Action at Bois Grenier and Pietre 1915

[Laurent]

Hi, someone could give more details about the fight at "Bois Grenier" an "Pietre" in september 25th 1915 with forces of 8th Division ? Thank you.

[Robert Dunlop]

From the history of the 8th Division:-

The attack was conceived as an adjunct to the Battle of Loos. The aim was 'to capture about 1200 yards of the German front line system opposite the re-entrant and link them up with our own line at the Well Farm and Le Bridoux salients, thereby both shortening and strengthening our position'.

The following assault troops were used:- 2/Rifle Brigade ®, 2/Royal Berkshire ©, and 2/Lincolnshire (L). 1/Royal Irish Rifles held the left of the line. The remainder of the brigade were in reserve. 2/East Lancashire and 1/Sherwood Foresters (both 24th Brigade) were detailed to exploit any 'weakening of the enemy opposite them'.

A four day bombardment was used. By day three it was noted that the German retaliatory fire had increased. This was thought to herald the arrival of more guns (it may have been due to shell shortages - German gunners at Loos were slow to retaliate for this reason apparently).

The assault force got forward at 3.30am on the 25th. In addition, six 18-pdr guns were dug into the front line for direct fire support. Smoke discharges on the flanks were ineffective because of the wind. Two mines were blown but did not break the surface, so they too were ineffective.

At 4.25am, the barrage increased. The 18-pdrs also began firing at the German parapets. The infantry kept forward under cover of the bombardment then lept to the assault when the barrage lifted. "C" Company, 2/Rifle Brigade, with an additional 80 bombers immediately occupied the front line trench on the right. "A" Company followed with 4 machine guns. By 6am the second line had also been occupied.

Three companies of 2/Royal Berkshire attacked through the centre. One company was picked up in a searchlight and came under fire while forming up. The attack was also successful in capturing the front line, as was the effort of two companies of 2/Lincolnshire on the left. The one problem was a 200 yard section of trench between the Rifle Brigade and Berkshire companies that remained in German hands. It was linked to a communication trench through which the Germans could funnel forward counterattack troops.

At 6.30am, the captured second line had to be abandoned under pressure from the counterattacks. The bombers were having difficulties with resupply and with the rain, which was affecting the fuses. On the right and in the centre, the German attacks were held. Pressure increased on the left but reinforcements of 2 companies of 1/Royal Irish Rifles were fed into the left sector. Three 'Grenadier platoons of the 24th Infantry Brigade were sent up at 8am to reinforce our troops throughout the length of the captured trenches. Despite this further reinforcement, the situation in Brideaux Fort again became serious as the morning advanced'. The supply of bombs gave out completely. The 2 companies of 2/Royal Berkshires and their reinforcements were forced back to the British lines at 2pm.

The British centre then gave way under increased German pressure. Although the right flank held out longer, reinforced with two trench mortars, once contact with the centre companies was lost, the retreat of these forces was inevitable as well.

Hope this information is helpful.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is a composite map of the area with the battle zone highlighted

[Laurent]

Did you have a complete map to the sector of this attack ? i will try to take a photo of this battlefield next week...Laurent. Thank you very much !

[brindlerp]

Does anyone have any photographs of the Well Farm area?

Regards

Richard

[Laurent]

I don't know if this farm still exist but i will take a picture of the well farm area soon.

Regards Laurent.

[Sue Light]

Laurent

This is the battalion war diary for 2nd Rifle Brigade for the day.

Sue

---------------------------------

September 24th 1915

Paraded 9.30am for inspection by G.O.C. and Church parade, but owing to shelling paraded was dismissed. Machine gun billets burnt, but only a few articles of kit were lost.

Battalion paraded at 6.15pm for operations and after an address by G.O.C. Brigade, marched to positions of assembly.

September 25th

The Battalion was ordered to assault and capture CORNERFORT and the German trenches to out left of it for about 200 yards.

The Battalion was in the position of assembly at 10pm on the 24th September, and in the position of assault at 3.45am on the 25th.

At 4.25am the final artillery bombardment commenced and, as far as this Battalion was concerned, was extraordinarily effective and well aimed.

