Should the Germans have sortied their battlefleet in spring 1918?

[Simon Mills]

While there were undoubtedly failures in the British chain of command at Jutland, I think your emphasis on the American impact of the war at sea (at least, in the North Sea) is a little unfair.

Jutland may not have been the decisive tactical victory that the British had sought, and like you I don’t think it can be reasonably argued that it was a tactical British victory, but it effectively proved that the German naval strategy up to that point in the war was flawed. In actual fact the High Seas Fleet did put to sea again in August 1916, but the plan was little different to that at Jutland (to isolate and destroy a detached squadron of the Grand Fleet), and when Admiral Scheer received intelligence that the entire Grand Fleet was once again approaching it was the German fleet that withdrew. Admittedly the Grand Fleet did not leave Scapa Flow when the Germans next came out in October 1916, but this was probably more to do with the fact that in September 1916 the British had concluded that due to the presence of mines and submarines, any Grand Fleet activities in the southern part of the North Sea would be unsafe. And who is to say that the Germans did not understand that concern; the fact is that it was the presence of British submarines that caused the Germans to break off their October 1916 sortie and withdraw. In the end it seems that neither side wanted to risk its larger surface units to an opportune submarine ambush…

Who knows what would have happened if Germany had not switched its emphasis to U-boat warfare. Perhaps there would have been a Jutland II, but either way the British can argue with some justification that at the end of the day it was the High Seas Fleet which sought to avoid a full-on confrontation after June 1916. As a result the German ships remained tied up in their home ports, with their crews mostly in barracks on shore; many of the finer officers and men transferred to the U-boat flotillas, with the situation at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven subsequently becoming fertile stomping ground for the more mutinous, left wing elements of the depleted surface units. In this respect while Jutland may not have been the tactical victory for the Grand Fleet for which the British public had expected and hoped, the impact of the British strategic victory was no less decisive.

The High Seas Fleet, while still intact, had already been check-mated long before America entered the war, with most of its subsequent activities located in the Baltic. As for the North Sea mine barrier, this was in fact an American proposal. The British originally were against the idea because its presence would have hampered the movements of the Grand Fleet if in pursuit of or – dare I say – retreating from enemy vessels. Okay, there is also the possibly that the British disliked the notion because it was someone else’s idea and not theirs, but essentially the barrier was not so much to keep the High Seas Fleet contained (because it already was) but to inhibit the passage of U-boats from Germany to the Atlantic. I don’t think that anyone expected it to stop the U-boats altogether, and really it was completed too late in the war to be able to accurately judge its full impact, but the fact is that over 70,000 mines were laid between the Orkneys and Norway (the vast majority by the Americans) in the spring/summer/autumn of 1918, while the High Seas Fleet remained in port, seemingly doing nothing to hinder the operation. That speaks volumes for their ability or desire to confront the Allies in the North Sea itself.

On the other hand, simply by existing the High Seas Fleet was having a massive impact on Allied naval strategy and deployments. In this respect the Germans probably tied down far greater Allied naval resources than they expended themselves…

[MikB]

While there were undoubtedly failures in the British chain of command at Jutland, I think your emphasis on the American impact of the war at sea (at least, in the North Sea) is a little unfair.

...

On the other hand, simply by existing the High Seas Fleet was having a massive impact on Allied naval strategy and deployments. In this respect the Germans probably tied down far greater Allied naval resources than they expended themselves…

I'd agree substantially with this, Simon. You've replied to Darren more politely than I would have done if I had had the time shortly after reading his post with its insulting references to Admirals who did their best with the information they had, and whom later successful Admirals respected for the decisions they took.

I think it was Darren who was being mischievous in saying anyone claimed Jutland as a tactical victory for the RN - reading back through the posts I can't see where anybody said that. I denied it was a tactical victory for the Germans for the reasons I gave - they got into situations where only expert ship-handling rather than fighting capabilities saved them from a severe mauling, and they fled the field leaving the RN anxiously trying to find them and fight some more. That isn't victory.

How could any of the Admirals present be blamed for not modelling their techniques on the USN in the Pacific of WW2? Astonishing.

