Shot at dawn - British WW1 Military Executions.

[Perth Digger]

Only  2 executions, so the murderer is not counted.

 

The stats are from the book.

 

Mike

[John_Hartley]

34 minutes ago, Perth Digger said:

7.7% of officer courts-martial ended in execution.

0.7% of soldier courts-martial ended in execution.

Even starker are the relative figures for those executed as a % of those sentenced to death.

[John_Hartley]

22 minutes ago, QGE said:

assumes (incorrectly in my view) that both groups were equally disposed to desertion

Martin

 

Whilst the desertion of an OR wouldnt be mentioned in the war diary, I wonder if one would expect there to be some mention of an officer being "missing"? Not missing in the usual sense after an action but a simple record that Lt Bloggs wasnt where he should be - not, at that time, suggesting he had deserted but simply that he wasnt there when, say, the battalion moved forward to the combat zone

 

John

[Perth Digger]

John

I have seen one example in a war diary where an officer is reported missing en route for an attack, but he was there when it mattered and there were no obvious consequences. But I'm also looking at a case, probably of quitting post during a German attack, which is not mentioned in the War Diary, and this led to a court-martial. This last one I'll give in more detail later, as there is a very interesting comment comparing officers and ORs.

 

Mike

[Guest]

21 minutes ago, John_Hartley said:

Martin

 

Whilst the desertion of an OR wouldnt be mentioned in the war diary, I wonder if one would expect there to be some mention of an officer being "missing"? Not missing in the usual sense after an action but a simple record that Lt Bloggs wasnt where he should be - not, at that time, suggesting he had deserted but simply that he wasnt there when, say, the battalion moved forward to the combat zone

 

John

 

John - it is an interesting question. As you know Field Service Regulations stipulate that the movement of Officers had to be recorded. In addition from the end of 1914 (if memory serves) a monthly return was made of all the officers in theatre, casualties, sick and on leave. Consequently even if the diary failed to record any absence, the monthly returns would be compelled to make a record. Most are no longer in the Battalion diaries having been forwarded up the chain of command. One of the infantry diaries I have worked on had a complete run on distinctly blue paper.

 

As you know absence became desertion after 21 days regardless of whether the individual returned. I have never seen any mention of an Officer being recorded as a deserter or absent  other than MIA. That is not to say it didn't happen but I am 99.9% positive that this was never recorded in a Battalion or Brigade war diary in 1914 -15 (my area of interest). I have seen one reference to an Officer being arrested but that was on a ship (possibly on the sauce?) and he magically reappears in the fighting a few days later (Gallipoli). The base material covers British Battalions and Brigades in the BEF and MEF as well as the IEF-A. Word searching 'desertion', 'absent' etc generates not a single mention relating to Officers. 

 

I think these cohorts were simply too busy doing their jobs and getting killed and wounded along the way. The relative casualty data would suggest these Officers were rather committed to tackling the dangers and not inclined to shirk. Cadogan (Gallipoli with the Yeomanry) is the only contemporary example I can think of who was critical of some Officers lobbying for cushy jobs on the Staff and trying to avoid the trenches. His view was that everyone should have done their bit in the trenches. Crozier (if he is to be believed) claims to have shot subalterns while retreating. There is no way of knowing how much rough-justice was meted out. 

 

Of note is that Officers were allowed more leave and this might have made a difference. Lord Moran's views on stores of courage not being infinite ring loudly here. He argued that everyone gets spent eventually and his store of courage had to be replenished. If one believes this (Moran was compulsory reading for Sandhurst cadets in the 1980s) one could argue that leave afforded the Officers an opportunity to recharge their store of courage more frequently than the Other Ranks. My speculation. 

 

Did Officers ever appear on the Police lists? 

 

MG

[Perth Digger]

This is the case of a 20-year-old who enlisted in May 1915 and became a Lance-Sergeant. HIs father had died when he was 6 and he was the only son. He went to Grammar School (no service in OTC) and was a clerk, so he was lower-middle class in background. He won the MM on the Somme, applied for and was accepted for a commission and went back to France in late April 1917. On 11 August the Germans made a violent attack on his part of the line following a hurricane bombardment. They used smoke and flame throwers and wiped out 2 of the battalion's platoons. He left his post, went through a TMB HQ, where he said he was looking for his Bn HQ, and ended up at Brigade HQ. The TMB officer said he looked in shock. He asked for reinforcements and then returned to the front line.

 

He was tried on two s.40 accounts, probably quitting post and desertion, and was guilty of one and acquitted of the other. Sentence: dismissal. He went back to England and immediately joined the RFC as a trainee mechanic. In the meantime, his sentence was being reviewed. One comment (the author of which I can't make out), wrote:

 

This is a very difficult case.

