How did the French and German Air Forces miss an army?

[centurion]

This scale would have been ideal for use in contemporary aircraft, though I can appreciate the difficulties of flying one, navigating and observing: rather too much for one man.

The big problem was unfolding and refolding the map so as to get to the appropriate part. Anyone who has tried to read a map on a windy torr or fell will know what I mean. The map had to be held down below the level of the cockpit combing to avoid it being blown away and two hands were needed. One of the problems with the Bleriot was that it used wing warping combined with an all flying rudder (no fixed fin) and very large unbalanced elevators. These were all held in position by the force of the control wires attached to the pilot's controls. If he let go they would tend to flap which could cause a sudden nose up followed by a stall and/or a spin (in which case it was the pilot's turn to flap). In other words it was inherently unstable as were many aircraft of the time. A further complication with the Bleriot was that the fuselage was completely uncovered behind the pilot which could cause anything loose in the cockpit (like a map or a note book) to be sucked out. When flown with an observer in the front seat the latter would invariably use a map board with clips. The control stick meant therewasn't room for this in the pilot's position. An advantage that the RFC had was that their principal recce aircraft the BE2 (a b or c) was inherently stable (this of course became a problem when armed opposition was encountered.).

[truthergw]

Well don't just sit there, Carl. Get busy translating!

[centurion]

Well don't just sit there, Carl. Get busy translating!

?

[George Armstrong Custer]

(Discreet cough) He was talking to Carl, author of the post before yours.

Ever Helpful & Polite George

[Robert Dunlop]

IX Corps flight was to cover the area towards Maubeuge though, which is where the BEF was concentrating.

Die Schlacht bei Mons recorded that "...a German plane reported no evidence of the enemy to the west, from the area around Lille west following the railways as far as the Valenciennes - Peruwelz road". It is not known which corps flight this plane was attached to, probably III Corps according to the map that I posted but that is just conjecture on my part. The crucial thing is that von Kluck interpreted this information, in combination with the shooting down of an RFC plane from Maubeuge and the cavalry contact at Casteau, to mean that that the BEF was probably due south. He wasn't sure exactly where because the BEF cavalry screens did their job effectively and, presumably, there was no definitive information from IX Corps' aerial reconnaissance of the Maubeuge area.

For the 23rd August, "[First] Army’s reconnaissance pilots were given the task of exploring the area Douai - Cambrai - Le Cateau - Avesnes - Valenciennes" (source: Die Schlacht bei Mons).

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...there was no definitive information from IX Corps' aerial reconnaissance of the Maubeuge area... (source: Die Schlacht bei Mons).

This is confirmed further on in the same source, with the reason being heavy morning mist preventing observation.

Robert

[sjustice]

This is confirmed further on in the same source, with the reason being heavy morning mist preventing observation.

Robert

Thank you for staying on the case with this, Robert. Fascinating stuff.

Cheers,

Simon

[Jean-Claude Delhez]

Hello All,

About the French Air Force in 1914, you will find all informations in the very good articles of Nicolaou, with great pictures, published in the French magazine Icare, about five years ago : all armies (Lanrezac and so on) in august and september 1914.

Jean-Claude

[Guest]

In post #63 Robert Dunlop mentions the weather. " issues (some of which, such as weather conditions, have not been touched on in any detail "

It's surely a good point, and the weather must have played some part in the failure of reconnaissance.

Not sure if these date apply exactly to the dates covered in this thread, but they do show the weather conditions at this time.

21/8/1914 The morning broke thick and misty aerial reconnaissance impossible. In the afternoon the weather cleared and RFC able to carry out reconnaissance Mons, Maubeuge, Landrecies- (OH) 1914 Vol 1 Page 52 or 93 of 692

23/8/1914 Sunday morning broke in mist and rain, which about 10 am cleared. Mons, Binche, Bray, and Obourg (OH) 1914 Vol 1 Page 76 or 120 of 692

1/9/1914 .Owing to the mist, aerial reconnaissance had been difficult until the afternoon, but from 3 pm onwards the Flying Corps sent in a series of valuable observations (of von Kluck's Army) . The Oise, Noyon, Verberie. (OH) 1914 Vol 1 Page 265 or 321 of 692

Mike

[James A Pratt III]

The books "The Air Weapon 1914-1916" and Tannenberg Clash of Empires" deal with some of the problems of aircraft observation ect.

