knots. Just a thought. Enjoying reading the discussion on here chaps.

[MikB]

Thank you ATM. Despite anti-British propaganda, it seems clear that Blucher was the German reply to what they expected the 'I's to be. Von der Tann may've been more of a reply to what they later turned out to be. I don't think there can be any real doubt that the I's were Battle Cruisers, early and less-developed designs though they were - they were beyond the league of any Armoured Cruiser. Regards, MikB

[gardendowns]

Just like to say hello to all on this forum, my first posting so be kind, although an avid reader of the forum I have never in fact joined as I rarely get the time. But at times like this I feel I need to speak up when I see things written that are incorrect as I find it concerning, even disturbing inaccuracies in some of this thread, the errors that continue unabated and passed on. I find it concerning in relation to history that the forum cannot attract many German academics on many issues raised like this, and a purely British prospectus can only be pushed, and in this case mythical at that.

I’m sorry to say but my research on S.M.S. Blucher-HMS Invincible "design connection" is a myth, as an examination of the development process for Blucher shows that it was quite independent of the development of Invincible. I have read the German design meeting notes and they match details already in Greissmers book, so please can we quote from real German sources as what is being written here is leading people astray. The point is the calibre and layout of turrets was decided before Invincible was designed, so please let this one rest as it is very tiresome reading to take it any other direction other than what the facts are. It is disturbing then to read the Germans built Blucher to what they expected the I’s to be, this nonsense must stop.

Bob.

[bill24chev]

Just like to say hello to all on this forum, my first posting so be kind, although an avid reader of the forum I have never in fact joined as I rarely get the time. But at times like this I feel I need to speak up when I see things written that are incorrect as I find it concerning, even disturbing inaccuracies in some of this thread, the errors that continue unabated and passed on. I find it concerning in relation to history that the forum cannot attract many German academics on many issues raised like this, and a purely British prospectus can only be pushed, and in this case mythical at that.

I’m sorry to say but my research on S.M.S. Blucher-HMS Invincible "design connection" is a myth, as an examination of the development process for Blucher shows that it was quite independent of the development of Invincible. I have read the German design meeting notes and they match details already in Greissmers book, so please can we quote from real German sources as what is being written here is leading people astray. The point is the calibre and layout of turrets was decided before Invincible was designed, so please let this one rest as it is very tiresome reading to take it any other direction other than what the facts are. It is disturbing then to read the Germans built Blucher to what they expected the I’s to be, this nonsense must stop.

Bob.

Just like to say hello to all on this forum, my first posting so be kind, although an avid reader of the forum I have never in fact joined as I rarely get the time. But at times like this I feel I need to speak up when I see things written that are incorrect as I find it concerning, even disturbing inaccuracies in some of this thread, the errors that continue unabated and passed on. I find it concerning in relation to history that the forum cannot attract many German academics on many issues raised like this, and a purely British prospectus can only be pushed, and in this case mythical at that.

I’m sorry to say but my research on S.M.S. Blucher-HMS Invincible "design connection" is a myth, as an examination of the development process for Blucher shows that it was quite independent of the development of Invincible. I have read the German design meeting notes and they match details already in Greissmers book, so please can we quote from real German sources as what is being written here is leading people astray. The point is the calibre and layout of turrets was decided before Invincible was designed, so please let this one rest as it is very tiresome reading to take it any other direction other than what the facts are. It is disturbing then to read the Germans built Blucher to what they expected the I’s to be, this nonsense must stop.

Bob.

Bob

An interesting first post

It begs the question did, Jackie Fisher dream up the concept of the Battle Cruiser because He had an inkling that Germany was about to build a Cruiser that would outclass all current and projected British Cruisers?.

[MikB]

I find it concerning in relation to history that the forum cannot attract many German academics on many issues raised like this, and a purely British prospectus can only be pushed, and in this case mythical at that.

I’m sorry to say but my research on S.M.S. Blucher-HMS Invincible "design connection" is a myth, as an examination of the development process for Blucher shows that it was quite independent of the development of Invincible. I have read the German design meeting notes and they match details already in Greissmers book, so please can we quote from real German sources as what is being written here is leading people astray. The point is the calibre and layout of turrets was decided before Invincible was designed, so please let this one rest as it is very tiresome reading to take it any other direction other than what the facts are. It is disturbing then to read the Germans built Blucher to what they expected the I’s to be, this nonsense must stop.

Bob.

