Mike Mannock

[Laurent]

Hi, a lot of new information about Mike Mannock death in July 1918 near Calonne sur la Lys at: http://monsite.wanadoo.fr/arham .

[Guest Ian Bowbrick]

My french is just about adequate (!!).

There is some very interesting info on Mick Mannock in Billy Bishop's biography 'Courage of the Early Morning' and whether he was the RAF's highest scoring fighter pilot. Funnily if Mannock's 'bag' was not 73 kills as is always quoted but 56 as Bishop's biographer writes, Bishop would be next in line with 72 kills!

Judge for yourself

Ian

[Paul Reed]

There is also a grave at Laventie British Cemetery of an unknown aviator which is reputed to be Mannock's grave... it came from the same area where he was shot down. CWGC apparently state there is not enough evidence.

[Dolphin]

Ian

There is considerable contoversy regarding the Bishop's victory total of 72. Modern research has suggested in quite strong terms that his total might be somewhat 'inflated', to put it gently, as very few of the claims correspond to German losses.

Mannock's biography "King of Air Fighters" was written by the Welsh ace Captain J I Jones, who disliked Bishop. He appears to have carried out a bit of creative accounting (adding some driven down claims to the total, double counting of some victories, etc) to ensure that Mannock's total was greater than Bishop's.

See "Above the Trenches" by Christopher Shores, Norman Franks and Russell Guest [iSBN 0 948817 19 4] for more information.

Cheers

Dolphin

[Guest Ian Bowbrick]

Hi Dolphin,

Many thanks for the info. I have never read Mannock's biography but knew there had been some creative accounting somewhere along the line!

I think it was Christopher Shores in his book on Aces of WW2 who stated that the total number of aircraft claimed to the number actually shot (not driven) down on the Western Front in 1917/18 was something of the order of 3:1, so I have always been a bit of a sceptic!

What about Rene Fonck - 120 or 75?

Ian

[Dolphin]

Ian

Yes, I think it's widely acknowledged that claims far exceeded enemy losses. In those days before the use of camera guns, such as those fitted in later conflicts, the results of air fighting would often be far from clear-cut.

In the confusion and stress of aerial fighting, no one who valued their survival had the opportunity or inclination to follow a downed opponent to ground level to ensure that he crashed. Allowing over-claiming certainly helped to boost morale among 'victorious' aircrew, and probably didn't do too much harm, provided that the claims weren't used to calculate enemy strengths.

I haven't seen a detailed analysis of Fonck's tally (there's a project for someone with sufficient time and energy!). However, I wouldn't be exactly surprised if he turns out to have been a bit optimistic.

Cheers

Dophin

[Guest Ian Bowbrick]

Dolphin,

An interesting book to read is 'Bloody April, Black September', which is an interesting account of the two bloodiest months in aerial combat for the RFC/RNAS & RAF (April 1917 & September 1918). It is interesting to compare the German losses with the British claims. Interestingly the German claims are quite close to the British losses!

Ian

[Dolphin]

Ian

Yes, I've read "Bloody April, Black September" and noticed that the German claims were pretty close to Allied losses. That's the advantage of fighting behind your own lines - you can count up the heaps of wreckage and get a pretty good estimate of how many aircraft were downed.

As the Germans had the advantage of seeing most of the downed Allied aircraft, they were able to ensure that claims weren't too excessive, whereas the Allies had to rely on airmens' and artillery observers' reports (both balloon and ground) with obvious limitations. I wonder how many disallowed claims there were on the German side of the lines - did they start off over-claiming like the RFC/RNAS/RAF only to have the claims reduced by making them correspond to the known shot down aeroplanes?

Dolphin

[Guest Ian Bowbrick]

Dolphin,

German regulations on confirming 'kills' have always been tough, although in the Battle of Britain they were claiming 3 to 1, so I suspect the WW1 policy of never crossing the lines therby fighting within their lines and being able to count wrecks was an advantage. Even to the point of disallowing a claim.

But, the Germans have always placed more importance on a pilot's 'bag' than the allies, even to the award of gallantry medals being linked to a specific number credited to the pilot. In addition in both wars the Germans also clumped together top scoring pilots such as von Richthofen's Jasta 11 and JV 44 in WW2. The Brits have always placed more emphasis on the team (tones of playing rugby & cricket here!), although 56 Squadron was an exception with such notables as Albert Ball. There is no doubt however in my mind that allocating pilots whatever their ability was a better policy as it meant that their influence and example was spread more evenly thereby raising the general standard of fighter squadrons!

Ian

[Dolphin]

G'day again Ian

We are of one mind here! There is, of course, another view on the German policy of concentrating the aces in particular units - while it gave them some elite formations, it also lessened the quality of the units they left behind.

Can you imagine the state of morale in some of the lesser Jastas in 1918, still struggling with Albatros D.Vas and even Pfalz D.IIIs, knowing that the potential high scorers have been concentrated in the Jagdgeschwaders, and issued with Fokker D.VIIs?

The British system does seem better designed to lift overall standards though, as you point out, there were exceptions, with a concentration of above average pilots in No 56 Squadron, and the occasional issue of better equipment to above average units, eg Sopwith Snipes to No 4 Sqn AFC.

Cheers

Dolphin

[Guest Ian Bowbrick]

Dolphin,

I totally agree with your views.

Ian