Schlieffen Plan

[stuartd]

Admitedly I might be missing something glaringly obvious here, but it is well known that the Schlieffen Plan depended on the Russians mobilising much slower than the French. It is also well known that in fact the Russians ended up mobilising much quicker than expected. But does anyone know why and how they mobilised qiucker? It just seems that every time I read about it the statement is made that they mobilised quicker than expected, but with no explanation.

[tn.drummond]

Is it that they mobilised 'earlier than expected' rather than 'quicker'. I think this may be suggested by the following paragraph from 'The Old Contemptibles' by Robin Neillands (pub John Murray pp19)

'On 28 July Russia mobilized her own forces on the Austrian frontier, at that time her southern border. This order alarmed the German general staff; their entire strategy was posited on the requirement that Russia would still be mobilizing her forces while France was crushed'.

I read this as being that it was the speed with which the order to mobilize was issued that effected quicker than anticipated mobilization.

Tim

[Guest Peedeel]

The German general staff evolved a couple of alternative plans for defeating Russia. Firstly an attack into Russia using most of the German front line strength to crush their standing army; this would have totally disrupted Russian mobilisation. The second was to use their full strength in the west, relying on a three-to four –week respite while Russia mobilized. This plan came to be the one finally adopted.

The Russian plan for mobilisation involved drawing three million men to the colours in the first stage, followed by three million five hundred thousand in the second stage which would be completed within three months of war's outbreak.

The Tsar had already agreed (with the French) that Russia would launch an offensive to coincide with the French plan XVII, or at any rate not later than the sixteenth day following the order for mobilisation. In other words Russia would use elements of its standing army (1,423,000 strong) to attack Germany prior to complete mobilisation. This was formalized in article III of the Russo-French Military Convention of September 1913.

It was Austria's belligerent stance regarding Serbia that caused Russia to commence their own "partial" mobilisation. By 27^th July (Austria declared war on Serbia on the 28^th) Russia had already commenced mobilization of half of European Russia and the military districts comprising the Caucasus, Turkestan, Omsk, Ipkutsk, etc.

So by the last week of peace half the Russian army had attained war footing. This 'partial' mobilisation by Russia gave them a head start, Germany had mobilized no troops at all, the delicate timing of the Schlieffen Plan was accordingly endangered…the view that forty days would elapse before Russian armies in any strength could attack German territory was proving illusory.

[RAF_Louvert]

.

Stuart, I would agree with Tim and Pleb on it being earlier than expected rather than quicker. G.J. Meyer notes the following in A World Undone:

(Thursday, July 30, 1914)

Even the Nicky-Willy telegrams were beginning to go wrong. In one of his middle-of-the-night messages, in a maladroit attempt to assure the Kaiser that Russia had no hostile intentions where Germany was concerned, Tsar Nicholas told him that "the military measures which have now come into force were decided on five days ago for reasons of defense on account of Austria's preparations." Wilhelm concluded from this that Russia "is almost a week ahead of us," and that "that means I have got to mobilize as well."

It should be remembered too that for every country except Germany 'mobilization' was a preparatory measure, and did not mean war was necessarily inevitable. But due to the Schlieffen Plan, for Germany 'mobilization' meant going to war. This was one of the myriad critical "little" factors that led to the seemingly unstoppable outcome.

Lou

.

[truthergw]

I agree with the earlier posts. The Russian mobilisation proceeded to plan but the attack on East Prussia did not wait for full mobilisation. The Russian railways had received massive investment, partly French, in the years between 1905 when Schlieffen presented his memorandum and 1914. I suspect that the aid this gave to concentration of the Russian forces on their border with Prussia had not been taken fully into account by the Prussian staff.

[stuartd]

Those are very interesting and useful answers. It seems then that they didn't mobilise quicker, just with a slight head start and helped by French investment in their railways when the Germans had previously under the Schlieffen Plan banked on slow(er) mobilisation due to poor railways.

Do we know what the Schlieffen Plan intended to do in Russia after defeating France? Conquer mineral / resource rich eastern areas like Hitler attempted from 1941?

