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Remembered Today:

Attempting to gain perspective on Churchill


kenneth505

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At the end of the month, I'll be watching that play Three Days in May, at Trafalgar Studios in London.

This discussion will loom large in my mind.

Redemption of earlier folly ?

Or, as Ken implies, was the intirinsic quality of the man as apparent in the Great War as it was to become in May, 1940 ?

Phil (PJA)

I believe his intrinsic quality was very apparent from his earliest days, well before the Great War.

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Totally agree, Tom - hence my point that "Churchill himself was of course far more than a comic character - which is why he was able to be so dangerous with his ideas on occasion."

George

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Perhaps Winston was trying to copy his illustrious ancestor, John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough.

In politics, he betrayed his party more than once. Marlborough had committed a notorious act of treachery, too.

In warfare, he - Marlborough - espoused the concept of manouevre and the far flung infiltration of the periphery as an alternative to slogging it out in Flanders. By diverting resources to a Spanish venture, he deprived those enterprises in the Low Countries and compromised the war effort. There is an analogy with the Dardanelles. Marlborough's dazzling triumph at Blenheim must have inspired Winston - not least because, by shifitng the axis of combat away from Flanders and making a bold strategic foray to the South, he achieved monumental success.

Both Churchills were adventurers, for better or worse, and it showed in politics and warfare.

Phil (PJA)

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Churchill was universally referred to as Winston. In an age when this was extremely infra dig. it gives a hint as to his peers' estimation of him. He may well have imagined that Marlborough's blood ran in his veins but there is a closer parallel between him and his father, Lord Randolph. Co-incidentally, I have just finished reading Richard Holmes' book on Marlborough. He left behind a string of military successes. Rather the opposite of his descendant whose short sojourn in the trenches was once again a source of humorous, not to say contemptuous comment. I am struggling to see a parallel between the duke's military career and Gallipoli. He was and still is recognised as a military genius. WSC initiated a combined military and naval exercise which had been analysed a decade before and rejected as impractical. Worse, by attempting the forcing of the Dardanelles by naval strength alone, he robbed the attempt of any slight chance of success.

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Dear Carl;

Always highly value your input on things Belgian. Let me comment on your points.

Just a couple of things on Antwerp.

Joffre is in his memoirs rather scathing on Churchill's plan to bring English troops to Antwerp. He claims that this put the entire Belgian army at risk.

The Belgian cavalry division was smaller than a German cavalry division (4 regiments to 6, 2 companies cyclists to one jäger bataillon, no mg company to one mg company)

So I am in error. I had understood that the Belgian infantry divisions were oversized (see below), so I made the unwarranted assumption that Belgium's lone (then) cavalry division was also very large. (I am throwing ideas out here, and am extremely busy with the unpleasant "real world", like a pressing and complicated legal matter, so I am, as you have been warned, flying on memory. I have not worked on Antwerp for a year, but will turn my attention there again in 3-4 months.) But here again there is the question of numbers. There was a certain symmetry of dispositions. The Allies at Antwerp had the Belgian Cavalry Division covering its right flank, and the III. Reservekorps also had a mobile formation covering its right flank, which I believe was something like a Jaeger battalion (four light infantry companies, a bicycle company, and a large MG company with 12 guns), a squadron or two of cavalry, and two horse artillery field guns, half a battery.

The Belgian divisions d'armee (only introduced in 1913) started changing already in 08/1914 (3 DA started with 24 bataillons in 4 brigades, by 15/08 they had reformed with 12 bataillons); All divisions d'arme had abandoned their original organisation by half october 1914.

In the back of my brain I recall something about there actually being two types of Belgian divisions, something that had me quite puzzled, had not figured out, so I pushed the question under the surface of my memory. (Please be assured that I will not publish anything without layers of vetting.) So I clearly will have to work that out. Is there a simple answer to the question if the Belgian divisions at Antwerp were the 24 battalion type or the 12 battalion version? It sounds like that they were in the middle of that conversion during the battle, and perhaps different divisions were at different force levels. I will have to study that carefully before uttering sweeping statements about numbers. Still, it seems clear that the attacking forces were outnumbered by the defenders, but of course the burden of attempting to defend such a large fortress system neccessarily divided the defending forces, while the attackers could choose their point of concentration and attack.