Well, that is a new angle on it from my point of view. I was accepting what was written - in this immediate case - by Bernard Ireland in the Illustrated Guide to Cruisers, though I've read it in a number of other places too. I would be interested to read original German sources if they throw any light on the matter, but we don't get to hear much about them in this forum. If an opinion with wide currency is to be disproved, the evidence should be produced. Ich kann auch Deutsch lesen.

But in any case, I only brought Blucher into the argument as an illustration of the high point of Armoured Cruiser development, to dispose of the assertion that the 'I's were actually Armoured Cruisers.

Blucher was more than a match for any other Armoured Cruiser I can think of, but would never have been able to survive a single-ship duel against an 'I' unless something really exceptional had changed the odds.

Regards,

MikB

[ATM]

Like I say, rightly or wrongly, it is what I have read in books also. I can understand both points of view. Personally I think it would have took the three Minotaurs together to sink the Blucher. Only the Rurik or the Japanese Tsukuba would have been close to an equal footing. But again, that is just my opinion.

[Signals]

Hi Bob,

Welcome aboard. Hope you already noticed that the theme you have taken here re Blucher seems to be the same theme as Victory has taken in his earlier post but ignored, and I agree with both of you. It is convenient for people to want to believe Blucher was the answer to the I’s as she was inferior and gives the British a warm & fuzzy feeling of superior design belief, but the actual answer to the I’s being V d Tann was superior and does not fit the bill required. As I have found, doing your own research finds the errors in books from the past and points to their unreliability in general.

As for getting German academics involved in this forum, little hope I am afraid as I know a few, recently I saw one of the great myths from WW1 again being pushed on this forum once again, it was the old line of the Germans having ships in which the men could not live while in harbour, they were like tanks and could only be accommodated whilst at sea for short stints and on the story went, why, because it was quoted in a book, and the book gave no official reference to the validity of the claim. Even when you point out the log books of the German ships do not back up these assertions, they are still believed and stand as fact. When I asked some Germans to step in and make a comment on this they told me, “Why bother wasting our time.” Why this is believed is an entrenched ideology that really began post Jutland, one that stifles free speech of any sort within RN circles and especially since the Dewar bonfire of 1928 on the topic of the failure of Jutland. Today the failings of the RN have turned into a deflection method to point out German failings as British Victories even if the German failings were never achievable and the British ones were. To have the enemy in the palm of your hand and being unable to crush them due to inadequate underwater protection that demanded a turn away from an enemy that was predicted to use their torpedoboats is a failure of the Royal Navy, no one else. And the problem is, be it your favourite football team, whatever, no one likes failure but fail they did on the day, this still does not mean the German’s won a thing, it means the RN had failed to do what they had been built to do, as Fisher lamented post Jutland. Had they won, they would have remained dominate for years to come.

Another point as well, I have been told here that I am wrong re the U-boats & the connection with the HSF, in fact I was told the HSF had nothing whatsoever to do with the U-Boats. Can anyone tell me who wrote these two pieces below and tell them they are wrong? I bet they also will be told they are wrong.

1. The Power behind the Submarine warfare of the Enemy is the High Sea Fleet. Remove, that Power and the Submarine menace would completely collapse. The removal of the High Sea Fleet would allow of the whole of the Forces of the Grand Fleet being set free to tackle the Submarine menace at its source, i.e. the Enemy bases.

2. On the other hand, the contention made after the battle by Mr. Balfour, then First Lord of the British Admiralty, a contention maintained by high British authority to this day, that England already enjoyed all the benefits which could have been derived from a Jutland victory, is misleading. On the contrary it would appear that the destruction of the High Sea Fleet at Jutland would have produced a change of far-reaching significance in the war situation. Mine fields not protected by guns may be swept up. With the German battle fleet eliminated the German mine fields out of range of guns ashore could have been swept up, while British mine fields could have been maintained comparatively close up to the German harbours. Submarines would have continued to give trouble, but the removal of their mobile heavy gun support would have greatly reduced their effectiveness.

Here is what Scheer also actually said on another point, liberty of decision is him saying get there first so we can decide to fight or retire when the battle continued at Dawn.

"If we could succeed in warding off the enemy's encircling movement, and could be the first to reach Horns Reef, then the liberty of decision for the next morning was assured to us. In order to make this possible all flotillas were ordered: to be ready to attack at night, even though there was a danger when day broke of their not being able to take part in the new battle that was expected. The Main Fleet in close formation was to make for -Horns Reef by the shortest route, and, defying all enemy attacks, keep on that course. In accordance with this, preparations for the night were made."

