Jump to content
Free downloads from TNA ×
The Great War (1914-1918) Forum

Remembered Today:

Did English Troops reach at Tekke Tepe on 9 August 1915?


akifemre

Recommended Posts

Hello everybody.

First of all Nice to meet you. This is my first post in this forum. I came from İstanbul. My nick is referring to Major Mahmut Sabri Bey who commanded 3.Battalion of 26. Regiment. This battalion defended Seddülbahir shores ( S, V, W and X Beaches) against 29. Division on 25 April 1915.

I have one question. I read in Nigel Steel and Peter Hart Book "Defeat at Gallipoli" that according to an English Lieutenant statements , some English units had reached at the summit of Tekke Tepe on 9 August 1915.

….Those who were hit stayed where they fell , and those who were climbed on. The only complain heard upon that hillside was that no enemy could be seen to fire upon. .. About thirty of us reached the top of hill , perhaps a few more. And when there were about twenty left we turned and went down again. We had reached the highest point and furthest point that British forces from Suvla Bay were destined to reach. But we naturally knew nothing of that.( Lieutenant John Still) (Defeat at Gallipoli p. 267)

But, I did not come across in any Turkish resourches such an information. I spoke to Kenan Çelik and Şahin Aldoğan who are well known Gallipoli Campaign experts in Turkey. They said that it was not true. Some English troops ( I think , they came from 32. Brigade) might have been arrived at ahead of Bakaba Fountain.

Could you tell me what is your opinion?

Thank you very much for your interest.

Tuncay Yılmazer

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Tuncay

Welcome to the forum, it is nice to see someone who may be able to give an alternative view. As it happens, Peter Hart is a member of the forum and he may be able to help you with your question.

TR

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm not sure of this date, but I assume the 9th

The Dardanelles campaign by Henry Wood Nevinson

It was now 6 p.m. In ignorance. Sir Ian had

given an order destined to entail disaster. It appears

almost certain that neither General Hammersley nor

his Chief of Staff knew exactly where the battalions

of the 32nd Brigade stood at the time. Otherwise

they must have informed Sir Ian that, as a matter

of fact, one of the battaHons (the 6th East York

Pioneers) had advanced that day, had occupied

Hill 70 (Scimitar Hill), and were at that moment

in position there—Scimitar Hill, next to W Hill the

most vital of all the semicircle of heights overlooking

the bay ! A battalion had occupied it that Sunday

without a blow, and were there only waiting for the

brigade's further advance upon W Hill or Anafarta

Sagir, to both of which it is the key. Lieut. -Colonel

Moore, in command of that battalion, had even sent

out three officers' patrols, one of which actually

reached the top of Tekke Tepe, another the outskirts

of Anafarta Sagir, the third a point near

Abrikja, all without serious opposition.

Mike

Link to comment
Share on other sites

An interesting post. I agree with Kenan Çelik and Şahin Aldoğan that during Colonel Moore's advance with his HQ and D Company, they only reached the forward slopes near Baka Baba, however during the morning I beleive that signallers had actually reached the top, or near to the top to signal back. See the previous post

which has letters from eye-witnesses of this.

Rgs Krithia

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hello Tuncay,

An interesting first post. By any chance do you have any alternative sources on the action on Kirech Tepe (particularly around the 16th August?)

Link to comment
Share on other sites

First of all Nice to meet you. This is my first post in this forum. I came from İstanbul. My nick is referring to Major Mahmut Sabri Bey who commanded 3.Battalion of 26. Regiment. This battalion defended Seddülbahir shores ( S, V, W and X Beaches) against 29. Division on 25 April 1915.
Hi Tuncay. Welcome to the Forum! I don't know about the specific question that you asked but I admire the achievements of 3/26 Regiment.

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Dear Terry,

Thank you very much for your information. It is a privilege to be here.

Dear Friends,

According to Turkish Military Records, on 8 August 1915 Ottoman regiments were deployed around Tekketepe and Kavaktepe area. As you know , Ottoman regiments were brought from Saros area. ( Nearly 40 km from Bolayır to Anafartalar) 34. Regiment was around İbrikçe, 35. Regiment was in North of Küçük Anafarta. Therefore , It seems impossible that some British units ( even they became a patrol) could reach Tekketepe area.

On 9 August 1915 at 4.00 am Ottoman 34. Regiment attacked surprisingly on an English Battalion. 35. Regiments came across around Sulejik area an English troops that headed for Tekke Tepe. They attacked on British soldiers and captured 3 officer, 41 soldier and three machine gun .

(Detailed information in: Turkish General Staff First World War Offical History V:5 Book:3 p.413 )

npm,

As soon as I have a time, I will wrote 16 August 1915 events in Kirecthtepe according to Turkish Offical History. Do you have any spesific question?

Robert, I agree with you. In my opinion 26. Regiment 3. Battalion was the most important, privileged unit in the 5. Ottoman Army.

Thanks,

( By the way, I was in Anafartalar area with my Gallipoli research team last month. I took some photographs from Tekketepe summit. It was magnificient scene! I present one of them below.

Tuncay,

post-52497-0-19937000-1309189564.gif

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hi,

I am entirely in agreement with Kenan Çelik and Şahin Aldoğan in their opinion that the unit only reaching the Baka Babu fothills and indeed said this in my latest book Gallipoli which was a lot less trusting of hitherto revered British accounts than my innocent 'Defeat' days!

Pete

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hello....

There should be very little confusion from the British sources as this event is well recorded. The War diaries (see below) show very clearly that patrols sent by the 6th (Pioneer) Bn East Yorks Regt on the 8th August (the day before) met with little opposition, but a later advance on the 9th Aug to exploit this opportunity by the 6th (Pioneer) Bn East Yorks supported by the 8th Bn Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding) and 67 Coy RE was too late. It was repulsed by Turkish reinforcements with heavy loss to D Coy 6th (pioneer) Bn East Yorks who advanced without waiting for the remainder of the Bn. It is a micro version of everything that went wrong for the British at Suvla.

It is vividly recorded in the 6th (Pioneer) Bn East Yorks War Diary which is with the 11th Div Diaries at TNA. This diary is easy to miss as it is not part of the line Battalion War Diary bundles, but is included in the Div papers as the Pioneers were technically Div troops, although it seems they were attached to the 32nd Bde for this operation. Capt V Kidd, Adjutant of the 8th Bn Duke of Wellington's Regt (West Ridings) also recorded the event in his personal account which is an appendix to the 8th Bn War Diary notes. Also the 6th Bn York & Lancs War Diary records the Turks' attack over Tekke Tepe.