If the offence had been committed by a soldier, and not an officer, he might have been convicted of desertion and sentenced to death, unless he had had, as this officer had, a character of gallantry.

And in that case I think any sentence of HL or P.S would have been suspended.

This officer left his platoon, or what remained of it, under very trying circumstances and did not pull up till he reached Brigade HQ, but he returned then to his Coy.

I am doubtful about the adviseablity of a commutation of sentence.

 

In the end he was reinstated with a severe reprimand, but sent to another theatre of war, where he was killed in March 1918.

 

The court-martial report, which was at least 18 pages long, was weeded from his SR, so all we have are the review comments. It's a pity that the writer did not say whether he thought a death sentence would have been appropriate if the officer had not been previously 'gallant', but he does seem to assume that a death sentence for an OR would have been commuted.

 

The officer was not pre-war officer class, but a temporary gentleman, so this was not a case of the Old School Tie working its magic.

 

Mike 

 

 

[Guest]

1 hour ago, Perth Digger said:

These class bias figures are useless. Only desertion while overseas was a capital offence, so you need to know how many of these men in the figures did not go overseas, for starters. 

 

Mike

 A simple proxy for numbers served in 1914-15  might be the total medals issued. Somewhere in the region of 2.3 million. One might easily double this for the whole war. given the near 50/50 split between volunteers and conscripts. 

 

SMEBE breaks down the Courts Martial Data by Home and Abroad and Officers and Other Ranks. Either way one stretches the data or adjusts the denominator it is impossible to escape the fact that Officers were less likely to commit capital offences than Other Ranks. The crux of the debate is whether this reflects a "class bias" that excused Officer offenders rather than prosecute them or whether the Officers were culturally less inclined to commit capital offences or both.  

 

Given 90% of OR sentences were not carried out suggests to me that the Military was generally extremely reluctant to execute men. Roman concepts of decimation spring to mind  although no proof of this has been forthcoming. 

 

One of the core issues is that desertion  - historically a major problem - was not a capital offence in peace time. This step change in potential punishment during 'active service' rather than 'overseas' would have been understood by Officers and Other ranks alike. 

 

Pre-war and post war data might provide some indication of crime and class, as would War era civilian crime in the UK. 

 

MG

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Guest

[Perth Digger]

I should add that only 7 ORs were executed for quitting their posts in the war.

[Perth Digger]

Martin

Have you seen Clive Emsley's Soldier, Sailor, Beggarman, Thief, Crime and the British Armed Services since 1914?

 

 

I used 'overseas' Martin, because most home courts-martial used the phrase "while on active service" in their charges.

 

 

Mike

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Perth Digger
Two replies conflated.

[Guest]

2 hours ago, Perth Digger said:

Thanks, Martin.

These data settle one point, I think. Source: Cathryn Corns & John Hughes-Wilson: Blindfold and Alone, p. 325.

46 officers tried for desertion during the war. 4 death sentences and 2 carried out.

38,584 soldiers tried for desertion. Just over 2000 sentenced to death and 266 carried out.

 

7.7% of officer courts-martial ended in execution.

0.7% of soldier courts-martial ended in execution.

 

Mike

 

Mike,  only  7,340* of the Other Ranks' desertions happened Abroad (where the death penalty was possible) Similarly the figure for Officers is 21. Deserters at Home could not suffer the death penalty as they were not yet on Active Service. 

 

This would generate desertion to execution ratios of :

 

Officers ...............9.5%

Other Ranks....... 3.6%

 

Officers charged with desertion were still 2.6 times more likely to be executed on this measure. The caveat is that the data is too small to be statistically meaningful. 

 

*SMEBE page 667

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Guest

[Ron Clifton]

1 hour ago, Perth Digger said:

He was tried on two s.40 accounts, probably quitting post and desertion,

Quitting post and desertion were specific offences under other sections of the Army Act. Section 40 would not apply here which covered "conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline" NOT covered in other sections. Also, it did not apply to officers, for whom section 16 could be used for catch-all offences.

 

Ron

[Perth Digger]

HI Ron

My reading of the Sec. 40 regulations were that if you did use it when another specific section existed, you had to use both (although that may not be clear in the courts-martial records). I've seen plenty of examples where Sec. 40 was used to cover another another specified section. I've seen these by comparing the courts-martial records with the charges in SRs. 

 

In my case above, the reports use Section 40 and he was an officer. 

 

All very confusing.

 

Mike

 

 

[Perth Digger]

Martin

 Corns and Hughes-Wilson didn't make that distinction clear.

 

I agree that the data are too small for statistical purposes, but still, there is no way that anyone could claim that officers got preferential treatment.

 

I think that we underestimate the social disgrace that dismissal brought on an officer (let alone cashiering). It was a draconian sentence, socially, even for the temporary gentlemen of the time. 