The actual assault was carried out by ‘C’ Company and 80 specially trained bombers.

They had been ordered to crawl forward during the final bombardment and this they did so effectively that they assaulted the German front line trench at about the same moment as out guns stopped.

The left of ‘C’ Coy. and the left bombing party were hampered by some uncut wire, but otherwise the assault was a complete success.

‘C’ Coy. and the bombers, in accordance with instructions issued beforehand, immediately bombed to right and left and up to the German 2nd line trench.

Before 6am the German 2nd line trench was captured.

‘A’ Coy and the machine guns followed ‘C’ Coy, moving along the ROSSIGNOL communication ditch.

Captain H. L. Riley D.S.O. went with them and took over command of the front two companies on arrival in the German trench.

‘A’ Coy. was seriously impeded by some quite new wire in the ditch between the German sap and their parapet, but in spite of this, and some very heavy fire from the German ANGLE to our left, reached the German front line trench without any very great losses.

Our guns, at this time, were firing on the German third line trench, and to our right of CORNER FORT. It was very important that ‘C’ and ‘A’ Coys. and the bombers should bomb along and join hands with the Berkshire Regt. to our left in the German 1st and 2nd line trenches.

Owing to the fact that the right Coy. of the Berkshires never reached the German trenches, this was not accomplished.

At about 5.15am ‘B’ Coy. [less 50 men] was ordered to go up to the German captured trench with blocking parties and shovels along the ROSSIGNOL communication ditch.

‘D’ Coy. was kept in reserve.

At about 6.30am owing to strong German bombing attacks, to the impossibility of joining up with the Berkshires and to difficulty in getting bombs up for our side, it was found necessary to abandon the German 2nd line trench.

By 10am, however, a firm position had been established in the German front line trench, blocks being made to our right and left.

Many bombs were sent up to the German trench, carrying for this being used from ‘D’ Coy., from the 8th Middlesex and the Londons. Also 2 French mortars and one East Lancs machine gun.

In spite of constant bombing attacks by Germans from both flanks and from their 2nd line trench out position on their front line trench was maintained.

At about 3pm a fairly determined counter attack on our left was easily repulsed, and our artillery bombarded heavily.

At about 3.45pm information was received that the Lincolns and the Berks had withdrawn from the German captured trenches and orders were given for our companies to withdraw.

‘C’ Coy. had already been withdrawn, as our front was so small, and this company had been held in reserve with part of ‘B’ and ‘D’.

By about 4.45pm the whole withdrawal was completed.

Our losses were 6 officers killed, 3 officers wounded, 32 other ranks killed, 173 other ranks wounded, and 29 other ranks missing. Total 243.

They were due to the German rifle fire and to the really hard hand to hand and bombing fighting in the German first and second line trenches, the enemy being on both our flanks, and in their second line trench during practically the whole day.

Many Germans were killed and wounded, and about 15 captured, including 11 who were shot by German machine guns.

At night the Battalion was relieved by the Worcester Regiment and reached billets near FLEURBAIX at about 1am on the 26th September.

The evacuation of the wounded was extraordinarily well carried out, practically no wounded being left behind.

The majority of the wounds were comparatively slight.

[stiletto_33853]

Laurent,

Heres the Rifle Brigades Regimental History account of the action at Pietre.