I have transcribed every surviving War Diary of every Div, Bde and Bn involved in the Aug offensive, their regimental histories and dozens of personal diaries. I have found no evidence, other than the earlier patrols that the British reached Tekke Tepe in force. I have attached the transcriptions of the relevant diaries. Small parts of the diaries are illegible, but do not detract from the integrity of the material. MG

11th Div Operational Report
"....Officer's patrols sent out by the 6th East Yorks reached Tekke Tepe and the Anafarta Range but were unable to return until after dark.[8th Aug].........Lt Col Moore's party reached a point near the high ground [sheet] 119 S [Edit: this is about 1 km from Tekke Tepe] but was here attacked in greatly superior force and practically anihilated. Lt Col Moore, a most efficient Commanding Officer was killed also Maj Brunner Commanding 67th Field Coy RE. The Sergeant Major of D Coy with about a platoon managed to fight his way through the Turks between the leading party and the remainder of the Battalion.....[9th Aug] "

HQ 32nd Inf Bde War Diary 9th Aug 1915.
By 03:45 the whole of the Bde with the exception of the 9th WEST YORKS had collected at SULAJIK (Square 105 B 4).
At 04:00 the 6th EAST YORKS supported by the 67th Fd Coy RE and the 8th WEST RIDINGS marched off on a bearing of 70° (magnetic) for Hill 278 (Square 119 O7). The 67th Fd Coy was included in this force to help put the hill tops in a state of defence.
The 6th YORK & LANCS was kept back to wait for the 9th WEST YORKS, the 2 Bns to be moved off as a Reserve & the troops who had already moved off to HILL 278. A further message was sent to the 9th WEST YORKS telling them to withdraw but this did not reach them until 05:00. At 04:30 as the 9th WEST YORKS started advancing towards the ANAFARTA SAGIR ridge the OC Bn was not satisfied with his position and he intended advancing a few hundred yards in order to secure a better position. As he advanced he met a Turkish attack coming down the hill. The Turks had evidently been reinforced during the night and were attacking our line with a view to pushing us back. The WEST YORKS found themselves outnumbered and their flanks being turned; they asked for assistanceand 2 Coys of the 6th YORKS & LANCS were sent up on their right; and assisted them in their retirement. This force finally took up position which had been prepared the previous day, running Southwards from the two Huts in 105 B 3 connecting up on the right with the 33rd Inf Bde who had come up to attack the ANAFARTA SAGIR ridge. From the 2 huts mentioned above the line ran westwards along the road. 06:00 It was intended to withdraw the remains of two Bns of the Bde to join the rest of the Bde North? of ANAFARTA SAGIR but the Bns were too heavily engaged; ??? ??? ???? (illegible) replace them. 08:00 The Turks began to work round our left flank down the KANLI KEUPRU DERU Squares 118 W & X and had almost cut off the MGs of the 2 Bns which were situated in the Hut 105 B 3 when Maj WOOD comd 9th WEST YORKS collected a party of 30 rifles belonging to the 86th Fd Coy RE (These men were working at a defensive point 100 yards South of the Bde HQ) and with these made a counter attack driving back the Turks in the immediate vicinity of the MG post. 09:00 The 34th Bde had ?? up & taken up a position echeloned to our left near 105 V 6 to 105 Q 6.. 10:00 The Turks were still attacking us in force and were still trying to turn our left flank. Reinforcements wer asked for and units of the 53rd (Territorial) Div were sent up but instead of reinforcing the left they moved over to the Right to support the 33rd Inf Bde on YILGHIN BURNU (CHOCOLATE HILL) 11:00 The 6th YORKS who had been ordered by Div Op Orders to proceed to HILL 10, Square 117 R S to improve the defences of the Hill were now called up to reinforce our line; they came up on our right about Square 105 H 3 as a connecting link between the 32nd and 33rd Bdes 19:00 At dusk 2 Bns of the 159th Inf Bde came up to reinforce, one was sent up near the Hut 105 H 3 and the other acted as a connecting link between the left of the 32nd Bde and the right of the 34th Bde. During the night, beyond hearing sniping, there was no movement on the part of the enemy.
To go back to the force sent off to the hills North of ANAFARTA SAGIR: 04:00 the 6th YORKS followed by the 67th Fd Coy RE and the
8th WEST RIDINGS moved off on the given bearing, all went well until they got into the broken ground NE of BAKA BABA about CHAKAL CHAIR 119 V when they encountered a superior force of the enemy well posted -
on the previous afternoon offensive patrols of the 6th EAST YORKS had been up on the hills for which the former were now making
and they and a few snipers had seen no sign of the enemy in strength; it was therefore thought that this force would be able to reach and secure its objective without much opposition. 07:00 The force was obliged to retire and withdrew slowly; fighting a rear guard action and retiring Westwards
.
The 6th EAST YORKS and the 67th Fd Coy RE retired behind the line whilst the 8th WEST RIDING took up a position about 118 S and finally at 15:30 Capt KIDD who was in command of the Bn withdrew and placed himself on the left of the 34th Bde when he came under Gen SITWELL'S order. The casualties during the day in both officers and men had been very heavy.

