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Remembered Today:

Should the Germans have sortied their battlefleet in spring 1918?


Lt Colonel Gerald Smyth

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It didn't take a genius to work out that Ludendroff's offensive and their resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare in the spring of 1918 was the last gasp for the Germans, their final roll of the dice to crush the Allies before enough American reinforcements arrived and our blockade starved them out. Question is why didn't they also send out their surface fleet to attack the cross Channel/Atlantic convoys to deny the forces in France/Belgium the reinforcements they so desperately need? (especially important given Lloyd George's reluctance to send reinforcements to Haig for fear he would use them in a Somme style offensive bloodbath)Instead, they leave them to rot in Kiel until defeat is inevitable and then when they try to send them on some desperate last attempt to save face this sparks a riot that leads to Germany's final defeat. So why didn't they use their fleet when it would still have been some use to them?

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The High Seas Fleet of March/April 1918 was probably a faint shadow of its former self if compared to the fleet that had fought at Jutland only two years earlier. For starters many of the better officers and men had already transferred to the U-boat flotillas, while political unrest, which boiled over in November 1918, was already beginning to fester during the summer of 1917. In the spring of 1918 there were some planned surface raids on British convoys in the North Sea, but nothing came of it and by the time the Grand Fleet was on the scene the German ships had already returned to port.

Apart from the questionable experience of the remaining manpower, by the spring of 1918 the High Seas Fleet was also significantly outnumbered and outgunned, so I suspect that any attempt to engage the British surface forces would have been doomed to failure. Even so, just by continuing to exist this “fleet in being” effectively tied down the Grand Fleet, thus ensuring that such huge resources could not be deployed elsewhere by the Allies.

The weaknesses in what remained of the High Seas Fleet were conclusively demonstrated six months later at the end of October 1918, when a planned sortie to take on the Grand Fleet and possibly improve Germany’s position at the peace negotiations was abandoned after the German crews mutinied.

S.

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In the spring of 1918, to get to the Atlantic to interfere with US Army Troopships, the German High Seas fleet would need to either go the long way round past the Grand Fleet at Scapa, Invergordon, and Rosyth or Make a dash through the Channel.

Room 40 would have given The Grand Fleet ample time to form and intercept on the Northern route. at this Time not only did the Grand fleet out number and outgun the Germans, including a Squadron of US navy dreadnoughts, but had rectified the problems with shell handling and poor quality shells although no Battle in war can be regarded as a forgone conclusion, I bevel the high seas Fleet would have failed to breakout into the Atlantic.

With the alternative route through the channel the High Seas Fleet may have got to the Straits of Dover before being intercepted by the Grand Fleet but mines and torpedo attacks by the Harwich and Dover forces would have taken a toll, not to mention the natural dangers of the Narrow seas.

A Third possibility would have been to slip the German battle cruisers out in ones and twos ( as per WW2). They would have been able to brush aside the armed merchant ships of the blockade force. However, once the alarm was raised for the first sortie RN and US Battle Squadrons would be positioned to intercept any future atempts. The US Navy had a surplus of battleships that could be made available to provide a close escort to any troop convoys.

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Breaking out heavy ships in ones and twos would have been a far more difficult proposition for the coal-fired ships of WW1 than the oil-fired ones of WW2. Coaling at sea was a practical impossibility. Sorties would have had to be limited in scope, and require a break-back in short order afterwards.

The only justification for building and holding the HSF was the hope of breaking the distant blockade by reducing the preponderance of the GF by defeating subdivisions of it in detail, and then bringing about a decisive fleet action when the GF had been sufficiently weakened. The whole of WW1 history through Jutland and beyond had demonstrated to anyone with unimpaired judgement that this simply wasn't going to happen. German naval command had failed to avoid blundering into a fleet action they didn't want and, although British losses were heavier, these were made good faster then the German. After Jutland the prospects faded away further and faster, especially with American reinforcements arriving.

The HSF of early 1918 had less prospect of defeating the RN - in combination with USN elements - than it did in 1916, still less with sufficient severity to allow relief of the desparate shortages at home.