[truthergw]

I have not pursued the subject but I am not aware of any development of the 'plan' beyond effecting a Cannae in France. The reason I write 'plan' is because much of Schlieffen's memorandum was hypothetical. He assumed a far larger army than existed and even after expansion, the German forces did not reach his ideal. He continued to work on the idea after retirement and presented updated versions and amendments until his death but these were aspirations rather than actual plans. Schlieffen's main impact was not in presenting anything like a detailed plan but in overturning his predecessor's strategy which was one of defence. Schlieffen presented and pursued the idea that Germany should not wait but attack and the best way to do that was to smash the French then hold the Russians. He did not believe the Tsar could be beaten but that with the French army destroyed, a la 1870, Russia could be brought to the treaty table after being checked at the Eastern frontier. The Schlieffen plan has been discussed at length here on the forum and a search ought to turn up the thread. I think you might find some of that debate of interest.

[SMSKaiser]

Those are very interesting and useful answers. It seems then that they didn't mobilise quicker, just with a slight head start and helped by French investment in their railways when the Germans had previously under the Schlieffen Plan banked on slow(er) mobilisation due to poor railways.

Do we know what the Schlieffen Plan intended to do in Russia after defeating France? Conquer mineral / resource rich eastern areas like Hitler attempted from 1941?

I think the matter is not so easy to be explained.

First of all, Russia ordered partial mobilisation on July 27, but full mobilisation just on July 30. The Army Corps directed against Germany ad thus only an advantage of 3 days against France (which mobilised on August 2).

And the first serious engagement took place on the 17th of August and 20th of August on the East Prussian border.

While in France those came at around the same date (early engagements in Alsace and Lorraine were fought by the border Corps, which were ready quite early, of course).

The timespan for Russian and French mobilisation is almost the same.

In my opinion the argumen of earlier mobilisation does not count.

Another explanation might be (although I have no other source to confirm it) found in Karl Bleibtreu's (Bismarck, part 3) account of the War in the East:

"11K., 6 Res., 9 K.D., 2 SchBg. warf der Zar auf Ostpreussen, die besten Truppen des Reiches, schon im Frieden auf Kriegsfuß."

(11 Army Corps, 6 Reserve Divisions, 9 Cavalry Division and 2 Rifle Brigades were thrown upon East Prussia, the best of all Russian troops, at war strength already in peace time.)

As the Advance of the Russian 1st Army began already at around August 14, after only 2 weeks, this might be the missing peace of information.

As far as the railways are concerned, it should not have been possible for the Russian Army to mobilise faster than Germany for the following reasons:

1. The 8th Army in East Prussia comprised the 1st, 17th and 20th Army Corps, which were border Corps which had no "long way" to reach the border. Their mobilisation did not take a too long time.

2. The Russian Army Corps had not as much railways avaiable as the Germans did, and they natrally had a longer way to reach the border.

You can compare the situation with that in Eastern Galicia.

Russia had an advantag of 260 to 153 trains per day to transport troops to the front, nevertheless Austria enjoined a significant advantage in time for an Army of similar size.

[wiking85]

Admitedly I might be missing something glaringly obvious here, but it is well known that the Schlieffen Plan depended on the Russians mobilising much slower than the French. It is also well known that in fact the Russians ended up mobilising much quicker than expected. But does anyone know why and how they mobilised qiucker? It just seems that every time I read about it the statement is made that they mobilised quicker than expected, but with no explanation.

Just like the French, the Russians kept a number of units at the border at permanent readiness, meaning that 3/4's of the army had to be at stations at all times. The French had 5 corps on the Franco-German border at 90% strength all times and ordered the rest back in July, before the crisis even started. They were prepared for violence. Russia understood that in the event of war she would take too long to mobilize and to prevent the French from being overrun the 1st and 2nd armies were kept at an unusually high state of readiness (i.e. most of the force had to be with the army at any time, so that meant less leave and other absences). So when the war started the Russian 1st and 2nd armies were already partially mobilized and on had, especially because the units comprising their forces were stations in the area and always had higher numbers on hand at any one time.

