Jump to content
Free downloads from TNA ×
The Great War (1914-1918) Forum

Remembered Today:

How did the French and German Air Forces miss an army?


sjustice

Recommended Posts

Who let you out of Bemersyde?!

Cheers,

Simon

I occasionally have my extra-curricular moments - it's all grist to the mill! :thumbsup:

Best,

George

Link to comment
Share on other sites

<snip>

Simon, I didn't think you were combative, I was rather hoping you had found some new evidence or interpretation.

<snip>

Tom,

Alas, no. This is outside my operational envelope at present but I am extremely pleased to see the emergence of such a constructive thread. I will offer gasps of incredulity until land is spied.

Cheers,

Simon

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hi Simon,

This is the aviation diary for 5th Army in August 1914: http://www.memoirede...001/viewer.html

It only gives a summary of the reconnaissance, I think you would need to get the individual escadrille's diaries (if you could identify them) for more detailed information. When considering range, don't forget that Lanrezac's army only moved north-west in mid-August, with an expanded 4th Army filling the gap. Most of the aerial reconnaissance seems to be limited to southern Belgium (limited by range) where the mass of the right wing German Armies wasn't.

For Centurion's benefit the "hotch-potch" of aircraft available to 4th and 3rd Armies included: Voisin L and LA; Caudron C2; Dorand; Blériot XI; Maurice Farman 7; Henri Farman 20. The names mean little to me but I'm sure that you'll be more familiar with their capabilities.

The Voisins were used as short range recce bombers and fighters (they were machine gun armed) Part of their job was to keep German recce aircraft away. The Caudron C2's performance could be described as marginal (the C2 was rejected by the RFC). The Dorand DO 1 was only built in very small numbers and was already considered obsolete by 1914, its performance was inferior to both the Farmans and I believe that it was primarily intended for artillery observation duties. The Bleriot was the aircraft available in the greatest number at the time, however to achieve the necessary range it had to be flown as a single seater (the RFC tried using the same type as a single seater recce aircraft and quickly reverted to using it in two seater short range mode as no useful observations were made and the pilot often became lost). The Maurice Farman MF07 did have the necessary range but not the necessary ceiling to avoid even rifle fire from the ground so that as one contemporary put it "it might get there but was unlikely to get back and report". The Henri Farman 20 did not have the range.

As early as October 1912 it was being taught in the British Staff college that recce flights without a trained observer on board (both to observe and to navigate so as to ensure that observations were actually made from where they were supposed to be made) were essentially useless. It was reckoned that it took as long to train an observer as it did a pilot (the Germans considered that it actually took longer)

Given the aircraft available I would still hold that the French did not have the assets necessary for effective strategic reconnaissance in August/September 1914.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Good afternoon,

I'm out at the moment so I can't check my references but looking at both George's and Centurion's posts, it reaffirms that 4th Army appears to be worse off in terms of type of aircraft deployed, having access to very few Blériots. As George points out each of their escadrilles flew the same type of aircraft, designated in their escadrille code.

Adding to George's points on reconnaissance it should be remembered that there was also an extensive network of agents and informants, particularly in the Belgian railway network.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

As George points out each of their escadrilles flew the same type of aircraft, designated in their escadrille code. 1

Adding to George's points it should be remembered that there was also an extensive network of agents and informants, particularly in the railway network. 2

1 I think this should be each of their escadrilles was supposed to fly the same type of aircraft. Some individual pilots seem to have managed to wangle a different aircraft

2 The problems with this was that it took time to get the message back; the format was less than standard; French security was so poor that everybody knew that the French had an extensive network of agents and informants, including the Germans who reckoned on he lines of "move fast enough and by the time the messages have got back, been interpreted,collated and integrated with all the other messages, analysed and a conclusion drawn it'll be far too late".

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Further to my previous post:

As Robert has mentioned the aircraft attached to Sordet's Cavalry Corps, it is also worth mentioning that based at Stenay were 3 Blériot XI attached to the 4th Cavalry Division.

4th Army had escadrilles V14 and V21 (Voisin L and LA); C11 (Caudron C2); Do22 (Dorand), each of 6 aircraft plus their commander Barés flew a Maurice Farman 11 type 1914 (the best in service). This made up their 25 aircraft.

