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Remembered Today:

Attempting to gain perspective on Churchill


kenneth505

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In an earlier thread, I think your water carrier said something like "... Churchill never understood how serious a matter the Great War was ! "

In astonishment, I retorted " What are you on ?"

Come to think of it, Haig mused in his diary that Churchill was on drugs, in allusion to the August Memorandum of 1916.

You refuse to waste your breath refuting my suggestion that there might have been validity in Churchill's presentation.

As for The Blood Test and salesie's allegation that the German figures were cooked, I will refute that with one name - EDMONDS.

Phil (PJA)

In other words you've no substance to offer in support of your assertion that it has ever been more important for any of Haig's supporters to criticise Churchill rather than accorded to Lloyd George.

George

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I can't speak for Tom, Salesie, but I should have thought it self evident that he didn't have such a ludicrous extrapolation as an alternative in mind with the phrase 'archeypal politician.' I took it to mean something along the lines of an opportunistic shape-shifter, who endeavours to coat himself with teflon - and Churchill was all of that. It is a breed not unknown in the present day - though few of todays lot could also display the statesmanship and rhetorical genius which made Churchill the man of the hour in 1940.

George

That's the nature of all politicians, George, it always has been and always will be (and not just with politicians either). Now, if Tom can state the bleedin' obvious then, surely, I can state the blindingly obvious alternative!

Cheers-salesie.

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Here's the substance of it :

Lloyd George's calumnies are so terrible as to render his account of Haig preposterous.

Churchill's criticism is far more temperate, and is backed up by statistical research which deserves respect : apart from the Blood Test chapter in his history, he gave a decent rendition in his August Memorandum which Boraston endorsed after the war.

Do not think for a moment that I support Churchill's argument for the Easterner approach.

I believe that Lloyd George's tirade disqualifies itself for serious consideration. Churchill's assessment is the more dangerous, because it contains well researched and properly marshalled statistics.

It's more important for Haig's supporters to give proper countenance to Churchill's criticism than to the hysterical rantings of the Welsh Wizard.

Phil (PJA)

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I think that it is more important for people who wish to study the war to find accounts in which they feel they can place some degree of confidence. No book tells the whole story. No author is without an opinion and therefore all are biased to some degree. I believe the best we can do is read widely and try to arrive at some sort of view which reflects a consensus. Lloyd George was an extremely important political figure from the Boer War until the post Great War period. His views were naturally accorded great respect at the time of his memoirs since they chimed with the pacifist zeitgeist. Unfortunately, these views were tainted by a personal agenda. Churchill was never as important politically and such influence as he did exert was for a much shorter span. His influence on the historiography of the war however, is much stronger than that of DLG because he was a great master of the english language. He excelled as an orator and writer. He worked hard at his speeches and his writings and that was reflected in their impact. There is an added influence on us since we see all his works through the aura which surrounds him since WW2. It may just be worth while to reflect that both in Wales and in Scotland, his reputation never stood as high as the established media would have us believe. Shortly after the Great War, Churchill lost his seat in parliament to a prohibitionist. Perhaps that tells us much as to his standing in the early twenties.

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It's more important for Haig's supporters to give proper countenance to Churchill's criticism than to the hysterical rantings of the Welsh Wizard.

Not so. This fails on two counts.

Firstly, the basis of of Churchill's criticisms of Westerner policy are demonstrably a postwar defence of the censure he received for his failed Easterner strategy. Churchill's wartime failures were nothing to do with Haig, and Haig's reputation suffers from collateral damage, rather than being the main target of Churchill's published post-war self justifications. What really suffered from Churchill's history was the historiography of the Great War for decades to come, such was its distorting influence in encouraging the notion that the war could perhaps have been decisively won other than by wearing down and defeating the main German army on the Western Front. Churchill liked and respected Haig, and surely recognised the success of the Western strategy. Yet he could not bring himself to say so without conceding that the alternative strategy which he himself had backed was an abject failure which, like the Westerners, he ought to have foreseen if he'd possessed half the strategic genius his posturing implied. So he damned it by saying it was a victory bought so dearly as to be indistiguishable from defeat. Churchill was clearly aware that Haig would see that his reputation and achievement would suffer damage in the published Churchill history of the war - the evidence for this was quoted by me in a related thread just last month. I'll repeat it as its import seems to have passed you by:

Churchill's The World Crisis was the figleaf held up to give his own disastrous strategic visions in the late war a specious credibility. Churchill knew that men like Haig would see these volumes for what they were. When, therefore, Churchill was preparing volume three of The World Crisis, and wrote to Haig asking permission for certain passages to appear, he felt obliged to add that “You may perhaps remember I was a convinced and outspoken opponent to our offensive policy at Loos, on the Somme and at Passchendaele, and the argument of the book turns strongly against it […..]” Churchill sent a copy of the published book to Haig with a covering letter, dated 28 February 1927, pleading indulgence: "Although I cannot expect that you will share the opinions this book contains, I believe that you will regard them as the result of reflection devoid of ill will etc [….]” Churchill was right - the impetus behind The World Crisis wasn't malicious. But it was self-serving, and consequently damaging to others.

Haig's reaction to Churchill's book, and the nature of the relationship between the two men, was recalled by his son, Dawyck Haig, who had been a nine-year-old boy at the time:

"The visit of Mr Churchill after a nearby Conservative fete gave an inkling of some of the differences between the two great men.

I remember my father talking with his Chief Gunner, Sir Noel (Curley) Birch, in our car coming back from Floors Castle after the Conservative rally in the summer of 1927. Churchill was trundling along in the car behind because he was coming to tea at Bemersyde. In our car were just Sir Noel, my father and myself, and these two Generals were discussing Churchill's book The World Crisis. The part which dealt with Passchedaele had just come out and these two were absolutely hopping mad and the whole car practically exploded. I can remember my father saying that Winston really didn't know what had happened, what the problems were and what the difficulties were over the French. I can remember a tremedous discussion and this went on for about nine or ten miles between Floors and Bemersyde. On arrival my father got out and then the sun came out and my father was his usual beaming warm self. Although Churchill had opposed my father's strategy, they had worked very closely together in the latter part of the war when my father was Commander-in-Chief and Churchill was Secretary of State fro Munitions. After the war they had been responsible for the demobilisation plans when Churchill was Secretary of State for War and my father was Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces. My father thought Churchill had done a good job over munitions, so in spite of their differences over strategy my father and Churchill shared a mutual respect and admiration."

In the same thread quoted above, I also observe that "If Churchill hadn't got his strategic ideas so wildly wrong in the Great War, and sought to disguise that at the expense of the victorious 'Westerners' in his postwar writings, he and Haig would have had few differences." In other words, then, there is little for Haig's supporters to get excited about so far as Churchill's relationship to Haig is concerned. Haig was merely part of the collateral damage of Churchill's demonstrably self-justifying version of his own inept wartime strategic ideas. There was no mutual antipathy during or after the war. Lloyd George, on the other hand, as wartime Prime Minister and postwar chronicler, used Haig as the whipping boy for what he very well knew was the inevitable cost of getting the German army shifted off French and Belgian territory, as required by Haig's political masters. And because of his position as wartime Prime Minister and the self-proclaimed 'man who won the war', Lloyd George's vitriolic attacks on Haig carried far more weight at the time they appeared than did Churchill's, whose own reputation had taken such a knocking during the war.

So I'm afraid your claim that you've given us 'substance' for your contention that Haig's supporters are more exercised with countering Churchill than Lloyd George is way off beam - as evidenced by the fact that you cannot cite an historian supportive of Haig who has taken that line.

Secondly, given Churchill's clearly self-serving 'Easterner' distortion of the war in his history - eg 1916 should have seen another invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula! - your faith in the impartial selection of the German statistical evidence used in his 'Blood Test' is touching, but is not a view I share.

George

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your faith in the impartial selection of the German statistical evidence used in his 'Blood Test' is touching, but is not a view I share.

George

This is where I have to hang my hat.

I honestly believe that there was no attempt at distortion by Churchill in his statistical analysis of the Blood Test : certainly, in this regard he is a paragon of virtue compared with Edmonds.

That Churchill was more engaged with refuting the wisdom of the Westerners than he was concerned with Haig himself is a point that I must acknowledge, and you're right to correct me on that score.

I think that you're on shakier ground when it comes to the August Memorandum and the Blood test.

Phil (PJA)

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It may just be worth while to reflect that both in Wales and in Scotland, his reputation never stood as high as the established media would have us believe. Shortly after the Great War, Churchill lost his seat in parliament to a prohibitionist. Perhaps that tells us much as to his standing in the early twenties.