Equipment for the fortress troops. As there were not enough rifles available they had use French lebel rifles I have collected several statements from Belgian fort and fortress commanders (e.g., fortress commander at Liege) very critical of the fortress troops, describing his fortress troops as 40-45 year old married men who really still retained few military qualities. At a number of forts the tremendous strain of being bombarded by the big guns (when there was a direct hit by the enormous shells the state of the living and dead victims terrified the remaining men; some dead men with every stitch of clothing blown off, the entire corpse turned entirely black, possibly shrunken in size; other dead without a single mark on them, presumably killed by the concussion of a 1750-2100-2550 lb shell going off; walking wounded picking thru the wreckage, body entirely black, most of their clothes blown off, with the remaining scraps of clothing sometimes on fire as they walked (these descriptions are from direct descriptions by Belgians who were there). So in a number of cases much of the garrison either fled or in some cases rebelled and even forced a surrender. A German infantry officer approached a fort that had not been shelled yet and tricked the fort commander into surrendering, the German actually had six men, while he stated that he had a battalion and artillery; but the Belgian commander only had 20 men left himself. At Liege the Germans approached the last one or two resisting forts and requested a truce and offered to take a delegation of the forts' officers to view the destroyed forts (the largest fort suffered the explosion of about 28,000 lbs of loose propellant powder in a magazine, totally destroying the fort, and killing or burying alive almost the entire garrison of perhaps 450,), and even allowed the officers to visit with the already-captured fortress CO Gen. Leman, who advised them that they had to at least resist a bit before surrendering. (Leman made a great point of him having been knocked unconsious by the explosion of his fort, so that he was captured unconsious, and had not surrendered; ironically, the German battalion commander that took him prisoner was of a major German steel-making family {Gruson, not Krupp} that had earlier supplied and installed the fort's high-quality ductile steel turrents). So they returned to their fort, in the next morning they received a brief shelling for the purposes of honor, and then surrendered.

Even the regular active-duty Belgian infantry had been restricted by the government to only firing a few rounds a year in target practice and drill, as an economy measure, as commanders complained; and German sources sometimes remarked on the poor marksmanship of Belgian infantry, but no wonder.

Hope this is of some use

Very much so, Carl, as usual. Thanks again!

Carl

Bob

PS: I know my treatise above wandered a bit, but I am hoping that the details illustrate the difficulty of defending forts against these guns. (My grand-father was in command of supplying the ammunition to these guns, as well as to all other III. RK artillery, and infantry ammunition as well.)

Karl; I will be sure that Belgian historians will in the future have access to his letters that he wrote to my father as these events unfolded. There are some interesting military revalations, as well as personal matters. The oral history is also very interesting.

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A daughter's view of Churchill. Entirely uncritical, of course, but nonetheless of related interest - and she does mention that her father was led to take up painting as a means of escape from the stress induced by the fallout from the Dardanelles debacle: Mary Soames

George

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Churchill was universally referred to as Winston. In an age when this was extremely infra dig. it gives a hint as to his peers' estimation of him.

An interesting source on Antwerp and the broader question of Belgium 1914 is E. Alexander Powell, Fighting in Flanders, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1915. Powell was an experienced American war correspondent. He was in Antwerp when Winston swept in, proclaiming that Antwerp was saved, Powell ran into him several times there, and also went out and watched the Brit naval infantry detrain. I read it some time ago, but recall that Winston was quite a diva there, Mr. Dramatic. Reports from American reporters early in the war are often useful sources, less so later in the war when Wilson started populating US prisons with people who were not that enthusiastic with the coming war with Germany that Wilson was engineering.

Didn't Winston telegraph the Cabinet from Antwerp suggesting that he be commissioned a Major General, as he was leading a division? I understand that this request was met with gales of laughter in the Cabinet, with one member observing that it seemed a reasonable request, as Churchill had once been a lieutenant. Is this true, and does someone have a good source for this story?