Still, both the 1st and 2nd armies were not yet fully mobilized when they crossed into East Prussia. Much of their supply and support units were not yet at the front and were still mobilizing, especially as these units were largely reservists. So when the Russians went into battle, they had most of their front line soldiers, but little of their logistic tail. This had a massive impact on Russian operations, especially after the initial engagements. Both the Russian 1st and 2nd armies were out of supply and starving when they fought the Germans at Tannenberg and the Masurian lakes, especially as their cavalry was operating away from the main force and were not properly fed. As a result they were not able to properly recon the battle area or screen the Germans. Obviously this led to major problems for them.

So the Russians did not really mobilize much quicker than expected, rather they used 'tricks' to reduce the amounts of mobilization necessary to put their armies into the field. As a result they suffered in effectiveness, which cost them dearly once the battles started.

[SMSKaiser]

Thanks for that explanation, it seems to underline what I just said before.

On the other hand a look on the composition of the 1st and 2nd Armies might be useful.

As a Russian Army Corps was much superior to the German counterpart in numbers (24-26 to 36 Bataillons), the active Corps of the 1st and 2nd Army were already superior to the German 8th Army.

The reserve troops naturally needed more time to mobilise than the active army did.

Samsonov and Rennenkampf had no need to wait for their 6 reserve divisions for the advance, with 11 Russian to 3 German active Corps in East Prussia. In common accounts of the battle they are not even mentioned, i think they did not fight at all in the first engagements.

General von Prittwitz on the other hand needed his 3 reserve divisions badly.

Not waiting for the reserves to be mobilised and attached should have given the Russian some days, too.

[bob lembke]

I will add something that might be useful, with the discussion of the mobilization of the Russian and German reserve formations. My grand-father was, upon mobilization, the "Id" in the Generalkommando of III. Reservekorps, based in Brandenburg, and as I have been writing a book about the wartime experiences of him and his son I have studied the mobilization of the III. Armeekorps and III. Reservekorps in detail, aided by my purchase of a detailed manuscript diary of a sergeant of the Reserve=Infanterie=Regiment Nr. 20 of the reserve army corps, and my grand-father's letters of the period, family oral history, etc.

Most German line or active infantry regiments, divisions and corps had what I call a "shadow" reserve unit, with the same regimental numbers. The reserve units had to call up the men, issue all sorts of gear and arms, do lots of paperwork, obtain active and reserve officers to fill out the unit, etc. Also, it was necessary to get the line unit out of the door first, and meet its needs. However, basically, the reserve corps followed the active corps "out the door" about three days later, after being basically created in that period. To me that was an astonishing performance, and was based on every matter being planned down to the last detail, I am sure.

Secondly, I understand that the Allies badly underestimated the quality of the German reserve units. They seemed to have turned out to be much the same quality as the line units, although they were not quite as well equipped; for example, the reserve divisions had, I believe, half of the divisional artillery as the line unit, some units might have less machine guns, and often certain weapons might be an older model of the same basic weapon. In the case of the III. RK at Antwerp the basic two division corps, which might be considered "second line" troops, was fleshed out by the equivilant of an additional four divisions, which were various flavors of "third line" troops, Landwehr, an Ersatz Division, and the Naval Division, which had been formed literally about a week before from some Marine units, but mostly from sailors found in various replacement depots and the like, led by an admiral.

At Antwerp, where many sources speak of "overwhelming" German forces, the III. RK, even expanded to three its original size, was outnumbered two and a half to one by the troops it faced, virtually the entire Belgian Army (a Belgian division was enormous), the UK Naval Division, and tens of thousands of Belgian fortress troops, aside from whatever advantage the Allies derived from the world's third largest fortess complex. The bulk of the Allied forces (the Belgian Field Army) should be considered first line troops. Yet they were routed quickly. (That analysis is a bit simplistic, I admit.) But that is a demonstation that the German reserve formations were really quite good quality. Again, it is my understanding that western Allied staff had badly underestimated the quality of these reserve units.

Bob Lembke

[SMSKaiser]

An impressive example of the mobility of the German reserves might also be the 1st reserve corps which was already fully assembled at the battle of Gumbinnen on the 20th of August.

But i personally doubt that this applies for the Russian reserves, too.

