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Remembered Today:

Haig's achievement.


phil andrade

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As a proponent of winning wars by taking the offensive, Haig, as C-i-C, secured the greatest victory ever gained by British arms in land warfare.

I wonder if his contribution in the defensive fighting of the autumn of 1914, when he was Corps Commander, and in the ordeal of the spring of 1918, has been given its due.

Phil (PJA)

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I can't help thinking that the opening sentence is going to cloud the contributions you obtain for the second. Surely it was sheer attrition and the effects of being overstretched by two major fronts that did for the Germans - not to mention the massive contribution of the French to name but one of many significant allies - not some grand coup de main that quite simply never happened.

Whatever qualities Haig possessed (and I believe he had many) it was not his offensive spirit that secured victory.

Suddery

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Ah, the learned voice of a Sir Splatathread.

What a joy it must be to be the custodian of so much free thought.

Suddery

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I am an admirer of FM Haig but no one general, admiral or politician won the war.

it was a combination of the failure of Germany to gain a quick victory in the west in 1914.

Once that had failed a war on two major fronts meant that not until the winter of 1917 would they have enough manpower to launch an offensive in the west with any chance of success. The British and french armies were just resilient enough to stop the German army, a consequence of this failure by the Germans was that precious reserves were used up resulting in the success of the final allied offensives in the West.

FM Haig along with Marshall Foch had an important role in this victory, so did the American declaration of war persuaded the Germans to launch the offensive in the spring of 1918 before the US Army was at a strenghth in France to influence the outcome.

The Royal Navies blockade also played its part but this may have been less influential as Germany could to some extent have imported food and materials from Russia.

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I wonder if his contribution in the defensive fighting ...snip... in the ordeal of the spring of 1918, has been given its due.

Phil (PJA)

In my view, Phil, despite the plethora of studies of Haig, his role in the period of March to March 1918 has been under-researched. I've covered this in a limited way on my book on the Flanders fighting in April but most works on 1918 give it rather short shrift.

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Thank you, Chris.

If, as we are told, Haig had a predisposition in favour of offensive warfare, then his achievement in holding things together under the pressure of that monstrous onslaught in the spring of 1918 is all the more remarkable.

Phil (PJA)

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In my view, Phil, despite the plethora of studies of Haig, his role in the period of March to March 1918 has been under-researched. I've covered this in a limited way on my book on the Flanders fighting in April but most works on 1918 give it rather short shrift.

Although admittedly 1918 is not the broadest of chapters in his work, I found 'Douglas Haig and the First World War" J.P Harris CUP 2008 a very interesting read on the subject.

With regard to your points Phil, I too tend towards an overall positive appreciation of Haig but more as a well connected, politically aware and effective CinC than a strategic General. His defensive moments seem to me not to have been of his own contrivance but more necessities of circumstance, foremost of these being the 1918 German offensives. Surely these were largely reactive episodes despite some significant attempts at 'strength in depth'. Is it fair to say that I don't think Haig was in too much control of these latter circumstances ? I'd be more than happy to listen to opinions to the contrary.

Suddery

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Should we accord more praise to a man who fights and wins spectacularly when he works in " his comfort zone", than to someone who makes a very good account of himself when he battles in circumstances not suited to his training and inclination ?

In this regard, I'm thinking about Haig's achievement defensively at First Ypres. Henry Wislon defined him as a good defensive general, which Haig and others might have deemed a rather equivocal compliment.

And, of course, we must think principally of spring 1918 in order to guage Haig's prowess when fighting on the defensive.

Few people would associate Haig with the defensive. Out of all the battle casualties suffered by the BEF on the Western Front 1914-18, five out of every six were sustained when Haig was C-i -C. And, of those, at least three quarters - maybe four fifths - were incurred in fighting when Haig had comitted his armies to the offensive.

Fighting and winning in The Hundred Days, though, was not just a reflection of Haig acting in suitable circumstances for his qualities to be engaged : he had done a lot to get those circumstances set up, hadn't he ?

Phil (PJA)

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At the least, I would suggest Haig's retention of a cavalry force for the fighting of 1918 was an achievement. Had the German army possessed such a thing the fighting of early 1918 might have been very different, and had Haig not retained three divisions of mobile troops for March/April, the outcome could have been very different.

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He was also shrewd in placing his weakest Army in an area where he could afford to give ground for the German 1918 Spring Offensives. As Phil says, his handling of 1st, and also 2nd Ypres, was pretty impressive also. Mons and the retreat was not exactly well handled but he must have learned well and quickly by 1st Ypres.

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At the least, I would suggest Haig's retention of a cavalry force for the fighting of 1918 was an achievement. Had the German army possessed such a thing the fighting of early 1918 might have been very different, and had Haig not retained three divisions of mobile troops for March/April, the outcome could have been very different.

I'd like to make two points about this.

(i) Surely Haig viewed the cavalry as an exploitative offensive strike force and as such they would always be de facto in reserve. I think his proposed use of the 3rd Cavalry Division at Loos (declined by Major-General Briggs) underlines his perception of the purpose of cavalry - then again could he anything but given his background. Both he and Rawlinson later decried French for failing to release reserves in the same action (another argument, another day but here I think French may have been right) and this, in its ultimacy, did for the old CinC. Again I think this demonstrates his nature.

(ii) The three division force was held back as both a sop to, and at the behest of Foch, who had wanted them transferred to French command to support failings further south in the line. I do agree that at this time he had been preparing for anticipated troubles at Ypres and North of the line where British political expedience would necessarily have been looking at defence of the channel ports. However, we should not forget that Henry Wilson had to counsel Haig against unduly sanguine operations against the Hindenburg line in the September (dare I say that Peter Hart is, oh I don't know, most illuminating on these later aspects in Chapter 13 of 'A Very British Victory'). I think his spirit was always for the offensive although no-one in actuality is that one dimensional - Hitler aside.