Worse, by attempting the forcing of the Dardanelles by naval strength alone, he robbed the attempt of any slight chance of success.

I am not a great fan of "what if . . . " speculation, but the Turks had a great stroke of luck when that Turkish officer laid that single string of mines (20?) parallel to the Turkish coast, which sank at least two Brit and French battleships. But even if that battle fleet had been able to persevere and push thru the Narrows, that would not have necessarily led to the capture of Constantinople and the fall of Turkey, but certainly to a messy and complicated military situation.

Bob

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The thrust of my posts, Salesie, has been to highlight the evidence for Churchill's moral bankruptcy in the face of failure, by means of the twin pillars of seeking to shift the blame on to others and the rewriting of history in his own favour. Your response on that old K of K thread linked to is more concerned with making a case for K of K having been past his sell by date. That's certainly an arguable point, but one for a thread of its own I'd suggest.

George

Well, George, it seems to me that I'm pretty much on the point i.e. the thrust of your post lacks a hell of a lot of context. Before I get to that, though, I would like to summarise what I believe we agree on:

1) The Gallipoli campaign was an unmitigated disaster.

2) The "Eastern strategy" was fundamentally flawed; and that the main enemy needed to beaten in the main theatre in the west.

3) Churchill was a political operator/plotter/schemer of the highest order.

4) Churchill's post-war writings were somewhat self-serving - and that the criticisms I directed at Blood Test Revisted apply equally to Churchill's original Blood Test chapter.

Now, to provide the context I mentioned earlier, I will say the following: The bogged-down Gallipoli campaign was just an excuse to demote Churchill within the government, in the full knowledge that said demotion would almost certainly bring about his resignation (which wasn't too long in coming, despite Asquith refusing to accept it when first demoting him).

And in reality, the Gallipoli campaign was/is a pretty lame-excuse i.e. the stalemate in Gallipoli was matched by stalemate in the west; the western front campaign was hardly moving along with any gusto by May 1915. And Kitchener, of course, as Secretary of State for War, held ultimate responsibility for both the east and west once the Royal Navy failed to force the Dardanelles and troops were landed – once troops were landed then Churchill’s responsibility, as First Lord of the Admiralty, was reduced somewhat.

The shell crisis hit at the same time as the initial failure in Gallipoli, and in many ways was a much bigger scandal. There was public uproar and outrage when the dire shortage of munitions for the BEF became public knowledge (thanks to Sir John French “leaking” the information to a Times reporter). Consequently, the real problem for Churchill’s position was the great political storm assaulting Asquith’s government. All of which combined to force Asquith’s government to seek coalition with the Conservatives - which brings me to the real reason why Churchill became the scapegoat on the grounds of failure at Gallipoli.

Churchill deserted the Tories to join the Liberals a few years before – and Tory venom was considerable. So much so, they refused to enter into coalition as long as Churchill held high office – thus Churchill became the sacrificial lamb to save the Asquith government. Yet Kitchener, who presided over stalemate in both east and west, and whose department palpably failed to adequately supply munitions for the army (a far bigger scandal than failure in Gallipoli), survived in office but responsibility for munitions was taken away from the War Office and handed to Lloyd George at the new Ministry for Munitions.

Churchill was sacrificed, in 1915, on the altar of political expediency ; ability, or results, didn’t come into it. And I would strongly suggest that anyone worthy of being in any position of political power would seek to regain his position by whatever means available – just as Churchill did (more than once).

Churchill was certainly a political operator/plotter/schemer of the highest order – but why should that be seen as a detriment to his character? If it is a detriment then virtually every politician we’ve ever had achieving high office should be viewed in the same light – indeed, I would argue that virtually every general/admiral we’ve ever had could also not have been short of at least some ability in the art of political gutter-fighting. Even Haig, portrayed these days by some as being worthy of beatification, had powerful political allies as well as enemies – did he get such allies by just being a nice guy, by being a political naivete, by being Saint Duggie? I’m sure that no one reached any high office in their own field by not being able to “gutter-fight” when needed – some were/are just more adept at concealing it than others.