The Twelth Battalions attack at Pietre

The action of Pietre began at 6am on September 25th with the assault of the Meerut Division on Mauquissait. It had been preceeded by a steady bombardment of four days and an intense bombardment of ten minutes, and was immediately successful. The Indians had already reached the German third line before 6.30am and were pressing on towards the Moulin du Pietre. But the atack of the Twelth Battalion was not timed to begin with that of the Meerut Division; it was not to be launched until orders were received, the nature of which would depend on the result of the Indian attack. At 7.30am orders reached Battalion Headquarters to advance and join up with the Meerut Division. By this time however all telephone communication with the assaulting companies was cut, and it was not until 8.25am that "D" Company (Captain G.F. Finch) received its orders and went over the top. "B" and "C" Companies (Captain L.C.F.Oldfield and Major R.E. Nott-Bower) were to follow in support, and "A" Company was to begin digging a communication trench out of the enemy front line. By 9.30am, despite heavy casualties caused by enfilade machine gun fire at short range, all three assaulting companies were in the German trenches. Two of the company commanders were pit of action, for Captain Oldfield had been killed and Major Nott-Bower had been wounded in the head. The digging party detailed by "A" Company suffered severely and made small progress. Shortly afterwards this company was relieved by a company of the 6th K.S.L.I. and endeavoured to join the remainder of the battalion. One platoon under Lieut. L.C.B.Russell suceeded in making an entry into the German line, and, having bombed down to the point where the communication trench was to join up, endeavoured to dig back to meet it. This was speedily checked by enfilade fire. The remainder of "A" Company could only get half way across and took cover in an open ditch. Headquarters with the commanding officer (Lieut.-Colonel W.G. Pigott) and the adjutant (Captain R.U.H. Prioleau) moved forward to an advanced report centre at 8.30am. No sooner had they arrived when a heavy shell burst in among them, killed the entire party with the exception of the commanding officer and the adjutant, and in addition wrecked the Regimental Aid Post, killing the Corporal in charge, many orderlies and a number of the wounded. The medical officer, Captain G. Malim, R.A.M.C. was knocked senseless but recovered and continued his work single handed. Within a few minutes another direct hit on the parapet hurtled him into the air and exposed what remained of the aid post to the full view of the enemy. Nevertheless Captain Malim worked on for twenty four hours attending single handed to more than four hundred cases. He was awarded the V.C. and richly deserved it.

Meanwhle the news came through that Captain Finch that he had taken the third German line with 2D" Company, and was consolidating. Shortly afterwards Captain T.E. Holland, who had taken command of "B" Company, reported that the Indians were falling back, that his bombs had run out, and that, without reinforcements and some counter action to the machine gun fire from the left, it would be impossible to hold out. What had happened was what might reasonably have been foreseen. The Bareilly Brigade had made a spirited atack and had carried all before it. The enemy on the right flank was sufficiently engaged with the situation from Festubert to Lens. But the left was virtually unoccupied, and engaged the attackers heavily. By the time the order had filtered through to the assaulting companies of the Twelth Battalion, the Indians had been receiving a steadily increasing measure of attention for two and a half hours. By the time the Twelth Battalion had battled its way across, against the furious machine gun fire it had encoutered from the left, a further hour had been spent and the rot had begun to set in. It is one of the truisms of warfare that native troops, magnificent in the dash, have not the staying power of Europeans. The Bareilly brigade was dispirited and its dash had gone. The 1st Btn. Black Watch held out unmoved; but the native troops gave way. By 11.30am, when a company of the Shropshires was sent forward to reinforce, the Twelth Battalion had worked its way steadily forward almost to the Moulin du Pietre and was in touch with the Black Watch in that neighbourhood. The Indians however were retiring; the Germans were advancing in force; and the supply of bombs had given out. To make matters worse the artillery was still shelling the captured trenches in the belief that they were held by the enemy. In these circumstances the officer commanding the Black Watc informed the senior officer of the Rifle Brigade that he propsed to withdraw. There was no sensible course except to do the same. By half past twelve the Twelth Battalion was back in its trenches less seven officers and three hundred and twent two other ranks killed, wounded and missing. The conduct of officers and men alike was in every way worthy of the best traditions of the Regiment. They were warmly thanked for their gallantry by the Divisional and Brigade commanders.

From The Rifle Brigade 1914 - 1918 Volume 1, pages 133,134 &135, hope this helps Laurent.

Andy

[stiletto_33853]

Laurent,

This is the entry in the Regimental History for the 25th September 2nd Rifle Brigade which should tie in with Sues Dairies.