 

Mike

[Guest]

1 hour ago, Perth Digger said:

Martin

 Corns and Hughes-Wilson didn't make that distinction clear.

Mike

 

Mike - Indeed. this is one of the reasons why the SAD discussion is a minefield.  Hughes-Wilson and Corns are certainly no apologists for SAD but they manage to miss this critical point. Here are some interesting stats:

 

45 % of all Courts Martial occurred at Home rather than Abroad

57% of all Courts Martial for Absence occurred at Home

81% of all Courts Martial for Desertion occurred at Home

 

The close relationship between Absence and Desertion is understood. A man would be declared Absent first and 21 days later would be classified as a deserter. The propensity to desert at Home rather than Abroad might indicate that Other Ranks were well aware of the different consequences between Home and Abroad. 4 in every 5 deserters chose to desert at Home where the death penalty did not apply. This might also indicate that Military Law with regards to deserters had some deterrent effect. My speculation. MG

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Guest

[Perth Digger]

Much more difficult to desert o/seas, Martin, and many home desertions occurred after return from France while recovering from wounds or sickness, when they were away from their own battalion and their support network. 

 

MIke

[TwoEssGee]

23 hours ago, QGE said:

In my day (466 BC) it took five weeks to train a soldier. It took a more than year to train an Officer. The first five weeks were exactly the same as a soldier's training and the attrition on week five was the highest. I went through Sandhurst in a Platoon of 30. Only 11 made it to Commission. I suspect the ratios at the OCTUs were different in 1915-1918 but the principles would have been similar. Serve to Lead. 

 

 

 

 

I wasn't going to respond to this point, as I didn't want to disrupt a thoroughly absorbing and interesting thread for such a minor point, but as it was brought up by Mike (Perth Digger) I guess it is worth clarifying.

 

As an adult recruit, I went through infantry basic training (Guards) in 1982. It was 26 weeks, not 5.

The 5 weeks Martin mentioned might have been the absolute minimum "infantry" part of basic training carried out by soldiers who were joining one of the Corps units, prior to entering their "trade" training, but even this seems a little short. No Infantry soldier passed out having completed only 5 weeks basic training. From memory, it was around  20 or 22  weeks. The Guards had a few extra weeks added on for drill.

The drop out rate was similar to what Martin mentioned. We started with 56, and ended up with 21. 

 

[Muerrisch]

Army Order 388/1914 issued October.

 

I have it in front of me, and I do not see where "5 weeks" come from.Detailed training of the individual soldier extends to the first 10 weeks ...... as an example week 10 comprises:

PT                             6 hours

Extended order     12

Platoon drill             6

musketry                  6

route marching       6

bayonet fighting     6

entrenching             4

outposts                  2

 

Then: "on the completion of recruit training the collective training of the company will begin [5 weeks] ......... battalion training will take place afterwards ......"

 

Of course it is accepted that men were sent to the front with less than the above, out of necessity. Trained they were not, and in many cases training with the unit on active service was inadequate. Part of the tragedy of the first year of the war.

[Guest]

35 minutes ago, TwoEssGee said:

I wasn't going to respond to this point, as I didn't want to disrupt a thoroughly absorbing and interesting thread for such a minor point, but as it was brought up by Mike (Perth Digger) I guess it is worth clarifying.

 

As an adult recruit, I went through infantry basic training (Guards) in 1982. It was 26 weeks, not 5.

The 5 weeks Martin mentioned might have been the absolute minimum "infantry" part of basic training carried out by soldiers who were joining one of the Corps units, prior to entering their "trade" training, but even this seems a little short. No Infantry soldier passed out having completed only 5 weeks basic training. From memory, it was around  20 or 22  weeks. The Guards had a few extra weeks added on for drill.

The drop out rate was similar to what Martin mentioned. We started with 56, and ended up with 21. 

 

 

I stand corrected. Can I really be out by a factor of five? Alzheimers. I was always under the impression that Basic Training was 5 weeks. The time it took to drill a man, train him to shoot and pass a weapons test and 'pass off' the parade square. No? Our first five weeks was (allegedly) designed to exactly replicate what soldiers went through in the belief that if one was to lead them one needs to know what they had been through... 5 or 26, it was significantly shorter than the time allotted to train an Officer.  Thank you for the corrrective. 

 

The syllabus attached to AO 388 of Oct 1914 shows a syllabus for a 6 months course in training of which "3 months" is "Recruit Training". It is followed by a 10 week course laid out in detail for Recruits. This was followed by 5 weeks Company training and after that Battalion and Brigade training and finally Divisional....so the 6 months really focused on training a battalion rather than just basic infantry skills. Anecdotally we know that men were being accelerated through training in 1914-15 (ref History of the Black Watch) and men with no prior military service were in the front line with as little as 12 weeks training. There is a separate thread on this. 