Quite right, Tom, Churchill lost his Dundee seat in the 1922 General Election, and also lost two by-elections before being returned in the 1924 General Election as the Member for Epping. He then went straight into Baldwin's government as Chancellor of the Exchequer no less, even though he'd stood as an Independent Constitutionalist (with Tory party backing) - shortly afterwards, of course, he re-joined the Conservative Party saying, "Anyone can rat, but it takes a certain ingenuity to re-rat."

Don't you just love the guy - no wonder us churls can't get enough of his undoubted class!

Cheers-salesie.

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I honestly believe that there was no attempt at distortion by Churchill in his statistical analysis of the Blood Test : certainly, in this regard he is a paragon of virtue compared with Edmonds.

Yes, we know that - despite Churchill having a motive which you concede is apparent in the rest of his history but not, apparently, in the supportive 'Blood Test' part. But this is leading to a rehash of material which has been gone over exhaustively elsewhere on this forum, with little common ground being found. Like the subject of Haig himself, it's not really germane to the topic of this thread, which is to solicit opinion upon whether Churchill's Great War performance should be regarded as a step on the road to greatness or as a grandstandingly inept misunderstanding of what the strategic imperatives were - and a precursor of some of the wild ideas which Alanbrooke had to contend with from Churchill during the Second World War when Winston tried to play the role of strategic genius rather than inspirational Prime Minister.

George

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Not so. This fails on two counts.

What really suffered from Churchill's history was the historiography of the Great War for decades to come, such was its distorting influence in encouraging the notion that the war could perhaps have been decisively won other than by wearing down and defeating the main German army on the Western Front.

George

Bloody hell, George, where I come from, anyone venting their spleen because the historiography of the Great War was distorted for decades, would be considered an out-and-out weirdo - but I know that you're not one of them, so why don't we just accept the fact that Churchill was a chancer; a highly bloody talented one, but a chancer nonetheless and leave it at that (and as you've probably gathered, I just love history's highly talented chancers - they possess the stuff that living legends, and massive empires, are made from).

Cheers-salesie.

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Bloody hell, George, where I come from, anyone venting their spleen because the historiography of the Great War was distorted for decades, would be considered an out-and-out weirdo - but I know that you're not one of them, so why don't we just accept the fact that Churchill was a chancer; a highly bloody talented one, but a chancer nonetheless and leave it at that (and as you've probably gathered, I just love history's highly talented chancers - they possess the stuff that living legends, and massive empires, are made from).

Cheers-salesie.

Well as you may have seen, Amigo, there are those in deepest darkest Wales who think I am weird for posting a pic of Haig's death mask and - whisper it - his grave on the Haig FB page! :rolleyes:

Churchill's history was of course only a part of those publications which, for various reasons, sought to distort either the central importance of the Western Front or the BEF's achievement there - chief amongst these was Lloyd George's erstwhile assistant writer, Liddell Hart.

I'm happy to go along with your summation of Churchill as an undoubtedly highly talented chancer, but a chancer nonetheless. These islands - and the wider world - were lucky that chancer was where he was in 1940. And yes, he is emblematic of the characters who bring colour and piquancy to our national story - though the perspective on chancers from the beaches of Helles and ANZAC might have been less charitable!

George

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If I can throw in some background to which you are all alluding let us look at the birth of the Dardanelles. It was first raised at the War Council on January 13th 1915. What must be remembered is the context of the meeting (in other words rid your mind of all that you know comes afterwards. The Council spent a great deal of time discussing the Zeebrugge Plan as a means to continue to take the war to the Germans. The whole atmosphere is one of 'what do we do'. Here is a flavour of the exchanges:

Mr Lloyd George asked what was General Joffre's view as to the means of overcoming Germany?

Lord Kitchener said that, as far as he knew, General Joffre had no big conception for terminating the campaign.

Sir John French said that General Joffre hoped to achieve some success by his offensive, but relied on the Russians to finish the business. He was not strong enough to break down the German resistance.

Mr Balfour said that he was unable to understand the failure of the Russians to accomplish more, taking into consideration their great numbers.

Lord Kitchener said they were short of artillery ammunition.

Clearly everyone was looking around for someone to win the war for them, without much idea of how it would be achieved. Also note the pretty negative comment as to the future of offensive plans on the Western Front from their Commander in Chief in that quarter.

The Dardanelles were then brought up:

The lead was a statement by Sir Edward Grey

......he (Grey) would be glad if the Admiralty could consider the feasibility of affecting something at Cattaro, or somewhere in the Adriatic, with the object of drawing Italy into the War. We also ought to consider what we should do in the event of a total stalemate. For this purpose we should study the possibilities of (a) cooperation with Serbia and B) an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsular.