Regards,

MikB

[Gary Charles]

Admiral Jellicoe says in his book (page 19) that he would not go into the southern North Sea because he was scared of torpedoes and mines. He says the Germans had more destroyers, which is not true, and that their surface ships carried mines, although I would say going into action with a deck load of mines is not recommended practice. Whether Jellicoe produced this policy of not wanting to fight, or whether it was dictated to him by the Admiralty, or War Council or whoever, I don't know. If it came from above I feel sorry for him, but he clearly did not take the opportunity when it was presented to him at Jutland. Lucky he wasn't around in Admiral Byng's time, or else he just may have joined him on his quarter deck.

Further Jellicoe believed the German ships were better in all classes, battleships and battlecruisers, and had said as much when he was in the Admiralty before the war (page 308), so believing that his ships had inferior protection and were vulnerable to both gunfire and more so underwater weapons, it is not surprising that he would not engage the Germans closely, but rather would stand off at long range, outside torpedo range and where gunfire was less effective. All he had to do was not lose, then the spin doctors could take over and write history as if he had won. (see above where someone says by 1918 it appeared that Jutland was a victory, But it wasn't in 1916) Jellicoe himself says his reports were changed.

The point is made that the U-Boats ruined Britain economically, and the German surface fleet enabled this to occur. A victory at Jutland would have prevented this.

[PMHart]

Oh

Pete

[MikB]

The point is made that the U-Boats ruined Britain economically, and the German surface fleet enabled this to occur. A victory at Jutland would have prevented this.

That's just 20/20 hindsight - even if it were true, nobody at Jutland could have foreseen it with any confidence.

Regards,

MikB

[Simon Mills]

...Whether Jellicoe produced this policy of not wanting to fight, or whether it was dictated to him by the Admiralty, or War Council or whoever, I don't know. If it came from above I feel sorry for him, but he clearly did not take the opportunity when it was presented to him at Jutland...

I think it's safe to assume that Jellicoe would have been all too aware of the concerns of his political masters, and don't forget that it was Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, who said that Jellicoe was "the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon." The destruction of the Grand Fleet would have left Britain's supply lines incredibly vulnerable, never mind her ability to resupply the British Army in France, and there's little doubt that Jellicoe would have had these factors in the back of his mind. As to whether or not he didn't take his opportunity at Jutland, I'm not sure that this is the case. Admittedly there were a number of operational failures on the day, but don't forget that Jellicoe's force didn't actually engage until just after 6.00 p.m., and it was the Germans who turned away. Who's to say what would have happened if night hadn't intervened.

The issue of British naval design being inferior to that of Germany also needs to be seen in context. The British fleet was designed with the specific purpose of defending an Empire; as such the fact that the ships had to operate around the world, in different environments and with the crews living on board had considerable factors in their design. Tirpitz's original strategy meant that the High Seas Fleet was created for one purpose alone, namely to confront the Grand Fleet in home waters. Because it wasn't originally conceived for such wide-ranging activities there were a number of design factors that could be taken into account to give them the edge over their British counterparts, although I understand that this made them inherently uncomfortable to be aboard for prolonged periods -- a factor not lost on the German crews who were normally shore-based when the fleet was in port, but who had to live aboard their ships continuously for over six months when interned at Scapa Flow.

[bill24chev]

As I understand it, the HSF's mission at Jutland was to engage an unsupported part of the GF/BC force and by overwhelming force reduce the GF's advantage Dreadnought and Battle Cruisers. To some extent they succeeded in this by sinking two BC's in the initial engagement. However that only gave Hipper's BC squadron parity in BC's and the 5th Battle squadron Queen Elizabeth class ships had not been damaged until the HSF arrived.

This initial action was a defeat for Beatty due to the poor accuracy of the his BC's gunnery. They had not been able to carry out live practice when based at Rosyth. This was the reason that the 5th BS was part of Beatty's force, one BC squadron was at Scappa for Gunnery practice. The more accurate gunnery of the 5th BS and their ability to take a lot of punishment probably saved Beatty from more losses.