The Second Battalion Attack at Bois Grenier

The action of Bois Grenier was planned and carried out by Brigadier-General R.B. Stephens with the brigade that he won on the field at Fromelles. His objective was the line of forts, on a twelve hundred yard frontage, from Bridoux Fort to Corner Fort, both inclusive. In addition to the artillery he brought up two trench mortar batteries into the Well Farm and Bridoux salients, and caused six 18 pounders to be dug into the front line pararpet- two in the Bridoux salient; one in the Well Farm salient; two west of Well Farm and one east of Le Bridoux- to fire direct on the enemy's parapet. He had considerable difficulties to overcome in the nature of the ground, for between the two salients, the line ran back fully five hundred yards and he had so to dispose of his centre as to enable it to attack simultaneously with the right and left. His dispositions were as follows:- On the right was the Second Battalion, commanded by Lieut.- Colonel F.H. Nugent, on a one company front. The attacking company ("C" - Captain Hon. R. Brand) with bombers attached was drawn up, in front of an old trench astride the Rossignol Ditch - a small watercourse flowing into the ubiquitous Riviere des Laies. On the left were the Lincolns, also on a one company frontage, in the borrow-pit outside the parapet of Bridoux salient and east of Le Bridoux road. The Royal Berkshires were to attack in the centre, with three companies in line along the cinder track across the re-entrant between the two salients. Behind the Royal Berkshires were to be posted two companies of the Royal Irish Rifles, the remainder of which battalion would hold the line on the left of the assault. In brigade reserve General Stephens had 1/1st Battalion London Regiment and the 1/8th Middlesex Regt. He rejected the idea of gas, but arranged for smoke to screen the flanks, and laid two shallow mines which, when exploded, would facilitate the digging of a communication trench to join up with the captured trenches. On the right of the attack the 2nd Btn. East Lancashire Regt. and the 2nd Btn. Sherwood Foresters of the 24th Infantry brigade were to co-operate with fire.

At 3.30 on September 25th Captain Brand took his company and the special bombers into their assigned position, some two hundred yards from the German line. At 4.25am the bombardment began. nticipating the tactics generally adopted later in the war, Captain Brand led his company and bombers right up to the barrage, so that directly it lifted they should leap into the fort. At 4.30 the barrage lifted. At 4.31 the Corner Fort had been captured, and the bombers were bombing right, left and forward to clear the communicating trenches. "As usual" said a German prisoner bitterly to the Corps Intelligence Officer, "before we knew what was happening the Rifle Brigade was on top of us"!. By 6am "C" Company not only had the fort but had pushed forward advanced posts into the German second line with blocks established to guard the right flank. Meanwhile "A" Company (Captain C.W. Wolseley-Jenkins) had penetrated into the German front-line trench to the east of the Fort, making use of the Rossignol Ditch for cover. Shortly after 5am part of "B" Company (Captain Hon. N.G. Bligh) had crossed by the same means; and "D" Company (Captain F.C. Hunt) was already at work deepening the ditch for communication purposes, and carrying material to the forward companies in the captured positions. Captain H.L Riley, the second in command, who crossed with "A" Company took command in the captured trenches, keeping up communication with Battalion Headquarters by a telephone laid, and kept in repair throughout the action by the Battalion signallers. The Divisional Commanders report of the action pays a glowing tribute to the "utmost dash and gallantry" displayed by the Battalion and especially by Captain Brand and by Captain C. Wolseley-Jenkins who "particularly distinguished himself". So far on the right the success had exceeded the most sanguine expectations.

On the left the Lincolns had captured Bridoux Fort by the same tactics and had also pushed forward to the second line. But in the centre all was not so well. The Royal Berkshire Attack on the left centre broke into the German line, capturing the Lozenge and a strip of trench extending to the elbow known as fifth point. But the right company of the Berkshires met with uncut wire masking machine guns; and the attack on Angle Fort was a failure. The consequent exposure of the left flank of the Second Battalion made it wiser to withdraw the advanced posts in the German second line and concentrate upon the defence of Corner Fort with a view to its ultimate absorption into the British front line system This was done at 6.30am. At 8am the situation was that the Lincolns held Bridoux Fort and were in touch with the Berkshires who prolonged the line up to and including the Lozenge. Then came a gap of three hundred yards in which the enemy held out all day. Then came the Second Battalion in possession of Corner Foer and of some two hundred yards of trench to the east of it. Just at about this time the two company's of the Royal Irish Rifles were sent to reserve to strengthen the Lincolns in Bridoux Fort; and the 24th Brigade bombers were sent forward to reinforce the line, "as the main difficulty was keeping up the supply of bombs and bombers". By 10am the Second Battalion was strongly entrenched in Corner Fort with blocks to the left and right. Sappers had aided the Infantry to reverse the enemy's trench, and communication was established with the old front line. Stores of bombs were accumulated and a machine gun and two trench mortars were brought forward. The Battalion was preparing to make a determined effort to capture the Angle Fort and join up with the Royal Berkshires. But before this could be carried out a series of happeningsa intervened, best described in the words of Major-General Hudson, the 4th Divisional Commander.