Regards,

MikB

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In April 1918 the HSF made a sortie to attack a convoy to Norway. This was their final big operation of the war. They failed to get the convoy do to poor inteligence. The Battlecruiser Moltke had a engine breakdown and was later torpedod and damaged by a British submarine. At least thats what i believed happened This is off the top of my head. It should also be pointed out the HSF suffered from a coal shortage throughout WW I which did effect there operations. Add to this the coal they did get was of mainly of poor quality.

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In April 1918 the HSF made a sortie to attack a convoy to Norway. This was their final big operation of the war. They failed to get the convoy do to poor inteligence. The Battlecruiser Moltke had a engine breakdown and was later torpedod and damaged by a British submarine. At least thats what i believed happened This is off the top of my head. It should also be pointed out the HSF suffered from a coal shortage throughout WW I which did effect there operations. Add to this the coal they did get was of mainly of poor quality.

Indeed they did - limited scope, with the outside hope of catching a segment of the GF in lower strength - but the breakdown to Moltke was enough to send the main part of the HSF heading for home. Any damage in seas where the enemy has superiority is always deadly serious. As at Jutland, only British failures saved them from more serious loss. And they were 24 hours out in their timing for the convoy.

Regards,

MikB

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Indeed they did - limited scope, with the outside hope of catching a segment of the GF in lower strength - but the breakdown to Moltke was enough to send the main part of the HSF heading for home. Any damage in seas where the enemy has superiority is always deadly serious. As at Jutland, only British failures saved them from more serious loss. And they were 24 hours out in their timing for the convoy.

Regards,

MikB

Just to add a bit more info to what has already been stated - a raiding force of Battlecruisers belonging to the High Seas Fleet did sortie out to take on a Norwegian convoy which Admiral Scheer hoped would be escorted by American Battleships.

On 22 April the German fleet assembled off Wilhelmshaven and departed next morning. Despite reaching the convoy route undetected, the operation failed due to faulty intelligence. They had narrowly missed both a west-bound convoy which departed Bergen on 22nd and an east bound convoy that had left Methil, Scotland on the 24th.

In response Beatty sortied with a force of 31 battleships and four battlecruisers, but he was too late to intercept the retreating Germans who arrived safely back in their home waters early on 25 April (Moltke having survived a torpedo hit from a British submarine - E42).

Michael

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This history is the vindication of the claim that Jutland was ultimately a British victory. The HSF could no doubt have battered its way out into the Atlantic by one or other of the possible routes, but it would have suffered major losses on the way and would then have been doomed to wither on the vine for want of friendly ports, fuel, ammunition, provisions, etc. The main fleet could arguably have sent cruisers, and perhaps even dispensable pre-dreadnoughts, to reinforce the raiding efforts of the Zeebrugge destroyer flotilla, but it is very unlikely that they would have got through the Harwich Force and the Dover Patrol. Present day perceptions of what might have been possible tend to be coloured by the situation in WW2, when the Germans had access to bases in Norway and on the French Atlantic coast.

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This history is the vindication of the claim that Jutland was ultimately a British victory...

I could be wrong, but most naval historians regard Jutland as a tactical victory for the Germans, by virtue of the fact that they inflicted heavier casualties, but a strategic victory for the British, because the German plan to destroy an isolated squadron of battlecruisers was not a success, to say nothing of the fact that the High Seas Fleet itself suffered extensive damage and was unable to put to sea for weeks.

Admiral Tirpitz' original "Risk Theory" had gambled on the fact that the British, in order to preserve the supremacy of the Royal Navy, would not challenge the smaller German High Seas Fleet in battle, not because they feared losing, but because the scale of the damage that would be inflicted on the Grand Fleet could leave Britain's empire vulnerable to attack from France or Russia. Jutland effectively proved that Tirpitz was wrong so in that respect you could say that the German strategy ultimately failed, but the consequence was the switch to a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, which for a time was far more successful.

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Bill24chev, it wasn't a given that Room 40 would know about a German sortie. Provided the Germans kept their W/T signalling to a minimum, as they did in April, 1918, then there was nothing for I.D.25, as it had become, to go on.

