Should the Germans have sortied their battlefleet in spring 1918?

[Gary Charles]

Jellicoe knew where the Germans were alright, he could see them! Admiral Scheer did not have the same luxury. Perhaps the Grand Fleet commander could have been guided by his predecessors: "he who lays his ship alongside that of an enemy cannot go far wrong." Or words to that effect. Today we would call that having a crack. When you outnumber the enemy 2:1 it is worth laying your ship alongside.

[MikB]

Captain Jason Hines, U.S.N.,'s article "Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland". (The Journal of Military History 72 (4): pp. 1117-1153.) is a useful corrective to the quite unfounded claims that Captain Thomas Jackson screwed up at Jutland, and that Jellicoe's choices during the night were so limited.

Simon

The story of Jackson's poor relationship with Room 40 has extremely wide currency, and is supported, at least in Castles of Steel, with alleged quotes from the man himself with regard to his opinion of the codebreakers.

However, Massie also says that his source, Gordon, "abandoned moderation" in his criticism of Jackson. I begin to wonder if an objective account is possible at this distance in time.

I haven't been able to get at this article without spending an unreasonable amount of money for an amateur - can you describe the gist of Hines' objection?

Regards,

MikB

[simonharley]

Apologies for the delay, MikB, I've been busy transcribing some post-Jutland reports on cordite (another dead horse) which I'll hopefully finish today - then I can have another look through Hines and summarise it for you.

Simon

[MikB]

Thanks for your time, then, Simon - I hadn't meant to put you out.

Regards,

MikB

[yperman]

In reply to the Darren's post it seems to me there are three seperate issues here, namely : who won the Battle of Jutland, whether the British blockade was still effective in 1918 and whether the HSF should have made a sortie in 1918.

To look at the latter question only, presumably the sortie's objectives would have been to a) regain full or partial control of the Northern Atlantic by the destruction of most of the GF, the resumption of German surface trade c) the interruption the flow of troops and munitions to France and d) to raise morale at home.

I agree with the comments posted above - that the HSF did not sortie because of the following reasons: a) the fully operational GF was simply too big. The risk of a decisive German defeat was too great. The HSF was better employed as a "fleet in being" - a constant threat to the GF and Allied sea communications, tying up massive British resources.

As mentioned in earlier posts, the German admirals had also to consider the problems of a fleet which had been inactive for two years, the low morale of the crews and the impact a decisive GF victory would have had on the German army and home front. After all only a few months later when ordered to sortie against the GF, the HSF did in fact mutiny and help trigger a revolution.

It seems to me that the German Admiralty made the right decision in 1918.

Yperman

[Signals]

“although I understand that this made them inherently uncomfortable to be aboard for prolonged periods -- a factor not lost on the German crews who were normally shore-based when the fleet was in port, but who had to live aboard their ships continuously for over six months when interned at Scapa Flow”.

Ok I have left this topic alone for a week now hoping some common sense would prevail, I think it is well overdue to start seriously talking about what is continuously written on these forums to at least give it some credit. First up it is time to concentrate on this topic above before moving onto the others.

Simon you have written, “Dan van der Vat's book, The Grand Scuttle. I seem to recall that he was very precise about it.” Very precise, can you please post his reference for his prognosis? On top of that can you please quote the German warship logs that also back up his claims.

I certainly have all access to all the Battlecruiser log books, some of the BB’s, and cruisers, never do they mention what you quote. What astounds me more is that you write this stuff and no one batters an eyelid. If you can prove his statement correct, so be it, but it must come from a primary source document, and if you can’t then I think you must use the edit function and adjust your post as the cut & paste generations of new historians will use this. ... Edited here KR...

Again I will also push the point, why were German ships match boxes compared to the lavish palaces of the British? Please supply the actual square foot per man, German against British.

Some of this stuff is as bad as the “No one offered to host the Interned German Fleet and that is why they were taken to Scapa Flow” that is quoted on every forum and every in book.

Look forward to your answer.

Edited 12 August , 2012 by Keith Roberts
Lack of respect for other forum members.

[Gary Charles]

Well it beggars belief that the lock entrance at Wilhelmshaven would resemble Waterloo station at 5pm on a Friday night, with crews lined up waiting to get on and off their ships as they came and went. Portsmouth also has a barracks, but just like the Germans, the crews lived on their ships.

[Simon Mills]

Darren:

Alas, if you think that such an aggressive stance is going to prompt me into a detailed on line confrontation then I’m afraid that I am going to have to disappoint you. I didn’t join this or any other message board for antagonism and confrontation; if I want that then I can always speak to my nephews…

Unfortunately I am not in a position to provide you with any of the data that you request as the vast majority of my WWI naval records are currently archived in my dad’s loft. However, not to put too fine a point on it please do not assume that my arguments are based simply on snippets of informartion that I have gleaned from reading the wrong kind of book. If you genuinely believe that I am a one-eyed Manchester United Fan (I’ll leave the moderators to decide if that is acceptable) who wrote what I did simply for the sake of “agreeing because it suits mythical British Myths to slur an enemy for whatever reason” then I see absolutely no point in continuing the discussion. Nor will I alter any of my posts.

For the record I am not just some rank amateur who having read a few books on a subject now thinks that he knows everything that there is to know about it. In actual fact I have researched and written a couple myself (not on Jutland, though) and over the years I have even been employed to carry out archive research on a fair number of film, maritime and historical documentary projects. The subjects do vary, but the High Seas Fleet and Scapa Flow are included in the documentaries on which I worked, and I spent a good deal of time going through various archives in London and Orkney. During the course of this particular project it even brought me into contact with naval researchers such as Dan Van der Vat and Dr. Eric Grove (we ended up consulting Eric Grove on several other projects), both of whom are respected experts in their field – History Channel always insisted that we included acknowledged experts in our list of consultants, although I should also point out that there were a good number of amateur historians who also contributed valuable information. Either way, I considered it a privilege and pleasure to work with both of these researchers and I’m even fortunate to now count the von Reuter family among my list of personal friends, so on the whole I think I can safely say that my knowledge comes from a reasonably wide base of sources.

As for Dan van der Vat’s claims about the German crews living ashore, you would need to speak with him about that but the reference in his book is very specific. I can tell you from several personal conversations that when researching his book (he did it during the year long strike at The Times in 1978/79) he spent a good deal of time going through both British and German naval records – fortunately he speaks German – which gives him an ability to access archives that I can only dream of. If you genuinely feel the need to dispute what he (and others) has written then I would suggest that you contact him direct. I could even provide you with his e-mail address but in the circumstances it would probably be best if you wrote to him instead. I’m sure that you can contact him through his publisher.

[keithmroberts]

I have made one edit to an earlier post. I have no wish to curtail debate, in fact the reverse, but please can we stick to language that will not cause offence. To differ, perhaps passionately, is absolutely legitimate, but to do so without courtesy is not acceptable.