First of all they were not used as independent forces, but rather each Corps had one Reserve Division assigned to it.

And second, as wiking wrote earlier the Russian advance was "overhasted" in East Prussia, just to fulfill the promise to the French, and as those Reserves are not mentioned to have fought at Tannenberg, they might have still taken some time to get operational.

For the performance of German reserves in the siege of Antwerpen i might also give the actual casualty figures, which are astonishingly low despite the quality and size of the fortress and its garrison:

In the storming of the fortress itself, the attacker lost only 1700 (!) men, but was able to push 30,000 enemies over the border into the Netherlands, and inflicting some casualties on the Anglo-Belgian forces too, of course.

[wiking85]

An impressive example of the mobility of the German reserves might also be the 1st reserve corps which was already fully assembled at the battle of Gumbinnen on the 20th of August.

But i personally doubt that this applies for the Russian reserves, too.

First of all they were not used as independent forces, but rather each Corps had one Reserve Division assigned to it.

And second, as wiking wrote earlier the Russian advance was "overhasted" in East Prussia, just to fulfill the promise to the French, and as those Reserves are not mentioned to have fought at Tannenberg, they might have still taken some time to get operational.

For the performance of German reserves in the siege of Antwerpen i might also give the actual casualty figures, which are astonishingly low despite the quality and size of the fortress and its garrison:

In the storming of the fortress itself, the attacker lost only 1700 (!) men, but was able to push 30,000 enemies over the border into the Netherlands, and inflicting some casualties on the Anglo-Belgian forces too, of course.

As Bob has mentioned elsewhere, the Belgians fled once the Germans managed to organize their siege train to tackle Antwerp, rather than wait and be slaughtered. There wasn't much of a fight beyond the first day or so, as the Belgians and British fled in several directions instead of being ground underneath the weight of the siege train. So I'm not entirely convinced that this had much to do with the quality of the reserve units, as much as the quality of the bombardment plan of von Beseler, the engineer-commander of the IIIR Corps.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Antwerp

It seems there was more fear of being trapped and unable to resist the artillery that drove out the Belgians and Brits despite their numbers and quality.

As to the quality of the Russian reserves...yes they were universally poor. Underequipped and barely trained, they were basically replacements for the active units once they suffered losses IMHO. They held lines and acted as 'filler' units, probably like the Ersatz.

[truthergw]

Experience at Liege, Namur and other fortified places had shown that they were no match for the German heavies. Withdrawal was the only sane option. German reserves were very roughly handled a short time later at Ypres.

[stuartd]

I appreciate the time that you have taken to answer my posting and I think that I am little closer to understanding Russia's situation. However, I'm not sure I understand quite what the Germans hoped to do when they had defeated the Russians on the eastern front. Merely hold the line? What line? Where? To what effect and with what end result? Maybe I need to bush up on my reading of the eastern front!

[truthergw]

I appreciate the time that you have taken to answer my posting and I think that I am little closer to understanding Russia's situation. However, I'm not sure I understand quite what the Germans hoped to do when they had defeated the Russians on the eastern front. Merely hold the line? What line? Where? To what effect and with what end result? Maybe I need to bush up on my reading of the eastern front!

As far as I have been able to find out, there was no grand strategy for defeating Russia and in fact, it does not appear that the OHL expected to do so. Historically, Russia had always simply retreated, trading space for time. Napoleon being the prime example of what lay in store for an invader. Hitler the next to demonstrate the dangers. Schlieffen did not detail plans for the Eastern front and I believe that it was simply assumed that with the Russian armies held at or near the border and the French army destroyed, the Tsar would be amenable to a treaty. The actual progress of the war in the East seems to have developed in a fairly ad hoc manner. The introduction of Lenin to Russia implies that the Germans did not envisage actually conquering Russia at that stage, long after the Schlieffen Plan had been superseded.

[wiking85]

I appreciate the time that you have taken to answer my posting and I think that I am little closer to understanding Russia's situation. However, I'm not sure I understand quite what the Germans hoped to do when they had defeated the Russians on the eastern front. Merely hold the line? What line? Where? To what effect and with what end result? Maybe I need to bush up on my reading of the eastern front!