I also certainly find it hard to believe anyone can relate Jutland to a Trafalgar with the passing of time, it only serves to belittle the achievements of Nelson, and there is a reason why one man stands on a huge column while others have busts hidden by Coffee Shop umbrellas. One gave 100 years of growth & wealth, no challenger over this time, and that can not be boasted about post Jutland, the opposite actually can be said so it does not make sense to declare a strategic Victory at all on the back of the RN’s performance, check the slide from 1914 to 1990 in relation to the percentage of world shipping of where England was are got to in that time frame, Nelson can claim the opposite up to that 1914 figure, in fact by 1922 it was well down on 1914 figures, and when it comes to Navies, by 1922 it was all over when parity was conceded to the Americans, Post Jutland the RN was never able to defeat a European major power again using their sea power in Battle without looking west for help. A German Victory, no, they lost the war, but the effects of what i am suggesting here are the result of failure by the Admirals of the day and they were not German.

[Bernard_Lewis]

I know little about naval warfare but have been looking at Massie's 'Castles of Steel' which, to an uninformed oik like me, seems largely believable. On the question on the aftermath of Jutland he quotes an American press comment that basically says 'The German fleet has assaulted its jailor...but is still in jail'.

I liked the quote so there it is...now back to the experts!

Bernard

[ATM]

Here are my thoughts on Jutland for what they are worth. As a young boy when I used to read about the naval battles of the First World War I used to see it as a British defeat. The Germans sank more ships and killed more sailors. It was without doubt a great tactical victory. In terms of the ships that really mattered, the battle cruisers, the Germans achieved a kill ratio of 3:1 in their favour. If they could have repeated this several times then they really could have come close to breaking the blockade and winning the war. However, now I am an old ****, I look on the battle with different eyes. I am less jingoistic than my youth but see the battle as a tactical German victory but also long term British strategic victory. The Germans never seriously challenged the Royal Navy again even though it was ultimately in their interest to break the blockade. Yes a fleet in being pinned down massive allied resources in the grand fleet, but this was not wasted as it kept the allied blockade in place as the Germans were unwilling to take the RN on. Germany was falling apart when the Hoch Sees Flotte mutinied rather than take on the British so mutinies across Germany weren't that uncommon at that point. The British were champing at the bit to avenge Jutland and were eager to engage again. This cannot be said of the Germans. I would describe it as a sort of psychological dominance that the British had. I have read several quotes from German naval officers about how pleased they were at winning, which tactically they did, but they also admitted that this was the best victory they were ever going to achieve against the British. In the short term the Germans won, however they did not follow this up, so in the long term the Royal Navy won as the blockade remained in place and unchallenged. Personally I don't fault Jellicoe for turning away from the German torpedo boat attack. He had always told his superiors and subordinates that that is what he would do in such an eventuality. My serious criticism of him is that he didn't train or equip his fleet for night action. He seemed to have the attitude that he would just avoid a night action and hope it wouldn't happen. This is very poor. This is the great failing of Jellicoe and the British at Jutland. The criticisms of Beatty are well known and I don't see the need to go into them as I generally agree with them. Just my thoughts.

[bill24chev]

I agree that the lack of night fighting training was a major set back for the Grand Fleet, especially in the Battle & Battle Cruiser Squadrons. Despite a lack of co-ordination and training the RN Destroyer flottilas put in a brave show when they came in contact with the German Battleships.

Also in the clash betwwen Commodore Goodenoughs Light Cruisers and a German Light Cruiser Squadron HMS Southampton and the next ship in line engaged upto four enemy light cruisers and sank one of them (Frauenlob).The two remaining ships of Goodenoughs Sqn. prudently kept out of the fight and were undamaged

In regard to Jellicoe's decision to turn away from a Torpeado Boat Attack or possible minelaying I believe this was possiblya flawed and wrong tactic because it potentialy exposed the Screws and Steering Gear to damage that could slow down and put a ship out of control. A quick bit ofmental arithmatic tells me that a ship moving at 20knots could not out run a torpeadonwith a range of 10k if it was fired within 5k of the target assuming a running speed of 40knots. Damage to the forward part of the ship would be less serious unless a magazine was hit but the aft magazine could also have been hit with a turn away.