Keith Roberts

[Lt Colonel Gerald Smyth]

Jellicoe knew where the Germans were alright, he could see them! Admiral Scheer did not have the same luxury. Perhaps the Grand Fleet commander could have been guided by his predecessors: "he who lays his ship alongside that of an enemy cannot go far wrong." Or words to that effect. Today we would call that having a crack. When you outnumber the enemy 2:1 it is worth laying your ship alongside.

Yes but in Nelson's day there were no torpedoes, a small torpedo boat, submarine or even minelayer had the ability to sink the mightiest battleship with one lucky strike. Churchill said of Jellicoe that he was the only man who could have singlehandedly lost the war in an afternoon and he was right

[Signals]

Ok, I can see no one has come up with any primary source documents to counterclaim what is written in the German Battlecruiser log books which are Primary Source, and that is that the Germans were not discharged to the Barracks every day and did not live on their ships. I just have gone through the War Diary of the German Pre Dreadnaught S.M.S. Braunschweig, in October 1915 she sailed from Kiel & arrived in Libau, being attacked on the way by a British Submarine, not before she left, or after she arrived in Libau is there a mention of discharging her crews to Barracks. So I would be suggesting here that I’m correct, I also looked though the War Diaries of quite a few Torpedo Boats, and seems they also lived on board. Also waiting for the proof from someone to declare the Germans ships match box 1 star accommodation, surely someone has this data as this is a common theme we are led to believe. I find it hard to believe I’m being told I’m wrong after saying I have read & have access to many German logs as opposed to being offered no such material.

The problem with Nelson is he set the bar too high for those to follow, to bring up the fact he did not have to deal with torpedoes, well I wonder if he would allow his fleet to be built up to such a grand scale, to build and keep pace with Submarine warfare and build a great submarine service as the British did, but at the same time developed nothing in anti-submarine warfare thus leaving the nation vulnerable, Nelson was smarter than this.

Winnie Churchill, what did he really think other than the throwaway line on Jellicoe, here is a hint, good to take note on how he saw the effect of the Blockade, and how to counteract the U-boats the US had added a very important element, they caused the allies to gain a superior number of Destroyers which Jellicoe always lamented he never had enough of. As mentioned, the line on Jellicoe should be, The only man who could have won the war in an afternoon but did not.

Printed for the War Cabinet. July 1917.

VERY SECRET.

Printed for the War Cabinet. July 1917.

VERY SECRET.

NAVAL WAR POLICY, 1917

THE traditional war policy of the Admiralty grew up during the prolonged wars and antagonisms with France. It consisted in establishing immediately upon the outbreak of war a close blockade of the enemy's ports and naval bases by means of flotillas of strong small craft supported by cruisers with superior battle fleets in reserve. The experience of 200 years had led all naval strategists to agree on this fundamental principle, "Our first line of defence is the enemy's ports."

6. The policy of distant blockade was not adopted from choice, but from necessity. It implied no repudiation on the part of the Admiralty of their fundamental principle of aggressive naval strategy, but only a temporary abandonment of it in the face of unsolved practical difficulties; and it was intended, both before and after the declaration of war, that every effort; should be made to overcome those difficulties. It was rightly foreseen that by closing the exits from the North Sea into the Atlantic Ocean, German commerce would be almost completely cut off from the world. It was expected that the economic and financial pressure resulting from such a blockade would fatally injure the German power to carry on a war. It was hoped that this pressure would compel the German fleet to come out and fight, not in his own defended waters, but at a great numerical disadvantage in the open sea. It was believed that we could continue meanwhile to enjoy the full command of the seas without danger to our sea communications or to the movement of our armies, and that the British Isles could be kept safe from invasion. There was then no reason to suppose that these conditions would not continue indefinitely with undiminished advantage to ourselves and increasing pressure upon the enemy. So far as all surface vessels are concerned, most of these expectations have been confirmed by experience.

7. But a number of profoundly important changes have taken place in the naval situation since these plans were made. The -submarine attack upon commerce ruptures the basis upon which the policy of “distant blockade" and still more the policy of” distant blockade and nothing else" stand. The sinking’s by submarines have already affected, and will continually affect, our power to carry on the war. They are perhaps at this moment the main cause of the prolongation of the struggle. It is absurd, for this and many other reasons, to speak of carrying on this war as if time might not be a decisive factor against us. It has also been proved, that the economic pressure of our distant blockade upon Germany is not in itself sufficient to prevent the enemy from carrying on the war by land or to force him to come out and fight at sea. He rightly prefers to remain in his defended waters, enjoying the command of the Baltic, neutralizing and containing Allied forces at least four times the strength of his own fleet, while ravaging all our sea communications with his submarines. On the other hand, we have been continually impressed with the obvious fact that we should only incur useless and possibly fatal losses by sending our present fast battle fleets naked into his defended waters, and we should thereby jeopardise all the solid advantages we now possess. We have, therefore, allowed ourselves to be driven by this new attack to purely defensive naval measures either of an active or passive character, such as eating less bread, ploughing up the land, cutting down the forests, dispersing thousands of guns on merchant ships, building more merchant ships for the submarines to sink, consuming hundreds of destroyers and thousands of small craft in escort and submarine hunting. These remedies may be good in themselves so far as they go; but the policy which dictates them is the negation of war.

16. To sum up, the situation which led to the policy of the distant blockade has now been modified in at least four fundamental conditions favorable or unfavorable.

On the one hand-

(a)The pressure of the blockade has not caused the enemy either to make peace or to come out and fight at sea, and there is no evidence that he will do so.

(b)The submarine attack on our commerce imposes a time limit on our power to continue the war.

On the other—

(c.) Our naval force has so greatly increased that it is possible to provide a powerful fleet for inshore; action without prejudice to the strength of the fleet needed to secure the general command of the seas.

(d.) Our numerical superiority in destroyers (with the Americans) has now greatly increased, and further there is the "submarine barrage" facilitating landings. It is therefore at once necessary and possible to resume the policy of close and aggressive blockade as an addition to and not as a substitute for our existing policy.

(xii.) If the naval authorities decide that no aggressive naval action on a great scale is possible, and that the fleet can only "keep the ring," it then follows that the battle fleets and cruiser forces maintained in commission should be strictly limited to what is necessary for that restricted role: and the surplus materiel, stores, and expert personnel should be released for other purposes. The guns and ammunition should go to the front. The officers and expert ratings should go to the Tanks or to The officers and expert ratings should go to the Tanks or to the air, where they are greatly needed.

July 7, 1917.