Churchill’s post-war writings were in many ways self-serving, but that just makes him like the vast majority of other memoir/history writers – who on earth writes about things they were involved in to make themselves look bad? Churchill had an advantage over most of the others though, he was pretty damn good writer – another flaw in his character, or an out-and-out ability to perform when necessary?

As for the notion that Churchill’s whole reputation is based on a few months in 1940 - I find that to be extraordinarily narrow-minded. Just two examples - In 1925, as Chancellor of the Exchequer in a Tory government, Churchill was instrumental in defeating a proposed defence pact with France (guaranteeing Britain would come to France’s aid if attacked) on the grounds that France’s refusal to re-negotiate the terms of the Versailles Treaty vis-à-vis Germany’s grievance about its eastern border would lead to future war with Germany if not re-dressed (an eerily accurate prediction). And, let’s not forget, Churchill stood almost alone for many years, at great political cost to himself, when warning about the dire consequences of allowing Herr Hitler’s inexorable rise to power (hardly a moral bankrupt then). He was not a man lacking foresight. And by giving up any prospect of returning to political office, when warning about Germany, he shows that though desperate for power at times, and capable of political expediency himself, when it came to what he correctly saw as dire threats to his country he was resolutely honest. And his rise to ultimate political power was due in part to his stance about Germany, and not least because, in 1940, much lesser men were falling by the wayside. He was not, by any means, a flash in the pan hero for a few months in 1940.

Now don’t get me wrong, I recognise Churchill’s flaws – he was, in my opinion, a flawed genius. But who on earth was/is perfect? No one, and I repeat no one, was born perfect and never will be – that’s where, in my opinion, those correctly seeking to re-dress the unjustified “bad-press” that Douglas Haig’s reputation has endured over the years go wrong; they seem incapable of accepting any criticism of Haig at all. Such a stance, of course, is counter-productive to their cause – the vast majority of people know full well that no one was born perfect, and are very suspicious of those who pretend to be or those who seek to make their hero seem so.

Churchill may have criticised Haig, but that doesn’t make him a fool (he was too slick an operator to be that), nor does it make him a bad man (I think it telling that both the extreme right and left hate him with equal passion), nor does it make him worthy of out-and-out derision (that is simply what Haig’s reputation suffered for years, and just look how wrong that turned out to be).

Haig is your undoubted hero, George – Churchill is mine despite his many faults, and in many ways because of them.

Cheers-salesie.

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Ok, I think I'm starting to get somewhere with this muddle. Many thanks to Salesie's summation in #33 directly above. Thanks to all for keeping a decent examination going.

The most telling point I've seen made against is that he was the principle champion of a campaign, Gallipoli, that was deemed to risky by British authorities ten years earlier. He may even have advocated reinforcing failure. This shows poor strategic vision in this case at least. Are there any concrete points the commission made that Truthergw referenced in Post #12?

I am not seeing any real condemnation of the Antwerp effort except CDR's qoute of Joffre that "this put the entire Belgian army at risk." I have to confess that I don't see how this could be? Do any of you have a further explanation? Wasn't Antwerp already besieged with the heavies on the way?

Next I see that his peers thought of him in a variety of unflattering ways. That he remained in the government and in the social circles the way he did makes him seem to be the type of person who one doesn't want to associate with but cannot dismiss. Often this is because people like that while annoying make valid points. He is starting to seem like a person who believed himself the smartest in the room, let you know it and compounded the insult by making it hard to prove him wrong.

Old Tom made a telling observation in post #2 "These [operations in the east] again had potential but seem to have been beyond the military capability at the time." This is supported by PMHart's hilarious post #20 that efforts should have been made. Perhaps a less vociferous support of making those efforts would have been a more sagacious approach on WSC's part, if he really had foresight and vision he may have been able to recognize that there simply weren't enough resources for both approaches. So many disasters from this war seem a result of some parts of theory and technology not keeping pace with others.

While his history may include too much self-serving justification I'm not seeing evidence to support GAC's assertion of Moral Bankruptcy. Perhaps we're still viewing these events from too close a perspective, journalism vs. history. Over here a discussion of FDR can still generate this type of wroth. By the by I've heard it said that WSC claimed 'FDR was the Greatest Man I've ever met.' I have to confess that I am not seeing how WSC remains such a divisive character in retrospect, especially when it comes to examining WWI.