It is also worth re-inforcing the point that the French aviation was mainly under the control of the individual armies' "état-major", who would bring all the strands of reconnaissance and intelligence together before drawing their conclusions and/or issuing new reconnaisance orders for cavalry and/or aviation. A couple of examples relating to 4th and 3rd French Armies which I've found in Jean-Claude Delhez' "Le jour de deuil de l'armée française" which I'm currently working my way through (and I am aware that Simon's original post referred to the German right-wing armies but the thread has developed to include a more general investigation of early aerial reconnaissance ):

1. On the 19 August, following Abonneau's reconnaissance of the line Arlon, Neufchateau, Paliseul, Maissin and Maistre (General of the état-major) sending their aviation to check the Luxembourg frontier, Langle de Cary was able to send a report to Joffre that there were small columns marching NNW on the line Aumetz, Arlon, Martelange, Sibret, Champlon, which led him to believe that the mass of the enemy forces were moving in that direction.

2. On the 20 August further sorties were flown that came under ant-aircraft fire and produced the significant observations I mentioned in an earlier post. Langle de Cary judged those to be substantial enemy forces (several corps) and submitted a further report to Joffre at 11.30. He then received further reports from his cavalry that there were also significant forces moving in a WNW direction, confirmed by aircaft later that day. in the meantime Joffre responded to the earlier reports and gave Langle de Cary the go ahead to advance into Belgium with an advance guard and "in secret", not the full advance L de C initially wanted. Maistre cautioned Joffre at 13.15 about the change in direction of the enemy, saying tomorrow we could find strong enemy forces at Bertrix, Saint Medard, Rossignol, Etalle. Joffre responded at 15.00 that "les mouvements signalés par un aviateur ne permettent pas de conclure que l'ennemi a déclenché son offensive..."

The rest of his response is quite interesting to our discussions but my dinner's ready !!!!! hopefully I'll get chance to return later.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

"les mouvements signalés par un aviateur ne permettent pas de conclure que l'ennemi a déclenché son offensive..."

Good evening, to return to Joffre's response;

(Troop) movements indicated by an airman do not allow us to conclude that the enemy has launched its offensive.The information received from elsewhere does not report significant movements in the region Givet, Ciney, Huy. On the bridges of the Meuse downstream of Namur, it doesn't appear that anything else is going on this morning other than German army corps convoys moving against the Belgian Army. (20/08/2014)

He concluded his order by saying that the time still hadn't arrived to give Langle de Cary the authority to march north with his full army. L de C was keen to get north of the great Belgian forests before having to engage the Germans. (all that was to change within 24 hours)

.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

(Troop) movements indicated by an airman do not allow us to conclude that the enemy has launched its offensive.The information received from elsewhere does not report significant movements in the region Givet, Ciney, Huy. On the bridges of the Meuse downstream of Namur, it doesn't appear that anything else going on this morning other than German army corps convoys moving against the Belgian Army. (20/08/2014)

Scepticism over aerial intelligence was certainly not uncommon at this time, Steve - particularly if it seemed to be unsupported by other sources - as these two further examples from the first months of the war, one French and one British, illustrate:

On the 19th August 1914, the XX Corps (Foch) of the French Second Army (Castelnau) were facing the small town of Morhange:

"Castelnau knew that the hills around Morhange were strongly held, because his aviation observers had reported large numbers of guns in prepared positions, with trench lines and hidden troop reserves. One pilot described the enemy army as setting a 'trap' before them like 'a compressed spring ready to let go forwards instead of retreating backwards.' He had tried to report this intelligence to XX Corps when they first began to advance, but Foch's Chief of Staff (Colonel Duchene) had rejected, most forcefully, the value of aerial observation. Since the pilot noted that his request to see Foch personally to explain his findings had been denied, it is impossible to judge how far (if at all) Foch shared his staff's prejudice." *

The British example, from March 1915, reveals a dismissive attitude to intelligence from aerial observation identical to that demonstrated by Duchene to the hapless French pilot in the above account. This time, however, the aviator told to take a hike was not an insignificant French flier, but Hugh Trenchard, and the matter had consequences when he brought it to the attention of Haig (then commanding First Army). Haig's response is the antithesis of scepticism about the value of of aerial reconnaissance in a new kind of war for a new century:

"When Trenchard tried to give the reports of aerial observation to an artillery general during the battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915, he was curtly told that the general was busy fighting a war, too busy to 'turn round and deal with your toys of the air'. Trenchard noted in his private papers that, 'After the battle I reported to Sir Douglas Haig and told him of the incident....He assembled all his Gunner Generals at once and told them he was not going to have any more "early Victorian" methods. He was going to use the air in this war, and they had to use it." **

George

* Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, The Forging of a First World War General (Cambridge, 2011), p. 15.

** Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate, British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, 1989), p. 55.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It's probably worth looking at the experiences of the RFC to put matters in perspective. On their first recce flight since flying to France; with two aircraft flying without observers (to save weight and increase range)

"They quickly discovered some of the difficulties of aerial navigation over entirely strange country with some proportion of concentration distracted perhaps by the identification of possible warlike objects on the ground and a look out for similar objects in the air. The two pilots lost each other and then lost themselves: both wandered around for long periods. Both landed to ask the way - one twice; one got back to Mauberge at noon the other at 5.30 pm. It is fair to say that the lessons of these two flights were assimilated; observers were carried in future in future and accurate information, positive and negative began to come in"

The eye in the sky

Both pilots were experienced but in a period when solo cross country flights were achieved by following the railway lines the results should not be surprising. If range limitations were causing the French to have to fly solo sorties then similar results might be expected. Strategic reconnaissance was in it's infancy. It needed trained observers who could also navigate from a map.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Scepticism over aerial intelligence was certainly not uncommon at this time...
George, a very important point. And one that should not be confined to aerial reconnaissance. Intelligence gathering and interpretation had to be driven (as now) off the back of multiple sources of information. None of the major combatants relied on one single source of tactical or operational/strategic information. This is why any perceived failures in the interpretation of enemy intentions, on both sides of the divide, cannot be ascribed to one particular source of information.

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It's probably worth looking at the experiences of the RFC to put matters in perspective. On their first recce flight since flying to France; with two aircraft flying without observers (to save weight and increase range)

"They quickly discovered some of the difficulties of aerial navigation over entirely strange country with some proportion of concentration distracted perhaps by the identification of possible warlike objects on the ground and a look out for similar objects in the air. The two pilots lost each other and then lost themselves: both wandered around for long periods. Both landed to ask the way - one twice; one got back to Mauberge at noon the other at 5.30 pm. It is fair to say that the lessons of these two flights were assimilated; observers were carried in future in future and accurate information, positive and negative began to come in"

The eye in the sky

Both pilots were experienced but in a period when solo cross country flights were achieved by following the railway lines the results should not be surprising. If range limitations were causing the French to have to fly solo sorties then similar results might be expected. Strategic reconnaissance was in it's infancy. It needed trained observers who could also navigate from a map.

An illuminating quote, Centurion. A problem which would certainly have affected British pilots was a lack of good maps. This was general in the first weeks after landing and I doubt if pilots were getting many of the ones the British did have.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

An illuminating quote, Centurion. A problem which would certainly have affected British pilots was a lack of good maps. This was general in the first weeks after landing and I doubt if pilots were getting many of the ones the British did have.

The point is even with a map a solo pilot was likely to have problems. Virtually impossible to handle a map in the confines of a pilot's open cockpit of the period and fly the aircraft at the same time. It was difficult enough for an observer as many contemporary accounts reveal.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I have studied the records of the flights made by RFC pilots in the earliest weeks of the war. Any issues around maps, open cockpits, presence or absence of observers, etc, etc (ie process-related issues) cannot be used to make assumptions about the results/outcomes of their efforts. The outcomes can be judged by the sketch map, for example, that I posted earlier. It clearly showed, reinforced by the earlier messages and reports from each flight, that major German forces were wheeling towards the BEF and the French Fifth Army.

French aerial reconnaissance efforts should be treated in the same way. Process issues must be separated from outcomes. I haven't seen anything in the French records that is as comprehensive as the reports from the RFC flights. What I have seen so far, however, does not suggest that the French efforts were less robust or productive than the British. This impression has been reinforced by Steve's excellent work too. I don't dismiss that there were process issues (some of which, such as weather conditions, have not been touched on in any detail). We should continue the search for more evidence of outcomes, such as Sordet's decision to reverse his advance into Belgium once aerial reconnaissance reported the presence of significant cavalry and other forces bearing down on Perwez and its vicinity.

The BEF made a decision to stand at Mons based on the knowledge that large forces were approaching from the north. This decision, however, was not based purely on aerial reconnaissance. There were multiple sources of intelligence that cross-checked on the presence of these forces.

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

...first record of a French Fifth Army aerial reconnaissance report... 9th August 1914.
Next day (10th August), the German Guard Cavalry Division "...followed its reconnaissance squadron across the Luxembourg-Belgian border at Donkholz (Doncols, Luxembourg - about 12 km east of Bastogne). An aeroplane appeared over us and was engaged immediately with carbine fire. Unsuccessfully but it turned back nevertheless."

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

For the German perspective, I have picked up the First Army's story from the evening of 17th August 1914. Von Kluck's army had just been subordinated to Second Army's command (which had left von Kluck fuming). The following map shows First Army's estimate of the Belgian Army's positions, the relative positions of the First Army corps, and the proposed aerial reconnaissance routes for 18th August.

post-1473-0-02702800-1325922512.jpg

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

There are no reports in von Kluck's account from the aerial recon of 18th August. Here is the situation on the evening of the 18th:

post-1473-0-89072600-1325923191.jpg

Notice that French forces have been detected, advancing towards Gembloux. This was probably Sordet's Cavalry Corps, as noted in an earlier thread.