W. S. C.

I think it is a touch misleading for people to be stating that the “it was the High Seas Fleet which sought to avoid a full-on confrontation after June 1916.” The truth is if you read German strategy they wanted to avoid a full on confrontation before Jutland, during Jutland, and after it, which is what a numerically inferior navy would normally do and Jutland did not change this policy, it was already there. What is more truthful once you wade through the smokescreen is that after the Grand Fleet lost 2 more cruisers to U-Boats during the August 1916 Sortie of the HSF which added to the earlier losses, the Grand Fleet never actively pursued forcing Battle on the HSF again, they conceded and this prolonged the war, Russia’s fate sealed, and that of so many men on the battlefields of France. How would we view the Armies in France had once they reached the Hindenburg Line only to declare it a Blockade and not fight.

It is not correct to claim Jutland as a tactical or strategic victory for the RN, why, because they did not control the Battlefield after the event, or in naval terms we would be saying Command of the Sea after the Battle, of which is misleading to state such a thing as we clearly need to understand the complete nature of what Command of the Sea actually means, and one clear aspect of this concept is that you are so strong the enemy cannot attack you, laughable when we look at the offensive nature of what the U-Boats achieved. This seems to be an attitude developed because it is an opinion shared with humiliated British Admirals not wanting to face up to the failures they were guilty of and the lack of success they were paid to achieve. And I do note many American Naval Officers from Frost to Gill who put pen to paper were not so easily fooled by the spin, and as they say, they would have chosen to fight. As Sheer is correct in saying, that had the Battle been as succesful and the British Media Claimed, why then did they not sieze the offensive and force the issue. Strangely it was the Germans that went on the Offensive.

In a recent book review by English Professor Eric Grove on WW1, he hit the nail on the head when he said WW1 was a great disappointment for the public and sailor alike. My view is the lads on HMS Victory under Nelson were the same gutsy type of men as serving in WW1 era ships whom were also raring to have a crack at their enemy, but they were just not given the chance to show their mettle due to timid and unimaginative leadership at the very top who failed their public, and this was nothing whatsoever to do with what the Germans were or were not doing, it was a British decision. The impossible dream created by these men on what a numerically inferior German HSF was supposed to achieve is simply a British smokescreen to cover the possible dream the numerically superior Grand Fleet could & should have achieved had they the will to fight in the grand traditions of the Royal Navy.

The Battle of Jutland was not an attempt to break out into the Atlantic by the HSF; it was to whittle down numbers on the Grand Fleet. Did they achieve this, YES & against incredible odds, when Jellicoe sprung his supprise it turned into the defence of Germany, was this achived, yes. So if we use the hypothesis given that the British won the Battle of Dogger because Germany had higher losses it must be a concession the HSF won the day at Jutland, you can’t have it both ways. Did the Battle of Dogger Bank & Jutland stop the HSF from coming out to repeat this, and the answer is NO, did the Battle of Jutland force the British to give up forcing the issues with the Germans, YES, to call it a stalemate would also cover any investigation into why the British gave up the fight. For the British there were glaring weaknesses not expected by the world at large, and to a greater extent causing their slow slide from the pinnacle of world sea power for good as to sustain and grow and Empire of this size your navy needed to be invicile. The level of fantasy levelled at the HSF by the dreaming British commenting on the situation in WW1 expected them to do should remain just that, fantasy, to achieve what the British say the Germans failed to do would require a HSF more than 4 times the size it was, that is to break out on mass, open up sea lanes, force countries around the world to trade with them, seize coaling stations from all the allies, and yet at the same time have enough ships to protect the Baltic against the Russians and so forth while also defeating the navies of France, Italy & Japan. The numbers against them and the geographical advantage of where the British Isles is on the world map tells you the HSF would have had a very hard time even defending their coasts and keeping the Baltic as their lake against an aggressive navy, but this they achieved against staggering odds in 1917 & 1918, as Churchill would quote, 4 or 5 to 1. So forget about these issues, forget the notion of German Battlecruisers raiding the sea lanes as people try & use as another HSF failure, when constructed they were noted not to be used for this purpose, end of story, they were far too important to risk like that when U-Boats were the chosen weapon to attack the sea lanes. All of these fantasies are purely a diversion of the main topic, why after Jutland did the Grand Fleet suddenly loose the will to entice, or force battle, on a numerically inferior enemy? Could it be that Battlecruisers were deemed the premier big ship of the day, and Jellicoe conceded the likes of Repulse & Renown were not fit for Battle and liable to explode with a single hit, I believe so, hence why he was pleading with the British Government to persuade the Japanese to hand over their Battlecruisers.

So what did the Grand Fleet achieve from this? And more importantly what did the Grand Fleet achieve post Jutland that they can solely hang their hat on from what we are led to believe was a British victory?

Jellicoe states in 1916, the Grand Fleet would be best served by destroying the HSF, did they achieve this, NO. All the clever talk after this alludes to the Germans not wanting to fight after Jutland and that being the reason there was no Battle, well I will repeat what I have written before, it you seriously want to fight & bring a war to a head and bring forward its conclusion just like the Americans did so well in the Pacific, and you are the numerically superior side, then the onus is on you, not the weaker side to fight. This is what Jellicoe, although exceedingly timid, was trying to do up to Jutland as he knew it was up to him to force a fight. When the Germans went out again in August 1916 2 more cruisers were scratched off the British books, and from this point, the British conceded and it was all too hard just like the Dardanelles, they never again actively pursued what Jellicoe said the Grand Fleet was best served to do. So why was this? Laying down new orders to say they would only intercept the Germans if they have committed half way to the moon also simply means the British had conceded the idea of fighting the Germans as only they could have done.

In Jellicoe’s book the Grand Fleet he has a concessional attitude that the German ships were superior even prior to Jutland, and especially highlights the better construction of their ships below the water line. So he has it on record in his view that British ships were vulnerable to weapons of lesser nations, be it torpedo or mine, which forget about the German issue for a minute, he is conceding against any lesser nation that was capable of mining or submarine warfare, and with this in mind they did concede to Turkey in the Dardanelles, gave up and passed the hard yards to the men in the trenches and transferred their offensive nature into one of support in escorting the cattle trucks to the slaughter houses. HMS Audacious was also a glaring embarrassment to the British, of which underwater weapons became Jellicoe’s main worry that his ships were not up to it, but all should be good in a gunfight hey, Gunnery at Dogger a question mark, but after Jutland this led Jellicoe to believe his ships were not up to it re armour protection. So from this point Jellicoe now has 2 serious areas of concern, and even he states the Despatches from Jutland were altered so as not to show the enemy the shortcomings of the Grand Fleet, (“modifications were made: some of them because it was considered that certain passages might convey useful information to the enemy, and others because it was thought to be undesirable to draw attention to certain features of British design, Page 304). Seems the Grand Fleet was heading down the path of the Grand Flop after their Grand Victory at Jutland as these matters were affecting the minds of the men at the top, and this not drawing attention to shortcomings in design has gone on for years.