Churchill then went on to describe the exchanges he had had with Vice-Admiral Carden (CinC Med.) and the Admiral's thoughts that the forts could be reduced in a step by step attack. Some discussion follows as to why Cattaro was unsuitable for action (the French were already there) with Grey insisting that something had to draw Italy into the War. Then comes for me a very important statement from Sir John French:

(French) ..said that complete success against the Germans in the Western theatre of war, though possible, was not probable. If we found it impossible to break through, he agrreed that it would be desirable to seek new spheres of activity, in Austria for example.

In this atmosphere was the campaign born. I leave others to judge as to whether many texts on the subject have concerned themselves with the helplessness that was clearly felt at all levels of the British civilian and military hierarchy in January 1915.

Oh, by the way, in the same discussion Churchill said that 'we ought not to go South until we are satisfied that we can nothing in the North.'

Jim

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I'm happy to go along with your summation of Churchill as an undoubtedly highly talented chancer, but a chancer nonetheless.

Consensus !

Phil (PJA)

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Well as you may have seen, Amigo, there are those in deepest darkest Wales who think I am weird for posting a pic of Haig's death mask and - whisper it - his grave on the Haig FB page! :rolleyes:

Churchill's history was of course only a part of those publications which, for various reasons, sought to distort either the central importance of the Western Front or the BEF's achievement there - chief amongst these was Lloyd George's erstwhile assistant writer, Liddell Hart.

I'm happy to go along with your summation of Churchill as an undoubtedly highly talented chancer, but a chancer nonetheless. These islands - and the wider world - were lucky that chancer was where he was in 1940. And yes, he is emblematic of the characters who bring colour and piquancy to our national story - though the perspective on chancers from the beaches of Helles and ANZAC might have been less charitable!

George

And I'd bet a pound to a lump of sh*te that those at the sharp-end didn't think much of determined sloggers either when the whistles blew on the Somme, at Ypres etc. As the survey of men's letters home showed in October 1917 - men's morale, and respect for their leaders, moved up and down depending on their units state of action i.e. the greater the action then the lower it went, but came back up dramatically when in quiet areas.

Cheers-salesie.

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If I can throw in some background to which you are all alluding let us look at the birth of the Dardanelles. It was first raised at the War Council on January 13th 1915. What must be remembered is the context of the meeting (in other words rid your mind of all that you know comes afterwards. The Council spent a great deal of time discussing the Zeebrugge Plan as a means to continue to take the war to the Germans. The whole atmosphere is one of 'what do we do'. Here is a flavour of the exchanges:

Edit...........

In this atmosphere was the campaign born. I leave others to judge as to whether many texts on the subject have concerned themselves with the helplessness that was clearly felt at all levels of the British civilian and military hierarchy in January 1915.

Oh, by the way, in the same discussion Churchill said that 'we ought not to go South until we are satisfied that we can nothing in the North.'

Jim

Thanks for that Jim. What I find interesting is that DLG had penned a memorandum at Xmas proposing military expedition to the Eastern Med/ Balkans. The secretary of the War Council had followed suit with a fair summary of the general situation and, as I mentioned in an earlier post, talked of forcing the Dardanelles. No mention of either of these proposals but I think it fair to assume that these memoranda would have been circulated to interested and influential parties so there were a lot of cards being played close to the chest. I see that WSC was still looking at the Baltic. I think it should be borne in mind that at this early stage of the game, many were still looking to an early close to the war. The politician who could attach his name to the winning manoeuvre could hope to reap a handsome dividend. Indeed, DLG, The Man Who Won the War, did just that at the end of he war.

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Indeed Tom. In the same meeting DLG talked of preparing the way for possible action in the Balkans and he did suggest the rail being doubled and the road improved for the possibility of a campaign there to be successful. His suggestion was not taken up and many problems that the eventual expedition did meet were down to poor communications. I am not saying it was a good strategy to go there but he did have the foresight to see the problems. He talks at length (as usual) on this in his memoirs and it is one of the areas in which he was not believed by some. Well at least in this case the evidence actually does back up his claim. (CAB 42/1)