Simon

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Breaking out heavy ships in ones and twos would have been a far more difficult proposition for the coal-fired ships of WW1 than the oil-fired ones of WW2. Coaling at sea was a practical impossibility. Sorties would have had to be limited in scope, and require a break-back in short order afterwards.

The only justification for building and holding the HSF was the hope of breaking the distant blockade by reducing the preponderance of the GF by defeating subdivisions of it in detail, and then bringing about a decisive fleet action when the GF had been sufficiently weakened. The whole of WW1 history through Jutland and beyond had demonstrated to anyone with unimpaired judgement that this simply wasn't going to happen. German naval command had failed to avoid blundering into a fleet action they didn't want and, although British losses were heavier, these were made good faster then the German. After Jutland the prospects faded away further and faster, especially with American reinforcements arriving.

The HSF of early 1918 had less prospect of defeating the RN - in combination with USN elements - than it did in 1916, still less with sufficient severity to allow relief of the desparate shortages at home.

Regards,

MikB

I complexly forgot about the "coaling" problem for the German ship but i did not think that they would be successful because the RN & USN had the numerical superiority to maintain the GF and provide Battleship/Battle Cruiser escorts for Atlantic Troop convoys..

My two other proposed options would have probably ended in the destruction of the HSF

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Bill42chev, it wasn't a given that Room 40 would know about a German sortie. Provided the Germans kept their W/T signalling to a minimum, as they did in April, 1918, then there was nothing for I.D.25, as it had become, to go on.

Simon

You are of course right that the HSF may not have given away there movements by radio. However the Norhsea was a busy area and a Submarine, patroling surface ship or neutral ship would have spotted the HSF and reported.

If the HSF was attempting a breakout or attack on the distant blockade ships the GF would need less notice because the engagement would have been nearer th GF'S bases than was the case at Jutland..

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I complexly forgot about the "coaling" problem for the German ship but i did not think that they would be successful because the RN & USN had the numerical superiority to maintain the GF and provide Battleship/Battle Cruiser escorts for Atlantic Troop convoys..

My two other proposed options would have probably ended in the destruction of the HSF

As Siege Gunner says, it's all too easy to think of Atlantic breakout in WW2 terms - but without French and Norwegian bases, such a breakout could have no effective support. If the ships breaking out didn't find unprotected targets on first sweep, or worse still got detected and reported, they'd then face the prospect of a fighting break-back with nothing to show.

The German surface Navy's Channel Dash of WW2 was trumpeted as a propaganda snub to the RN, but was actually an admission of defeat in the Atlantic - and that was when they had the French bases.

Regards,

MikB

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I could be wrong, but most naval historians regard Jutland as a tactical victory for the Germans, by virtue of the fact that they inflicted heavier casualties, but a strategic victory for the British, because the German plan to destroy an isolated squadron of battlecruisers was not a success, to say nothing of the fact that the High Seas Fleet itself suffered extensive damage and was unable to put to sea for weeks.

I don't think you can even call it a tactical victory when a weaker fleet has its T crossed by a stronger, has to do an elaborate turnabout to escape and then makes the same mistake again minutes later. There might have been a technical victory in the damage-resistance of the German ships, and there was certainly a propaganda victory in the days following, but Scheer's tactics have not generally been admired. He avoided complete debacle by a combination of well-trained crews and captains, and intelligence failures by the British.

He was dead lucky. If British fortunes had even been ordinarily good, at least a couple more of his heavy ships would have gone down.

Regards,

MikB

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Coaling ships at sea was not impossible, although it was certainly far more difficult than oiling at sea. I have never seen this problem cited as one of the reasons for changing to oil, but it may have been involved.

However, there were experiments in coaling at sea, and they were generally successful (I have seen a photo of some of the experiments), but it was very slow. Coal could only be transferred in sacks, and even if there was a continuous arrival, it was much slower than coaling when alongside (basically, there was a continuous line from the stern of the supply ship to the bow or near of the warship, and coal in sacks passed along the line). You have to factor in sea states as well. It is difficult enough oiling in a sea, but moving sacks takes you into a much higher level of difficulty, especially with over the stern activity.