Beatty was then successful in Drawing the HSF onto the guns of the GF and in the short engagement the HSF suffered a lot of damage. Good seaman ship and tactics saved the HSF but this was nearly undone when Sheer turned back towards the GF and Scheer had to again disengage and try to get back to the safety of the Horns Reef .

During the night the HSF may have had one further chance of causing the GF serious damage. One of the 5th BC ships Either Valiant or Malaya, sighted a number og German Battleships in line ahead and close by. The captain of this ship, decided to await orders from his Squadron Flagship, Barham> assuming that Adm. Evans=thomhas was aware of the enemy presence. If the HSF ships also spotted the 5th BC, their formation of line ahead would have enabled them to engage the 5th BC in overwhelming numbers. The 5thn BC was down to 3 ships and Jellicoe's night formation of Squadron columns meant that the rest of the GF may not have been able to react to an attack on one (the 5th BCSqn.) column. Also At the time of Jutland the Germans where better equiped with searchlights and Starshells and were also probably better trained in night fighting. the loss loss or major repairs to the three QE class ships would have been a great victory for Scheer.

As I have said before there were problems with RN Ships, the BC's Gunnery, poor performance of AP Shells and failure to follow safety SOP's but the HSF and Germany was still blockaded, had fewer ships available compared to the GF in the immediate aftermath and forced the reintroduction of unlimited submarine warfare. This last factor eventually brought the USA into the war and caused the German Army to launch the series of , in the end, unsuccessful offensives in the spring of 1918 that wasted their reserves and reduced morale both at the Western front. in the HSF, and amongst the civillin population.

[Gary Charles]

I see that some people still subscribe to the propaganda about Germans living ashore, this of course is pure fantasy and utter rubbish. It just did not happen, and has been proved so in another thread, or on another forum. It is just another smoke screen to detract from the other issues raised, which have not been commented on, largely because they come from Jellicoes own writing.

[Signals]

It is OK, to say, the US tipped the scales in WW1, that is what won the war. The HSF would have continued to hold their own, the RN had no plan in motion to finish it, you can’t use the Blockade as the big victory as before the US entered the war it had not worked!

Agree Victory, and you have replied more politely than i would have done. Rather than making these blanket statements that everyone copies and pastes as fact, come up with some hard evidence. German crews were not barrack bound during the war, must be confusion of a pre-war policy. They were constantly at sea supporting and protecting minesweepers, so it is ridiculous to suggest they would daily move men from barracks to ships for this purpose. You should also be asking for some hard evidence of the match boxes they were living in on-board compared to the spacious palaces of their counterparts. I have read people throwing the comments on other threads this cramped nature of German accommodation as fact because they had thicker armour, it was something I read 17 years ago so it must be right, but there is never a mention that German ships were not confined to size re beams due to docks, and thus had wider beams. I think if people want to continue quoting these things please come up with direct comparisons as whenever I ask I never get an answer. So please Simon, facts please. How does better underwater construction, which Jellicoe states is a fact proven in battle that German ships were superior, make on-board accommodation less liveable, German ships were taking long cruises overseas pre-war, von Spee also did a tad of cruising around, what did his fleet have to say about this?

Simon, Churchill was very critical of the GF for not fighting in 1917, his comment Jellicoe was "the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon” is another throwaway line before Churchill’s mind was changed due to inaction & by 1917 a more apt line would be; “Jellicoe the only man who could have won the war in an afternoon but did not,” something Beatty may agree with me. Simply put, Churchill was no fan of a Navy not fighting in the true traditions of the Great Nelson, buy to conveniently use a comment he made makes your audience believe the opposite. What I don’t get is your comment that Jellicoe was mindful that a defeat would lead to British Sea Lanes being vulnerable. So the Grand Fleet failed at Jutland, is that what you are saying here? Because guess what, after Jutland British Sea lanes were more than a tad vulnerable, they coped a mauling, and all because the HSF was not destroyed, but even worse, the GF gave up the idea of forcing the issue. Beatty himself states in 1918 the HSF was the cause for the U-Boat carange. It has to be said, the HSF held their own, they were undefeated and caused the Royal Navy to lose its confidence to win the big battle. Great Navies like the one Nelson built are done so on the back aggression and an element of risk, but everyone pats Jellicoe on the head for not taking a risk or being aggressive because it fits the story, work that out.