6th (Pioneer) Bn EastYorks Regt. War Diay 9th Aug 1915.
We found the West Riding Regt in a vacantTurkish Trench at about 1:30 am.
After some confusion getting the men into the trench in the dark, orders (lost) were received at 3:30 a.m. (late inreaching us) to deliver an attack (orders lost) on TEKKE TEPE (Sheet 119 O2) the West Riding Regt was to attack KAVALA TEPE (Sheet 119 C7) on ourleft. The men were at this stage in a state of extreme exhaustion and hunger.The Battn moved northwards out of the trench in the following order D,C ,B,A after passing SULAJIK we took a NE route crossing the dry beds of the streams.Verbal orders had been given by Lt Col Moore that in the attack D and B Coys should form the first line (D on the left, B on the right) A Coy (Capt Willats ) the second line and C Coy (now under Capt Pringle) the reserve. Lt Col Moore was with D Coy. The other three companies due to the extreme exhaustion of the men and absence of explicit orders failed to keep in touch with D Coy who proceed to advance up the lower slopes of the hill without waiting for B Coy to come into position on their right or for the other two companies to get into place. D Coy with Lt Col Moore and 2 Lt Still (Acting Adjt) and HQ party seemed to have encountered no opposition at first. It was only when they were up the first shoulder (Sheet 119 L4) that the strength of the enemy was disclosed. Fire was poured in from concealed Turkish trenches and our men were unable to hold their ground. There was considerable confusion due to the rapid advance of D Coy and the fact that the other Coys had lost touch. D Coy suffered heavily. Capt Grant had been wounded in the hand early in the engagement – Lt Col Moore, 2 Lt Still, Capt Elliott, Lt Rawstorne, 2Lt Wilson were all missing when what remained of the Coy fell back. A general retirement took place during which there was much mixing of units due to the Battn failing to keep its formation. After two other stands had been made in conjunction with the West Riding Regt a line was eventually taken up along a line running N from (Sheet 118 V6).
Reinforcements came up here and about 13:00the Battn was relieved and ordered to concentrate at the cut on A Beach (Sheet104 B1). All orders and despatches relating to these are lost as the orderlywho carried them is missing……[A long list of casualties follows]

8th Bn Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding) War Diary 9th Aug 1915.
(Capt Kidd) In action, heavy losses. Lt Col H J JOHNSTON wounded , missing {Capt V R Kidd: "
At about 04:00 the Regt and the 67th Field Company RE was ordered to advance on a bearing of 70⁰ and attack TEKKE TEPE, the EAST YORKSHIRE Regt advancing [?] in front. At about 06:00 when the Regt was about 800 yards from the objective the front of the leading Regt appeared to be retiring so the order was at once given to advance to a small donga and hold on there. By this time a lot of men from the leading Regt had rushed past saying that the Turks were advancing in force. The fire now became very hot and heavy casualties were rapidly being sustained. Lt Col Johnston [?] had .....[illegible]....wounded before we advanced and at this moment Major TRAVERS was seen to take? the command, then ??? when ??rne [illegible]. The Turks were now beginning to turn our flanks and as I had only about 350 men left and practically no officers and ammunition was running out I decided to withdraw to a more suitable position. At about 11:30 we took up a position near a farm house about 600 yards due West of the donga and took steps to hold on until reinforcements arrived and more ammunition. The enemy (almost 300 strong) came on but were held for about an hour until it was again reported to me that we were being turned on our left flank. At that moment a runner came up from HQ 34th Bde with an order saying that if compelled to withdraw I was to fall back on the left of the MANCHESTER REGT. This movement was completed by about 15:30 and we at once dug ourselves in on the left of the 34th Bde"
}

6th BN Yok & Lancaster Regt War Diary 9th Aug 1915
. 00:35 SULAJIK. C & D Coys were sent to support 9th W YORKS on L. A & B Coys to support 6th YORKS on R 05:00 POSITION: L 9th W YORKS…. 6th Y&L (D Coy)….6th Y&L (B Coy)… 6th Y&L (A Coy)… 6th YORKS ↑ R. 05:00 SULAJIK. This was maintained against repeated counter-attacks from enemy on L, mainly due to the strong positions held by the Bde MGs which effected great losses.
Enemy's reinforcements were observed coming over the TEKKE TEPE RIDGE
10:00 159th Bde (53rd Div) reinforce on our L 11:00 Enemy reinforced very strongly attacked our L and Centre from direction of BURNT HILL but were repulsed 14:00 158th Bde reinforced R This position was maintained till dark, severe fighting taking place throughout the day, ground being alternately lost and gained. 20:40 Orders receieved for troops to entrench positions held.

These were transcibed from the original diaries held at TNA. Any mistakes are mine. Regards MG

The red asterisk denotes the position Sheet 119 L4 mentioned in the 6th (Pioneer) Bn East Yorks War Diary. TT denotes the top of Tekke Tepe - some 1.5 kilometres from the peak. It is difficult to imagine 100 isolated men fighting their way to the top, given what we know know about the Turkish reinforcements. Having read Still's account on the linked thread and Elliott's accounts (see following post), I don't believe they got to the top. Still gives the impression that they were surrounded and captured near the top whereas Elliott says they were captured on the foothills after retiring from near the top.

The red cross denotes where the 11th Div Operational Report claims Lt Col Moore's party reached - still 1 km short - but this raises more questions. On a bearing of 70 degreesit is impossible to reach this point from the point marked by the red asterisk. If this grid is accurate, then Lt Still and Co confused a shoulder of the range with the actual peak and were still (excuse the pun) a kilometre short.

post-55873-0-72330000-1309276684.jpg

Link to comment
Share on other sites

There is an illuminating account written by a British Officer - Capt R D Elliott 6th Bn East Yorks Regt - engaged in this action who was captured and made a POW. After the War all captured British Officers were required to make a written statement to the War Office of the events surrounding their capture. Please note that this account also includes allegations of atrocities. I am acutely aware of the sensitivities toward this subject. Rather than comment on them here, please kindly note there are other threads on alleged war crimes (by both sides). I think this thread should focus on whether Tekke Tepe was taken on the 9th. This account emphatically records that it was not. although it does suggest they nearly reached the top.

I think it is unlikely they got as far as this officer claims. The terrain along the line of advance is extremely steep and they were advancing with less than 100 men against (we now know) stiff opposition for over 1.5 km from the point they first encountered resistance if we are to believe the varied accounts. Looking at the contemporary contoured 1915 British Trench Maps (Sheets 118 and 119) and the 1916 Sevki Pasha maps, the line of advance (70 degrees) would have been up an extremely steep spur, surrounded by higher ground on three sides. This is consistent with account of fire from left and right.