Jim

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The notion of attacking the soft underbelly is always attractive to the amateur strategist. The question is whether the belly belongs to the main contender. Forcing the Dardanelles could have had more than one result. It might, as suggested by the Gallipoli enthusiasts, have knocked Turkey out of the war and allowed a seaway to and from the West for Russia. On the other hand, Russia might simply have settled down in Turkey after occupying Constantinople. This was, after all, one of her war aims. Either way, would this have materially affected Germany's ability to fight on the Western Front? That is at least questionable. The same question can be asked with regard to Mespot, Balkans, Salonika et al. In fact, it is quite clear, that Germany was not at all affected by the fighting there and the political motive was paramount. Here we are threatened by bogging down in Franco- Anglo rivalry in the near and middle East. Reading the French political memoirs of the wartime is very instructive on this topic. I suspect that Germany would gladly have provided fully provisioned ships to help Britain or France send troops to the Levant and surrounding parts. The only real need for military action was protecting the Suez canal from the Turks. The Indian Army were capable of carrying out that task and it was their responsibility to do so.

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The secretary of the War Council had followed suit with a fair summary of the general situation and, as I mentioned in an earlier post, talked of forcing the Dardanelles.

The memo by Hankey is from the 2nd February (CAB63/3) and is in the way of collating all the positive discussions of the previous 3 meetings. He says, 'I have been immensely impressed with the cumulative effects of the arguments presented in favour on military (sic) action in the Dardanelles at the earliest possible date.' He then lays out the positive strategic, political and economic arguments for the campaign. He does not talk of how it will be done so to say he talks of 'forcing the Dardanelles' is perhaps going a little far. He does; however, stress the word military, thus the italics, due to the argument that the fleet may destroy all the batteries and be able to open the Dardanelles for their use but merchants ships would not and therefore the enemy cannot be in possession of the shore. You can see where the arguments for the army's involvement began to evolve.

Jim

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Tom

Hankey's memo of 1 March, titled 'After the Dardanelles' makes interesting reading in respect of your last post, have you seen it?

Jim

Edit: Just to say I have been called!! unsure.gif Will not be here to answer should you comment Tom.

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If I can throw in some background to which you are all alluding let us look at the birth of the Dardanelles. It was first raised at the War Council on January 13th 1915.

Thanks for those extracts, Jim. We can, of course, go back further than the 13 January 1915 War Council meeting. There was Churchill's decision as First Lord of the Admiralty to appropriate neutral Turkey's two dreadnought battleships then under construction in British shipyards on 1 August 1914. This played its part in Turkey's alliance with Germany. Then there are the two War Cabinet meetings of 7 and 8 January 1915, at which it was resolved to stand by the French on the Western Front. A subcommittee meeting - that of 13 January - was also scheduled to discuss the feasibility of other fronts being opened. As Jim's excerpts indicate, Churchill had prior to this been in discussions with Admiral Carden regarding the latter's proposal to force the Dardanelles by picking off the forts from the sea one by one in a purely naval operation. Peter Hart in his 'Gallipoli 1915', notes of Churchill's eloquent endorsement of Carden's plan to the 13 January meeting that:

"Although Churchill put his case persuasively to the assembled War Council, the proceedings degenerated into near farce. Every wild scheme for alternative theatres of war was given a renewed airing and every hobbyhorse dusted off in the rambling debate that followed. In the end nothing of consequence resulted apart from the poorly expressed instruction that the Admiralty should prepare a naval expedition "to invade and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective", commencing February 1915.'

Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, notes in The Supreme Command the diverse and dangerously incompatible conclusions of the 13 January meeting and the positions of the main protagonists as follows:

"Finally, after some more or less desultory discussion, Asquith, who for some time had been busy writing, read out the following conclusions, which were adopted:

1/ That all preparations should be made, by concert between the Naval and Military authorities, including making ready for the despatch of two Territorial divisions, without guns, to reinforce French by the middle of February, for an advance along the Dixmude line to the Dutch frontier. The actual decision whether the circumstances call for such an operation can be postponed till the beginning of February.

2/ That the Admiralty should consider promptly the possibility of effective action in the Adriatic - at Cattaro, or elsewhere - with the view (inter alia) of bringing pressure on Italy.

3/ That the Admiralty should also prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective.

4/ That if the position in the western theatre becomesin the spring one of stalemate, British troops should be despatched to another theatre and objective, and that adequate investigation and preparation should be undertaken with that purpose, and that a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence be appointed to deal with this aspect of the situation.