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Von Kluck did not describe any specific positions for the Belgian Army. He noted, however, that there were reports from 'intercepted letters' that seemed 'to indicate the arrival of British troops on the Belgian left flank'. The proposed recon flights for 20th August are more extensive. There was no plan for IV Corps. The flights for III and IX Corps were much more extensive than previous, with both corps missions' covering the Mons area. Of course, the bulk of the BEF was further south and had not reached Mons by this stage. Here is the map:

post-1473-0-16408800-1325924240.jpg

Von Kluck noted that the French forces, comprising 'the French 5th Cavalry Division [to which an escadrille was attached] had retired from near Pervez, with heavy loss, under the fire of Marwitz's 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions.' As mentioned above, Sordet had ordered the withdrawal of his force because of aerial reconnaissance information about the German cavalry.

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

First Army reached Brussels in force on 20th August. The positions are shown in this map. Von Kluck does not mention the orders for aerial reconnaissance:

post-1473-0-89324000-1325925340.jpg

With respect to the BEF 'it is believed that the disembarkation of the British Expeditionary Force was completed in French harbours on the 18th August; the direction of its advance is unknown'. This is indicated on the map by marked the BEF off map to the bottom left.

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Robert,

Very interesting indeed. The change in emphasis is marked and I note the use of air reconnaissance exactly as if it were a cavalry screen, but without the teeth (at this stage, or the cost in fodder and expense of time). The third diagram of German III and IX Corps operations depicts legs between 30-40 miles and total flights each of about 100 miles in checking other sources and searching for the BEF (did British cavalry detachments reach Mons during 19 August?). At 50-60 mph about a two-hour trip, then. An enormous area covered in that time and, apparently, a definite search pattern.

Cheers,

Simon

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Next day, von Kluck mentions that the area 'as far as the line Ghent-Audenarde-Tournai was clear of the enemy...'. This is marked with the white dotted oval in the map below. I believe this information will have come from aerial reconnaissiance, in part.

The various corps were reshuffled slightly around Brussels, enabling the reserve corps (which I haven't marked) to begin the process of screening off Antwerp. On the evening of the 21st August, OHL passed on the following information to First Army:

"A landing of British troops at Boulogne [incorrect] and their advance from about Lille must be reckoned with. It is believed that a disembarkation of British troops on a big scale has not yet taken place [incorrect]."

The monograph "Die Schlacht bei Mons" ["The Battle of Mons"] suggested that this intelligence came from newspaper reports. Irrespective, the proposed aerial reconnaissance flights take this information into account. IX Corps flight was to cover the area towards Maubeuge though, which is where the BEF was concentrating.

post-1473-0-71450100-1325927401.jpg

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

And so it was that von Kluck wrote the following about contact with the BEF on the 22nd August:

'The presence of British troops in front of the Second Army was established in the course of the 22nd August: a squadron of cavalry was reported at Casteau, north-east of Mons [correct], and a British aeroplane, which had come from Maubeuge on a reconnaissance flight, was shot down [correct].'

With respect to First Army, however, 'the presence of British troops in front of the First Army was also certain, though it was not certain whether the mass of the British Army had yet arrived near Maubeuge'.

The scene was set for the Battle of Mons on August 23rd.

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

...I note the use of air reconnaissance exactly as if it were a cavalry screen, but without the teeth (at this stage, or the cost in fodder and expense of time).
Simon, aerial reconnaissance was an adjunct to the cavalry screening process. It could go where cavalry couldn't, for example the flights behind the Belgian lines. As the advance progressed, the flights became much longer. Again this was covering off territory that could not be physically covered by cavalry, either because there wasn't enough or because the distances were too great. Even today, aerial recon does not replace cavalry screens. When covering the same sector, the two forms of recon provide different perspectives literally and figuratively :).

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

post-6447-0-41672400-1325942914.jpg

I am posting this map extract as an example of the quality of 1:100,000 mapping available to the BEF. I think that the quality is highly impressive for the period. These maps were right up to date, having been produced and then printed by the Ordnance Survey in 1911/12. We know that they were available on wide distribution, because one was captured by a German unit at Le Cateau and used as 'proof' of perfidious Albion being in league with the French and planning dastardly deeds prior to the war. This scale would have been ideal for use in contemporary aircraft, though I can appreciate the difficulties of flying one, navigating and observing: rather too much for one man.

Jack

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hello

Interesting topic. A very good book on this topic is (in flemish !) "Luchtoorlog boven België 1914 " by Bernard De Neckere (2010) It has a very torough overview of all arial activity above Belgium from the start of the war untill the start of trench warfare

Carl

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
×
×
  • Create New...