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It didn't take a genius to work out that Ludendroff's offensive and their resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare in the spring of 1918 was the last gasp for the Germans, their final roll of the dice to crush the Allies before enough American reinforcements arrived and our blockade starved them out.

This is incorrect. The Germans resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917.

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By 21 March 1917, seven American merchant ships had already been sunk by U-boats. President Wilson summoned Congress and on 6 April 1917, America entered the war.

Five coal-burning dreadnoughts served with the British Grand Fleet, and others were based in Ireland to counter any break-out by German battle-cruisers which might have been tempted to attack US troopship convoys. Other USN units served as convoy escorts.

Michael

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By 21 March 1917, seven American merchant ships had already been sunk by U-boats. President Wilson summoned Congress and on 6 April 1917, America entered the war.

Five coal-burning dreadnoughts served with the British Grand Fleet, and others were based in Ireland to counter any break-out by German battle-cruisers which might have been tempted to attack US troopship convoys. Other USN units served as convoy escorts.

Michael

Based in Ireland the USN ships, although slower than German Battle Cruisers, would have a head start to be in position with troop convoys before the could be attacked. p[providing the Germans were detected going around Scotland or through the Channel .

On the result at Jutland Jellicoe achieved what Nelson had done at Trafalgar, he had ensured the continuation of the blockade; admittedly with a less obvious victory. " the HSF had assaulted its Gaoler but was still in Gaol"

For the RN the biggest problem was technical, British amour piercing shells tended to breakup/explode before penetration. At the time i believe it was thought that this was also due to the quality and greater thickness of German Armour on the HSF Battle Cruisers. apparently tests post war on German (Krupp) armour plate showed results that it was actually weaker than British armour which meant that the British BC's were only slightly less well protected than there German counterparts. it was failiure to follow SOP's in Beaties Sqns. that led to the loss of the three RN BC's and obsolete design that caused the loss of the Heavy cruisers Defence and Warrior

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I think a lot of people misunderstand my point. I'm not saying that the Germans would have had any chance of victory at sea in 1918 (the arrival of the American fleet at Queenstown essentially spelt an end to any possiblilty of that) but could they have sacrificed their fleet, sending them out individually or in small groups by night to destroy the convoys, giving their land forces some small chance of victory?

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Not least any attempt to foray was impossible because of the resolutely mutinous state on many of the Gerrman ships. In addition and arguably the British blackade was Briatain's ace card in victory.

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I think a lot of people misunderstand my point. I'm not saying that the Germans would have had any chance of victory at sea in 1918 (the arrival of the American fleet at Queenstown essentially spelt an end to any possiblilty of that) but could they have sacrificed their fleet, sending them out individually or in small groups by night to destroy the convoys, giving their land forces some small chance of victory?

I think I would stick to what I said in my original post (#2). The fact that the High Seas Fleet was outnumbered and outgunned, combined with the low morale and potentially mutinuous elements within the fleet itself, means that any such operation would have been unlikely to succeed. When they did eventually try to put to sea for what was perceived by the rank and file as a final confrontation on 29th October 1918, Scheer's plan collapsed before the fleet had even been able to completely assemble; the crews of two battleships (Thuringen and Helgoland) were even threatened with being torpedoed by ships on their own side if they didn't surrender.

In October 1918 the sailors of the High Seas Fleet were not prepared to sacrifice themselves, and I suspect that the situation would have been little different earlier in the year.

S.

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For the High Seas Fleet in 1918 read the Yamato in 1945..... It would've met the same fate to no purpose whatsoever.

Would it? If they had stemmed the flow of reinforcements to France and Belgium and helped the German Army in the field would it have been pointless?

Why did the German's fight to fanatically in 1945 but cave in and mutiny back in 1918?

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Any potential benefits from such an operation would almost certainly have been completely outweighed by the negatives.