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He is starting to seem like a person who believed himself the smartest in the room, let you know it and compounded the insult by making it hard to prove him wrong.

I think Churchill himself wouldn't baulk at that description of his character, Ken - I certainly don't.

As for Churchill being a divisive figure - of course he is, just like all great historical figures are; none of them are like Mary Poppins i.e. perfect in every way, and thus give those who follow-on the opportunity to make capital out of imperfection (most of them without ever having carried the heavy responsibility of high-office themselves, but with the aid of spoonfuls of hindsight).

And Churchill was far from being perfect in many ways - he was wrong about some things and right about others, but when it came to the "big one", the one that really mattered, when it came to the time for stout hearts, steady nerves, and a steely determination to win through, it was Churchill who stepped up to the breach when the bottle of lesser men was rapidly disappearing down the plughole of life's gross misfortune (not unlike Haig in that respect). And let's not forget, the vast majority of those lesser men being the very one's who had derided Churchill, and cast him into the political wilderness for years, for his resolute, almost solo, stance against Herr Hitler's rise to infamy.

For sure, he was wrong to be a champion of the "Easterners" in WW1, and for sure he was wrong to criticise Haig the way he did (but he also praised Haig on occasion, which seems to be forgotten), but such things don't automatically make him a fool or a moral bankrupt - his overall record of achievement makes it clear that he was neither.

For those who seek perfection in their leaders (or pretend to seek it to suit their own agendas), ask yourself this question - who would you rather have leading you in a fight to the death; a Mary Poppins like character, perfect in every way - or someone like Winston Spencer Churchill; sometimes right sometimes wrong, a smart-a*se, a gutter-fighter, and, when needed, an underhanded and ruthlessly determined slick operator (but a firm champion of democracy [at home at least])?

Cheers-salesie.

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but he also praised Haig on occasion, which seems to be forgotten

How right you are to mention that, salesie !

Whereas Lloyd George was so frenzied and vituperative in his tirade that any discerning reader will recoil from it, WSC is far more fair and balanced.

That is why it is all the more important for Haig admirers to discredit Churchill's stance.

The fact that he became the hero of the second conflict makes this task more daunting....better to focus on the folly of the Dardanelles.

It seems that in the Second World War he attempted to vindicate his Easterner stance of 1914-18 with consequences that were controversial, to say the least. Thank God for Alanbrooke !

George is more than disdainful of my allusion to what I consider to be the validity of his analysis in the Blood Test.

Time for me to put my head back down below the keyboard parapet.

Phil (PJA)

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Haig is your undoubted hero, George – Churchill is mine despite his many faults, and in many ways because of them.

I had deliberately refrained from introducing Haig into this discussion of Churchill's tarnished reputation in the Great War, as Churchill achieved that all by himself in another theatre of war, independently of any dealings with Haig, and, indeed, before the latter even became C-in-C. Nor do I find the use of 'my hero' and 'your hero' in the context of discussing Haig and Churchill useful. My view is that they were both towering figures in positive senses in British history - Haig for his achievement as C-in-C between 1915 - 1919, and Churchill as PM between 1940-45. Though both their lives need to be studied in the round, they are inevitably seen in popular history and culture as existing within the respective vacuums of the years 1915-19 and 1940-45. Without the Great War of '14 - '18 or WWII 1939 - 45, neither Haig nor Churchill would loom large in the public consciousness today. What this thread is about, it seems to me, is looking at Churchill outside of the 1940-45 vacuum which sealed his greatness, and examining his performance in the war which established Haig's greatness. But Churchill's relations with Haig are very much of secondary importance in assessing Churchill's strategic misconceptions and his subsequent attempts to vindicate these in his postwar writings.

Whereas Lloyd George was so frenzied and vituperative in his tirade that any discerning reader will recoil from it, WSC is far more fair and balanced.

That is why it is all the more important for Haig admirers to discredit Churchill's stance.

