French civilian morale in 1917-18

[wiking85]

What was the state of French civilian morale during the 1917-1918 period? I've seen talk of a domestic 'remobilization' enacted by Clemenceau in 1917 that villified the anti-war movements and saw his opponents like Caillaux jailed, which kept the French in the war until the end. Still by the very end the French army, according to Robert Doughty, was at the end of its tether. What about the civilians? It seemed during the German 1918 offensives that the French government was most worried about the civilian population revolting like the Russians, forcing a separate peace. Could this have happened? What were civilian attitudes during the critical period before the Americans entered the fight in numbers?

I've seen anecdotal evidence of French civilians insulting and spitting at British soldiers in Paris, because they thought they were going to abandon them in the March 1918 danger period. Also 1 million French civilians left Paris during the German offensives...

[truthergw]

Pretty wide area there and you would likely have to do a bit of reading to get anything like a full appreciation of morale in French civilians. A quick summary might go like this. Army morale plummeted after Chemin des Dames and pacifist and pro-German factions fed off that. Petain for the army and The Tiger behind the lines both took strong and effective steps to counter sedition and raise morale. This started to take effect by late '17. By 1918, the civilian populations of all the belligerents were growing weary of the war. In France, it was felt that neither the nation nor the army could well sustain a major defeat. That view was also held in certain influential sectors in Britain. How deep the war weariness was has been a subject of debate. Some feel that Petain was correct while others feel that the French were more resilient than assumed. Germany gambled on French defeatism three times during the war, Verdun, Chemin des Dames and Kaiserschlacht and she was proven wrong each time. The French army and people rose to the challenge, met and overcame it. T o get a real idea of the subject, you should read some of the French political memoirs. President Poincare's War Memoirs for example.

[wiking85]

Pretty wide area there and you would likely have to do a bit of reading to get anything like a full appreciation of morale in French civilians. A quick summary might go like this. Army morale plummeted after Chemin des Dames and pacifist and pro-German factions fed off that. Petain for the army and The Tiger behind the lines both took strong and effective steps to counter sedition and raise morale. This started to take effect by late '17. By 1918, the civilian populations of all the belligerents were growing weary of the war. In France, it was felt that neither the nation nor the army could well sustain a major defeat. That view was also held in certain influential sectors in Britain. How deep the war weariness was has been a subject of debate. Some feel that Petain was correct while others feel that the French were more resilient than assumed. Germany gambled on French defeatism three times during the war, Verdun, Chemin des Dames and Kaiserschlacht and she was proven wrong each time. The French army and people rose to the challenge, met and overcame it. T o get a real idea of the subject, you should read some of the French political memoirs. President Poincare's War Memoirs for example.

Can you recommend any other titles besides political memoirs? I will definitely check them out, thanks for the tip.

As to the three occasions you mention, Verdun was against the army to soften them up for follow on blows, not to break their morale; Chemin des Dames was a French, not German, offensive, so I fail to see how the Germans 'were banking on French defeatism' there, and Kaiserschlacht was a battle against the British, not the French, by design, because the Germans thought the French were the more dangerous foe.

Honestly, other than the war lasting so long and the French wasting so much manpower, the Germans never really banked on French defeatism at all. One can make an argument for Verdun, granted, but it was supposed to bleed them physically, not morally, at least in conception. The 1918 offensives were tactical flailing at the Allies to get them to surrender by separating and defeating them in detail militarily, not morally.

If anything there was not enough focus on the French morale in the German efforts, at least from the German army.

[truthergw]

Can you recommend any other titles besides political memoirs? I will definitely check them out, thanks for the tip.

As to the three occasions you mention, Verdun was against the army to soften them up for follow on blows, not to break their morale; Chemin des Dames was a French, not German, offensive, so I fail to see how the Germans 'were banking on French defeatism' there, and Kaiserschlacht was a battle against the British, not the French, by design, because the Germans thought the French were the more dangerous foe.

Honestly, other than the war lasting so long and the French wasting so much manpower, the Germans never really banked on French defeatism at all. One can make an argument for Verdun, granted, but it was supposed to bleed them physically, not morally, at least in conception. The 1918 offensives were tactical flailing at the Allies to get them to surrender by separating and defeating them in detail militarily, not morally.

If anything there was not enough focus on the French morale in the German efforts, at least from the German army.

How do you understand ' soften up ' if not to break the morale? At Chemin des Dames, the failure to meet the great expectations was a terrible blow to the French army's morale, kicking off a series of mutinies. The Kaiserschlacht had rather nebulous strategic aims but one hope was that the allies could be split. It was felt that the French on their own would be easier to deal with. Throughout the war, the Germans maintained a mistaken belief that the French nation would yield to pressure sooner than the British. Matters of civilian morale are the responsibility of the government and political memoirs are one of the places where these are discussed in detail. Lastly, I did say that my post was a quick summary. The subject requires study of many books to gain a fair idea.

[wiking85]

How do you understand ' soften up ' if not to break the morale? At Chemin des Dames, the failure to meet the great expectations was a terrible blow to the French army's morale, kicking off a series of mutinies. The Kaiserschlacht had rather nebulous strategic aims but one hope was that the allies could be split. It was felt that the French on their own would be easier to deal with. Throughout the war, the Germans maintained a mistaken belief that the French nation would yield to pressure sooner than the British. Matters of civilian morale are the responsibility of the government and political memoirs are one of the places where these are discussed in detail. Lastly, I did say that my post was a quick summary. The subject requires study of many books to gain a fair idea.

I should preface my reply with the explanation that I am not trying to attack you personally for your response, which I appreciate, but simply to argue a view point.

Verbluten was the verb I always read about Verdun, which means to bleed out in a physical sense. I've seen it translated as 'to bleed white', which Falkenhayn used in his explanation for the 'Meuse Mill'. Chemin des Dames and the mutiny following it wasn't the objective of the Germans, who had no idea the French would break down as a result and seemed not to have realized there was a mutiny underway.

You are of course correct that the Germans viewed the French as more brittle by 1918, but still saw they as the more dangerous and skilled opponent. Also you are correct that the Germans thought the French would more morally vulnerable, but that was based on the large number of desertions versus the British and generally bad morale of the men captured in raids and combat actions. Plus there was the understanding of the large anti-war movement among the civilian population, which was centered on the well-developed left. I'll definitely check out the French political memoirs, but I was hoping there were social analysis done of French society during the war that discussed these issues. I have the book about French society during the Great War.

http://books.google.com/books/about/France_and_the_Great_War_1914_1918.html?id=8rbSnt4bgNIC

But it leaves much to be desired about the 1918 period.

[Paul Hederer]

Just for some perspective and an alternate view:

The German Hermann Ziese-Beringer maintains in his work on Verdun and Falkenhayn, "Der einsame Feldherr," that Verdun was a victory and effects were not realized until 1917.

Paul