All that said I do admire Haig. Someone had to stay there, take all the flak, keep it together and fight the Army corner, all of which I think he did admirably. He was also open to the modernisation of materiel and scientific adaptation. And who were the alternatives ? Robertson would never have been acceptable politically despite his gifts, Wilson who was too much the staff eminence grise or Allenby who had muddied his boots in France. The rest of the full General were probably all either Haig's men or long in the tooth.

So a man of many capabilities but not, to my mind, those of defensive strategy.

Suddery

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Should we accord more praise to a man who fights and wins spectacularly when he works in " his comfort zone", than to someone who makes a very good account of himself when he battles in circumstances not suited to his training and inclination ?

In this regard, I'm thinking about Haig's achievement defensively at First Ypres. Henry Wislon defined him as a good defensive general, which Haig and others might have deemed a rather equivocal compliment.

And, of course, we must think principally of spring 1918 in order to guage Haig's prowess when fighting on the defensive.

Few people would associate Haig with the defensive. Out of all the battle casualties suffered by the BEF on the Western Front 1914-18, five out of every six were sustained when Haig was C-i -C. And, of those, at least three quarters - maybe four fifths - were incurred in fighting when Haig had comitted his armies to the offensive.

Fighting and winning in The Hundred Days, though, was not just a reflection of Haig acting in suitable circumstances for his qualities to be engaged : he had done a lot to get those circumstances set up, hadn't he ?

Phil (PJA)

Many fair and good points Phil, I just don't agree with your assessment of the hundred days.

Suddery

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The assessment I offered about Haig's role in the Hundred Days was a bit slippery : I ended it with a question mark, almost as a kind of disclaimer !

The other thing that I feel a bit wobbly about is the question of how much of Haig's war actually comprised defensive fighting. No question about the first half of 1918 : it's the first half of 1916 that is harder to guage. I get the impression that the Germans were pretty aggressive against the British during that period. Verdun, surely, set the tone here : the extension of the British front into the Arras sector reflects the enormous pressure the French were under ; and the German attacks against the British both there and in the Mount Sorrel sector in the Ypres Salient suggest that the Germans were keen to make significant attacks in a diversionary role.

Didn't Haig allude to this when he mentioned the large number of casualties his men had sustained in those months, with a mention of hundreds of mine attacks that the Germans had made ?

Editing : here's the passage from Haig's diary, dated 31st May 1916 :

I took exception to a para. which said that " British Army had not been attacked" and pointed out that our losses in killed and wounded since December amounted to 83,000 - and 653 mines had been sprung during that time.

Phil (PJA)

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Phil

Another factor for the first half of 1916 is how much were the higher command levels involved in actions during the period. Once the front to be covered had been decided and armies allocated their front (more akin to staff decisions than strategic ones), local actions will have been handled at a much lower level. How much Haig was involved in decision making on these defensive fronts would need a great deal of careful primary research - it would be wrong to make judgements otherwise. GHQ decision making only really begins to kick in when major attacks develop which could mean a need for reserves or general movement of large forces to meet the threat.

Certainly my work on early 1917 leaves me with the impression that major movements of large Corps size units, or rearrangements of divisions within Corps, were mainly as a result of impending offensive plans and less of a reaction to defensive needs. However, the period is one of general German inactivity on the British front and therefore may not be relevant to the previous year.

Jim

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Excellent point, Jim, and one which it is all too easy to forget : I certainly think that I needed ro be reminded of it. In command of armies totalling one million men, the micro management of individual sectors has to be left to subirdinate commanders.

In connection with this, there is a revealing episode in mid February 1916 when Haig has to consider whether to sack Plumer, on account of the poor state of Second Army defences.

Phil (PJA)

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Second Army defences are Haig's reasons for the consideration, others see more political motives given Plumer's status and popularity within the army. One of Haig's better judgements to hold his hand at that point.

Jim

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Once the front to be covered had been decided and armies allocated their front (more akin to staff decisions than strategic ones), local actions will have been handled at a much lower level. How much Haig was involved in decision making on these defensive fronts would need a great deal of careful primary research - it would be wrong to make judgements otherwise.
Jim, the recent biography of Haking helps. GHQ was not directly involved in planning many local actions (though some were ordered from on high). It did, however, set the tone for recurrent low level trench raiding. Haig personally commented on achievements in this regard.

Robert

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Part of my summer holiday reading Robert! Now made even more appetising by what you say.

Jim

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and 653 mines had been sprung during that time.

Phil (PJA)

That's astonishing ! Is he saying that the Germans had actually detonated that many mines in the British sector ? Or does he mean that they had laid that number ? Could he be alluding to the number of mines fired by his own forces ; or might it be the combination of British and German mines ? The reason I ask is my surprise at the number : I hadn't realised how prolific mine warfare was.... the figure implies that it was not only an everday occurrence, but a several times a day feature of routine trench warfare.

Phil (PJA)

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To some extent I would suggest the size of the force under Haig's command is not appreciated and because of that he is not given credit for developing (not quite the right word) that force to the extent that when it had sufficient equipment, in particular artillery, and when its formation commanders and staff were experienced, it was capable of the battles of the 100 days. At that stage the Russians had been defeated, the French were exhausted and the Americans undertrained. The only force capable of ending the war in 1918 was that under Haig's command.

Old Tom

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, the French were exhausted and the Americans undertrained. The only force capable of ending the war in 1918 was that under Haig's command.

Old Tom

For an exhausted force, the French made a tremendous fight in the Marne Soissons battles of July and early August, 1918.

Might it be the case that some of us, in our laudable effort to give Haig due credit for the Hundred Days, have written off the prowess of the French ?

Phil (PJA)

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