"At 1pm" he says, "a determined counter attack drove the Lincolns from Bridoux Fort and captured the trench for one hundred yards west of the Fort" (i.e. in the direction of the Royal Berkshires). "Both flanks of the Royal Berkshires were then hard pressed; and at 1.55pm Colonel Hunt gave the order to withdraw. "During this time the 2nd Battaion Rifle Brigade had maintained themselves in the enemy's trenches, had beaten off several counter attacks and had consolidated their position.... ground had been gained to the east towards the 2nd Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment and the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade were preparing, by bringing up bombs, to make a big effort to join hands.

"Unfortunately the retirement of the left and centre attacks made it imperative to withdraw the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade; and at 3.30 orders were issued to them to retire."

He records that the retirement was "very orderly", being completed by 4pm; and warmly commends Captain H.L. Riley for the skill and coolness with which it was carried out under his direction. Higher praise can hadly be given to a Battalion by its Divisional Commander in his official narrative of the battle. But it was dearly brought. Captain C.F. Hunt, Captain C. Wolseley-Jenkins, Lieutenants W.N. Monteith, A.W.W. Turnour and W.F.T. Sheridan, 2nd Lieutenant L.V. Chapman and sevety three other ranks were killed; Captain Bligh, Lieutenant C.B.A. Hoskyns, the battalion machine gun officer, 2nd Lieutenant C.M. Beazley and one hundred and sevety four other ranks were wounded. The fighting had been hand to hand and bitter. Lieutenant W.G.K. Boswell, of "B" Company, having shot down two Germans and emptied his revolver, flung himself at a third with bare fists and knocked his man out. Rifleman Fido, only seventeen years of age, won the Military Medal and the Croix de Guerre by his invincible courage throughout the day, bombing indefatigably(and accurately) for twelve hours. He was one of the last to leave the captured trench; and in the very moment of departure he must turn and hurl a final bomb!. Sergeant Riddett, one of the machine gun section, who took charge after Lieutenant Hoskyns was wounded, won the D.C.M. by his cool and skillful shooting. D.C.M's were also won by Sergeant W. Sheffield, Rifleman J.Ryan and Rifleman Burgess. The first and second for gallantry in patrol, the last for maintaining the telephone line in No-Mans-Land. Captain Brand received the D.S.O., the Chaplain, the Rev. E.K. Talbot, the Military Cross. Many officers and other ranks were mentioned in despatches.

From The Rifle Brigade 1914 - 1918 Volume 1 pages 135,136,137 & 138.

Andy

[Laurent]

Thank you.

Regards Laurent.

[Jimmy Taylor]

Here is the relevant extract from my history of 1st Royal Irish Rifles.

BOIS GRENIER

The attack to be carried out by the 25th Brigade had a similar object to the attack at Hooge, and two others, by the Indians north of Neuve Chapelle and the 2nd Division at Givenchy; that is to say, it was designed purely to pin down German reserves and serve as a diversion from the affair at Loos. But it was perhaps on the smallest scale of any of the holding actions. All that was hoped from it at best was the capture of the German front-line trench upon a front of about 1,200 yards, after which it was intended to join it up to the existing British line. In order to allow the consolidation of the front line, when taken, the second was also to be captured, and the troops withdrawn as soon as the front had been put into a state of defence.1