The conclusions represented exactly the sense of the discussions. Nearly everyone was well satisfied. French, to whom I sent a copy of the conclusions immediately after the meeting, had obtained a reversal of the veto on his Flanders plan, for a decision to prepare was almost a decision to act. Lloyd George's thesis had won favour to the point that, if stalemate was admitted in the spring, troops would be despatched to another theatre which was to be studied. Kitchener had gained a respite which he wanted in case the Germans should once more attack in the west as he believed they would, but he was not committed to a further attack there the success of which he somewhat doubted. Churchill had secured approval in principle to the naval attack on the Dardanelles on which he had set his heart. Fisher alone, whose silence had not meant consent as was generally assumed, was beginning to brood on the difficulties of his position which were eventually to lead to his resignation."

As Peter Hart correctly notes, however, although it was Churchill's eloquent and determined advocacy on 13 January which had caused the beginnings of the Dardanelles campaign to be sanctioned, thereby making it politically his baby, culpability was also collective in its failure to appreciate the necessity of beating the main army of the enemy in the main theatre of war:

"Above all the guilty men of the War Council forgot the sound principle of war: concentrate on the main enemy on the main front. Thy were generally motivated by the best of intentions, yet their names should be recalled with at the very least a raised eyebrow: Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, the former Conservatice Party leader Arthur Balfour, the Lord Chancellor Lord Haldane and Liberal politicians Lewis Harcourt, Reginald McKenna and the Marquesse of Crewe. They and their advisors, Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey, First Sea Lord Sir John Fisher and Chief of the Imperial General Staff Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Wolfe Murray, were the men who bore the collective responsibility for everything that was to follow. Their excuse was that they believed they were only using a fleet of obsolescent ships that could abandon operations if they ran into trouble. This is fatuous. A serious operation of war should not be undertaken in such a casual fashion; hundreds of men's lives cast away on a whim, as if in a mere game of sport that could be abandoned at half time. Many of those responsible managed to evade the consequences of their culpability during their lifetimes, but history has a long memory."

Hart's right, and the catching up of historical memory is why, post WWII, many find it difficult to accept the evidence of Churchill's central role throughout in making, sustaining and ultimately rewriting the Dardanelles fiasco. But Churchill it was who was cavalier about provoking Turkish neutrality in August 1914, and Churchill who then so strongly advocated the war-winning necessity of taking Turkey out in January 1915. Churchill it was, who, stripped of his position of First Lord of the Admiralty, nonetheless urged Monro on his departure for Gallipoli in October 1915 that sanctioning an evacuation would be a disaster - as if it weren't already one. When Monro went ahead and correctly recommended evacuation, it was Churchill who viciously sneered of Monro that "He came, he saw, he capitulated." And as we have seen through this thread, it was Churchill who in the aftermath conspired with Hamilton to shift all blame onto K of K's shoulders, and when the latter was inconveniently KIA, it was Churchill, following his own dictum that history would be kind to him because he would write it, who wrote his own history of the war to make the false case that his schemes could have won the war more cheaply than on the Western Front. Perhaps the best tribute that can be paid to Churchill over his central role in the Gallipoli disaster and what he became in 1940 is that given by Hart, that "the setback would have ended the career of a lesser man."

George

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Here is an excerpt from volume 1 of Roskill's, " Hankey, Man of Secrets".

" In the field of strategy Hankey pressed in the same ' Boxing Day ' paper for the blockade of Germany to be tightened by an extension of ' Belligerent Rights' through stricter control of neutral shipping, and for our sea power to be used to attack Turkey. ... This proposal may be regarded as the inception of the Dardanelles venture, "

The reference is to a memo completed by Hankey on Xmas Day 1914 and produced the following day at his office. Hankey was renowned for getting his own way. A formidable power as a civil servant. The Sir Humphrey of the cabinet and War council. It would have been easy for him to drop a hint here and a suggestion there and plant the seed of Gallipoli in the fertile ground that was the War Council, all eagerly searching for a new idea with which to impress their colleagues. It is somehow inevitable that Winston should be the one to seize the ball and rush forward with it. Hankey went to a lot of trouble to aid Churchill when he was facing the Dardanelles Commission. Could it have been a belated attack of conscience? Who can tell.