Aside from the fact that the High Seas Fleet had been denuded of manpower to the U-boat flotillas and throughout 1917 had also experienced problems with morale and discipline, the fact is that even if the High Seas Fleet had left port then its chances of success in the kind of operation which you suggest would have been minimal. Germany would have been incapable of keeping such a large fleet supplied on a long term basis (even the British couldn't do it, which is why they settled on the notion of distant blockade), while the strategic location of the British Isles would have effectively kept the German ships bottled up in the North Sea.

Had the two fleets actually met then while it is reasonable to assume that the Grand Fleet would have been damaged to some extent, the likelihood is that the High Seas Fleet would have been badly mauled, if not destroyed utterly. Even if by some miracle a few ships had got through, their damaged and unsupported condition would have left them incredibly vulnerable; even if by some miracle they found themselves in the right place at the right time when they finally came across an Allied convoy in the Atlantic (from where the vast majority of the war materials, supplies and personnel came), it's unlikely that they would have been in a position to exploit it.

Aftter Jutland the Germans effectively acknowledged that the best way to wage the economic war against British and Allied shipping was via the U-boat. The ships of the High Seas Fleet could not have added materially to the conflict in 1918, and it can even be argued that their sacrifice would only have hampered the U-boat campaign. As long as the High Seas Fleet existed, even if only as a fleet in being, its very presence had a massive effect on the strategic deployment of British and Allied warships. Without the High Seas Fleet these Allied war assets could have been deployed elsewhere, so the arguments in favour of any any breakout were negligible. The potential losses would have massively outweighed any potential gains.

S.

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Agree no benefit for a sortie, the main focus was to ruin Britain economically by using the U-boats of which only did not succeed due to lack of numbers and the entry of the US into the war with the large amount of aid & small vessels they offered along with teaching the British how to spell the word Convoy. There would be no U-Boat campaign if there was no High Seas Fleet so they were way too important to risk. The British had tried to mine a ring around the Germans, but this ended up in favour of the Germans due to the fact they could choose where they could clear a gateway for the U-Boats under the guns of the HSF, and following this the Grand Fleet could not close these gateways due to a lack of will to take on the HSF again after Jutland, and thus did suffer terrible economic damage due to losses of their merchant fleet which were the very people the Navy was supposed to protect. With the numbers against them in 1917-1918 of around 4 to 5 to 1 the HSF could in reality only hold the fort against these numbers. Lose this Fleet and they expose the whole of their Northern coast to the Russians in the Baltic. With this they succeeded and held their own.

For people to be claiming Jutland was eventually a tactical British Victory is a little bit mischievous and gives failed British admirals something to hang their tainted reputations on & there is a reason there is no Jutland Square in London, it is incredible if you look at what the outcome would have been had it been a British Victory, and even had the British losses been greater as Sheers says and happened again, Britain would not give up, that is the British spirit, timid leadership like at the start of WW2 would be replaced with a Churchill and we may have seen a different war. The only way to knock out Britain is to invade, they had a great geological position to make this stand. Had the GF been crushed Germany then would have to invade half the world to get supplies going as much was from allied ports of origin and if a wharf worker won’t load the goods you have an issue bigger than opening up sea lanes. But how long are we drawing the bow to make this claim of a Jutland, a tactical victory can be claimed by the likes of Wellington at Waterloo, knowing full well he could possibly be beaten by the French he chose a defensive position with the hope Blucher would turn up, keep his promise, and swing the balance in the Allies favour, now that was a clever tactical victory by Wellington. Now in comparison, after Jutland the Grand Fleet also chose only to keep an ineffective defensive ring and not to fight, Jellicoe states not one of them could think of a way of forcing battle on the Germans and he knew only full well the side with the superior numbers had the responsibility of forcing an action, but they did not have the will to do it after Jutland, and they had no idea that when these decisions were made not to fight the USA would be the Blucher of the day, even though the US get little or no credit in this area.

