Sleepwalkers - Christopher Clark

[zijde26]

To All,

Did a member read the book " Sleepwalkers " written by Christopher Clark ? Is it worth bying?

The Dutch newspaper NRC (Book division, friday 5 april 2013) gives a review of this book (translation " Slaapwandelaars ").

Gilbert Deraedt

[Alan Tucker]

An outstanding book. Will change old thinking about the circumstances which led to the war.

[stuartd]

Hi Alan, I know the response to this is 'read it'! but what are the key points it makes to challenge thinking about the circumstances which led to war?

[Alan Tucker]

It is very strong on the responsibility of the French and the Russians putting themselves in a position where their policy towards another Great Power could be determined by the 'extremists' who ran Serbia. France instead of restraining Russia in the July crisis - e.g. Poincare's visit to Russia - was quite willing to go along with this Balkans inception scenario. Also the importance of Italy's attack on Ottoman Libya in destabilising the Balkans and leading to the two Balkan Wars which ended with a stronger Serbia with Russian support.

Also a necessary corrective to the view that Austria-Hungary was on its last legs based on post-war hindsight and not accorded the respect it deserved from other Powers in dealing with a situation where its heir to the throne had been assassinated on its own soil with the complicity of another state - Serbia. Austria-Hungary's treatment of Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina (annexed in 1908) was radically better than Serbia which mistreated minorities in the territories in the areas it took over in the Balkan Wars.

Also good on Britain and the final crisis and how a German attack on France via the Ardennes would not have been enough to swing the Cabinet in favour of intervention. Also good on the competing power centres within the Great Powers which shifted over time in the preceding years - hawks and doves, those who wanted detente between supposed enemies and those who wanted a more aggressive stance.

[stuartd]

Sounds interesting. May have to buy a copy. He was due to speak at a WW1 conference that I went to at Wellington College but pulled out for reasons which are obscure but seem to be connected to him and the Headmaster there.

[ph0ebus]

I heard a piece on NPR here the other day about it and I want to pick it up....sounds like a well written and interesting book.

-Daniel

[Old Tom]

Have just started it, following Alan's suggestion a while ago. A slightly unusual statement in the introduction, something like; this is about how the war started not why.

Old Tom

[markland]

I have read slightly less than half of "Sleepwalkers" and see it as an achievement already. Certainly it has cleared up a good deal of the confusion in my own mind as to why the war happened. Internal conflicts and disconnects within the separate governments seem to have been as great a cause as conflicts and disconnects between nations. I borrowed this book from the library and had to be put on a waiting list because there were two readers ahead of me. After about a month I had it for two weeks but could not renew it because of further requests. I am in line again now. A very popular book, particularly for a non-fiction of its length and complexity. It is not easy reading, at least not to me. However, it is extremely worthwhile reading.

[David Ridgus]

It is very strong on the responsibility of the French and the Russians putting themselves in a position where their policy towards another Great Power could be determined by the 'extremists' who ran Serbia. France instead of restraining Russia in the July crisis - e.g. Poincare's visit to Russia - was quite willing to go along with this Balkans inception scenario. Also the importance of Italy's attack on Ottoman Libya in destabilising the Balkans and leading to the two Balkan Wars which ended with a stronger Serbia with Russian support.

Also a necessary corrective to the view that Austria-Hungary was on its last legs based on post-war hindsight and not accorded the respect it deserved from other Powers in dealing with a situation where its heir to the throne had been assassinated on its own soil with the complicity of another state - Serbia. Austria-Hungary's treatment of Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina (annexed in 1908) was radically better than Serbia which mistreated minorities in the territories in the areas it took over in the Balkan Wars.

Also good on Britain and the final crisis and how a German attack on France via the Ardennes would not have been enough to swing the Cabinet in favour of intervention. Also good on the competing power centres within the Great Powers which shifted over time in the preceding years - hawks and doves, those who wanted detente between supposed enemies and those who wanted a more aggressive stance.