Can you give us any examples of Haig's supporters prioritising criticism of Churchill over that of Lloyd George?

George

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How right you are to mention that, salesie !

Whereas Lloyd George was so frenzied and vituperative in his tirade that any discerning reader will recoil from it, WSC is far more fair and balanced.

That is why it is all the more important for Haig admirers to discredit Churchill's stance.

The fact that he became the hero of the second conflict makes this task more daunting....better to focus on the folly of the Dardanelles.

It seems that in the Second World War he attempted to vindicate his Easterner stance of 1914-18 with consequences that were controversial, to say the least. Thank God for Alanbrooke !

George is more than disdainful of my allusion to what I consider to be the validity of his analysis in the Blood Test.

Time for me to put my head back down below the keyboard parapet.

Phil (PJA)

George's disdain at your allusions to the validity of Churchill's Blood Test has my full and unequivical support, Phil. Not least because the German casualty stats, upon which the Blood Test is based, are in my opinion about as reliable as the balance sheets that Greece and Italy used to "smooth" their way into the Euro-zone i.e. I prefer my books to be delivered un-cooked.

Cheers-salesie.

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I had deliberately refrained from introducing Haig into this discussion of Churchill's tarnished reputation in the Great War, as Churchill achieved that all by himself in another theatre of war, independently of any dealings with Haig, and, indeed, before the latter even became C-in-C. Nor do I find the use of 'my hero' and 'your hero' in the context of discussing Haig and Churchill useful. My view is that they were both towering figures in positive senses in British history - Haig for his achievement as C-in-C between 1915 - 1919, and Churchill as PM between 1940-45. Though both their lives need to be studied in the round, they are inevitably seen in popular history and culture as existing within the respective vacuums of the years 1915-19 and 1940-45. Without the Great War of '14 - '18 or WWII 1939 - 45, neither Haig nor Churchill would loom large in the public consciousness today. What this thread is about, it seems to me, is looking at Churchill outside of the 1940-45 vacuum which sealed his greatness, and examining his performance in the war which established Haig's greatness. But Churchill's relations with Haig are very much of secondary importance in assessing Churchill's strategic misconceptions and his subsequent attempts to vindicate these in his postwar writings.

George

I take your point about focus, George, but Ken in his opening post asked for Churchill to be put into perspective, and without a broader context than WW1 then any perspective would be lost for the most part, not least because Churchill spanned, and loomed large in, both conflicts.

That said, I also made the point that failure in Gallipoli was/is, in my opinion, a pretty lame excuse for saddling Churchill with a "donkey-tag" i.e. as head of both the Admiralty and Munitions in WW1 (posts which spanned either side of his “tour” of the trenches) he performed at least as well as anyone else did. And failure in Gallipoli was not an isolated, nor the most important, scandal of 1915 - but it was the "sacrificial cross" of political expediency that Churchill found himself nailed to.

Even without WW2, and the years leading up to it, it still seems pretty clear to me that Churchill was no “donkey” – a bit of a “mule” on occasion perhaps – but certainly no “donkey”.

Cheers-salesie.

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Churchill's opinion of Haig is of no importance. His foolish notion that he was somehow gifted with military genius was shared by none of his contemporaries. He was criticised officially for his part in the Gallipoli campaign. His pre war actions in the house of commons where he was vociferous in his efforts to reduce military and naval spending were in stark contrast to his actions when sitting on the Board of the Admiralty. In other words, he was the archetypical politician whose every action was taken with one eye on how his electorate would view it. With reference to Antwerp, here is a quotation from, " Lloyd George & Churchill" by Richard Toye. It refers to a diary entry by Frances Stevenson, DLG's secretary.

" C [ Lloyd George] is rather disgusted with Winston still, about Antwerp, and thinks that the PM is too. Having taken untrained men over there, he left them in the lurch. He behaved in rather a swaggering way when over there, standing with shells bursting near him and actually promoting his pals on the field of action". It may be of interest that at Xmas, 1914, 3 different alternatives to the Western Front were independently proposed. One from Lloyd George and one from Hankey. ( This contained the germ of the Gallipoli campaign) and a third from Churchill. This was not an ' Eastern ' suggestion but rather, a Northern one. WSC suggested an action against the Kiel canal with a view to occupying the Baltic.