With his main worry about mines & torpedoes he laments on the lack of cruiser & destroyers that could protect his Fleet as an issue holding them back, but said by 1918, with the exception of battlecruisers, “The position was assured, and we could have afforded to take risks later on which, in 1916, would have been most unwise. ”So why not fight? Surely facing your enemy on the battlefield is the way to go rather than trying to stave his women and children with a Blockade, sound like echoes of the South African War. Jellicoe is also delusional of the abilities on the use of the K Class submarines in a Fleet action as though somehow they would make a difference, “The inclusion of the K. class submarines—submarines of high speed—in the Grand Fleet in 1917 made it very probable that any losses suffered by us by submarine attack would be more than compensated by enemy losses from the same cause,” but then if you read what one Commander named Leir had to say about them you are left to wonder where Jellicoe’s mind was, Leir said, “the only good thing about the K Class is that did not engage the enemy.” Also the Ministry of Defence Publication from the 1970’s BR3043, The Development of HM Submarines clearly states the sea keeping qualities of the K Class were so poor they were unable to keep up with the Fleet. There is little doubt confidence was rocked after Jutland and the idea of forcing battle was abandoned. You will also be led down a path that the Germans did not want to fight after Jutland as they were left shaken bla bla bla, but you will also not be told many of these shaken timid men manned something called a U-Boat in which can be deemed a far more dangerous & perilous existence, they simply had chosen another weapon to take the fight to the RN where they did not suffer numerical inferiority.

So in the end, after Jutland, did the Grand Fleet have command of the sea, the answer to that question is NO. Did they have access to open sea lanes, YES, did they control them, NO. The contention made after the battle by Mr. Balfour, then First Lord of the British Admiralty that England already enjoyed all the benefits which could have been derived from a Jutland victory, is misleading and part of the general smoke screen. The British had adopted a policy of a distant blockade & this was not the preferred choice. Only a close blockade would be successful, and in using a distant blockade Germany was able to fight on, build guns, bullets, submarines, torpedoes. A distant blockade allowed Germany to trade with Norway, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark via the backdoor. So if the Grand Fleet wants to hang their hat on the blockade as their most aggressive action of the war, then this is misleading as by the middle of 1917 it simply had not achieved its goal. But the picture painted was that every day the strangling effect was doing its job, the reader of this is left under a spell of suspense & the reader of such comments would be led to believe the ring was complete and solely due to the Royal Navy. So it is a not correct to hang their hat on this after Jutland, it is like a child hiding behind it mother apron. By the middle of 1917 the political situation had changed to the point where had Germany lived out the British fantasy of sailing the HSF to the open seas they would also have to invade that country in order to trade with them as virtually the whole world was on the allies’ side. It is very clear the only reason the blockade worked in 1918 was it became a political blockade, and by this they clearly say it was America’s entry into the war which had an imediate impact which is nothing to do with the RN, but still this was not enough so in the end what closed the ring was the political pressure applied to Sweden, Norway, Denmark & Holland in 1918 to cease trading with Germany and this can be found in trade agreements with the likes of the US & Norway in May 1918, and this was done because the Grand Fleet Blockade was not as successful as we are led to believe and had they done the job, which we are led to believe had become their main aggressive action, then political pressure on neutrals would not have occurred. The Political effect these neutrals had, once they ceased trading, was immediate and had the same effect as if the Royal Navy conducted a close blockade from the start of the war or after a victory over the HSF.

It is also wrong to assume it was solely the RN that protected the open sea lanes and they can hang their hat on that; there would be no naval blockade if it were not for the other navies involved. Command of the Sea and open Sea Lanes was mainly protected by distance from Germany itself, or by other nations, and this was proved by the Raider Wolf as she managed to get out and sink numerous Allied ships around the globe, and then got back to Germany unmolested through waters all over the world where Britain claimed to have command of the sea, so in the true sense of Command of the Seas these loses would not be possible. So again, did the Grand Fleet have command of the sea after Jutland? They confirm this with a big NO in 1916 when the Russians were desperately asking for the Royal Navy to demonstrate their strength and force battle on the Germans, the answer to this needed to be some thrust into a sensitive German area, (something like what the Japs tried at Midway and what the Americans became masters of from 1943), but the answer the Russians received was the Royal Navy were unable to do it as they did not have command of the sea, WOW!

The results of not winning a crushing victory at Jutland by the Grand Fleet are immense, but the part that is unforgivable is they gave up the fight after Jutland. There would have not been such a horrendous U-Boat campaign for one, maybe a slight pest but not a campaign, those U-Boats were only able to get out under the guns of the HSF which the Grand Fleet failed to destroy or attempt to tackle in 1917-18, and in fact one glaring failure during the whole of WW1 is that the Grand Fleet was powerless to stop the wasps leaving their nests. Land ofensives continued in Belgium with the incredible loss of life that followed, and the brave but failed attempts at Zeebrugge. The decision not to force battle on the Germans & take out the HSF at this point is an exceeding poor one by the British Admiralty as it was their job to protect the very people being killed by these U-Boats, it undoubtedly cost thousands of merchant seaman their lives, prolonged the war on land, and caused Britain immeasurable financial damage to the point where they were knocked from their thrown as the #1 Merchant nation. It caused trigger happy ships to constantly fire on & damage & sink many of their own submarines in the exercise of U-Boat hunting in British waters. It affected British shipbuilding in that the ship required on the stocks was a merchant man & not a Man-o’-War. Even right up to the end of the war, they comment in cabinet documents that the losses had eased but were still serious. It is ludicrous to think that Jutland was a British Victory when after the event they were under siege and the Germans taking the offensive at sea. The British should have been attacking not defending, and it is exceeding lucky for them the Germans did not have the number of U-Boats required to do the job and the US came to the fight with huge numbers of required small ships.

A Victory at Jutland would have also closed the ring of the Blockade, undoubtedly brought the war to an earlier conclusion, & most likely have relieved the pressure on the Russian front & saved them from their fate, British dominance would be reiterated around the world, and most importantly, the Americans would not have to be involved. But from the moment Jutland was over, and the decision was made to concede and not force the issue, the Grand Fleet slipped into a world where they were no longer capable of fighting & winning a war at sea against a major European Power without the aid of the United States of America, and that is the sad fact of the matter. So we can conclude here that Command of the Sea was gained only after the fighting had ceased on land and the allied soldiers had shed so much blood, remembering, no matter what happened, someone had to do this bloody fighting, and this was not the Grand Fleet.