Do you mean in 1914? If so then the Germans did not intend to beat the Russians, just hold the line until the French were beaten. But understand that I mean beaten, not totally defeated. Even the Schlieffen/Moltke plan did not intend to defeat France outright, as the experience of the Franco-German war taught them the French wouldn't give up. Instead the Germans intended to beat the French armies to then fall on the Russians. The enemy would have their professional armies crushed and peace would be sought. Still the Germans anticipated a 2 year campaign minimum. Even with the French defeated in the first round, they were expected to return later on, but by then more Germans would be mobilized to tackle them. The Russians would become the main focus. Still peace was supposed to be sought after the initial campaigns and France's armies crushed (hopefully withe the Belgians and Brits thrown in for good measure). It may be worthwhile to check out Hew Strachan's "To Arms" for more information about pre-war planning.

Interestingly enough, there was never a unified German plan for war goals. Several were floated and one even offered in late 1916, but even that was a political ploy rather than a real offer. Every year, and sometimes every several months, new plans were offered in the Reichstag and in general public discourse.

[stuartd]

Is this therefore to suggest that the plan was to invade France first and beat - but not totally defeat - the French army. With them beaten the Germans would then hold some sort of line in France including Paris? Whilst holding that line they would then turn to the east and halt the Russians until the Russians sued for peace before turning back to re-fight a rejuvenated French army which would have called up more reserves. Have I got that right? This is certainly very interesting but quite had to follow excactly what the Germans planned to do. Even they seemed to be planning this as they went and responding to events!

[RAF_Louvert]

.

From what I have read over the years, and has already been mentioned here, the plan was not total defeat on either front but only to get the enemies of Germany to sit down for peace negotiations. At the start of it all it was believed the fighting would be over by Christmas of 1914. That thought of course quickly dissolved away, as did all the pre-planning.

.

[truthergw]

Is this therefore to suggest that the plan was to invade France first and beat - but not totally defeat - the French army. With them beaten the Germans would then hold some sort of line in France including Paris? Whilst holding that line they would then turn to the east and halt the Russians until the Russians sued for peace before turning back to re-fight a rejuvenated French army which would have called up more reserves. Have I got that right? This is certainly very interesting but quite had to follow excactly what the Germans planned to do. Even they seemed to be planning this as they went and responding to events!

I'm not sure where the idea of nearly but not quite defeat of the French came from. Army doctrine at the time would have required total defeat in the field leaving the French army completely unable to fight and therefore France totally helpless. A small garrison would then have been sufficient to hold Paris and maintain order while the bulk of the fighting forces went East to push back the Russians. It was originally intended that the small Prussian force on the Eastern frontier would conduct a fighting retreat until joined by the main army from France. It is only when one stops to soberly assess the efforts required of the German soldier in this herculean task that one appreciates that the Schlieffen 'plan' was simply an aspiration. Moltke the elder had intended to stand on the defence in the case of war. Schlieffen thought that offense was the best form of defence. Both of them put forward their solution to the problem of fighting a war on two fronts. For thirty or so years, Bismarck made sure that Moltke's plan never had to be put to the test. A modified version of Schlieffen's failed.

[RAF_Louvert]

.

Tom, perhaps we are having a difference of semantics here. I apologize if it seems I am suggesting that the German Army would not have had to defeat the French before moving the bulk of their forces east, but no matter how bad the rout it would still have been a temporary defeat. While a small garrison of troops could have held Paris and maitained order for a time while Germany focused on Russia, I don't imagine they would have had a lot of time to work with before France regrouped her forces in the northwest and, with the help of England, came back in strength against German troops. This is what I was getting at when I said that the German Army was not necessarily focusing on "total" defeat, but only long enough to force Russia to the table, along with France.

.

[wiking85]

Is this therefore to suggest that the plan was to invade France first and beat - but not totally defeat - the French army. With them beaten the Germans would then hold some sort of line in France including Paris? Whilst holding that line they would then turn to the east and halt the Russians until the Russians sued for peace before turning back to re-fight a rejuvenated French army which would have called up more reserves. Have I got that right? This is certainly very interesting but quite had to follow excactly what the Germans planned to do. Even they seemed to be planning this as they went and responding to events!