For complex social and psychological reasons that reflected the Age, the British Officer in question would have been under intense pressure to show himself, his brother Officers and his Regiment in the most positive light and demonstrate to the War Office enquiry that he had achieved something before being captured on the foothills i.e not at the top which would have been a rather more 'heroic' place to be captured. In an age when British Officers were expected to lead from the front (and die there if necessary) the War Office would have been extremely interested in finding out why some Officers (and men) were captured at the bottom of the Hill that was their objective. This is a Bn that landed in the early hours of the 7th Aug with 22 Officers and 750 ORs (3 Officers and 153 ORs left in reserve at Imbros). Within 3 days, Officer casualties were 15 (75% of those who landed on 7th Aug) with 2 KIA, 5 WIA, 6 MIA and 2 'Wounded and Missing'. Most MIAs at Gallipoli were actually KIA, so to survive intact immediately drew intense scrutiny. In the Oglander correspondence with senior surviving officers, there is a brutal allegation of cowardice by a (wounded) officer of the 8th Bn Northumberland Fusiliers against the only 'unwounded' surviving officer of his Battalion ( I think Peter also mentions this in his book). The message was clear - at Suvla in August if you were an Officer and not killed or wounded, you were tacitly suspected to not be doing your duty. The Officer casualty rate among the assault Bns in August was over 85% with some Bns seeing 100% Officer casualties* (KIA, WIA, MIA and WAMIA) - I have researched this in minute detail and posted elsewhere on the forum . The ORs fared little better. Of the 750 ORS in the 6th (Pioneer) Bn East Yorks Regt, by the end of the 9th August the total casualties were 347, or roughly 46% in just 3 days. By Aug 22nd, Officer casualties had reached 20 of the original 25 (80%) and OR casualties had reached 546 of the original 903 (60%). By way of comparison, casualties for the 32nd Bde whose Bns were engaged around the area are interesting. Up to the end of 22nd Aug (when then last main attack failed) they read as follows;

Eff. Str on 5th Aug (Off & ORS).......Eff. Str on 6th Aug (action)........Reserves at Imbros.......Eff Str on 22nd Aug^ .......Total Casualties & % Casualties

9th Bn W Yorks.........28 & 894...................25 & 750..................................3 & 144..........................3 & 194............................25 & 700...........89% & 78%

6th Bn Yorks..............27 & 923..................25 & 750..................................2 & 173..........................1 & 295............................26 & 628...........96% & 68%

8th Bn DOWR............25 & 904...................24 & 725..................................1 & 179..........................3 & 316............................22 & 588..........88% & 65%

6th Bn Y&L.................28 & 908..................25 & 750...................................3 & 158..........................8 & 361............................20 & 547..........71% & 60%

Total for Bns.............108 & 3,629..............99 & 2,980................................9 & 654.......................15 & 1,166........................93 & 2,466........86% & 68%

32nd Bde Bde HQ......5 & 39........................5 & 38....................................0 & 1............................4 & 33...............................1 & 3.................20% & 8%

Total 32nd Bde.......113 & 3,668..............104 & 3,013...............................9 & 655.......................19 & 1,199........................94 & 2,469........83% & 67%..

^Includes reinforcements that had been deployed around 12th Aug

* 9th Bn Sherwood Foresters (33rd Bde) saw 100% casualties among regimental officers in August.

Against these horrendous figures, the pressure on Officers to explain their (unscathed) survival was immense and it is useful to bear this in mind when reading their accounts. I note that Lt Still quoted in the opening post was a POW with Elliott and the 'supporting' views of Underhill only relate to the recce on the 8th and fighting on the 9th (no mention of reaching the peak on 9th). It is worth noting that all 3 accounts were written 3, 8 and 10 years after the events and well before the OH was published. Also when Still was writing in 1924 he thought that there were no other survivors whose accounts might conflict with his.

Regardless of any debate over how far they reached, Elliott does not claim anyone reached the very top. The correspondence papers between the OH author Aspinall-Oglander and the senior surviving officers of Gallipoli are full of conflicting accounts and mistaken memories of old officers subordinating accuracy to regimental and personal reputation.......**

Any mistakes are mine.

Regards MG

** The National Archives ref CAB 45

Statement made to WO (War Office) by Capt R D Elliott 6
th
East Yorkshire Regiment, 32
nd
Bde, 11
th
Div; Taken atTEKKE TEPE near SUVLA BAY – 9
th
Aug 1915.

At midnight on the 8
th
/9
th
August we were withdrawn from a position to the E of the SALT LAKE, which we had occupied with slight opposition, to an old Turkish trench about ¾ mile nearer to the sea. At about 4 a.m. on the 9
th
orders were received that we were to make a dawn attack on thehill known as TEKKE TEPE. "D" Coy 6
th
East Yorks Regt was on the left nearest opposite hill. Lt Col Moore commanding 6
th
East Yorks Regt ordered as many of us as possible to advance immediately for dawn was now nearly up. We started about 100 strong & came under heavy rifle fire from both flanks as we approached the foothills & particularly from the position from which we had been withdrawn on the previous night. Capt Grant Comd "D" Coy was hit and I took charge. At the foothills Lt Col Moore gave me the necessary orders and the position I was to make for. We started up TEKE TEPE about 60 strong. Lt Wilson who was killed, leading the party on my left & I was leading the other party. Lt Rawstorne was to collect men who came later and to join up on my right. When about half way up the hill we extended having come under rifle fire from higher ground above. Nearly at the top we found that a deep fold separated us from thetop of the hill.
[EDIT: I think this is the plateau between the false peak at 119 S and the real peak of Tekke Tepe 119 O - the red cross and the TT on the map above. MG]

It was impossible to advance further, the enemy were in large numbers round us on the crest of the hill. I waited for reinforcements. We were now about 30 strong & under heavy rifle fire.

Lt Col Moore, Lt Still and Maj Brunner RE came up about 15minutes later with some more men & I reported to Col Moore that the enemy were above us in very superior numbers & after considering (sic) he ordered us to retire with the remnants. I took charge of a small party to cover the retirement where necessary. When nearly at the bottom of the hill we were surrounded and Col Moore ordered us to surrender. When we had surrendered Col Moore made an attempt to sit on the bank of the ravine and was bayoneted through the back, he died 10 minutes later. Lt Rawstorne who I did not see at all until we were at the HQ of Gen Limon Von Sanders appears to have taken up about 10 men. The men captured consisted of about 6 taken with Lt Rawstorne, a number of men who did not get beyond the foothills, some who did not get the order to retire & 3 or 4 signallers and other men arrived down safely with Col Moore, Lt Still and myself. Whilst up the hill I could see the remainder of the battalion being attacked so we could not expect reinforcements & I was powerless to help them.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

This might help explain the confusion. Anyone who has hill walked will know of the optical illusion a convex hill and distance and perspective will have. From a far distance at ground level, the higher peaks can sometimes appear lower. When viewed from the start position at Sulajik, at ground level the shoulder to Tekke Tepe appears to be much higher (marked with the yellow pin and coincidental with grid 119 S as per 11 Div Operational Report) - and might well have been confused as the peak. The first picture shows the ground from Sulajik with the red line on a 70 degree bearing. The peak on the immediate left appears to be lower and the peak on the bearing appears to be higher and could easily be assumed to be Tekke Tepe..... but as we pull back and get an aerial view, we can see the 'higher' peak on the right is in fact lower than the peak on its immediate left - which is in fact Teke Teppe - and the peak on the bearing is in fact a spur or shoulder to the higher Tekke Tepe which would be initially hidden from troops approaching from Sulajik on that bearing.... a simple explanation as to why some of the British thought that they had reached TT..... Just a thought . It occurred to me as I have just been walking in the Lake district and experienced this demoralising effect many times...."are we there yet?"

post-55873-0-14133600-1309284289.jpg

post-55873-0-80019400-1309284297.jpg

Link to comment
Share on other sites

npm,

As soon as I have a time, I will wrote 16 August 1915 events in Kirecthtepe according to Turkish Offical History. Do you have any spesific question?