Not sure why you are astonished Mike, people use hindsight to claim Jutland as a British Victory, The Admirals in WW1 were nothing like the Great Nelson, the Americans said they would have done things different in WW1, namely, they would have decided to fight, and when put to the test in WW2, they did this in the true nature of what Nelson would have done. I certainly have a right to compare these two wars as it is an example of how to fight a war using aggression when you are the superior force numerically. The inaction of the Grand Fleet post Jutland is an incubus on the back of the Royal Navy and the reason for all the spin post Jutland that is hard to swallow, they have cleverly used what is known as the deflection method and point the finger at the Germans as being unwilling to fight. But this is a clever cover as when you are the numerically superior navy to such a great extent as this conflict was, then forcing a battle, if you really want to fight, it is you that must take the front foot. It followed the same line as the Dardanelles, when it got too tough they handed the hard yards to the foot solider to win the war and if all you can claim is they were suppling the men in the trench, what can I say, a great thing to hang your hat on. I have always said, someone had to shed a lot blood to win that war, and the Grand Fleet decided it was not going to be them, they were more worried about their status in the post war world. C’mon Mike, beyond this thread there is this whole forum, and others like it, and when the topic of Tactical Victory is given to the GF as a Victory, then questioned, it turns to oh well it was a Strategic Victory. This was only possible in the long run as it was in WW2, and that was the entry into the war of the USA.

The other line too dropped, it was the Germans that turned away first, but what is this supposed to mean? It is only natural isn’t it when you are outnumbered to implement new tactics, what is not natural is the numerically superior navy does not give chase. The arrival of Jellicoe changed the battle, we all know that, for the Germans it simply turned into the defence of Germany. They firstly had to avoid encirclement, which they did, Sheer then said he needed to get to Horn Reef first so he could be in the box seat to make the decision to either continue the fight at dawn on their terms or turn for home. At daybreak he was surprised there was no GF, and if you read the Room 40 book they allude that by approx. 1030 PM Jellicoe should have had enough info to know the HSF was heading for Horns Reef. I can see a comment that the HSF had another chance to cause more damage to the GF but did not, so why not mention the damaged Battlecruisers of the HSF also came under the guns of the GF in the dark but were not fired upon.

The spin is just that, mention the 2^nd Battle of Helgoland, you will get, oh that was indecisive, but for who. The Germans won that engagement, their role was to defend their minesweepers and keep the channels open, did they do this, yes, and inflicted damage to their enemy. Did the Royal Navy achieve their goal, no, they failed miserably, so it was decisive, yes it was, the U-Boats continued to flow for the rest of the war, the Germans won this engagement. The British say, at wars end the U-Boat campaign was still serious, and it only stopped when they were withdrawn from the seas. The Great War was a huge disappointment for public and sailor alike, and no spin can hide this fact.

Sorry but the immediate entry of the US into WW1 was The Zimmermann Telegram, not as Post #32 alludes.

[bill24chev]

I agree that the final catalyst that convinced the USA to enter the war was the Zimmerman Telegram.

However, a question to ask is why was the Zimmerman Telegram sent?

Was it because the Germans due to unrestricted submarine warfare, were expecting President Wilson to declare war. the sending of the Zimmerman telegram therefore aimed at distracting the USA to secure its own border and not take part in a European War.

If this is the reason, then the aftermath of Jutland is one of the reasons for US involvement in the war. Global and large scale wars are generally not won by one battle or campaign. For example the outcome of the American Revolutionary war was decided as much by events and battles fought by the British against European states as against Washington,s forces, and early Confederate victories did not prevent their loss of the ACW.

Churchill was critical of the actions of the GF after he ceased to be First Lord of the Admiralty. It is easy to be critical when you are not directly have responsibility. His "lose the war in an afternoon" was not a throw away line at the time it was said. The GF, who ever commanded it could not win the war in an afternoon. The War had to be won by either blockading The German people into submission. or militarily. The Military defeat and the affect of the blockade on Germany came to an head in the Autumn of 1918.