Had WW1 been decided at Jutland, had the Grand fleet won the battle as people like to claim, it does not fit the bill of what comes with such an event. Meaning, in WW2 the USN were dominate, they won battle after battle, they were aggressive and were rewarded with success, they reaped the rewards of war, and with this came growth & wealth for their country, and undisputed #1 in World Sea Power with the former foes not rising up again 20 years later. Prior to WW1 if we look at British goals, to convert its fleet to oil burning so as to have an advantage over other navies, to gain control of oil fields that were owned at the time by the Ottoman Empire, to grow its fleet to a size that was equal to those of the next 2 biggest navies combined, to grow & strengthen the British Empire and look at the empire now, it shows all the signs of a cataclysmic failure during WW1. Churchill points in 1917 as the reason they did not want to fight was due to not to giving up the world dominate position they had built up over the years and not to concede this dominance in naval power to others after the war. But this excuse goes out the window as so many ships were scrapped after the war the British actually conceded parody to the USN. So why did they do this? In their quest to build new ships in the early 1920s it is quoted that the Royal Navy possesses no ships that had been built with the monumental lessons learnt from Jutland. And if you add poor underwater protection to their gunfire concerns then you have a fleet that can only be scrapped and its survivors completely reconstructed, which is what happened. And from the whole WW1 era ships they give an exception to HMS Hood re these problems, and look what happened to her. It is quite strange as the war went on when you look at the ships such as Battlecruisers and where both sides were heading with them, Germany would have had a Bismarck style ship with 15 inch guns up against a weaker HMS Hood, so all of this was adding to the growing concern Jellicoe was talking about. The British simply stopped building capital ships during WW1 and those that were coming on line were odd or of very little use, Repulse, Renown, Furious, Glorious, Courageous, R Class Battleships, (Jellicoe was not happy with the R Class), to name a few and compared to what the Germans were planning to build you wonder where the British were heading, the new German designs were making everything, even the Queen Elizabeth’s old hat.

Conclusion, the Royal Navy did not force Battle on the Germans because they had convinced themselves losses would be worse than in the Turkey and they would not win even with the numbers of ships they had built. Is this the reason why Jellicoe also did not push himself more aggressively on his day of reckoning? Great Navies became great the attach an element of risk in exchange for success, & you need to look no further than the ultimate risk the Americans took at Midway, and all because they were provoked to fight. Life was simple when England was #1, dominate Navy=huge & prosperous & growing empire, lose that edge & loose the empire which is something they knew only too well, and lose both they did, Jutland proved they had lost their edge to crush a European Power as they had at sea in the past, the spell of Trafalgar was well & truly over from this point as everyone from the Americans to Japanese had caught up & began to surpass the Royal Navy, all brought to a head on one late afternoon in late May 1916, it was no British Victory at all but the start of handing the batten to the US. The bottom line is the US bailed the Allies from 2 world wars, simple as that.

[PMHart]

Utterly fascinating!

Pete

[MikB]

Darren, I think your entire agenda shows in your own bottom line.

Fortunately not all Americans hold your view.

Regards,

MikB

[Gary Charles]

Darren, thank you for putting everything succinctly and in a way that is easy to read and understand. You have covered the entire issue perfectly, and I doubt whether there will be any replies that can contradict anything you have said. Not only fascinating, but also instructive and final. Bravo!

[MikB]

It isn't necessary to contradict what Darren has said to argue against his basic position that British Naval command was spineless and/or incompetent. It's not that what he's said is false, but that it's partial and biased - what he's ignored is as important as what he's stressed.

Insofar as Jellicoe didn't succeed in delivering the severe defeat Britain wanted and expected against the HSF, it was primarily because he didn't get the accurate information he needed, and which his superordinates at the Admiralty and his subordinates at sea could have provided, but didn't.

As it was, he inflicted sufficient damage to the HSF that it didn't - despite occasional limited-scope sorties afterwards - ever attempt to weaken the GF again in the same way.

It's true that American help made enormous difference to the conduct of both World Wars, but the counter-accusation to the statement that the US had to bail out the Allies in both, is that the US was quite happy to shed the blood of other nations in the defence of its own interests until it had no option but to participate itself. Churchill said something like: "America can be relied on to do the right thing - after having exhausted all the other possibilities" - and it can be agued that's as reasonable a view as your own.

Personally I'd rather keep the view that we were allies fighting in a common cause and not seek to exchange recriminations.

Regards,

MikB

[bill24chev]

We all have our views and opinions on events in History, I don't think h ave come across any event that any two "historians" totaly agree about.

As far as Jutland goes perhaps the most important view was that of Sheer who I believe said something on the lines of "if we try that again we will be slaughtered" and from then recommended the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare.

As I have said previously This submarine warfare policy was not the only reason for the USA joining the allies but it was significant and the arrival but initially slow build up,of US troops of the AEF in France forced Luddendorf to gamble on a "swift" breakthrough and victory on the Western front in the Spring of 1918 which used up his reserves.

[Signals]

Hi All,

Still awaiting the primary source documents on the size of German ships living quarters as opposed to their British counterparts, I am starting to sniff a myth here. And anyone found the reference to German crews not living onboard? Me thinks so many of these issues are so ingrained that when constantly quoted, if they fit the bill of making the enemy look inferior the myths go through to the keeper and no one objects. The one that after Jutland the Germans were Port bound and inactive is just so biased and without basis, but why do people believe it? Again it is another slur & giggle issue on an enemy without the slightest bit of research to back it up. No mention of sorties post Jutland, no mention of raids like the Mary Rose Convoy, no mention of the invasions of Osel & Dago, no mention of the invasion of Finland in 1918, no mention that on most days Germans big ships were out far past Helgoland in support of the minesweepers, the idea being if the enemy arrives the protecting ships and minesweepers would fall back on the guns of the High Seas Fleet and with this they were too tough to handle one must conclude, so how can they be stuck in Port and never moved, Seydlitz herself shows in her log she spent nearly 30 days in the North Sea in 1918. I have every single WW1 Submarine Log Book and Patrol report from WW1, all I can say is the interaction between Submarine & German heavy ships was constant, and yes the British Submarines did not enter German Ports. One chap on this forum whom I recently helped, his relative survived the sinking of the Mary Rose, when I asked why did he join he Submarine Service he said his grandfather was seeking revenge on the Germans, & as far as I can see they were the only branch of the Royal Navy still having a crack at the German big ships hence his decision.

But this belittlement of the HSF goes against what the men at the time had to say of them:

Beatty 1918 wrote,

I attach more importance to the surrender of the surface units of the High Sea Fleet than even to the whole of the Submarine Fleet.

The Power behind the Submarine warfare of the Enemy is the High Sea Fleet. Remove, that Power and the Submarine menace would completely collapse. The removal of the High Sea Fleet would allow of the whole of the Forces of the Grand Fleet being set free to tackle the Submarine menace at its source, i.e. the Enemy bases.

I’m also trying to find the reference in the National Archives for the documents & reason Norway said no to hosting the interned HSF, will be off to Kew soon again so want to make a copy.