That would be really helpful - any information on enagagement with the Royal Irish Regiment is useful to me. I think around or near Jephson's Post*? Although my G-Grandfather may have been a pioneer and might not have been with his battalion on that day. But no hurry - only when you have time :)

(* from memory as I have not reviewed all my research recently)

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • 4 weeks later...

Hello again - I have been trawling the archives for further evidence of British Troops on Tekke Tepe... one interesting account:

Letter from Lt Col E S Weldon DSO CBE (5th Bn Dorset regt) to Lt Gen Aspinall-Oglander dated 30th Jan 1931
"... when we arrived on Ridge 28 [Point 28] I saw to the NE a small field gun barely 400 yards away being manhandled. I ordered Lt Bowler to collect what men he could and try to capture it. He followed that gun over the neck and onto Tekke Tepe where he remained all day [7th Aug] waiting for us.He returned next morning [8th Aug] and reported that there was still no enemy in sight..."

Lt Bowler was in B Coy 5th Bn Dorset Regt, part of 34th Bde. Typical of the events in August, the 5th Dorsets were to lose all but 3 Officers killed, wounded or missing by the 22nd Aug. Lt Col E S Weldon (then a Major and 2IC of the Battalion) was wounded on 9th Aug, and Lt Bowler was wounded on 21st Aug.

Any mistakes are mine. regards MG

Link to comment
Share on other sites

MMMM,

Seems lots of hearsay and not a lot of 'primary source' here, there was no one in the Battalion, Brigade or Division that knew who reached where or when. All the official reports had be compiled after the events by persons who had not been present.

The maps look good today using the map references provided by the official sources, who gave the reference?

Hamilton when writing his diary's in the mid 1920s did not know, who what and when, and was regularly corrected by people that had been there.

I suspect John Stills letters in 1915 and 1916, are reasonable correct as he remembers his actions, he was an archaeologist so would be able to read the ground and a map. Lt Underhill who was in B Company and had been to the summit of Tekke Tepe was a Land Surveyor, his reply to the Hamilton's Diary's was published in the Times Feb 1925.

I do not believe they reached the summit but do believe they reached the top as they knew it.

Regards Charles

Link to comment
Share on other sites

MMMM,

Seems lots of hearsay and not a lot of 'primary source' here,.....

Regards Charles

Charles - I would be really grateful for the source of the typewritten patrol report by Moore on the related thread. I have only seen the handwritten one in the 6th East Yorks War Diary.

From a personal perspective I think War Diaries and personal accounts from three people who claimed to be there (Still, Underwood and Elliott) would generally be considered as primary source material. I don't think anyone would consider War Dairies as 'hearsay'. All three of the personal reports claimed to be on the hillside on the 8th or 9th or both, although they conflict as to the point reached. I think it notable that when Still made his claim, he seemed unaware of Elliott's POW report and strangely draws in Underhill to corroborate his story but Underhill only refers to the patrol on the 8th reaching the top, not the attack on the 9th. Nowhere does Underhill say anyone reached the top on the 9th Aug (the subject of this thread). This seems to be lost on Still.

None of the War Diaries claim Tekke Tepe was taken on the 9th Aug...in fact they all agree that it wasn't.

The only claims that British forces reached the top of Tekke Tepe at any stage come from Still and Underhill and Weldon. Unless I am reading this incorrectly Underhill only refers to the patrol on the 8th reaching the top of Tekke Tepe, not the attack on the 9th. Only Still claims to have reached Tekke Tepe on the 9th, and given the rather egotistical style of his claims in the press and the conflicting account from Elliott who says they didn't reach the top. Elliott also mentions Still, Moore etc catching up with him and them turning back short of the top under Moore's orders. There is considerable doubt that Tekke Tepe was 'taken' on the 9th. Personally I don't believe they got anywhere near on the 9th, which suggest to me that Still was at best mistaken and at worst deluded with his claims to the Times. Reading Still's accounts in "A Prisoner in Turkey" [1920] and his letter to the Times [1923], there seems (to me) to be conflicts in his own versions.

MG

P.S. I hope to be in Gallipoli in 2 weeks and plan to walk the line of advance up Tekke Tepe.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hello again - I have been trawling the archives for further evidence of British Troops on Tekke Tepe... one interesting account:

Letter from Lt Col E S Weldon DSO CBE (5th Bn Dorset regt) to Lt Gen Aspinall-Oglander dated 30th Jan 1931
"... when we arrived on Ridge 28 [Point 28] I saw to the NE a small field gun barely 400 yards away being manhandled. I ordered Lt Bowler to collect what men he could and try to capture it. He followed that gun over the neck and onto Tekke Tepe where he remained all day [7th Aug] waiting for us.He returned next morning [8th Aug] and reported that there was still no enemy in sight..."

Ummm, I have come across Lt Bowler before and used a quote or two in my forthcoming Suvla book for Pen & Sword. I think he may be confusing Tekke Tepe with somewhere else as I doubt Bowler got anywhere near the real TT, more likely Kitetch Tepe or maybe near Chocolate Hill.

"Just before we reached the limit of our advance, there occurred an incident that nearly resulted in the capture of two field guns. These guns were in a ravine in well concealed emplacements and were very much troubling our left and the Manchesters’ right; during our advance the naval guns had tried to ‘get’ these guns but had failed to do so. We were about 300 yards away when a party was sent forward under Lieutenant Bowler to try and reach the guns, at the same time a party was despatched from the extreme right, to cut off the guns on the flank at the opening of the ravine in the valley; the guns now limbered up and made off, the flank party got within 150 yards of them, and opened fire but they got away."