[MikB]

In the end the effect of British blockade of Germany by surface navy outstripped the German blockade of Britain by U-boat - it was Germany that starved. No-one could reasonably argue that the entry of the US into the war didn't make a difference to that. But at Jutland nobody knew whether or when that was going to happen. Jellicoe was right to preserve the numerical superiority of the GF - it was the smaller ships that enforced the blockade, but without the preponderance of cover from the dreadnoughts they wouldn't be able to operate.

WW2 in the Pacific was about as different as a naval war could be. The technology with which it was to be fought was largely established with the initial attack, whereas in WW1 it was, literally, changing under them as they fought. There was no risk of the US being starved of foodstuffs or resources by enemy action at sea, and most of that action took place thousands of miles offshore. I don't accept that realistic comparisons can be made.

Regards,

MikB

[Simon Mills]

Simon, Churchill was very critical of the GF for not fighting in 1917, his comment Jellicoe was "the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon” is another throwaway line before Churchill’s mind was changed due to inaction & by 1917 a more apt line would be; “Jellicoe the only man who could have won the war in an afternoon but did not,” something Beatty may agree with me. Simply put, Churchill was no fan of a Navy not fighting in the true traditions of the Great Nelson, buy to conveniently use a comment he made makes your audience believe the opposite. What I don’t get is your comment that Jellicoe was mindful that a defeat would lead to British Sea Lanes being vulnerable. So the Grand Fleet failed at Jutland, is that what you are saying here? Because guess what, after Jutland British Sea lanes were more than a tad vulnerable, they coped a mauling, and all because the HSF was not destroyed, but even worse, the GF gave up the idea of forcing the issue. Beatty himself states in 1918 the HSF was the cause for the U-Boat carange. It has to be said, the HSF held their own, they were undefeated and caused the Royal Navy to lose its confidence to win the big battle. Great Navies like the one Nelson built are done so on the back aggression and an element of risk, but everyone pats Jellicoe on the head for not taking a risk or being aggressive because it fits the story, work that out.

Darren,

WC was pretty well known for his witty asides but they were rarely just throw away lines. Like any of his aphorisms they contained an essential truth, and I think that his reference to Jellicoe was, in this case, no different. As to Churchill being in favour of decisive action, based on his track record I don't think that anyone would disagree with that, but at the same time Churchill was the sort of man who could see the bigger picture. It was Churchill and Fisher who realised the strategic necessity of keeping the German fleet contained and although the Admiralty had been toying with the idea of using Scapa Flow as a base, it was ultimately Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, and Admiral Fisher who did it. They knew that by doing so they would concede effective control of the North Sea (hardly in the spirit of Nelson) but they still did it, with the result that Admiral Tirpitz's strategy of any clash with the Royal Navy being in the relatively secure area close to his home waters was no longer an option.

Nor am I for one minute suggesting that Jellicoe lay awake at nights worried about what his political masters at the Admiralty might think, but the simple fact is that he would have been aware of the broader strategic issues and they were vulnerable -- after all, a single German mine had sunk the brand new battlecruiser HMS Audacious in 1914. At this stage of the war battleships still dominated naval strategic thinking; I don't think that anyone (even the Germans) had really contemplated the scale of threat that the German U-boat campaign would ultimately become, but it's evident that the failure of the German surface strategy at Jutland ultimately made it possible. I never said that the High Seas Fleet itself was defeated, and indeed its mere existence continued to assist the U-boat campaign because it tied down huge Allied naval resources, but after Jutland its effective capability in the North Sea was on a downward trend.

None of this disguises the fact that the outcome of Jutland was a disappointment for the Grand Fleet, and I think I mentioned that in an earlier post, but in many ways their effective failures were no less than those of the High Seas Fleet. Mistakes were made on both sides at Jutland because of the very nature of a new kind of naval warfare, which few (if any) had experienced." As WC later said, "We had more captains of ships than captains of war." It was no different for the Germans; Jultand was a bit of a learning curve for everyone.

[Simon Mills]

I see that some people still subscribe to the propaganda about Germans living ashore, this of course is pure fantasy and utter rubbish. It just did not happen, and has been proved so in another thread, or on another forum.