The book had the same impact on me when I read it in the summer: really making me rethink a lot I had taken for granted. However I watched a lecture on the BBC Parliament channel this evening by Vernon Bogdanor in which he takes issue with Clark's negative view of Edward Grey. He also reasserted the 'it's Germany's fault' orthodoxy. It was very persuasive.

I'm about to start Margaret MacMillan's 'The War that ended Peace' and I shall be interested to see where she attributes the blame.

This argument still has plenty of legs!

David

David

[mhurst]

I've got to the July crisis and have found it fascinating so far; I look forward to as detailed account of the subsequent unfolding of events as given of the period leading up to the assassination. In particular, as noted above, the detailed accounts of the internal tensions within and between the Balkan countries at that time are very illuminating. Also, I hadn't known that Italy had invaded Libya in 1911, and its effect on the two Balkan wars which followed. It's a tad too scholarly at times, and a more popular style would have not gone amiss, but my vocabulary has certainly been enhanced - it now includes 'irredentist', for example (which has nothing to do with teeth, I discovered), which should be easy to slip into in any number of conversations.

[nigelcave]

Very difficult if not impossible to understand Italian politics pre (back a century or more, if not earlier) and during the war without grasping the importance of Italia Irridenta - 'unredeemed Italy'.

[cdr]

just finished this book (Christmas present)

very very good

Carl

[egbert]

I am half through and concur it is mind-blowing. There was a recent discussion Forum of historians, to include Clark and another Professor from Oxford University. From the 4 participating historians 3 said that history books Need to be revised. Literally ALL countries have to be blamed universally. But as I said- I am only half through and stand by for more revelations.

[Anneca]

Today's Sunday Times mentions this book has become a surprise best seller in Germany as it moves away from blaming Germany as the principal aggressor. They go on to say the book features in the top three of most bestseller lists but in Britain it lags behind Max Hastings' Catastrophe which takes a more uncompromising view. Christopher Clark is reported to have said "Some will tell you 'the Germans like it because he's letting them off the hook' but I am not interested in that and I am certainly not an apologist for German foreign policy in 1914 which was incredibly cack-handed, mismanaged and paranoid. What I am not saying is that it was the Serbians' fault or the Russians' or whatever. I am just saying this was a European crisis and when you isolate one culpable state you impoverish the complexity of the crisis. What you find above all is that everyone is up for a war."

Now my appetite is whetted I wish this book had been under my Christmas tree!

Anne

[AlParsons]

From my perusing the book in bookstores, I would say that it looks astonishingly good. (Not that I haven't made a mistake or two doing this in the past). I believe it comes out in paperback about February/March so, if you can hang on, you might be able to save a little money. I will definitely be adding this one to my collection.

[David Ridgus]

From my perusing the book in bookstores, I would say that it looks astonishingly good. (Not that I haven't made a mistake or two doing this in the past). I believe it comes out in paperback about February/March so, if you can hang on, you might be able to save a little money. I will definitely be adding this one to my collection.

Its been out in paperback since July. Currently available from Sellers at Amazon for just over a fiver and on Kindle for £4.68.

David

[AlParsons]

Its been out in paperback since July. Currently available from Sellers at Amazon for just over a fiver and on Kindle for £4.68.

David

Well, blow me down. Did not know that. Thanks, David.

[KJames]

I read Sleepwalkers after seeing Jack Sheldon comment on it in the topic, 'Going back to 1914'. I think Alan has summed it up nicely in post #4. There is also an interesting programme about the July Crisis on BBC iPlayer from the Parliament Channel for the next 6 days, link http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03mtlps.

[David Ridgus]

I read Sleepwalkers after seeing Jack Sheldon comment on it in the topic, 'Going back to 1914'. I think Alan has summed it up nicely in post #4. There is also an interesting programme about the July Crisis on BBC iPlayer from the Parliament Channel for the next 6 days, link http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03mtlps.