SOURCE: National Army Museum: Sergeant G. Boucher, 5th Dorsets, 34th Brigade Collection, p.3.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

On 27/07/2011 at 07:22, Krithia said:

Ummm, I have come across Lt Bowler before and used a quote or two in my forthcoming Suvla book for Pen & Sword. I think he may be confusing Tekke Tepe with somewhere else as I doubt Bowler got anywhere near the real TT, more likely Kitetch Tepe or maybe near Chocolate Hill.

"Just before we reached the limit of our advance, there occurred an incident that nearly resulted in the capture of two field guns. These guns were in a ravine in well concealed emplacements and were very much troubling our left and the Manchesters' right; during our advance the naval guns had tried to 'get' these guns but had failed to do so. We were about 300 yards away when a party was sent forward under Lieutenant Bowler to try and reach the guns, at the same time a party was despatched from the extreme right, to cut off the guns on the flank at the opening of the ravine in the valley; the guns now limbered up and made off, the flank party got within 150 yards of them, and opened fire but they got away."

SOURCE: National Army Museum: Sergeant G. Boucher, 5th Dorsets, 34th Brigade Collection, p.3.

Hi Krithia... I must confess I was slightly puzzled by the reference to 'over the nek' - as you will know the topography in the area does not really lend itself to that description in any direction - but the orientation of the Bn at the time - facing the Eastern ridge that includes Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe is right. I suspect he meant Point 28 rather than 'nek' but it is worth noting that Weldon constantly refers to Point 28 as 'Ridge' 28. Someone on the OH staff (Aspinall Oglander?)has drawn a huge question mark next to the paragraph and corrected it to Point 28. It is the only logical explanation. Having said that I see that Sgt Boucher records Lt Bowler was on the left which implies that if he did get up on the heights it would have been Kavak Tepe [?] assuming he was facing East, but then it raises questions as to how, as they would have been enfiladed from their left - Kidney Hill etc.

There is some confusion over the disposition of the 5th Dorsets on the 7th. The War diary is scant on this date but records part of the Regiment advancing towards Karakol Dagh and "2 part" advancing towards Hill 50, so it is possible that Bowler was facing the Northern ridge, but I think it highly unlikely he milled around Kiretch Tepe as a raging battle between the 11th Manchesters and the Turks was going along the ridge at the time. IF Bowler got onto any ridgeline on the 7th as claimed by Weldon I think it would have been the Eastern ridge line that includes Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe. If the Weldon account was wrong by a day and it was on the 8th, the Bn had retired from Chocolate Hill and had concentrated on Point 28, which would again help explain the movements.

Bowler was B Coy ( I think) and its probably worth trawling the other B Coy narratives in the NAM collection - from my research records there is a Capt E Sanders B Coy who left an account (now with the NAM), so it might mention this episode. Also MAj Fitz R Day was originally OC B Coy who left some correspondence with Aspinall-Oglander I recall. I might get to the NAM today as I live about 1/2 a mile away and have been wading through the 34th Div accounts only recently. Sadly Lt Col Hannay's long correspondence with Aspinall-Oglander (see his diary extracts as an appendix to 5th Dorsets War Diary) sheds no light on this event. He does not mention it and his account splits his troops between Point 28 and Chocolate Hill with anything between an 1/2 and a 1/4 of his Bn charging off. Confusing.

I put the Weldon quote up to illustrate that other commanders believed British troops had reached Tekke Tepe before the 9th Aug. I have not found enough other material for the 7th/8th to corroborate or challenge whether any British did get up to Tekke Tepe on the 7th or 8th. As mentioned before I don't believe any British troops (Signallers included) got within a kilometre of the top of Tekke Tepe on the 9th (the subject of this thread). The contour map clearly shows a 'double peak' with a long flat plateau between Tekke Tepe and its shoulder well over a km to the SW. This plateau is what I think Elliott describes as the 'fold' between the limit of their advance (the point at which Moore ordered them back down) and the real peak of Tekke Tepe. The false peak is marked + in my post 9 - If the 6th Bn East Yorks (Pioneers) got up to the heights on the 9th (and it is a big IF), at best they would have reached the point marked +. The reason I think this is the case is that this shoulder, when viewed from the plain looks like the highest point (but isn't) and is also on a 70 degree bearing from the start point on the 9th Aug (their line of advance). When on the heights, it is difficult to accurately discern which is the highest - I was up there last July with the Plummed Goose (Eric Goosens) discussing these very actions - he kindly drove us up the forestry tracks in his jeep, so enabling us to get to places that a car couldn't. I hope to be there again on the 8th Aug (coincidentally) for a week to do more research (including getting the Dead Man's Gully/Ditch photos) and plan to walk (stagger?) up the line of advance of the 6th East Yorks up to Tekke Tepe - let me know if you need any photos.

By the way, is your Suvla book about to be released? I recall it was going to be an August landing rather like Suvla itself?......

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Martin,

Have you come across Lt John Stills reports to Military Intelligence in 1915/1916, he does mention going up the hill and the murder of Lt Col Moore.

Did I say that the hill was taken, I do apologize... part of D Coy proceeded up the hill and reached a shoulder which they believed was the top, having been there they could not get any higher with the route the took.

War diaries have now been accepted as primary source material, due to the transit of time maybe. The 6th War Diary at that period was compiled by the Adjutant Lt Halse days after the event and no one that went up with D Coy got back down.

The typed report came from the transcripts of the East Yorkshire Regimental War Diaries done at the end of the war for the war history committee, I have checked most with the original diaries and they are very correct, including the same mistakes and corrections.

POW reports are suspect as the penalties for cowardice or failing to do your duty were severe.

REgards Charles

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Martin,

Have you come across Lt John Stills reports to Military Intelligence in 1915/1916, he does mention going up the hill and the murder of Lt Col Moore.........

War diaries have now been accepted as primary source material, due to the transit of time maybe. The 6th War Diary at that period was compiled by the Adjutant Lt Halse days after the event and no one that went up with D Coy got back down.

The typed report came from the transcripts of the East Yorkshire Regimental War Diaries done at the end of the war for the war history committee, I have checked most with the original diaries and they are very correct, including the same mistakes and corrections.

POW reports are suspect as the penalties for cowardice or failing to do your duty were severe.