I'm afraid I'm not aware of the other threads or forums regarding the living arrangements of the German crews. However, I have read in several places that they spent much of their time ashore, although the only specific reference I can remember at this time was in Dan van der Vat's book, The Grand Scuttle. I seem to recall that he was very precise about it...

[bill24chev]

Darren,

None of this disguises the fact that the outcome of Jutland was a disappointment for the Grand Fleet, and I think I mentioned that in an earlier post, but in many ways their effective failures were no less than those of the High Seas Fleet. Mistakes were made on both sides at Jutland because of the very nature of a new kind of naval warfare, which few (if any) had experienced." As WC later said, "We had more captains of ships than captains of war." It was no different for the Germans; Jultand was a bit of a learning curve for everyone.

Simon I think that this paragraph, more than any other, sums up nicely what happened at Jutland.

There have been a few references comparing Jellicoe to Nelson. In my opinion, to compare Jellicoe or any other WW1 (orWW2) Admiral is not really possible. The technology was so different and Nelson had over 200 years collective experience to base his decisions on, WW! Admirals had only the Russo-Japanese conflict of the previous decade and inconclusive clashes at Heligoland and Dogger Bank to base their tactics on.

WW2 and to some extent WW1 admirals also had Air Power to consider.

[MikB]

.

There have been a few references comparing Jellicoe to Nelson. In my opinion, to compare Jellicoe or any other WW1 (orWW2) Admiral is not really possible.

I've often wondered how to compare Jellicoe to Nelson. The conclusion I come to is that I don't know enough about Trafalgar - because on the face of it, Nelson's decision to engage the way he did looks foolish - allowing the enemy to be across his T for a long time during a slow approach - and maybe he was dead lucky, or maybe he knew a lot about the comparative fighting qualities of French and English crews at the time. But I don't know enough to visualise realistic alternative outcomes and so can't decide which.

Beatty certainly thought he was in the Nelson tradition, but he had failures in basic fleet-handling that are never commonly attributed to Nelson. It was Beatty's Flag Lieutenant who cobbled a number of his signals - and who ultimately committed suicide IIRC. Beatty's histrionics and mean-spirited backhanded attacks on Jellicoe seriously undermine the image he tried to project. But no-one can deny that he was courageous and never refused battle.

Regards,

MikB

[Simon Mills]

I've often wondered how to compare Jellicoe to Nelson. The conclusion I come to is that I don't know enough about Trafalgar - because on the face of it, Nelson's decision to engage the way he did looks foolish - allowing the enemy to be across his T for a long time during a slow approach - and maybe he was dead lucky, or maybe he knew a lot about the comparative fighting qualities of French and English crews at the time. But I don't know enough to visualise realistic alternative outcomes and so can't decide which.

It’s very hard to compare them. Nelson’s tactics at Trafalgar were undeniably bold – some would even say reckless – but he knew that the British sailors could handle their ships better than the enemy and, more importantly, he knew that the British gunners were far superior to their Franco/Spanish counterparts; it was very much a calculated risk.

As to the handling of the fleet after battle was joined, Nelson never really had to deal with that problem whereas Jellicoe and Beatty did. About the only comparable factor in 1805 and 1916 is that the custom was for the two fleets to be in line of battle before engaging. At Trafalgar Nelson modified it by approaching from an unorthodox angle and forming two columns rather than one, but the most obvious factor is that the ranges of the weaponry meant that at Trafalgar things got very up close and personal, whereas at Jutland the majority of the fighting was carried out at ranges which in 1805 would have seemed inconceivable. Moreover, once the British had penetrated the Franco-Spanish line at Trafalgar Nelson no longer had any real control of the events. It’s what he called a "Pell Mell" battle, which I think by its nature meant a generally confused and disorderly slugging match between the two opposing fleets.

Nelson’s task was very different to that of Jellicoe and Beatty, in that after placing his fleet in a superior tactical position he could be confident that his men and ships were capable of doing the job; in any event his overall view of much of the battle would have been limited and obscured, leaving him little scope for influencing most of what happened after the fighting had begun. At Jutland things may have been equally confused at times, but the probable carnage resulting from Iron Duke and the Friedrich der Grosse slugging it out at point blank range doesn’t bear thinking about.

