Question re: The Nivelle Offensive

[aiwac]

Granted the Nivelle offensive didn't accomplish its ridiculously grandiose objective of 'ending the war'. Yet surely - in light of the almost 1:1 casualty ratio - it was an attritional success?

[JimSmithson]

Ah but when promised the complete and utter victory by a naive commander who could not recognise when his plans had misfired even before they had been put into action; it was the straw that was close to breaking the camel's back, it certainly almost broke the French Army. If the Germans had been aware of how low the French morale had fallen and had not been distracted by some valiant fighting around Arras by the British and Canadians, the Entente could have been in serious trouble that Spring.

Jim

[Ron Clifton]

I doubt that the French were aware at the time of the supposed 1:1 casualty ration. They would have been far more aware of the casualty ratio within their own units - quite heavy - and by the distinct lack of ground gained.

Ron

[phil andrade]

You're right about the near parity in the casualty exchange. The French had attained that since July 1916. It was the damage done by the dashing of hope that was dangerous. The claims for the operation were extravagant, and the political situation in France was fragile, and the effects of failure were amplified.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

I understand. How exactly did Nivelle accomplish a (near) 1:1 ratio, anyway?

[Robert Dunlop]

What is the evidence for the 1:1 ratio please?

Robert

[phil andrade]

Robert, John Terraine cites a figure of 187,000 French and 163,000 German casualties, which covers the fighting that continued through May, long after the initial ten day period from April 16th. That figure ( source not given) is largely corroborated by the Reichsarchiv, which tabulates German casualties against the French on the whole Western Front from April to July 1917 as 238,310, including 86,407 killed or missing/captured. For the same period, the French Journal Officiel, Documents parlemetaires, gives a total of 279,000, including 87,000 killed or missing/captured. The ratio is pretty consistent with the figures cited by Terraine, and the virtually identical totals for killed and missing indicate how many prisoners the French succeeded in capturing. By way of contrast, it's instructive to compare these figures with those of the period September to November 1915, when the same sources as above tabulate 410,000 French casualties against 154,139 Germans, with the figures for killed and missing being 115,000 and 55,715 respectively. I think that the French figures are inflated by inclusion of those evacuated sick, while the Germans only included battle casualties. But the difference in the ratios of killed/missing/ captured attest how much more skillful the French had become in their combat methods, and suggest that the Germans must have been finding the cost of this warfare increasingly difficult to cope with.

Incidentally, the British, in the period April to July 1917, failed to achieve quite the exchange rate achieved by the French, which is significant when you think that this included notable British successes at Vimy and Messines. The Germans posted 70,448 of their men as killed or missing against the British in this period, while the British lost 81,075.

The French were clearly fighting with skill, killing and capturing more Germans than the British, even though their soldiers were more susceptible to a failure of morale.

Phil (PJA)

[Chris_Baker]

Ignoring everything else said above: with a French population in decline in comparison to a German one, how could 1:1 be described as an attritional success?

[aiwac]

"The French were clearly fighting with skill, killing and capturing more Germans than the British, even though their soldiers were more susceptible to a failure of morale"

I wouldn't be so quick to jump to those conclusions. I would be curious to know how hampered the French were by terrain and weather as opposed to the British.

[phil andrade]

Ignoring everything else said above: with a French population in decline in comparison to a German one, how could 1:1 be described as an attritional success?

By virtue of the huge British Empire contingent, and the prospect of US deployment. And, especially, by the dramatic improvement in the exchange rate for the French, who, on the same ground in the autumn of 1915, had failed to inflict comparable damage on the Germans.

The attritional performance of the Entente on the Western Front was markedly improved when compared with the grignotage ( ?) of 1915, and, I think, testifies to better tactics and vastly more powerful artillery. The Germans had obviously improved their tactics, too, but I would argue that the edge that they had enjoyed over the Allies had been significantly eroded, and perhaps the figures I cite testify to that.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

"The French were clearly fighting with skill, killing and capturing more Germans than the British, even though their soldiers were more susceptible to a failure of morale"

I wouldn't be so quick to jump to those conclusions. I would be curious to know how hampered the French were by terrain and weather as opposed to the British.

Are you suggestig that the French were not killing and capturing more Germans, or do you imply that, somehow, by dint of more favourable conditions, they faced an easier task ?