REgards Charles

Charles

I would be interested in seeing Lt Stills' report to the Military Intelligence. I have seen his book and the letters to the Times. He writes articulately in his book. He talks about carrying Lt Col Moore on his back before he died. Can you tell me where I can find the report to the Military Intelligence?

I have a copy of the original War Diary and the typed report is exactly as the original handwritten one.

Regards

MG

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hi Krithia... I must confess I was slightly puzzled by the reference to 'over the nek' - as you will know the topography in the area does not really lend itself to that description in any direction - but the orientation of the Bn at the time - facing the Eastern ridge that includes Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe is right. I suspect he meant Point 28 rather than 'nek' but it is worth noting that Weldon constantly refers to Point 28 as 'Ridge' 28.

There is some confusion over the disposition of the 5th Dorsets on the 7th. The War diary is scant on this date but records part of the Regiment advancing towards Karakol Dagh and "2 part" advancing towards Hill 50, so it is possible that Bowler was facing the Northern ridge, but I think it highly unlikely he milled around Kiretch Tepe as a raging battle between the 11th Manchesters and the Turks was going along the ridge at the time. IF Bowler got onto any ridgeline on the 7th as claimed by Weldon I think it would have been the Eastern ridge line that includes Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe. If the Weldon account was wrong by a day and it was on the 8th, the Bn had retired from Chocolate Hill and had concentrated on Point 28, which would again help explain the movements.

By the way, is your Suvla book about to be released? I recall it was going to be an August landing rather like Suvla itself?......

Regards MG

Hi Martin,

Some excellent use of records here which helps us get closer to answering the question. I think most of the evidence points to no units getting to the top of Tekke Tepe, or any other pinnacle on that range, but maybe close to, e.g. in and around Baka Baba appears to be the consensus. Inadvertly those East Yorks made PoW probably got the closest at the end of the day. Your false peak theory is of great interest as all those who have trod this ground have probably fallen into this trap, it’s amazing how the geography and the light plays together in a way that can disorientate a visitor, hence carrying a trusty GPS to keep me on track.

Back to the Dorsets, and I won’t spend too long as it is going off the original question of the post, but it helps to show the confusion and contradictory accounts of those first few days, not helped by post-war editing. Karakol Dagh / Hill 28 was the direction that most of the Dorsets were heading, in support of the Manchester’s. With Weldon's reference to the gun battery, this almost certainly was pulled back in the direction of the Chocolate Hills / Anafarta Spur. Could the statement to following the gun and "the neck" be this actual spur? Bowler most probably followed it across the plain but I doubt he would have got much further noting Chocolate Hill was in Turkish hands at the time and he mentions no sign of life in the area. I did note somewhere about the first troops on Scimitar Hill which mentioned the 6th East Yorks and a small party of men who remained unidentified that wore a yellow castle on their jackets, could this be Bowler and men from the Dorset’s (their cap badge was a castle and early cloth insignia could have used this as a design?).

As to the book, yes, it should be in the shops by the first week in September. It is pre-orderable now from Amazon and Pen & Sword.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Suvla-August-Offensive-Gallipoli-Battleground/dp/184884543X

http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/Suvla-August-Offensive-Gallipoli/p/3200/

Let us know how the Dead Man's Gully recce goes. I am over there early September and planning a similar walk, shame we were not there at the same time.

All the best, Steve

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hi Martin,

I think most of the evidence points to no units getting to the top of Tekke Tepe, or any other pinnacle on that range, but maybe close to, e.g. in and around Baka Baba appears to be the consensus. Inadvertly those East Yorks made PoW probably got the closest at the end of the day.

Back to the Dorsets, and I won't spend too long as it is going off the original question of the post, but it helps to show the confusion and contradictory accounts of those first few days, not helped by post-war editing. Karakol Dagh / Hill 28 was the direction that most of the Dorsets were heading, in support of the Manchester's. With Weldon's reference to the gun battery, this almost certainly was pulled back in the direction of the Chocolate Hills / Anafarta Spur. Could the statement to following the gun and "the neck" be this actual spur? Bowler most probably followed it across the plain but I doubt he would have got much further noting Chocolate Hill was in Turkish hands at the time and he mentions no sign of life in the area. I did note somewhere about the first troops on Scimitar Hill which mentioned the 6th East Yorks and a small party of men who remained unidentified that wore a yellow castle on their jackets, could this be Bowler and men from the Dorset's (their cap badge was a castle and early cloth insignia could have used this as a design?).

Let us know how the Dead Man's Gully recce goes. I am over there early September and planning a similar walk, shame we were not there at the same time.

All the best, Steve

Hi Steve.

Great news about your book. I have pre-ordered and am really looking forward to seeing it.

Back to TT:

1. Tekke Tepe. I agree - there is modern consensus that no British troops got to the top of Tekke Tepe and that the POW group were the ones who got furthest. It is diffucult to build an alternative case on these two points. It is only Still who claims to have reached the top, and in his defence he may well have believed it.... however I would not consider Baka Baba as being 'close' to TT......my gut feeling is that they must have got further than Baka Baba for a few reasons -

a. More people than Still believed they were fairly high up i.e Elliott's 'when we were half way up' implies a position much higher than Baka Baba. Elliott's account is quite detailed and specific. It would be unusual (but not impossible) for 3 eyewitnesses to all be wrong (Still, Elliott and Underhill). It is unlikely that they all colluded in exaggerating the extent of their advance on the 9th.

b. My sense is that they must have been higher than Baka Baba as the timeline suggest that they would have had a few hours to get going before the Turkish attacked in numbers. The accounts are very specific about where they first encountered resistance and it would make sense that there was a significant distance between D Coy and the remainder of the Regiment and the West Yorks etc to create the gap that the Turks swept into. This point is of course impossible to prove but could all three be so wrong about time and space to think they were over a 1km further on than they actually were?

c. Survivors. I understand the CSM of D Coy and a small handful of men managed to fight their way back to the main body. I have not seen any account from this party, but it would seem unlikely that the reports written at the time would not have included information from this individual, given there would have been fairly strenuous efforts made to find out what happened to the CO, Adjt and at least 2 other officers who were MIA. Anyone from that party would have been questioned, particularly the CSM who would likely have given some idea as to the extent that D Coy reached. I may be wrong on this - it is mostly an educated guess - and I am trying to dig deeper.