The line in this sector that had been selected for the attack, between Well Farm salient and Le Bridoux Road salient, ran back in an almost complete semi-circle. Across the front of this area lay a ditch which was dry in summer but flooded and wet in winter. It was decided to use this ditch as the jumping off point and link the two salients to the German front, between Corner Fort and Bridoux Fort, which included two other particularly strong points, the Angle and the Lozenge. Having captured this front the attack was to proceed and take the German second line but only to allow time for the consolidation of the previous gain and, once this was done, to withdraw. Operation Orders issued by Col. Daunt included the following: ‘Coys will “Stand to Arms” at 3.45 a.m. when they will receive an issue of rum, which is to be carefully supervised by Coy Officers.’

C Coy moved at 6.20 p.m. on the evening prior to the attack via Rue Delettre, Rue des Charles, Bois Grenier, to Shaftesbury Avenue, taking over the trench from 2nd Northants. D followed fifteen minutes after C had left Bois Grenier. A and B started out at 6.30 p.m. and moved via Rue Bassieres, Rue Lombard, Croix Marechal, Elbow Farm, Bois Grenier, to Shaftesbury Avenue. They were ordered to halt near Croix Marechal from 7.20 p.m. until 2 a.m. on the 25th, when they moved into their selected position in Rue des Layes. At 3.30 a.m., A and B, under the command of Major Merriman, had taken up their position about 900 yards to the rear of C and D. Fifteen minutes later Col. Daunt left his HQ and joined them. The plan of attack was that Corner Fort was to be assaulted by 2nd Rifle Bde, the Angle and the Lozenge by 2nd R. Berkshires, and Fort Bridoux by 2nd Lincolns. The extreme left of the attack was to be made by the two leading companies, C and D, of 1st RIR. According to QM Edwards:

This was the first time in which the precaution was taken of leaving a proportion of officers and senior NCOs out of the fight, in order to re-form the unit in case of heavy casualties.

The attack, which was preceded by an intermittent bombardment that lasted for four days and by a concentrated bombardment starting at 4.25 a.m., was launched at 4.30 a.m. On the right, Corner Fort was captured at once; in the centre, 2nd R. Berkshires captured the Lozenge but, below it at the Angle, were beaten back by heavy machine gun fire. On the left, 2nd Lincolns took Fort Bridoux and advanced to the second line. This, however, was heavily manned by the Germans and a protracted bombing engagement ensued.

Meanwhile, C and D Coys of 1st RIR had been provided with a Stokes gun, a 2-inch trench mortar, 1,000 smoke candles, and eight catapults with 1,000 threffallite bombs to create smoke in the left flank of the attack. An 18-pounder field gun had been brought up and put in a parapet emplacement on the night of the 24th, its purpose being to fire directly at the enemy parapet. Two mines were to be exploded: one at Corner Fort at the moment of the attack, and the other, a much shallower one, at Fort Bridoux after the wave had gone over. The latter was to be blown in no-man’s-land, which was very narrow at this point, and its objective was to form the basis of a communication trench. Owing to the wind being unfavourable, the smoke candles were not used and were subsequently set on fire by a German shell, killing 2/Lt. R.H. Andrews. The 2-inch trench mortar jammed having fired only two rounds. Worse still, a Stokes bomb burst setting all the others on fire and, moments later, a shell ignited the threffallite bombs. The resultant large column of smoke rising from the breastwork drew heavy fire from the German artillery and actually hampered the British artillery observation. The 18-pounder gun only fired during the bombardment and was not detected.

C and D were heavily shelled from 4.30 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. but suffered comparatively slight casualties. At 6 a.m. the bombers of C Coy were sent by the CO to assist the Lincolns who had asked for bombs. Thirty minutes later 2/Lt. F.C. Wallace and 24 Brigade bombers were also sent to assist. When he reached the German trenches he found that they were being abandoned by the Lincolns and attempted to bomb out the enemy. On finding that they could outrange his bombers, he returned to the breastwork for his eight catapults and did excellent work clearing the German trenches with them, driving the enemy back 300 yards. Most of his men and catapults were lost in this action.