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George's disdain at your allusions to the validity of Churchill's Blood Test has my full and unequivical support, Phil. Not least because the German casualty stats, upon which the Blood Test is based, are in my opinion about as reliable as the balance sheets that Greece and Italy used to "smooth" their way into the Euro-zone i.e. I prefer my books to be delivered un-cooked.

Cheers-salesie.

Rumour has it that the Germans are so unwilling - perhaps even unable - to cook books that they exhibited extraordinary naivety in allowing those countries into the Eurozone in the first place.

Phil (PJA)

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Even without WW2, and the years leading up to it, it still seems pretty clear to me that Churchill was no “donkey” – a bit of a “mule” on occasion perhaps – but certainly no “donkey”.

I can't see where anyone has called Churchill a 'donkey' - a worse than useless phrase best consigned to the historiographical midden with discredited frauds like Clark, Laffin and Winter. Churchill was certainly stubborn in his refusal to admit, even tacitly, that his Easterner strategy and its stillborn spawn, the Dardanelles, was not a viable way of winning the war.

'Ken Santa Fe' tells us he sees no evidence to support a description of some of Churchill's behaviour as 'moral bankruptcy.' I disagree, and for the following reasons.

Firstly, we have seen through the articles linked to earlier how Churchill and Hamilton - respectively main political instigator and military executor of Gallipoli - conspired to offload responsibility for the debacle onto the shoulders of K of K.

Secondly, having been robbed of their scapegoat by reason of his being KIA, both Churchill and Hamilton sought vindication in their postwar writings. Churchill used his The World Crisis to depict the attrition necessary to wear down the German army on the Western Front as being so costly as to make victory indistinguishable from defeat. This is arrant nonsense, and is entirely at odds with Churchill's later recognition and praise of the even more costly Soviet achievement in the vital attritional wearing down of the German army to the point where it could be defeated in WWII - a role which, as Churchill well knew, had fallen to the Western Allies in the Great War. Yet, as the quote I gave earlier from Robin Prior highlights, “It is {..] hard to avoid the conclusion that when Churchill wrote this volume the failure of Gallipoli was still very much on his mind. Thus throughout the first half of the volume Churchill is anxious to demonstrate the immense cost of the war on the Western Front and to point to easier alternatives in the east." It was with this self-serving agenda that, with all the benefit of hindsight about the Gallipoli campaign, for which he had been censured at the time, Churchill could still make the ludicrous suggestion when writing The World Crisis in the 1920's that a credible alternative to the Somme in 1916 would have been another invasion of Gallipoli. Thus The World Crisis was written to plant the idea that, despite the Gallipoli fiasco, and despite the war having actually been won, as it had to be, by defeating the main German army in the main theatre of war, the Western Front, it could still have been won more cheaply if only Churchill’s schemes had been given greater backing. It ought never to be forgotten that Churchill was still an active and ambitious politician when he wrote these books. His eloquent prose in these ought not to be allowed to distract from the fact that they were nothing less than the delibertate - and far reaching - distortion of the history of the Great War by Churchill for self-serving personal purposes. The putting into practice of his conceit that "History will be kind to me - for I shall write it!"

It's my view that describing the above behaviour as a form of moral bankruptcy is no more than fair comment.

George

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He behaved in rather a swaggering way when over there, standing with shells bursting near him and actually promoting his pals on the field of action".

He was no end of a show off....look at his conduct in the Sidney Street affair.

Phil (PJA)

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Indeed. But you still haven't responded to this:

Whereas Lloyd George was so frenzied and vituperative in his tirade that any discerning reader will recoil from it, WSC is far more fair and balanced.

That is why it is all the more important for Haig admirers to discredit Churchill's stance.

Can you give us any examples of Haig's supporters prioritising criticism of Churchill over that of Lloyd George?