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Clearly a remarkable and intelligent man, Hankey liked to portray himself as an observer of events and as a discreet behind the scenes fixer when the schemes of others went awry. But as Tom notes, he was the consummate Sir Humphreyish eminence grise, with the essential qualification of that calling to appear to be all things to all men, so that all parties confided in him. Yet there is a suspicion that he may have been rather more proactive in the formulating and commissioning of policy than he lets on in his account The Supreme Command - which nonetheless remains an invaluable source. He tantalisingly lets the mask slip just once, to reveal a glimpse of personal ambition. Hankey's advice was certainly freely solicited in private by Lloyd George as Prime Minister. A fascinating and all but unknown character today, Hankey is well overdue for an in depth reassessment of the nature and extent of his role as Cabinet Secretary during the Great War - as indeed are other unelected movers and shakers during the war who operated within the political and military spheres from the shadows, such as Lord Esher and F S Oliver. The opinions on Hankey given on the dustjacket of The Supreme Command are indicative of his importance:

BALFOUR: "I tell you that without Hankey we should not have won the war."

ASQUITH: "I should like you to know that you have been in a true sense what Carnot was called - 'the organiser of victory'. "

LLOYD GEORGE: "He was as essential to our success in the war as any man."

CURZON: "When history is written he will deserve his own niche in the temple which recalls the builders of our national constitution."

MILNER: "I really doubt sometimes whether we could have won the war without you. I am sure that your contribution towards the country's victory was second to none."

CHURCHILL: "He knew everything; he could put his hand on anything; he said nothing; he gained the confidence of all."

George

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Hart's right, and the catching up of historical memory is why, post WWII, many find it difficult to accept the evidence of Churchill's central role throughout in making, sustaining and ultimately rewriting the Dardanelles fiasco. But Churchill it was who was cavalier about provoking Turkish neutrality in August 1914, and Churchill who then so strongly advocated the war-winning necessity of taking Turkey out in January 1915. Churchill it was, who, stripped of his position of First Lord of the Admiralty, nonetheless urged Monro on his departure for Gallipoli in October 1915 that sanctioning an evacuation would be a disaster - as if it weren't already one. When Monro went ahead and correctly recommended evacuation, it was Churchill who viciously sneered of Monro that "He came, he saw, he capitulated." And as we have seen through this thread, it was Churchill who in the aftermath conspired with Hamilton to shift all blame onto K of K's shoulders, and when the latter was inconveniently KIA, it was Churchill, following his own dictum that history would be kind to him because he would write it, who wrote his own history of the war to make the false case that his schemes could have won the war more cheaply than on the Western Front. Perhaps the best tribute that can be paid to Churchill over his central role in the Gallipoli disaster and what he became in 1940 is that given by Hart, that "the setback would have ended the career of a lesser man."

George

Can I ask, George, why there is no mention at all in this post of the political shenanigans that erupted in May 1915, why is there no political context at all? Without which, this whole post becomes highly misleading.

You tell us about collective responsibility, tell us in some detail about a whole cabal of "guilty" men who evaded sanction in their lifetimes over their collective responsibility for failure at Gallipoli, but you then simply skip over it, as if it were an irrelevance, to once again bemoan Churchill's tainting of the historiography of the Great War and, by implication, decry his unadulterated cheek in claiming that the war could have been won more cheaply away from the Western Front. I'm sorry to have to say this, but I understood that point the first time you made it, and the second time and the third - and, believe it or not, I actually agree with you i.e. Churchill's post-war writings were self-serving (but I don't see that as being the crime of the century).

However, what I can only describe as your apparent obsession with the historiography of the Great War, and Churchill's disservice to it, does nothing to further this debate, it does nothing to get at the underlying truth of the events of May 1915 vis-a-vis Churchill and the Gallipoli fiasco. In my earlier summation, I mentioned the shell crisis, coalition government, political expediency etc. And from all this later talk of collective responsibility and cabals of "guilty" men screams the question, why did Churchill alone carry the political-can for this collective failure?

I gave you the answer earlier, a huge political storm engulfed the Asquith government in May 1915, the darkest clouds being formed by the shell crisis (the public were used to military stalemate by this time, so Gallipoli was not as great a shock to their collective psyche as the shell crisis was). Asquith was desperate to survive and sought coalition with the Tories, he sought to form a National Government, but Bonar Law, the Tory Leader of the Opposition, refused to enter into said coalition as long as Churchill was involved at cabinet level (a manifestation of Tory venom at Churchill's crossing of the floor to the Liberal benches). So great was this political storm that it is worthy of note that after May 1915 the Liberal party never held office on its own ever again.