Its hard to piece everything together given all of the distortion over the years by the principles involved in planning and execution of the plan. Honestly there was no 'Schlieffen Plan" as such as executed in 1914. There was Moltke's plan, which seemed to be to grab everything in France that could be defended and try and knock out the French army in the process. Moltke's biographer Mombauer suggests this.

http://books.google.com/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&pg=PA72&lpg=PA72&dq=moltke+biographer+mombauer&source=bl&ots=hcBPKOmAc8&sig=IF-F8h--GDBlOdQwRDkfI2Ng6Uk&hl=en&ei=JgCJTbDREe-F0QH_pNXzDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBQQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

The goal wasn't annexations, but victory to set the political tone for the coming decades (i.e. don't mess with Germany). As to the "home by Christmas" no one was actually planning on that, but it WAS propaganda told to the civilians to keep them happy. A fine little myth for historians to seem all superior in hindsight.

[truthergw]

.

Tom, perhaps we are having a difference of semantics here. I apologize if it seems I am suggesting that the German Army would not have had to defeat the French before moving the bulk of their forces east, but no matter how bad the rout it would still have been a temporary defeat. While a small garrison of troops could have held Paris and maitained order for a time while Germany focused on Russia, I don't imagine they would have had a lot of time to work with before France regrouped her forces in the northwest and, with the help of England, came back in strength against German troops. This is what I was getting at when I said that the German Army was not necessarily focusing on "total" defeat, but only long enough to force Russia to the table, along with France.

.

No apology necessary. Quite the reverse. That said, I am reluctant to get too involved in purely hypothetical situations. Since the Germans never did manage to defeat the French, we simply do not know what they would have recognised as defeat. I suspect though that it would have been a case of extremely heavy casualties in the course of a complete rout of the French. Soldiers casting away arms while fleeing the field, complete break up of units and loss of control. A demand for surrender from the government and occupation of Paris. We only need to look at the progress of the Germans in Belgium and the occupied areas of France to see how ruthless they would have been in victory. The BEF of 1914 would have been hard pushed to even do a Dunkirk if the French had ceased to fight, far less regroup and launch an attack. With Paris occupied and the government suing for terms, the French army would have simply had to lay down their arms as they had in the Franco-Prussian war. All of that is the merest surmise of course. We are each fully entitled to paint our own picture of what might have happened.

[stuartd]

These have certainly be interesting observations and thought on the Schlieffen Plan and have given me some food for thought. Thanks Wiking for the Google books link - I will certainly be reading that the moment I find a spare minute or two!

[bob lembke]

These have certainly be interesting observations and thought on the Schlieffen Plan and have given me some food for thought. Thanks Wiking for the Google books link - I will certainly be reading that the moment I find a spare minute or two!

I am reading a work that could cast some light on the question; Terance Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914, Sources and Interpretations, 2004, Boydell Press. People deep in this area are even arguing if there was or was not a Schlieffen Plan, or at least what it actually was. A rather "dense" book, published in the UK but written by an American who served three years in the 12. Panzer Division!

Reading the above, on the topic of planning for war in the East, the Russians took several steps. First of all, knowing the problems of mobilization, which not only included activating reserve units, but also bringing line units from peace-time to war-time strength, quite different in some countires, the Russians started to keep major units near the border at war-time strength in peace-time, to allow quicker deployment at war strength. Secondly, they also worked on their transportation infrastructure, like rail lines.

Interestingly, on the German side, the rail lines and roads in eastern Prussia were actually quite deficient, and also Army attempts to raise the defensive posture on the eastern frontier by bringing the Landsturm to a higher state of readiness was blocked by the Kaiser and Minister of War, who both seemed to not want to alarm or rile the Russians, and also had domestic political concerns. Also, seemingly, German law forbad any more peacetime training for the Landsturm, or even possibly counting them! So, on the other hand, the German posture for quick and effective mobilization of the forces in the East (for defense of the East) was deficient, mobilization for sending active and reserve units to the French Front was in a much better state, but this stripped the East of units to defend the East from Russian invasion.

Bob Lembke