A telephone message was received by Battalion HQ at 8.05 a.m., from the 25th Brigade, ordering up A and B Coys to support the Lincolns left flank as they were in urgent need of reinforcements. This was passed on to Major Merriman and he acted on it at about 8.15 a.m. A and B advanced via Emma Post and Safety Alley. B was ordered to remain in the seventy yards line while A proceeded to the breastwork. At 10 a.m. Major Merriman led two platoons of A across to the German trenches just east of Bridoux Fort. The mine here had been a comparative failure, not having broken deeply enough into the ground, and proved small aid to communication. The Lincolns were found on the British side of the enemy parapet as the second line trench was full of Germans and rifle fire was brisk. Eventually, under an avalanche of bombs, the Lincolns withdrew with the Irish Rifles, and in this retirement Major Merriman was severely wounded, losing an arm. 2nd R. Berkshires were now attacked from both flanks and had to retire. 2nd Rifle Bde had done very well and had established itself firmly at Corner Fort, beating off many counter-attacks, but had to withdraw at 4 p.m. as the overall attack had been a failure. The four machine guns, under the command of Capt. Gartlan, had been in action all day. A and B Coys returned to their first position in Rue des Layes at 4 p.m. Col. Daunt reported to Brigade HQ:

I left my Adjutant at my report centre in the 250 yard line all day, while I was in the breastwork, and I experienced considerable difficulty in getting communications as all telephone wires were soon cut, but the orderlies worked well though communication was slow, however nothing of an urgent nature arose.

The operations were greatly spoiled by the heavy rain, the weather having broken on the 23rd. Brigadier-General Stephens made the following observations in his report to Division:

The weather was bad, with much mist and heavy rain late in the day. It was impossible to see what was going on. Artillery observation was very difficult, but in spite of this the artillery support was splendid and made no mistake.

Most of the casualties were caused by shell fire or by bombs, and few by rifle fire. Consequently a large proportion of the wounded were slightly injured. The arrangements for getting the wounded away worked admirably and very few were left behind in the German trenches.

The chief reason for the failure to hold the German trench was the superiority of the enemy bombers, who threw a larger and heavier bomb than the British could throw. At 6 p.m. orders were received to remain in position for the night. Other casualties on the day were 2/Lt. J.H. Butler (slightly wounded), 11 other ranks killed, 76 wounded, and 15 missing.

[Laurent]

THANK YOU.

Best Regards Laurent.

[Guest Remembrance]

It is my understanding that the Indian Expeditionary Forces 7th Meerut Division fought on the 25th September 1915 with the 2nd Battalion Black Watch. My great uncle was in 7th Platoon Black Watch. I am trying to find out where he died. He is buried at Armentierres so I am assuming that he must have been in a battle nearby - perhaps Pietre or Bois Grenier. Can anyone shed any light on this please.

[Blueblood]

Remembrance

Who is you are looking for? Someone on the forum may have the exact information you want.

You can try this link:

[Broken link removed]

It should get you to the right spot. This is the Erquinghem-Lys website which is near to Bois Grenier.

The link is for the Commonwealth graveyards in the area and has the names of most of those buried in them.

If the link doesn't work the website is www.erquinghem-lys.com

And click on 'L'histoire.

There is then a drop down box and one option is Les cimetieres militaires and click on that

This should get you to the cemeteries then click on a chosen cemetery.

Don't forget the Commonwealth War Graves website as well.

Good Luck

Blueblood (Phil)

[jainvince]

Have just come across this interesting post which answers a number of questions. However, try as I might I can't seem to locate Pietre (or Moulin du Pietre) and Well Farm is also elusive as is the other Salient at Bridoux.

Any clarification would be much appreciated as would a map of the action.

BernardP

[goldsrobin]

Does anyone, by any chance, have a map of the front for the attack by 25th Brigade, III Corps, from the area of Bois Grenier on 25th September 1915. Sadly the link on this thread no longer works. Specifically, between Corner Fort and Bridoux Fort.

 

Many thanks in advance.