[MikB]

Simon, there is also the factor that ships in Nelson's day were relatively much more resistant to the damage the contemporary weapons could inflict. It would be very unlikely for a few hits to deprive a vessel of its mobility or its ability to return fire, as guns were under local control for function as well as direction, and there were more of them. A ship had to be shot nearly to pieces and have many of it s crew incapacitated before it ceased to be a threat - unless it surrendered, and that was not a realistic possibility in WW1.

You're right - comparisons are as impossible as with the carrier-borne pacific naval war in WW2.

Regards,

MikB

[Simon Mills]

All true. Nelson's ships were less prone to a sudden catastrophic explosion and there was generally little thought of pursuit of an enemy after a battle, yet these are all issues that Jellicoe and Beatty had to consider.

How did a thread about a WWI sortie which never happened end up with an analysis of the fighting at Trafalgar?

S.

[MikB]

How did a thread about a WWI sortie which never happened end up with an analysis of the fighting at Trafalgar?

S.

Because you can't talk about the HSF in late WW1 without discussing Jutland, and you can't discuss Jutland without running across comparisons of Jellicoe and Beatty with Nelson...

Regards,

MikB

[healdav]

Unlike, it would appear, everyone else on this thread, I have been at a lecture by a successor to Jellicoe and had himself been at a lecture on Jutland by Jellicoe.

He said that Jellcioe's main problem was that he had no idea what the German fleet was trying to do, and he was badly let down by Beattie.

In effect, Beattie went into battle and neglected to even tell Jellicoe what was happening. Goodenough in his cruiser did try to tell Jellicoe, but although he said what the Germans were doing he neglected to say where he was was as he watched. Jellcioe had to guess. And his guesses were, on thw whole, pretty good.

Remember that in 1916 there was no radar, no sonar, and radio could be very fickle. In addition, Jellicoe did not have, as commanders had in WW2, the benefit of guidance from the Admiralty from radio intercepts. In fact, what guidance he did get was wrong due to Fisher asking the wrong question - "where is Call sign X?" and not the correct question - "where is the German fleet commander?". The interceptors answered the first question correctly, but did not say that when the fleet went to sea their call sign changed. Why should they, they had not been asked the question.

At the end of the war the German commanders did want or at least consider, sending the fleet on a death run against the Rn. Not unnaturally, the German sailors objected to this; why should they be sacrificed for some glory for the admirals?. Given the state of the German civil state at the time - a real danger of revolution in the Russian sense, the whole idea was dropped.

[simonharley]

Are you referring to Mountbatten, healdav?

Simon

[MikB]

In fact, what guidance he did get was wrong due to Fisher asking the wrong question - "where is Call sign X?" and not the correct question - "where is the German fleet commander?". The interceptors answered the first question correctly, but did not say that when the fleet went to sea their call sign changed. Why should they, they had not been asked the question.

To my understanding it wasn't Fisher who asked the wrong question, but (IIRC) Captain Jackson, who already had an abrasive relationship with the interception staff, who therefore didn't try to get to the bottom of what the question meant.

When it became apparent to Jellicoe that the information he had was seriously wrong, he - quite reasonably - treated further Admiralty information with suspicion; and some have said that was why he didn't believe in the Horns Reef route for the German escape.

Regards,

MikB

[simonharley]

Captain Jason Hines, U.S.N.,'s article "Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland". (The Journal of Military History 72 (4): pp. 1117-1153.) is a useful corrective to the quite unfounded claims that Captain Thomas Jackson screwed up at Jutland, and that Jellicoe's choices during the night were so limited.

Simon

[MikB]

Thanks, I'll see if I can find that.

Regards,

MikB

[healdav]

Are you referring to Mountbatten, healdav?

Simon

No. Unfortunately, whilst I have the story in my notes from the College I don't have the admiral's name!

I have a feeling that it was the Admiral commanding the Staff College at the time, but for the life of me I can't remember what it was.