I have done a Control F search for the word “Slaughtered” on the PDF version I copied of Scheer’s book but alas the word did not turn up for some reason. But I have highlighted what actually he said and again it is nothing like the myth, basically he could achieved the results of Jutland again but he does not say slaughtered.

“Finally, I beg respectfully to report to Your Majesty that by the middle of August the High Sea Fleet, with the exception of the Derfflinger and Seydlitz, will be ready for fresh action. With a favourable succession of operations the enemy may be made to suffer severely, although there can be no doubt that even the most successful result from a high sea battle will not compel England to make peace. The disadvantages of our geographical situation as compared with that of the Island Empire and the enemy's vast material superiority cannot be coped with to such a degree as to make us masters of the blockade inflicted on us, or even of the Island Empire itself, not even were all the U-boats to be available for military purposes. A victorious end to the war at not too distant a date can only be looked for by the crushing of English economic life through U-boat action against English commerce. Prompted by the convictions of duty, I earnestly advise Your Majesty to abstain from deciding on too lenient a form of procedure on the ground that it is opposed to military views, and that the risk of the boats would be out of all proportion to the expected gain, for, in spite of the greatest conscientiousness on the part of the Chiefs, it would not be possible in English waters, where American interests are so prevalent, to avoid occurrences which might force us to make humiliating concessions if we do not act with the greatest severity."

Not to be biased in any way and representing both sides as I have been accused of here, some comments from the British post Jutland, after reading what Jellicoe says below I‘m surprised no-one has brought up the obvious that this is the point where Jellicoe would not offer battle as he considered they would be slaughtered by mine & torpedo, although he does not say slaughtered but if it is good for one it is good for another. So the word Timid has been turned into spineless, does that mean we have a new name JellibackJ

Probably, therefore, the German policy—apart from submarines, on which I shall say a word presently—is to avoid a general action in the North Sea, & while doing everything possible gradually to whittle down the strength of the Grand Fleet till something approaching equality is attained. The most hopeful method of carrying but this scheme is to tempt the British into the southern portion of the North Sea, which is crowded with mines and haunted by submarines, by holding out hopes of a general action. The general action would be refused; but in the meanwhile some very unpleasant accidents might happen to our fighting ships. "We lost two light cruisers on the 19th August; next time we might lose two battle cruisers, yet never get a shot at the enemy. The Commander-in-Chief and Admiral Beatty are therefore of opinion (and the Admiralty agree with them) that the proper way of dealing with this situation is to retain the Grand Fleet in the North unless and until the Germans have so far committed themselves to a forward movement that they cannot retire to their own base without trying conclusions with the British.

Jellicoe 14th of October 1916.

Catalogue Reference: CAB/24/62

In spite of the numerical superiority of the British Force the position cannot either now, or in the immediate future, be considered as satisfactory.

(Signed) ERIC GEDDES

31st of August 1918

Ok, with regard to the US, I’m well within my rights to suggest they made the difference and swung the balance, no doubt about it & can’t be questioned. Rather than just dropping the word BLOCKADE as if it was invented by the Royal Navy & its implementation & success only due to them we must look a tad deeper. The Germans were alarmingly heading towards a position of ultimate strength and had the US not joined would most likely have prevailed, Churchill admits the Blockade was not working, seems the old tactic that subdued France were not being used and the war was going on, his words. So we must understand in the end the Blockade was the weapon that subdued Germany, but it can not be solely attributed to a Naval Blockade, below you can see it had simply turned into a desperate Political Blockade with the Neutrals being the main focus as they were still keeping the war going due the choice of a Distant Blockade and not the traditional Close Blockade. The desperation was due to the huge gains Germany had in the east when they broke the Blockade on that front, and the obvious materials & food that were about to begin to flow and thus keeping the war going; urgent measures were desperately required to force the issue, and simply put, not at all possible without the US as they made some very damaging trade agreements with the likes of Norway in May 1918. Before this, actually in April the reports to the British Cabinet tell a story that the Germans through efforts of their Government were actually increasing food production and they had used alternative materials for war manufacture. Amazing how once the Blockade was complete as though it was a close blockade how quickly things fell apart in Germany.

The War Cabinet Report of the Year 1918.

The overwhelming disaster which befell the Central Powers in the latter part of 1918 tends to weaken the recollection of the strength of the German position in the early months of the year. It is necessary, however, to keep this in mind in order to estimate the task which the Allies accomplished. On November 28th, 1917, the enemy had concluded an armistice with Russia, and in the latter part of that year and during the early months of 1918 he had transferred a largo number of troops, well exercised in open warfare, from the East to the West. In February a Treaty of Peace had been signed between Germany and the Ukraine, whose independence from Great Russia was thereby recognised. In March the Soviet Government at Moscow signed a peace on German terms. In the same month Germany had intervened in Finland and proceeded to organise it as a basis both for land and sea operations. In May the Treaty of Bucharest was signed with terms of extreme severity for Rumania. Meanwhile the German penetration and exploitation of Russia continued, and the Black Sea, like the Baltic, became a German lake. The month of May saw German domination in Eastern Europe at its height. There was thus imminent danger that not only European but also Asiatic Russia would rapidly pass under German control, and that, with the resources of East Europe, of Asia Minor and of a large tract of Asia open to exploitation, the war would be very seriously, if not indefinitely, prolonged. It was therefore imperative to take steps to prevent so far as -possible the development of this condition of affairs in Russia, while the pressing need of the brave forces of the Czecho-Slovaks in that country increased the urgency of Allied support. At the same time pressure was brought to bear on neutral countries with a view to making the blockade of Germany as effective as possible. These steps—intervention in Russia and the tightening of the blockade—helped materially to reduce the resistance of the Central Powers and to shorten the war.

B. The Blockade.

As was shown in the previous report, the entry of the United States into the war had already made an incalculable difference in blockade matters during 1917. The opening of the year 1918 found the pressure upon Germany steadily increasing in stringency, and in the course of the year the full effects of the American, declaration of war were realised. The development of the blockade in 1918 simply put the finishing touches to what 'was already an extremely effective weapon.

The increased control of cereals, raw materials, fertilisers, fuel and transport placed the Associated Governments in a stronger position for negotiating with neutral countries contiguous to the enemy for the purpose of curtailing the home products passing from these countries to the enemy, and of reducing to a minimum the trade of the Central Empires with their immediate neighbours. As early as October, 1917, the United States, and/the Allies, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, had prohibited the export from their territories and possessions to Scandinavia and Holland of all food, fodder, raw materials and manufactured articles, with very trifling exceptions in the nature of luxury articles and certain goods which Germany was herself exporting to those countries. It was impossible to prevent Scandinavia and Holland drawing goods from other neutral countries, since the prohibition of exports, known as "the general embargo," could not affect neutral countries. At the same time, however, the supplies which other neutral countries could provide were negligible, Spain being, the only neutral source from which imports of any importance could be obtained; South American goods and Dutch East Indian products could not in practice, reach Scandinavia and Holland owing to the fact that bunkering facilities, controlled by the Associated Powers, were refused to vessels carrying undesirable cargoes.