 

Robin

[WhiteStarLine]

Hi Robin,

 

You may well have seen this one, at the National Library of Scotland web site.  The marker is in the correct square for Corner Fort.  Just select the 1:10,000 Bas Maisnel 1915 map and disregard that all the labels are upside down!  Their map is correctly georeferenced.

 

Rat's Alley gives Fort Bridoux at 36.I.31.c.95.10 and the marker denotes this position.  Once again, swap to the 1915 map.

Edited 25 July , 2020 by WhiteStarLine
Rat's Ally => Rat's Alley

[MAW]

From which RFA unit were the 'six 18-pdr guns dug into the front line for direct fire support' as mentioned in Post #2 (History of the 8th Division)?

 

I know the 105th Brigade RFA was attached to the 8th Division and that the guns were positioned in an area around Chapelle Armentieres, but I do not know how the guns were deployed.

 

Mark

[goldsrobin]

19 hours ago, WhiteStarLine said:

Hi Robin,

 

You may well have seen this one, at the National Library of Scotland web site.  The marker is in the correct square for Corner Fort.  Just select the 1:10,000 Bas Maisnel 1915 map and disregard that all the labels are upside down!  Their map is correctly georeferenced.

 

Rat's Alley gives Fort Bridoux at 36.I.31.c.95.10 and the marker denotes this position.  Once again, swap to the 1915 map.

That is immensely helpful. Thank you very much.

[goldsrobin]

22 hours ago, WhiteStarLine said:

Hi Robin,

 

You may well have seen this one, at the National Library of Scotland web site.  The marker is in the correct square for Corner Fort.  Just select the 1:10,000 Bas Maisnel 1915 map and disregard that all the labels are upside down!  Their map is correctly georeferenced.

 

Rat's Alley gives Fort Bridoux at 36.I.31.c.95.10 and the marker denotes this position.  Once again, swap to the 1915 map.

That is incredibly helpful. Thank you very much indeed.

 

Robin

Edited 25 July , 2020 by goldsrobin
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[IRC Kevin]

On 24/07/2020 at 11:55, goldsrobin said:

Does anyone, by any chance, have a map of the front for the attack by 25th Brigade, III Corps, from the area of Bois Grenier on 25th September 1915. Sadly the link on this thread no longer works. Specifically, between Corner Fort and Bridoux Fort.

 

Many thanks in advance.

 

Robin

This any use to you, Robin. It's from 25 Bde's diary for August 1915.

regards,

Kevin

 

[WhiteStarLine]

Hi Robin, here is Kevin's map overlayed on a modern map.  It lets you see Corner Fort and Bridoux Fort, based on fitting Kevin's map using the River Layes, Rat's Alley location for Bridoux Fort as a georeference and the war diary north point as a cross-check.  Wye Farm seems slightly off but that might be me - I have checked the location on a later trench map and it is correct.  We are trying to fit it on a hand drawn map.  You can zoom in, pan around or change the opacity at the web page itself.

[WhiteStarLine]

Sheet 36.I.31.c.95.10 (Fort Bridoux) seems to align with the modern Rue du Vieux Bridoux and the intersection of Rue Jean Baptiste Messean and Chemin du Bas Maisnil seems to match the original ink of the 1915 War Diary and what I assume is Well Farm with a pencil arrow points to a modern farm, so with a bit of luck this gives you an insight into the layout you wanted.

[IRC Kevin]

Robin,

This too may be useful, though the actual positions are from early 1917, they are before the remodelling of the sector in later 1917, I suspect not a lot changed between 1915 and the remodelling. The placemark positions are derived from map references in 57 Division's diary and various of their battalion and brigade diaries. These were then loaded onto a geo-referenced digital trench map and the coordinates plotted on Google Earth- so should be fairly accurate.

regards,

Kevin

 

Edited 26 July , 2020 by IRC Kevin

[goldsrobin]

I am so grateful to both of you for your wonderfully helpful support. Thank you Kevin for the 25th Brigade sketch. That makes it very clear, although it took me a moment or two to orientate myself with the south facing sketch! I am also very grateful to you, White Star Line, for your superimposition on Google Earth that ties up so well with Kevin's 1917 points.

 

What amazing help. Thank you both.

 

Robin