[ATM]

That is a fair enough point. I suppose you can look at the example of what the first torpedo hit did to HMS Prince of Wales in 1941 when it was sank. Completely wrecked the outer propeller shaft and doomed her. Didn't HMS Falmouth take massive damage to her bow when torpedoed but survive it only to be sunk by another U-boat the next day? I suppose though it is one of those that can never be properly agreed on. Re-thinking it over again and again I can see the value of your point but can still see the logic of Jellicoe. I don't think I could have been brave enough to turn into the torpedoes if I had been in charge. Going back to the jailor analogy, I am a prison officer and was assaulted by a prisoner out of the blue recently. I fought back and bundled him back into his cell, however I was by far the worse off. However in the long term I will have had 9 weeks off by the time I go back to work and as I am pressing full charges he will have another year and a half added onto his sentence. So who won out of that one eh?

[MikB]

I know little about naval warfare but have been looking at Massie's 'Castles of Steel' which, to an uninformed oik like me, seems largely believable. On the question on the aftermath of Jutland he quotes an American press comment that basically says 'The German fleet has assaulted its jailor...but is still in jail'.

I liked the quote so there it is...now back to the experts!

Bernard

I think that's fair comment. It would be idiotic to suggest Jutland was a British victory like Trafalgar - it certainly didn't secure us another century of maritime supremacy - and in that sense I think some here are attacking a phantom Aunt Sally. There were major British deficiencies in ship design, training and especially communications - which wasted some of the advantage held in interception of German signal traffic. But the HSF was extensively damaged and the blockade narrowly held. Regards,MikB

[ATM]

I think one of the most frustrating things, as a Brit, reading about the battle of Jutland is the number of times in the night that the British ships sight crippled German vessels sailing past or in some cases, directly across their path, and simply doing nothing. Just assuming that the other ships know that they are there and will take the lead. The deficiencies of the British navy are well known. Like you say the ship design was flawed, designed for global operations rather than just taking on Germany, the Germans having wire wrapped guns, the poor quality of British shells, the lack of searchlights, the training that drilled obedience into subordinates etc etc. If you had an equal number of British and German ships in parallel lines facing each other and lobbing shells then the chances are the Germans are going to win. However as I have mentioned before there are pro points too. The well drilled gunnery of the Grand Fleet (But definitely not of the Battle Cruiser Fleet), the great quality of British light forces but also, as I have mentioned earlier, the British had that willingness to engage and fight. Yes you can bring up instances like Troubridge etc, but in general the RN had a will to fight and win that the German navy did not. Whether that that is because it was a relatively young navy without a tradition of victory I don't know. But it is my opinion. Both sides had their negatives and pros. Which was the better fleet I don't know and can't answer.

[Gary Charles]

Terry I can see where you have been influenced. After the battle Jellicoe informed the Admiralty "Of course the German battle cruisers are battleships in protection, ours are armoured cruisers." The Germans put it another way, “The „English Battleship-Cruisers” stand against our “Cruiser-Battleships”.

[bill24chev]

ATM

The poor gunnery of the Beatie's BC's was a result of insufficient practice, there was no suitable prctice area near Rosyth.The 5th Battle Squadrons gunnery was very effective and did most of the damage to Hippers BC's.

Hood's Sqn, who had gone to Scapa to practice gunnery, was very accurate (and fast) against the German cruisers engaging HMS Chester and probably saved her, but not alas Boy Cornwell and many of his shipmates. The high rate of fire was a probable cause of Hood's ship being lost. Unprotected cordite causing a fire leading to a magazine explosion.

[ATM]

Bill, it is also the reason why Beatty's ships favoured rate of fire over accuracy. I have read about how the ships in the Battle Cruiser Fleet were removing protective doors in order to speed up the rate of fire. I recall that a senior officer of the grand fleet who was attached to the BCF just before Jutland demanded, and got, the anti-flash doors and other precautions put back in on the Lion. If I remember rightly the BCF was placed at Rosyth because of the threat to the English coast due to the German raids. If this right then you can call the raids a German victory as they got the BCF removed from Scapa, with subsequent loss in gunnery skills, loss of precautions and over-stocking of cordite on board. There was a documentary on the TV over a decade ago which I wish they would repeat. It was on Jutland and I found it very informative. Usually I find a documentary a repackaging of old ideas and nothing new, however this one had old footage of Beatty's ships which was claimed to be taken just before Jutland. The footage showed the cordite stacked in corridors and even on deck in places! It stuck in my mind quite vividly. It could have been that the cordite was placed there on its way to be taken further into the ship but the whole thing struck me as haphazard and left an impression on my mind. Another sad factor is that the German cordite was better too. It had a metal casing (Bronze, brass or copper?). I think the Seydlitz actually had a fire in her cordite at Jutland but instead of it going up in a huge explosion like the British cordite it simply burned and was soon under control. It makes you wonder what the result of Jutland would have been if the BCF had the same standards and practise as the GF. But then again that is a pointless what if like what would have happened if the Australia and Queen Elizabeth had been there too.