It may also not be a given that the GF would prevail either, which is most likely why they held back after Jutland, Jellicoe concedes he cannot guarantee it won’t happen again, Sheers says he can do it again but it won’t change the situation, but for Jellicoe the world was watching these weakness with great interest & if it happened again you can no longer hide. It is obvious the mine & torpedo was the game changer, and Jellicoe knew his ships were no match for the Germans with underwater protection. So for this wanting to allude to the fact there was no difference with the big ships in this aspect there was, British ships were proving easy to sink with single hits from a mine or torpedo, German ships as with Goeben not so, plus the numerous number of hits the Submarines got in on the Germans prove this fact. Even reconstructed ships & new capital ships going into WW2 such as Ark Royal continued this aspect.

The war had dragged on for 3 years+ and all because the ring was still open, and would have gone on much longer had it not been for the US, whatever side the US joined would have won that conflict. The key to the war was completing the uncompleted blockade of Germany, and sitting back after Jutland and not forcing the issue was not going to do this, & had they crushed the Germans at Jutland they could have closed the ring, Holland, Denmark, Sweden & Norway were keeping the war going and it was the US’s entry and port of origin re supplies and the added political pressure from the US that forced these counties hand in the critical period of mid-1918, after which things fell apart in Germany. The British say Germany by April 1918 had increased its food production with efforts from the government, they were using alternative materials and the war was going on, they were setting up business in Captured Russian areas & especially the Ukraine, but before this could all take effect the British say that America were the ones who had the immediate effect on the war, and in closing down the Baltic countries politically as was achieved the war was over in a way had the Royal Navy conducted a close effective Blockade of Germany in the first place. So sorry, I have never seen how Jutland could be deemed a tactical British victory when the focus has been centred around the effect of the blockade of which they can hardly claim all the credit, they war would go on, the US was the key.

Why rely on Room 40 by the way, they may have put Jellicoe in a position to fight, but can’t make him fight or any other Admiral. Some say Jellicoe was given enough information in time to meet Sheer at Daybreak at Horns Reef even without the Zeppelin recon info not passed on because someone with this information was asleep, or that an aggressive bolder Admiral would have taken a punt on the info he was given in time to catch this so called inferior enemy at Horn Reef.

The sad fact of the matter of Jutland and its aftermath was the true reality that Britannia no longer solely Ruled the waves, she had conceded and now had to share them with other great navies like Japan & America, and from this point in history Britain could no longer defeat a major European Power as they had done in Nelson’s day without the aid of the USA. She had gone from the greatest battle fleet of the day in May 1916 to scouting around defending their waters in vessel they themselves deemed only fit for lesser navies with the aid of the US, while this great battle fleet was powerless to stop the enemy submarines leaving their bases. Although Germany did not win the war, their navy had held their own against odds that on papers would suggest they would struggle to defend their coasts and waters against an aggressor, but even against these odds they launched a naval campaign to economically ruin England, and England have never been the same again and began a slow slide from their pinnacle of Nelson’s days. A true tactical victory are the ones implemented by the great Nelson, and from his victories there was no slide from the world stage, they gave England strength to the point where former foes did not rise up again 20 years later as they would be so soundly beaten.

There simply was no great reason for the German Battle fleet to sortie, break out, no one left to trade with, no coaling stations, and I guess anyone who was up against the legendary strength of the Grand Fleet would also be expecting a huge offensive at any moment to defend but for some odd reason it never came. The HSF had in effect broken the Blockade by their invasion of the Osel & Dago in the Baltic and the pressure led to Russia’s demise from the war, but to take effect this needed more time which was dashed by the political efforts on the Baltic Counties. The reason the political scene was so strong in 1917-1918 to force the hands on neutrals was indeed required by the lack of success of the blockade and the failure to crush the HSF. So it is time to start giving the effect the US had on WW1 some serious credit as it is long overdue from much of the over the top stuff written by failed admirals of WW1, the war was much bigger than their egos. So what would have happened had the US not come into the war, simply put from a Naval point of view, the British simply had no idea what to do, sit back & hope for the best. You want to look at the perfect naval war last century that was a good as anything Nelson did, look no further that the USN in the Pacific, and when you do you see there is no comparison to the supposed spoils of Jutland.

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