Phil (PJA)

[Chris_Baker]

By virtue of the huge British Empire contingent, and the prospect of US deployment. And, especially, by the dramatic improvement in the exchange rate for the French, who, on the same ground in the autumn of 1915, had failed to inflict comparable damage on the Germans.

Perhaps my point was too subtle. I opened with "ignoring everything else" - and you cannot. It is nonsense to do so. As with all aspects of this complex global war, you cannot take one single battle and decide whether it was a winner or loser and that is especially true of casualty figures.

[aiwac]

PJA,

I'm saying I'd like to rule other factors out before I conclude that undoubted increased French tactical skill was the primary reason for the casualty ratio.

[phil andrade]

There is something ironic in the story of the Nivelle offensive. Of all the major Allied attacks on the Western Front, this one is the most synonymous with failure - and a catastrophic one at that. And yet, in terms of relative casualties, it was far more successful than the majority of its predecessors. Which, of course, goes to show - as I'm sure many will tell me - that we must be wary of attributing excessive importance to casualty statistics when it comes to assessment of the war's various battles.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

PJA,

I'm saying I'd like to rule other factors out before I conclude that undoubted increased French tactical skill was the primary reason for the casualty ratio.

And who would argue with that ?

One such factor - according to some commentators - was the enormous effort exerted by the British armies to the North. The improvement of the French armies on the attack coincides with the opening of the Battle of the Somme. British casualty levels soared, while those of the French - both absolutely and relative to those of their enemy ( and their allies) - declined significantly. I do suspect, though, that there has been a reluctance on the part of some British people to give the French the credit they deserve for improving their tactics. They had to, after the huge casualties of 1914-15 : not to mention Verdun. I'm sure that it was Verdun itself which sharpened up the French battle skills.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

PJA,

We're talking too much in the air. Conjecture is nice, but I'd like to see some hard analysis with facts involved.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks for posting the figures, Phil. The Nivelle Offensive did not last until May. For the purposes of comparison, the break-out objective of Nivelle's offensive should only include the 10 day period from April 16, at most. The nature of the battles on that front changed fundamentally. What does this do to the ratio of French to German casualties?

Robert

[phil andrade]

Robert,

The French official history ( armees francais ?) gives a total of 96,000 for the ten days. At the time, it was accepted by those in authority that the actual total was in the region of 115,000 - as evidence of this, I cite Haig's diary for April 26, 1917, when he describes a visit to Ribot at the Quai d'Orsay

Already 95,000 wounded had passed through their casualty hospitals, and he presumed there would be over 115,000 casualties

I note this disparity between the French official history and the parlement account of casualties throughout the war : the account of Sears certainly bears out the higher figure - and more - for those ten days.

As I write this, I find a decent account of this in Cyril Fall's history, THE GREAT WAR, which makes comments pertinet to our discussion

Nivelle's return gave the losses up to April 25 only and put them at 96,115, including 15,589 killed [there were an additional 13,000 + posted as missing ] , and this figure has been disputed, though it was accepted by the French Historical Service. Losses suffered by both sides durring the whole course of the operations are estimated by a careful and well informed British historian as : French 187,000 ; Germans, 163,000. French politicians in their eargerness to discredit Nivelle circulated fantastically high figures for these losses. The soldier was given the impression that he had been defeated, whereas he had won a success greater than in many battles which had been proclaimed as smashing victories. The Germans, intensely relieved, proclaimed that their performance had been the most brilliant of the war. And out from their sewers crept the defeatists, some in German pay, to make their supreme effort....

Incidentally, in a footnote on this page (279) Falls states the source for the figures cited by Terraine as Edmonds, Short History, p. 221, and goes on to say

If this is correct for the French, then the return to April 25 must be too low. The total from that date to the end of the battle on May 9 could not have doubled.

My supposition must be that the ratio of French and German casualties was close to parity, both in the first ten days and in subsequent operations, and the capture of 28,815 German prisoners would have occurred preponderantly in that first intense phase. But it is suppositional on my part. If this was not the case, then it would be interesting to speculate on why and how the Germans suffered more than the French in the subsequent fighting. There is always , of course, the notorious German counter attack to be reckoned with.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

PJA,

We're talking too much in the air. Conjecture is nice, but I'd like to see some hard analysis with facts involved.

You don't ask for much, do you ?

The source I used above ( Falls ) states that The German artillery had been well and truly dealt with , page 276.