In one move, by nailing Churchill to the sacrificial cross of political expediency, the "guilty" cabal could escape any due sanctions (being thrown out of office in an election), and the Tories didn't have to fight an election during a war in order to get back into the corridors of power. Despite all this collective responsibility and guilty cabals stemming from failure in Gallipoli, and despite him having sod all to do with Kitchener's failure over the greater scandal of shell shortages, Churchill was the scapegoat to keep the Liberals in power and to return the Tories to power; Gallipoli was the lame excuse back then (and still is now) - no wonder Churchill was pissed-off and sought the eventual re-dress that his temperament demanded.

On a further note; Kitchener became his immediate target because he was the man who did the actual stitching-up of Churchill, almost certainly to save his own reputation (after being handed certain powers by Asquith because the Gallipoli commission had very few). In other words, Kitchener was involved in these political machinations up to his glorious, be-medalled, neck.

Sources available if you want me to dig them out.

I'm sorry to take this tone, George, but I feel you do a great disservice to Churchill. You can't just go on about historiography etc. and treat the politics as irrelevant - the politics are key to this matter, these events did not occur in a political vacuum. How on earth do you imagine (as you quoted Peter Hart) that "Many of those responsible managed to evade the consequences of their culpability during their lifetimes..."? I'll tell you how they managed to avoid it, by being slicker political operators than even Churchill was at the time (and that includes “honourable” Generals and Admirals, as well as right honourable members of both Houses of Parliament).

Churchill was only forty years old when all these events overtook him, in many ways he was still serving his political apprenticeship amongst sharks - but, irony of ironies, he learnt his trade so well that he became one of the biggest political sharks this country has ever seen.

Cheers-salesie.

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Errrr,

Churchill was the driving force behind the Gallipoli naval and military campaigns. His was the prime guilt and the others named were - as is made clear in the text quoted- responsible for not stopping such a stupid diversion from the main effort! Their guilt was secondary not as instigators but as fellow travellers who sought an 'easy' option. When things went wrong Churchill - rightly - was the man who took the brunt of the blame. I was merely pointing out that the others - if they had the guts and strategic vision - could have stopped him! I do not think this is a particularly complex argument.

Salesie' emotionally powerful argument that at 40 Churchill was an innocent abroad has caused me much amusement! Keep 'em coming chum!

Pete

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Sorry Salesie, but as Pete has already pointed out, you've misread the import of the collective guilt passage I quoted from his book. The point being made is not that the Dardanelles wasn't what I called 'Churchill's baby' - it was, and he chose to run with it - but that the War Committee in January 1915 contained nobody to forcibly state the essential Westerner position of the necessity of beating the German army squatting in Belgium and France. That is, beating the main enemy in the main theatre. Putting sufficient forces and logistical support into enterprises elsewhere would only have allowed the Germans to achieve their goal in the West. In the event the War Committee in January 1915 fell between two stools - committing neither sufficient force to give an Eastern enterprise a hope of success, nor determining to commit all we had to the main task on the Western Front. There were men serving in France in 1915 who knew where the war had to be won, however long and hard a task that proved to be, and said as much - likening the Dardanelles enterprise to a wasteful sink down which valuable resources were flushed. Then look at Hankey's assessment of Lloyd George's position in January 1915 which I quoted earlier and you see the shape of things to come - "Lloyd George's thesis had won favour to the point that, if stalemate was admitted in the spring, troops would be despatched to another theatre which was to be studied." Lloyd George wanted to win the war, and - like Churchill - wanted the political kudos for doing so. But he was never able to grasp the essential requirement of beating the German army, nor what an onerous and costly task doing so would be. Instead he let other men shoulder the responsibility - or blame as he later made it out to be - for pressing ahead with that strategy whilst he pretended there might be "another theatre" which could have won the war more cheaply. But the Dardanelles was Churchill's baby, which he would have taken all the kudos for had the lunacy succeeded. When it inevitably went tits up he was rightly made to carry the political can - though he never accepted it.

As to Churchill being a political apprentice surrounded by sharks in 1915 - come off it mon ami mate, this is me you're talking to! In 1915 Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty, and had previously served as Home Secretary and President of the Board of Trade - you don't have those positions on your CV by your early forties if you're a political bottom feeder rather than a shark - and you know it.

George

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But he was never able to grasp the essential requirement of beating the German army, nor what an onerous and costly task doing so would be.

George,

Do you think that he really was unable to grasp this : or do you think it might have been more a question of his unwillingness to grasp it ?

I reckon that this question could be germinal to our discussion.

Phil (PJA)

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