George

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Churchill's opinion of Haig is of no importance. His foolish notion that he was somehow gifted with military genius was shared by none of his contemporaries. He was criticised officially for his part in the Gallipoli campaign. His pre war actions in the house of commons where he was vociferous in his efforts to reduce military and naval spending were in stark contrast to his actions when sitting on the Board of the Admiralty. In other words, he was the archetypical politician whose every action was taken with one eye on how his electorate would view it. With reference to Antwerp, here is a quotation from, " Lloyd George & Churchill" by Richard Toye. It refers to a diary entry by Frances Stevenson, DLG's secretary.

" C [ Lloyd George] is rather disgusted with Winston still, about Antwerp, and thinks that the PM is too. Having taken untrained men over there, he left them in the lurch. He behaved in rather a swaggering way when over there, standing with shells bursting near him and actually promoting his pals on the field of action". It may be of interest that at Xmas, 1914, 3 different alternatives to the Western Front were independently proposed. One from Lloyd George and one from Hankey. ( This contained the germ of the Gallipoli campaign) and a third from Churchill. This was not an ' Eastern ' suggestion but rather, a Northern one. WSC suggested an action against the Kiel canal with a view to occupying the Baltic.

I'm not sure that this reference will get us anywhere, Tom. You can post many references that show Churchill in a bad light, and I can post many that will show the opposite - but where will that get us, seeing as I've already accepted your point that Churchill’s "genius" was flawed?

As for Churchill being "the archetypal politician", no great surprise there - so am I to take it that by saying this you’re advocating that this country should have adopted the German system, and reduced civilian politicians to being mere rubber-stampers of what their military overlords demanded, with no regard at all for what their virtually impotent electorate did or did not want?

Cheers-salesie.

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am I to take it that by saying this you’re advocating that this country should have adopted the German system, and reduced civilian politicians to being mere rubber-stampers of what their military overlords demanded, with no regard at all for what their virtually impotent electorate did or did not want?

I can't speak for Tom, Salesie, but I should have thought it self evident that he didn't have such a ludicrous extrapolation as an alternative in mind with the phrase 'archeypal politician.' I took it to mean something along the lines of an opportunistic shape-shifter, who endeavours to coat himself with teflon - and Churchill was all of that. It is a breed not unknown in the present day - though few of todays lot could also display the statesmanship and rhetorical genius which made Churchill the man of the hour in 1940.

George

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Perhaps Winston was trying to copy his illustrious ancestor, John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough.

I'm rather pleased to say I've never heard stories of how many times Winston could pleasure his wife before removing his boots.

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Rumour has it that the Germans are so unwilling - perhaps even unable - to cook books that they exhibited extraordinary naivety in allowing those countries into the Eurozone in the first place.

Phil (PJA)

Ah yes. This would be the reason behind the Nazis' legendary truthfulness and aversion to propaganda.

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Indeed. But you still haven't responded to this:

In an earlier thread, I think your water carrier said something like "... Churchill never understood how serious a matter the Great War was ! "

In astonishment, I retorted " What are you on ?"

Come to think of it, Haig mused in his diary that Churchill was on drugs, in allusion to the August Memorandum of 1916.

You refuse to waste your breath refuting my suggestion that there might have been validity in Churchill's presentation.

As for The Blood Test and salesie's allegation that the German figures were cooked, I will refute that with one name - EDMONDS.

Phil (PJA)

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I'm not sure that this reference will get us anywhere, Tom. You can post many references that show Churchill in a bad light, and I can post many that will show the opposite - but where will that get us, seeing as I've already accepted your point that Churchill's "genius" was flawed?

As for Churchill being "the archetypal politician", no great surprise there - so am I to take it that by saying this you're advocating that this country should have adopted the German system, and reduced civilian politicians to being mere rubber-stampers of what their military overlords demanded, with no regard at all for what their virtually impotent electorate did or did not want?

Cheers-salesie.

My post is a contribution to the general debate and not aimed at you specifically. I am afraid that I have no suggestions to help you over your obvious dilemma.

Churchill claimed to have a genius for strategy and my point is that he had no such thing. He was simply a politician with the usual politician's share of veracity. The rest of your second paragraph is stretching things a bit. Can you point out the part of my post that would make you think in that way?

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