[Robert Dunlop]

Brose reviewed the German reconnaissance assets prior to and during the early weeks of the war. When the war started:

"[German] General Staff Headquarters (OHL) in Koblenz had five new airships on the western front. Each had been given specific long-range missions during prewar planning. The two stationed in Duesseldorf and Cologne were to overfly Belgium and northern France, respectively, reporting back by wireless on enemy troop movements. The heat, thunderstorms, and turbulence of August 1914, however, prevented long-range Zeppelin reconnaissance over Belgium and northern France until 1 September. Four times in August, the Z-9 took off from Duesseldorf to find the BEF; it was forced back each time by bad weather. Unlike nonrigid airships, Germany's aluminium-frame giants were too susceptible to wind damage to stay aloft under these conditions."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

French airships were only used very briefly for recce as one was shot down by French troops (on the assumption that any airship must be a Zeppelin).

Ultimately the answer must be that the French simply did not have the requisite assets for effective strategic reconnaissance,.

Also from Brose:

"Altogether the French [non-rigid airships] airfleet flew 28 nighttime reconnaissance missions in 3 weeks [in August 1914], taking advantage of German campfires to estimate enemy troop strength and location.

After Maubeuge fell in early September, the occupying Germans found photographs of a modern nonrigid airship strewn about a partially destroyed hangar. Proud of their larger, longer Zeppelins, the conquerors quipped that the Montgolfier was 'just good enough for target practice' [reference to the fact that this airship was shot down by French troops]. They laughed even harder when they learned that this was almost exactly how it had been destroyed.

Last laughs are always cruelest in wartime.

That... the Zeppelins made no contribution was probably the most disastrous legacy from peacetime, for Military Transport and the War Ministry had argued in 1912-1913 that nonrigid airships gave the army long-range eyes in the kind of windy weather that was unsuited for Zeppelins. But their arguments were rejected. The French were able to get [their airships] aloft and had the last, cruel laugh."

Robert

[Jasta72s]

Die Schlacht bei Mons recorded that "...a German plane reported no evidence of the enemy to the west, from the area around Lille west following the railways as far as the Valenciennes - Peruwelz road". It is not known which corps flight this plane was attached to, probably III Corps according to the map that I posted but that is just conjecture on my part.

No, the airplane must have been the Armee-Flieger-Abteilung (a unit under direct command of AOK 1). This unit was Feld-Flieger-Abteilung 12, which flew to Tournai and Lille etc.

The crucial thing is that von Kluck interpreted this information, in combination with the shooting down of an RFC plane from Maubeuge and the cavalry contact at Casteau, to mean that that the BEF was probably due south. He wasn't sure exactly where because the BEF cavalry screens did their job effectively and, presumably, there was no definitive information from IX Corps' aerial reconnaissance of the Maubeuge area.

The aerial reconnaissance of IX.AK was Feld-Flieger-Abteilung 11. One flight touching Maubeuge did spot a big airfield (known from documents of the downed British airplane). North of the fortress the flight spotted a 5 km long mixed column, obviously retreating (?) and another column of baggage moving forward. However, This information did not make it to Army Head Quarter (like 50% of all information from aerial observation!; according to a later German general staff work a main problem).

In the evening AOK 1 and III.AK focused on the southern line Valenciennes-Mons. However, the flights were without results. Later it was speculated that fog and industrial dust from the industry and mining area around Mons may have contributed to the failure.

It is notable that German 1^st Army should have had Feld-Flieger-Abteilungen for every Armee-Korps. However, FFA 9 of IV.AK was moved away to X. Reserve-Korps before. So, FFA 30 flew for II.AK and FFA 7 for III:AK. The latter flying detachment had spotted a British airplane south of Löwen on 20. August. The same day long range recon missions of FFA 12 (300 km over Gent, Brügge, Ostende) and FFA 21 (X.AK, 380 km over Knoche-Ostende-Nieuport) to the coast did not show British embarkments.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you very much for the extra details.

Robert

[sjustice]

Thank you very much for the extra details.

Robert

Let me echo that. I'm very pleased, but not at all surprised, by the continuing response to this thread. All very interesting and a terrific contribution from the community.

Cheers,

Simon