The '' general embargo '' was a measure applied to bring political pressure to bear upon the neutral countries, with a view to compelling them to cease exporting food and raw materials to the enemy and to make comprehensive commercial and tonnage agreements where under the neutrals, in exchange for the offer by the Associated countries of facilities for the import of essential raw materials and foodstuffs really required for use in their own countries, would, generally speaking, undertake to limit their exports to enemy destinations and to grant loans to enable the Associated Powers to purchase supplies in those neutral countries on more favourable terms than could otherwise be obtained under the much depreciated rates of exchange then ruling. In addition, these agreements contained clauses relating to the employment of the shipping of the country concerned. As a general rule, it - was found possible to reach an agreement whereby, after sufficient tonnage had been left for the carriage of the rations provided for in the agreement, the remainder was placed at the disposal of the Associated Governments, for use partly within and partly without the war zone, on agreed terms as regards rates, insurance and bunker supplies.

The neutral tonnage engaged in the service of the Associated Governments included a large number of Dutch ships which were requisitioned by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government at the end of March. This step was necessitated by the extreme stringency of the shipping situation at the time. Proposals had been before the Netherlands Government for the greater part of the preceding year for an arrangement whereby the Dutch ships could be employed in Allied service, but an agreement was not reached, and no course was left except to requisition the ships. An arrangement satisfactory to all parties was subsequently made in regard to the terms on which the services of the vessels were taken. Undeniably the results of the '' general embargo '' were even - more effective than could have been reasonably anticipated. It was not expected that the neutral countries would, long hesitate to conclude general agreements on the lines desired, but the series of apparent military successes achieved by the enemy during the first half of the year 1918 made the border neutrals hesitate long before entering upon agreements. Viewed solely from the blockade point of view, this delay was all to the good. Difficulty in obtaining tonnage and in moving ships, entirely due to the enemy's unrestricted submarine warfare, had resulted in comparatively small imports reaching Scandinavia and Holland during the year 1917.

Holland and Denmark, to whom in particular Germany looked for the-supply of agricultural produce of all kinds, e.g., meat, pork, butter, cheese, condensed milk and eggs, rely in the main upon imported fodder-stuffs to provide them with an exportable surplus of these commodities. The neutral countries contiguous to Germany began the experience of a general suspension of imports at an unfavourable moment; their accumulated supplies of goods were not as large as usual, and the winter, during which livestock are dependent so much upon concentrated fodder, was approaching. There followed a slaughtering of livestock upon an unprecedented scale; the livestock which was saved by the farmers in the hope that their Governments would soon, conclude agreements under which imports of foodstuffs and fertilisers would shortly be renewed, suffered by being given "maintenance rations" rather' than " fattening rations," so that the cattle were turned out to grass in a comparatively unfit condition and were unable to derive the full benefit from the pastures which they would otherwise have gained. Moreover, the grass season came later in 1918 than usual. The usual exportable surpluses of agricultural produce either disappeared entirely or dwindled to insignificant amounts.

The result of the measures taken by the Associated Powers was that Germany's larders over the border became, in 1918, nearly empty. Sweden, instead of having an exportable surplus of some 20,000 tons of butter, was actually competing in the Danish market against German purchasers. Dutch exports of butter, instead of being in the neighbourhood of 65,000 tons, fell to a quite inconsiderable figure. Germany, already suffering from a shortage of native pork, previously one of-the staple articles of her dietary, was unable to look to the border neutrals for relief. The enemy's supply of fats, the shortage of which had for a considerable period caused her something more than inconvenience, now became more acute than ever. In due course the neutrals concluded agreements, with the Associated Powers. Norway and Sweden signed, in May and June respectively; Denmark delayed until the beginning of October and Holland until November, approximately one year after the imposition of the “general embargo." The Norwegian and Swedish agreements were ominous for Germany, resulting as they did in an almost complete cessation of exports of food from those countries to the enemy and in a largely diminished supply of raw materials. By the time, however, that the two later agreements were concluded the Blockade had already achieved its purpose, the shortage of food arid supplies contributing in a marked degree to Germany's overwhelming defeats upon the battlefield. It will be interesting to read, when the time comes, the history of the Blockade written by the Germans, since it will furnish more complete information upon its strangling effect than can now be obtained. Whilst the Germans have an ulterior motive in declaring that the Blockade lost them the war, there is a very wide body of opinion among the British prisoners of war that as a military weapon the Blockade was unsurpassed. An 21143. D article issued early in 1919 in the " Kolnische Zeitung," based upon authoritative German statistics of births and deaths and of public health in Germany definitely attributed the final crumpling of the German Army to the undermining by the Blockade of the morale of the civilian population which dragged with it to its fall the fighting forces. Be that as it may, the statistics upon which the article in question was based stand on record as irrefutable proof that the Blockade acted with cumulative effect and more, than justified itself as an extraordinarily powerful military, weapon.

[Gary Charles]

Thanks Darren. Way too many facts and truths here for the punters to digest, they are happier with their long held propaganda views. I am afraid you are flogging a dead horse. The quote of Scheer is important, he says the way forward is economic warfare, crush the econmoy, which the U-Boats did. This makes the comments of some authors that the U-Boats couldn't stop the supply of oats for horses (sorry to use the dead horse again) so totally stupid as to be beyond belief. The German plan wasn't a hunger blockade, it was to crush the English economically, just read the u-boat war declaration. (it is on the net). I am very happy with this thread, it is airing a lot of varied views.

I notice still no replies about Jellicoe's comment that the Jutland Dispatches were doctored. I think it is a little bit of self delusion that the Germans could have learned anything from British stratagy or tactics, the Germans did fine without them . The single lesson the Germans could have learned was about radio silence, but that's it.

Perhaps Beatty removed the circle the battlecrusiers described from the plan maps because he though it looked silly on the chart? That is just one example, I wonder what else was removed, and why? It doesn't matter which angle you look at it, Jutland was just one big stuff up, from every point of view. Please comment further.

[Signals]

Thanks Victory,

Sorry been away, but yes way too many facts & way too many myths, and I note when they clash only facts can hold up, and yet you never get "OH I COULD HAVE BEEN WRONG," just silence & pride. I have shown you Churchill was straight to the point, the Blockade from a purely Naval Point had not worked & was not going to work especially with Germany moving into a position of great strength after breaking the Blockade in the East, and yet the Pure Naval Blockade was the most aggressive action attributed to the Grand Fleet. The British Government then state It was the Americans that made the difference & after they made trade agreements with the Neutrals the Blockade suddenly became a success. And I must add even more successful in 1919.