Arguably this is all just semantics as it seems axiomatic that Tekke Tepe was not reached. However, I think it is worth trying to establish exactly how far D Coy really got, and I would argue that there is some circumstantial evidence that they may have got much further than Baka Baba.

2. Dorsets. This is definitely worth exploring. If it was horse artillery, presumably their options for withdrawal would have been fairly limited to the existing tracks - . I had assumed that they would have withdrawn up the road coming down from the right-angle between the Kavak Tepe ridge (running N-S) and the Kiretch Tepe ridge (running E-W) - the junction of these two ridges had and still has tracks/roads that would get wheeled vehicles up onto the heights. I note that none of the accounts give any indication as to direction, so it is all speculation. The Dorsets' position at this stage was somewhere near Point 28 and anywhere between half to three quarters of the Bn facing Kiretch Tepe (ish) and the remainder facing Chocolate Hill - i.e. facing in the opposite direction....so presumably any direction of advance by Bowler was possible between these 2 extremes. As you imply, this could just be a case of the hill being incorrectly named. ..... separately I am not sure how Bowler could have got across the Anafarta spur (read "neck") and loitered there for a day if Chocolate Hill and much of the Anafarta spur was in the hands of the Turks at the time. Lots of food for thought. I hope when I am there next week walking the ground that things might become clearer ...

Such a pity we are not there at the same time. It would have been good to explore together. I am going to try and film my struggle up the 70 degree bearing from Sulajik to TT. Currently in the Alps, so getting some training in.....

Regards

MG

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Dear friends,

I would like to make a contribution to this matter. Maybe you know, 2 years ago, Turkish Army Staff Military History section published "Prisoners of War at the Çanakkale Battles, Testimonies and Letters".(2 Volume) I present you Cpt. Elliot and Lt. Still's first statements after having been captured by Ottoman soldiers.

As you see, this statements do not contain new information but I think their authenticity is important.

………………………………

R. Derrick Elliot

Rank: Captain

6. Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment

11. Division

Nunsbury Turufad Broxbourne Herts (?) England

I was taken a prisoner in the morning of August 19, 1915. (sic) ( It must be 9 August ! T.Y ) I cannot tell you the composition of the English regiments that were with us. We came to Egypt after leaving the port of Avonmouth ( in the west of England) towards the end of June. We stayed there just for a day and came to Çanakkale. We were on a single ship. I cannot tell you the number of people on board , because I do not know. I am twenty years old. We landed on the Suvla port in the dark. Then we were brought to Teke Tepe and we were taken prisoners after a decisive battle with the Turks. I do not have anything to complain about the Turks. On the contrary, when they had the opportunity of killing me , they saved my live. I would like to present my gratitude to them.

……………………..

John Still

Second Lieutenant

6 th East Yorkshire Regiment ( Pioneers)

Mayfield Cottage, Milford, Godalming, Surrey, England

I was taken prisoner in the morning of August 9, 1915 on Tekke Tepe. The adress above is where my wife lives. I do not know anything about the battalions near us. I am a clerk at the tea factories on Ceylon Island. I enrolled the army willingly in October, last year, in England. This army that is being established gradually is referred to as Kitchener's Army and is established solely for the war purposes. We set out from England towards the end of June. We stayed in Egypt for a day. Staying for 3 weeks on Limnos Island we constructed piers for wounded soldiers. I am 35.5 years old. I am 35.5 years old. I was taken prisoners in a creek on Tekke Tepe. I have nothing to complain about the Turks. They have been treating me gentlemany. I was actually expecting this.

Resource: "Prisoners of War at the Çanakkale Battles Testimonies and Letters "V 1 p: 274 and 281 Ankara, 2009 Turkish Army Staff Military History Section.

.................................................

Best wishes

Tuncay Yılmazer

My web site: www.geliboluyuanlamak.com ( English means: Understanding Gallipoli )

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Tuncay

Thank you for posting these accounts. Quite fascinating and a very rare (for me) insight into the perspective from the Turkish side. The differences between these accounts and the accounts written after the war for the British POW accounts are quite disturbing.

This opens up a whole new chapter for me. Is there an English translation of the whole volume?

MG

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Tuncay

Thank you for posting these accounts. Quite fascinating and a very rare (for me) insight into the perspective from the Turkish side. The differences between these accounts and the accounts written after the war for the British POW accounts are quite disturbing.

This opens up a whole new chapter for me. Is there an English translation of the whole volume?

MG

Martin,

This book contains two volume in which there are pow's( Anzacs, British, French, Senegalese etc. ) ( who were taken prisoner by Ottoman force during Gallipoli Campaign ) testimonies and letters with Turkish and English translation. Moreover, it can be seen original interrogate paper's picture. ( Some of them were written by pow's handwritten) I think, it is very helpful book for researchers. Unfortunately, to find it is quite difficult.

I bought it from Harbiye Military Museum in İstanbul two years ago. I remember, You wrote that you would come to Turkey. You can buy it from this museum .

Adress: Askerî Müze ve Kültür Sitesi Komutanlığı Harbiye- Şişli / İSTANBUL/Turkey Tel : 00 90 212 2332720 Fax: 00 90 212 2968618 (Unfortunately, I cannot find email adres)

If you interest a spesific person's testimonies or letters , I can write to you. (But It might takes time)

My mail: dryilmazer2003@yahoo.com

Best wishes,

Tuncay

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Martin,

This book contains two volume in which there are pow's( Anzacs, British, French, Senegalese etc. ) ( who were taken prisoner by Ottoman force during Gallipoli Campaign ) testimonies and letters with Turkish and English translation. Moreover, it can be seen original interrogate paper's picture. ( Some of them were written by pow's handwritten) I think, it is very helpful book for researchers. Unfortunately, to find it is quite difficult.

I bought it from Harbiye Military Museum in İstanbul two years ago. I remember, You wrote that you would come to Turkey. You can buy it from this museum .

Adress: Askerî Müze ve Kültür Sitesi Komutanlığı Harbiye- Şişli / İSTANBUL/Turkey Tel : 00 90 212 2332720 Fax: 00 90 212 2968618 (Unfortunately, I cannot find email adres)

If you interest a spesific person's testimonies or letters , I can write to you. (But It might takes time)

Best wishes,

Tuncay

Dr Tuncay - that is a very kind offer. Thank you. I will see if I can obtain a copy next week. Failing that I think I can get one through abebooks at a reasonable price. Regards MG

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
×
×
  • Create New...