This programme is the one I referred to in post #9. Bogdanor praises "The Sleepwalkers" near the start and then spends the rest of his lecture undermining its conclusions!

David

[KJames]

This programme is the one I referred to in post #9. Bogdanor praises "The Sleepwalkers" near the start and then spends the rest of his lecture undermining its conclusions!

David

Ooops, apologies David I didn't see that post. I thought some of the points made in the lecture were a little bit tenuous, but that might have been down to the lack of time to expand his arguments.

[David Ridgus]

Ooops, apologies David I didn't see that post. I thought some of the points made in the lecture were a little bit tenuous, but that might have been down to the lack of time to expand his arguments.

I take your point. A one hour lecture against a 750 page book!

David

[Seadog]

Just watched the lecture which is on BBC Ch 81 right now, the Prof has described the book as an excellent attempt to shift blame for the war from Germany/Austria.

Norman

[mhurst]

I’ve just finished the remainder of the book, and the description of the course of the crisis after the assassination is as riveting as that of the events leading to it.

The diplomatic exchanges and soul-searching within the various governments prior to the start of actual fighting are well described, but for a book which claims to chart ‘how’ and not ‘why’ the war started, it is curious that the final declarations of war by the various nations are documented, with the exception of Britain; no mention is made of the ultimatum for Germany to withdraw from Belgium, or the latter’s refusal to do so, and the consequent state of war between the two nations.

Professor Clark draws an intriguing parallel between the international condemnation of Austrian demands to carry out an investigation in Belgrade into the assassination plot, and NATO demands on Belgrade in 1999 to monitor Serbia’s actions in Kosovo; the author opines that Austria’s note of 1914 pales by comparison. A similar situation recurred in a UN Security Council debate in 2011 on introducing sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria, favoured by NATO countries, but opposed by Russia and China as violating the sovereignty of Syria.

As for the inevitable question: “Who was responsible for the war?” there is, of course, no simple answer. As the author wryly observes, anyone looking for an Agatha Christie-style denouement, where the murderer is discovered standing in the conservatory over the corpse with a smoking pistol, will be disappointed; in this case all the participants in the crisis would be found with smoking guns in their hands.

Many national attitudes and individuals played their part in the road to war, as did alliances and military plans. There was also the element of bluff, although the Germans seriously under-estimated the Russians’ willingness to fight, the British resolve to honour their treaty obligations to Belgium, and the determination of that country to resist invasion à l’outrance. Those involved in the current debate over the nature of the war should read this book – Michael Gove in particular. Germany may have been a ruthless occupier once it started, but was neither more nor less to blame for how it began than the other participants – the war was never a ‘just’ one in the sense that the Second World War could be so described.

The only country that could be regarded as ‘reluctant’, at best, to go to war was Britain, safe behind the Channel and the Royal Navy, although once it entered, the news was greeted by the people there just as enthusiastically as on the continent. While I had always understood that Britain went to war out of a sense of outrage over the violation of Belgium, the situation was never that simple: it is clear that the prospect of that country being invaded by Germany at the start of a war with France had often been considered, and if the occupation were kept short, politicians weren’t too uncomfortable with the prospect. The author raises another possible motivation for Britain’s entry: in order to keep close tabs on the machinations of Russia, long seen as the most likely of opponents in a European war, arising from tensions in the Black Sea straits and Northern India.

What comes over is that none of the key decision-makers ever seriously thought of backing down from a fight – they were all ‘up for it’ in modern parlance – although, as Professor Clark highlights, each nation was obsessed with portraying itself as reluctantly getting into a war started by others. Many actively relished the prospect, presumably thinking that it would be a straightforward affair, such as the Russo-Japanese or recent Balkan Wars, but ending as decisively. There were a few on all sides who were alarmed at the horrendous casualties in these conflicts caused by modern artillery, so devastatingly demonstrated again in August 1914, or who foresaw that no decisive early breakthrough could be achieved by either side, but they marched on towards Armageddon just as readily as those who had not done so. The author persuasively contrasts the situation with that in 1945, when the horror of nuclear weapons was immediately grasped by nearly everyone, resulting in a tense, but ultimately successful Cold War instead of a cataclysmic nuclear one.