For instance when I threw the theory of Germans not living on their ships to German researchers, I got “don’t waste your time even answering.” They also sent this, “The diary of Seaman Stumpf of the HELGOLAND which has been in print for many years (and which is readily available on the used book market) clearly indicates that the crew of this battleship lived on board, even when the ship was in dockyard hands.”

Even when you highlight that Scheer said nothing like slaughtered in his book, and what he actually is saying is we could punish them again, but it won’t alter a thing, it is nothing like the myth. So here is another sample of why the British thought they would not find the going easy and why they did not fight when they were the numerically superior force & if they won at Jutland this would be the next move, proof I guess they did not win Jutland as had they done so the word Offensive would not be such a dirty word.

A STRONG DEMONTRASTION AGAINT THE SOUND AND THE BELTS. Page 195 to 1998, ADM 137/1247, 1916

The Russians lay Great stress at the demonstration which they ask for being “timely, weighty, & prolonged”.

At the Dardanelles we had the complete command of the sea at the commencement, though later there was some interference by submarines.

We have not yet got command of the North Sea and the expedition would have to move across the front of the High Seas Fleet. Our Grand Fleet could cover the moment for as long as they could remain at sea without refuelling, but not continually.

We know what a big military operation overseas is not just one big move of transports across the sea but that a constant stream of transports have to be kept running always.

The Germans if they were sensible, as they usually are, would attack our first big move of transports and our covering Grand Fleet with Submarines. This would not be difficult as most of our best small craft would be required at the Kattegat end of the operation.

When the Grand Fleet withdrew to refuel the High Seas Fleet could dash out and attack our transports and ships inside the Skaw with a very fair chance of getting safely back before our Grand Fleet could intercept them.

Moving and maintaining a large force across the North Sea provides a splendid objective for the German Navy and gives the chance they always hope for of materially reducing our Fleet. The forced required for the naval side of the operations would be considerable that we would have to bring home all our forces in the Mediterranean.

My words here, In the end the Strong Demonstration shown to the world in support of the Russians was the sending of 4 antiquated C Class petrol driven submarines.

With this in mind the comments below make further sense.

There was a choice: to fight or not to fight. Ours, in the place of the Admiralty, would have been to fight. Theirs was not to fight. That decision fastened upon the British Navy an incubus of which it will not rid itself for many a year. Every British commander with an instinctive willingness to assume risks, which is the very foundation of naval & military greatness, will be confronted with a formidable library purporting to prove by every form of skillfull plea and clever argument that Jellicoe won the World War without “leaving anything to chance.”

Page 516, The Battle of Jutland, The Effects of Jutland, Holloway Frost U.S.N.

And to back up my previous post with what Beatty was saying re the HSF, here is a US Point;

In this role of covering the operations of the submarines the German Battle Fleet had a very important influence upon the ensuing stages of the War. It was altogether a delusion to think that the career of the German fleet had been ended at Jutland — and that it "never came out." On the contrary, Admiral Scheer's fleet kept a wide area cleared for the egress and entrance of the German U-boats in their destructive campaign. If the German fleet had been destroyed in the Jutland action, it would have been possible for the Allies to put in place and maintain mine barrages close to the German Bases. There is no need to add anything to this statement to show the great results that would have been gained, if the British had been able to win a decision in the Battle of Jutland.

A True Account of The Battle of Jutland Pages 45 & 46, by Thomas G. Frothingham Captain U.S.R.

[cdr]

had the German fleet resolved all problems from the 1917 mutiny ?

[bill24chev]

Hi All,

Thank you for such a detailed post, to save space have Edited the "quote" only to your salutation.

Although my view of the Naval War in the North Sea and Atlantic in WW1 differs from yours I appreciate your obvious detailed research.

Have you published any of your work on this subject? If not I believe you could produce a book or at least an article for an History Journal that would create even more interesting debate.

Bill

[MikB]

I stick by the accusation of bias and partiality. All Darren want to say amounts to barkeeper Mo's words from The Simpsons: 'We saved yer ass in World War 2', but Darren wants to extend this claim to WW1 also. Detailed research that only has the establishment of a specific view as its aim is not entitled to be regarded as objective.

The facts are what they are. HSF did not again attempt to defeat the GF in detail, and it was Germany that starved - and was already suffering grievously before the US entered the war - not Britain. I have family knowledge of this - my father was a starving 9-year-old in a middle-class region of Berlin in 1917. By the time the war ended, he could not remember not being desperately hungry.

Whether or not the British evaluation was correct, that the support of a direct attack on Germany would have been too costly to allow continuation of the blockade, is not knowable, but even Beatty - whom some consider a crazy-brave - supported it. It was not a conclusion reached through spinelessness.

Jellicoe's indecisive result at Jutland was not due to cowardice or weakness on his part. His ship was in the line of battle with the others, delivering heavy fire into the HSF, and sharing risk of reply.

Regards,

MikB

[Gary Charles]

The fact remains, Beatty presided over the altering of the records, and Jellicoe was shunted off to the antipodes so he couldn't voice his view. He says in his book he was rushed off before he could finish off his work properly.

[Gary Charles]

Found it Simon. The quote from der Vat book, where as you say he seems very definite about it. Here it is:

"The Germans had every reason to anticipate acute discomfort in a prolonged period at anchor cut off from shore. The way of life in the German navy bore little resemblance to that in the Royal Navy, which was accustomed to inordinately long periods at sea (and did not forbear to complain). The German ships were not intended to be lived in and were not built for anything but very short periods of occupation (a fact which gave them certain structural advantages over their British counterparts - the bulkheads for example were much stronger because rather fewer doors were needed). The relationship between a German sailor and his ship was comparable with that of a soldier in an armoured regiment and his tank. The soldier is actually only inside the tank for purposes of battle, movement or exercises. He does not eat in it; he has to get out even to brew tea, and he certainly does not sleep in it. The German capital ships, with as little as one third the coal capacity of the British, were built for short forays relatively close to their home ports. In between times, they tied up at the quays and the crews messed and slept in barracks ashore. Thus only the most rudimentary facilities were provided aboard, including storage space, because the ships were not expected to go to sea for more than a few days at a time."

I am having trouble with this, when you consider that the trip to Africa and South America by SMS Kaiser and König Albert took around six months. Where did the crews stay? .................................................................... der Vats assertion is plain rubbish. I notice he doesn't give any reseach references. And the business about range, Seydlitz had the same or greater range than Lion, according to Gröner and R.A. Burt. The quote about German ships having one third the coal capacity is more rubbish, no wonder there are no citations or references.

Edited 31 August , 2012 by Keith Roberts
Lack of courtesy.

[keithmroberts]

This is the second time that I have to intervene here. members are entitled to differ, and to be critical of other members posts, but it is required that they do so in a civil and courteous manner. No matter how strongly a member may feel that his point has been disregarded.

Please keep it polite.

Keith Roberts