This is of inestimable importance, since artillery was the big killer, and supression of the defender's guns was bound to influence casualty ratios in favour of the attacker, machine guns notwithstanding.

A couple of things come to mind to account for the outrage felt by the French at their casualties : first, that security had been abysmal, with the event being discussed openly ; secondly, arrangements for evacuation of the wounded were deficient, with several thousand of them dying for want of proper attention.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

PJA,

OK, but that only starts the inquiry. Were the German artillery dispositions as thorough and sophisticated at the points of attack of the Nivelle offensive as they were at the Ypres salient? As well placed? Were the Germans as determined to hold the position there as at Ypres?

I seem to recall that A) The British had also improved their CB tactics by 1917 and The Germans had particular terrain and concentration advantages in Flanders. Am I wrong?

Furthermore, we haven't even gotten to the question of comparative infantry tactics, the relative use of mustard gas (IIRC, there was a substantial amount used and inflicted at 3rd Ypres).

[Jim_Grundy]

I think there's a very real danger of an over-reliance being placed upon one issue, albeir a crucial one, and that is casualties. If battles - and, by extension, wars - are deemed to have been won or lost by the simple measure of the balance of casualties, then the Central Powers won the First World War and Nazi Germany defeated the Soviet Union second time around. That doesn't quite reflect the actual course of events, does it?

[phil andrade]

How I wish I knew enough to answer your questions !

I suppose you must be right about the development of British CB fire : that certainly proved effective at Arras.

And the mustard gas was disruptive and dangerous, causing fifteen thousand (?) British casualties in Flanders in July alone. I insert the question mark because I'm not sure about that figure.

The Germans staged a spoiling attack in the Nieuport sector in July, which certainly caught the British on the back foot.

As for advantage of terrain and concentration, determination to hold ground and sophistication of artillery deployment, I would have thought that the Germans were every bit as resolved and equipped to hold their ground along the Aisne as they were in Flanders. The Chemin des Dames was not a sector that they were prepared to relinquish, although I can appreciate that their railway network in Flanders was more of a bottleneck than elsewhere, rendering their situation in the North vulnerable. I would think that the area of Craonne and the Californie Plateau was a formidable defensive bastion, quite as daunting as Gheluvelt.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

Jim,

But it's more than that. Details are critical here, details which we are missing. Therein lies the devil.

What were the causes of the casualties? Was it mostly successful attacks or failure thereof? counterattacks? artillery barrages? poison gas? What were the infantry tactics used by both sides? How much did the weather play a role? What about terrain - not just high and low ground but also the possibility of digging in the ground?

Remember, too, that a single mass-casualty day (say 1 July 1916) can seriously skew the stats and create the impression that 'every day of the Somme was 1 July' which is patently false.

To argue about casualties for what amount to very large scale battles and even campaigns without analyzing the details and creating an overall assessment of the preponderance of evidence is to engage in futility.

" I would think that the area of Craonne and the Californie Plateau was a formidable defensive bastion, quite as daunting as Gheluvelt"

A good assumption. Surely this can be checked.

[phil andrade]

Perhaps you might weigh in with a few suggestions.

May I invite you to venture an opinion or two ?

I reckon your comments might be discerning.

The conspicuous thing about the French losses in this offensive is that they differed markedly from those of the 1916 fighting, and resembled those of the 1915 battles. At Verdun, the worst calendar month for the French did not produce a daily average in excess of 2,500 casualties. The same was true for the Somme. This was very much more an affair of enormous, intense battle with the grand rupture as the declared aim. Roughly ten thousand French casualties a day - on average - for ten days. This had echoes of September 1915, and consequential failure was unbearable, even if the Germans had been badly knocked about.

I wonder why the Germans were not more adept at exploiting their advantage after the crisis of French morale. I'm sure that the efforts of the British were vital here ; but I also suspect that the Germans had developed a healthy respect for the skill and power of the French army, and were happy to see the tempo of the fighting die down in the French held sectors.

Phil (PJA)

[aiwac]

Phil,

I'll have to read up a lot more in detail before I could venture a comprehensive opinion of my own . Unlike yourself and the many esteemed members of this board, I have only begun to seriously learn about WWI. I would like, therefore, to restrict myself to general questions and/or suggestions meantime.

Could you perhaps point me in the direction of good, up-to-date sources on the battles in question? I think I'd be able to contribute far more after reading them.

All the Best,

AIWAC