[MikB]

I don't see why cordite was stowed in side passages rather than the magazines.

As with rifle-calibre smallarms, heavy-calibre naval projectiles weighed 4 or 5 times as much as the propellant charges, which were divided into up to 4 bags in British capital ships so as to be just man-handleable.

Since the shells weighed from 850 lb. for 12" to 1920 lb. for 15" - effectively beyond the range of manual handing - the rate these could be fed to the guns would always depend on the mechanical arrangements of hoists and gunloading cages in the mounting and trunk. The cages contained compartments for cordite charges too, with handling arrangements to pass them to the mounting and ram them from gunloading cage to chamber. Unless there was some serious problem keeping the cages fed with cordite directly from the magazines, it's hard to see the objective of stowing it elsewhere.

Some have pointed to the near-loss of Seydlitz at Dogger Bank from an aft turret explosion caused by a hit from Lion as the source of German improvements in propellant-handling which paid off at Jutland. It would be very interesting to know what changes were made to German Battle Cruisers as a result of Dogger Bank, and how the apparently careless stowage of cordite was supposed to improve the British rate of fire.

Regards,

MikB

[bill24chev]

ATM

I can't recall the source but the improved saftey on HMS Lion was thought to be down to a Warrant Gunner who, althogh a junior officer in the RN pecking order, being the expert on the tecnicalities of gunnery with a lifetimes experience in the turret and gun house insisted on the correct storage of cordite.

Whoever decided to stow cordite more safely on Lion probably gave Maj Harvey RMLI VC just enough time to order the flooding of Q magazine.

[bill24chev]

Going back to who won at Jutland. we need to remamber the aims of the two commanders of the two fleets and how far they achieved those aims.

Sheer would have wanted to isolate and destroy a significant portion of the Grand Fleet to take away the numerical superiority of the RN and of course mainatain his own fleet in a state that it could exploit such a success. Using Hipper as bait he did isolate a good proportion of the GF but failed to inflict enough damage to even up the numbers. the damage done to the German ships especialy the BC's would take weeks of repair before it was fit to fight again.

Jellicoe wanted to engage and destroy the High Seas Fleet but like Sheer he must preserve his fleet. This was even more imprtant for Jellicoe because as Churchill pointed out loss of the GF would probably cost the UK the war. Jellicoe failed to destroy the HSF but did inflict serious damage."What ifs" are useless but Jellicoe arrived late in the day when better communications and understanding of the inteligence could have placed the GF much further south giving more daylight for Jellicoe to succeed.

I dont know if Sheer was aware of the lack of nightfighting ability in the GF, if he did he missed a great opportunity to develope a pell mell night action between individual or small numbers of ships were he would have the advantage in tactics, training and better night fighting capabilities of the german ships. Perhaps the tenacity of the British Destroyer Flottilas gave him the impression that the GF new how to fight at night.

Both sides failed to carry out their aims and as dawn broke on 1st June 1916 the staus quo remained unchainged. However the Grand Fleet still had enough ships, in a battle worthy condition, for a repeat performance.

It was not the last time that both fleets were at sea at the same time but neither side had the opportunity to meet, due mainly to the HSF's reluctance to hang around once it was aware that the GF may be "out" and an individual Battle or Battle Cruiser Squadron could not be isolated and attacked.

[ATM]

MikB, I must confess that I know very little about ammunition handling/loading procedures on a warship. So I can't really elaborate on the footage on that programme or why it would have not been where it . I wish I could remember its name so perhaps somebody else could find it online and view it. But it did stick in my mind quite vividly. The sailors in the background grinning at being filmed or looking awkward and not knowing what to do. Maybe I am mistaken, it is quite possible. Bill, I had a large library of books upstairs in the spare room but the wife insisted on taking this little please away from me and I had to box them up and store them away so I don't have much access to them. So this is off of the top of my head. You may well be right about the rank of the officer who got the doors etc put back in. I do remember that he was an expert in gunnery. I will have a dig upstairs in a bit and brush up a bit more on the subject and find out his exact rank and name. I'll also get out Geoffrey Bennett's book. Has a good section on the working chamber.