 

MG

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

Black Watch:

 

"As the fighting developed into trench warfare the training became more intensive. A syllabus of work was brought out by the War Office for a course of twelve weeks' training, and for the average recruit this was found sufficient"

 

Royal Sussex Regt:

 

10414 Pte William Burrell 2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regiment who enlisted on 7th Aug 1914 and disembarked 95 days later on 10th November 1914 with a reinforcement draft. He was sent out with 10415 Pte Charles Brooker who I believe also had no prior military service. 

 

According to the charts in Hughes-Wilson and Corns, desertions* peaked in 1915. This would coincide with the period of accelerated training of men. Fully trained and Effective Regulars, Reservists and Special Reservists had almost run out by March - April 1915. Dozens of regiments had less than 100 trained men in their Reserve Battalions according to Official Weekly Returns. The first K1 Battalions did not reach France until May 1915 (I think), meaning Spring 1915 was a rather desperate time. It is possibly one of the underlying factors behind the spike in desertions. My speculation.MG

 

 

* Chart of Numbers struck off as deserters. Source: Blindfold and Alone Appendix III Hughes-Wilson and Corns. Shown here under Fair Dealing. 

 

Numbers struck off as deserters averaged around 1000 per month between march 1916 and Nov 1918. Prior to this the numbers were three to four times higher. 

 

 

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Guest

[Muerrisch]

AO 388 of Oct 1914 replicates the earlier August AO 324 exactly, except that it takes cognisance of the shorter daylight available in autumn and winter.

 

I would love to see the "course of 12 weeks training" because it would be a brick in the wall of knowledge. I cannot think I missed it in my slow trwl through 1914 AOs and ACIs.

 

Does any reader have sight of it please?

[Guest]

36 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

AO 388 of Oct 1914 replicates the earlier August AO 324 exactly, except that it takes cognisance of the shorter daylight available in autumn and winter.

 

I would love to see the "course of 12 weeks training" because it would be a brick in the wall of knowledge. I cannot think I missed it in my slow trwl through 1914 AOs and ACIs.

 

Does any reader have sight of it please?

 

 It doesn't answer your question but the attached book has an interesting history of the training of the New Armies and in particular ho this changed through the wr.

 

https://archive.org/details/raisingtrainingn00willuoft

 

page 132 is relevant

 

 

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Guest

[Muerrisch]

Thank you Martin, most interesting, I have downloaded and will read this evening.

[Guest]

22 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

Thank you Martin, most interesting, I have downloaded and will read this evening.

 

Page 132 onward specifically mention the change in mid 1915 whch might help you source an AO or ACI.  The most important aspect is how it highlights the big differences in training draft finding units (Reserve Battalions) compared to training the New Army Battalions.

 

Relating this to SAD, it is is pretty clear that thousands of men were being launched into the fray with inadequate training. The correlation between desertion and radical changes (shortening) training periods is fairly high.  MG

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Guest

[Ron Clifton]

8 hours ago, Perth Digger said:

HI Ron

My reading of the Sec. 40 regulations were that if you did use it when another specific section existed, you had to use both (although that may not be clear in the courts-martial records). I've seen plenty of examples where Sec. 40 was used to cover another another specified section. I've seen these by comparing the courts-martial records with the charges in SRs. 

 

In my case above, the reports use Section 40 and he was an officer. 

 

All very confusing.

 

Mike

Confusing indeed! As I read them, the sections of the Army Act, and the explanations given in the Manual of Military Law, are quite clear. Section 40 applies only to "soldiers", and it is made clear elsewhere that this does not include officers. It is not impossible that a charge under Section 40 might be added if the facts given in court were thought insufficient to support a conviction for a more specific offence, but in that case there could be no question of a death sentence, for example.

 

It is also not impossible that, among the 300,000+ courts-martial during the War, some of the paperwork was prepared by inexperienced officers and inaccuracies such as these crept in. No doubt any such errors were, largely speaking, either corrected or (if not materially important) glossed over as part of the confirmation process.

 

Ron

EDIT: I have checked the text and S.40 does apply to officers as well as other ranks, though the maximum permissible punishment under it for officers was cashiering, i.e. not death, penal servitude or imprisonment. I apologise for the errors in this and my earlier post, which I have corrected.

Edited 16 November , 2017 by Ron Clifton

[Ron Clifton]

1 hour ago, Muerrisch said:

I would love to see the "course of 12 weeks training" because it would be a brick in the wall of knowledge. I cannot think I missed it in my slow trwl through 1914 AOs and ACIs.

 

The peacetime training syllabus (six months) is given in Appendix II of Infantry Training 1914, where it is described as a guide, and not intended to be followed rigidly.

 

Ron