What also comes over is the frighteningly short period of the real crisis. It should more accurately be described as the “Last Week of July Crisis”, covering the nine days from the delivery of Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum to Serbia on the 23^rd July to Germany’s declaration of war on Russia on the 1^st August.

The author makes a case for those involved sleepwalking towards war, hence the title, but I think that the decision-makers went into it with their eyes wide open and all their faculties alert. He terms the war a “tragedy”, but in the original Greek sense of the word, the protagonists are overwhelmed by circumstances beyond their ability to deal with. In the case of war in 1914, as the author points out, it would just have been possible for the decisions taken by the various parties to culminate in a non-belligerent outcome. In this light the war could be seen, in the words of Niall Ferguson, in his “The Pity of War”, as a terrible mistake.

Perhaps in the end there was a grain of truth in the explanation given by a certain Captain E. Blackadder to Private Baldrick, just before they went over the top for the last time: “The real reason for the whole thing was that it was just too much effort not to have a war.”

[SWorrall]

As for the inevitable question: “Who was responsible for the war?” there is, of course, no simple answer.

Germany may have been a ruthless occupier once it started, but was neither more nor less to blame for how it began than the other participants – the war was never a ‘just’ one in the sense that the Second World War could be so described.

While I had always understood that Britain went to war out of a sense of outrage over the violation of Belgium, the situation was never that simple: it is clear that the prospect of that country being invaded by Germany at the start of a war with France had often been considered, and if the occupation were kept short, politicians weren’t too uncomfortable with the prospect. The author raises another possible motivation for Britain’s entry: in order to keep close tabs on the machinations of Russia, long seen as the most likely of opponents in a European war, arising from tensions in the Black Sea straits and Northern India.

What comes over is that none of the key decision-makers ever seriously thought of backing down from a fight.

The author makes a case for those involved sleepwalking towards war, hence the title, but I think that the decision-makers went into it with their eyes wide open and all their faculties alert. He terms the war a “tragedy”, but in the original Greek sense of the word, the protagonists are overwhelmed by circumstances beyond their ability to deal with. In the case of war in 1914, as the author points out, it would just have been possible for the decisions taken by the various parties to culminate in a non-belligerent outcome. In this light the war could be seen, in the words of Niall Ferguson, in his “The Pity of War”, as a terrible mistake.

Melvin's post raises a number of questions:

The simplest explanation for the outbreak of the war, and culpability for that, is: Germany was willing to risk general war in backing the Austro-Hungarians declaration of war against Serbia. This was understood and acccepted, even regarded as a good thing by the German Cabinet who assiduously kept the Kaiser away from Berlin at the critical point, in case he prevented it from happening. In Austria-Hungary Conrad had proposed war against Serbia at every possible juncture over a period of months until he finally got his way. The rest were reacting to Austro-Hungarian belligerence, although they did not know that it was backed by Germany. Right through July Sir Edward Grey was trying to get the Germans to mediate between the contending parties, in the belief that they were honest brokers as they had been before. Since they were not, all his attempts were thwarted. Germay and Austria-Hungary bear the prime responsibility, as even German historians accept.

Germany was not just a ruthless occupier, but also committed multiple breaches of the Hague Conventions to which it was a signatory in the march through Belgium and France in 1914. As demonstrated it was certainly more to blame than most countries, with the possible exception of Austria-Hungary. The war was a just one for Belgium and France, both of which were invaded and both of whose civil populations suffered outrages, including unprovoked murder, forced deportations, pillage, destruction or confiscation of industry, destruction of heritage and slave labour. It was also a justified one for Britain: if Germany had won it would have seized control of Western Europe, a situation which British foreign policy had resisted for 4 centuries, whomever the potentially dominating Power had been. In that situation the British would have been finished as a Power. If Britain had abandoned France (and Russia) then the Ententes were finished and if they had beaten Germany then Britain was finished as a Power. Either way Britain had to fight and win.

The 'rape' of Belgium was a useful reason to gain public support, but Melvin is correct that there were deeper reasons. Partly they are covered in my previous paragraph, the need to fight and win, or face eclipse. But the Liberal Government was divided until the Unionist note to Asquith made war inevitable, at which point the anti-war faction in the Cabinet performed a volte-face to keep their Cabinet seats. The need to keep the Liberal Party in power and the Unionists out was a powerful motivational factor in the Liberal Party uniting behind an ultimatum to Germany over Belgium. Belgium was, politically, a useful tool for the anti-war Cabinet members to save face and retain power.

None of them thought of backing down: Austria-Hungary was faced with dissolution under growing ethnic tensions and focussed on an external enemy for two reasons: 1) to flatten the nation posing the largest existential threat to the Empire ; 2) to show its ongoing might to any ethnic group considering secession. Germany was willing to risk war to deal with the Alliance of France and Russia, before the resurgent might of Russia made this too dangerous to contemplate. The fact that the Serbia / A-H situation was a pretext is shown by the fact that, the moment that general war broke out the A-H government were told to halt their offensive agasint Serbia and distract the Russians from the east of Germany. Germany's war needs came first, those of A-H a distant second. France and Belgium were invaded, why would either of them back down? Belgium was instructed to give the German invaders free passage and refused. France withdrew its forces 10km from the border, to avoid giving Germany a casus belli. If war is forced upon a country why should it back down? Grey tried strenously to avoid a general war, believing that the Germans would support his efforts, but they had no intention of doing so and even urged the A-H to get on with it on a few occasions. When Grey finally realised the duplicity of Germany he became aware that war was inevitable and was convinced that the future of Britain depended upon being involved on the winning side. Basically every country had reasons which, in their view, made war inevitable and necessary. Every party believed that they faced an existential threat. In the case of the losing parties that was true: Russia ; Germany ; Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire all collapsed when they lost. So their reasoning was rendered valid by the outcome.

The decision makers certainly went into it by making concious decisions, although they misjudged the kind of war that they were going to actually be involved in. There was no 'sleepwalking' involved on any side. Once the Germans issued the notorious 'blank cheque' to the Austro-Hungarians, and then packed the Kaiser off to his cruise around the Baltic (to stop him backing down), war was inevitable. That the Germans immediately insisted on the primacy of their own campaign plan, over the ostensible reason for a small localised conflict between A-H and Serbia, shows the real motivation of the German Cabinet and High Command.

Ferguson is entertaining, if very heavy on the numbers and graphs. But his theory can never be proven and only represets one single possible alternative. His refusal to allow for the consequences of either a German, or Franco-Russian, victory invalidates his thesis entirely.

Simon.

[mhurst]

Melvin's post raises a number of questions.....

Simon.

That's a very interesting analysis, Simon, and you make a very strong case for Germany being the ultimate baddie. However, my instincts after reading Professor Clark's book are that it was never that simple - they all played their part in the road to Armageddon, although perhaps some more than others.

There are two statements I would take issue with. One is that after victory for Germany in a war where Britain remained neutral, Germany would have seized control of Western Europe. I rather think that there would have been an early version of the EU instead, albeit with Germany as the dominant power (as it is now, economically).

The second point is about the war being a just one for France, since she was invaded. For Belgium, yes - the invasion was unprovoked - but France could hardly claim the moral high ground if she is invaded as a result of an alliance with another country, Russia, which went to the aid of a third country, Serbia, with whom she had no formal ties, in its struggle with yet another country, Austria-Hungary, with whom she had no quarrel.

Melvin